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Due to the party-orientation and professional nature of the
adversary mode of criminal procedure, the principles of a
fair trial are best observed where the accused is
represented by a lawyer. Given the advantages to be gained
from legal representation, the principle of equal justice
requires that all accused should have access to legal
assistance and thus that legal aid should be provided for
indigent accused. The South African legal aid scheme cannot
yet provide assistance to all indigent accused because of
the large number of these accused, the shortage of manpower
and the lack of funds. There are, however, few legislative
provisions to safeguard the rights of the vast majority of
accused, arraigned in the lower courts, who remain
undefended. The Supreme Court, in order to ensure that these
accused are fairly tried, has imposed the following types of
duties on jUdicial officers: (a) a duty to facilitate the
accused's participation in the proceedings by advising him
of his rights and duties and assisting him in their
exercise; (b) a duty to control the prosecutor in the
exercise of his powers; and (c) a duty to conduct an enquiry
before arriving at administrative-type decisions. These
duties are, however, inadequate to achieve the Court's ,
objective because, firstly, not all, rights are made
accessible to the accused, and secondly, the duties are
inadequate to ensure that the accused's guilt is reliably
established. The failure of the legislature and the Supreme
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Court to incorporate .t h e principle of equal justice into the
legal process, has resulted in court proceedings that are
characterized by unjust practices and outcomes. To ensure
the more equitable prosecution of undefended accused it is
suggested that an activist jUdicial officer should be
responsible for the enforcement of all the principles of a
fair trial (which would be concretized in clear legal rules)
in an impartial manner, with his decisionmaking routinely
supervised by the Supreme Court.
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The fundamental aim of the criminal trial can be described
in the broadest terms as the attainment of 'justice',
encompassing the establishment of criminal liability and the
determination, if necessary, of an appropriate penalty, in a
manner which is fair to all parties involved. The values
and principles according to which liability and penalties
are determined are shared by most Western legal systems, and
are called the principles of a fair trial, or in American
jurisprudence, the principles of due process. These
principles are expressed in constitutions, bills of rights,
the common law and in international documents.
The procedures by means of which these common principles may
be pursued, varies according to jurisdiction. In the Anglo-
American common law jurisdictions the mode of procedure is
adversarial, while on the European continent it is
inquisitorial.
South Africa has inherited from England the adversary mode
of procedure. The English legal profession, its rules and
traditions, have also been replicated. Because of the party-
centred nature of the adversary system, lawyers for both the
State and the defence play a prominent, if not dominant role
in the pursuit of procedural justice. Yet legal
representation is available at a price and this has meant
that it has remained the privilege of few due to the
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indigence of most accused. As a result, the majority of
accused in South Africa face a trial within the adversary
system without a defence lawyer.
In a system predicated upon full participation by the
parties in the pursuit of justice, the undefended accused
will be severely handicapped should he lack legal knowledge
and expertise. His difficulties may be exacerbated by
problems such as illiteracy, language difficulties, and
class or cultural differences. The problem to be confronted,
then, is how a fair trial is to be achieved in the South
African criminal justice system for those accused who cannot
afford legal representation.
The accepted solution in Anglo-American jurisdictions has
been the provision of State-funded legal aid. This, when
fully implemented, would ensure equality of the parties,
which is a precondition for the pursuit of a fair trial in
the adversary system. It will be shown, however, that this
option will not meet the needs of the majority of indigent
accused in South Africa in the foreseeable future, due to
the large number of potential candidates for legal aid, the
shortage of lawyers and the lack of State-funding.
This necessitates the investigation of other potential
~ solutions. One possibility is the simplification of
proceedings; this would minimize the accused's need for
legal knowledge and skills. The alternative remedy involves
the development of an activist jUdicial officer. This may
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require either assistance to the accused designed to make him
an effective adversary, or inquisitorial-type intervention
by the court, on behalf of the undefended accused, in order
to ensure that justice is attained. The former would involve
the maintenance of the adversarial party orientation while
the latter would entail introducing a strong inquisitorial
element to a predominantly adversary system.
It is proposed to examine the development of legislative and
jUdicial rules relating to the criminal process in order to
determine:
(a) whether the problems facing the undefended accused in
the adversary system have been recognized; and
(b) whether the abovementioned solutions have been, firstly,
considered and secondly, implemented.
SUbsequently, lower court proceedings will be studied in
order to assess:
f (a) the extent of the difficulties confronting the
undefended accused;
(b) whether and to what extent legislative and jUdicial
provisions are implemented in practice; and
(c) the adequacy of such provisions to address the problem
of the undefended accused.
Before embarking upon these enquiries, it is important to
clarify and elaborate upon some of the concepts mentioned
~ thus far. 'Ch a p t e r One, then, will comprise of a discussion
of the principles of a fair trial, the nature of the
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adversary system and the implementation of the principles in
that system, particularly with reference to the undefended
accused. Chapter Two will consider these aspects in relation




PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE ADVERSARY TRIAL
1. THE PRINCIPLES OF A FAIR TRIAL
A concise definition of procedural justice is difficult, if
not impossible. The broad notion of "fair trial" or "due
process" encompasses, however, certain legal principles
protective of the individual, which are common to the legal
systems of the Western world, irrespective of whether the
mode of procedure is adversary or inquisitorial, as both
modes have been influenced by the same liberal ideology of
the European Enlightenment. 1 The principles have been
incorporated in international documents which are applicable
to adversary and inquisitorial systems alike,2 and in
municipal law are to be found in Bills of Rights,3 or the
common law4 or both. 5
1. See A Esmein ~ History of Continental Criminal Procedure
(1913 reproduced 1968) 428; M Damaska "structures of
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure" (1975) 84
Yale LT 480 532; J Hermann "Various Models of Procedures"
(1978) 2 SACC 3 14.
2. See eg Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN doc A/811
adopted 20 December 1948; Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War signed 12 August 1949;
European Convention on Human Rights signed in Rome 4
November 1950.
3. See eg united States Constitution, and further, Yale
Kamisar, Wayne R LaFave & Jerold H Israel Modern Criminal
Procedure (1980); JG Cook Constitutional Rights of the
Accused: vol I Pretrial Rights, vol 11 Trial Rights,
vol III Post Conviction Rights (1979). Canadian Bill of
Rights, see further, SA Cohen Due Process of Law (1977).
4. For united Kingdom, see Walker & Walker The English Legal
System 5th ed by RJ Walker (1980); C Hampton Criminal
Procedure (1982); S Mitchell (ed) Archbold's Pleadings,
Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases 14th ed (1979).
5. TM Franck Human RIghts in Third World Perspective Vol I,
11, III (1982).
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Broadly, these principles give expression to the liberal
ideology that accords primacy to the individual when in
conflict with the state. This is achieved through the
protection of certain rights regarded as fundamental to the
individual's well-being and thus entail limitations being
1placed on state power. Since the loss of liberty and social
stigma flowing from a conviction and sentence, are among the
gravest inroads on the individual's freedom which can be
perpetrated by the State, the principles of a fair trial
constitute an attempt to protect the individual against
unwarranted infringements of his rights by limiting the use
of the criminal sanction by the state.
In any criminal dispute between the State and an individual,
the protection of the individual is effected firstly through
the presumption of his innocence. 2 The State must show cause
for any interference with an individual's rights. From this
principle flow the rules in respect of bail, a preliminary
hearing before an accused is put on trial, the onus of
proof, the accused's right to remain silent, and a discharge
at ·the end of the State case if insufficient evidence has
been presented against the accused. The dispute between the
State and the individual should be concluded expeditiously in
1. Herbert L Packer The Limits of the Criminal sanction
(1969) 165.
2. In chapters 4 to 10 the basis of these principles will be
set out.
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order not to exhaust and harass the latter unnecessarily.
The forum which is called upon to settle the dispute should
be impartial to give satisfaction to both parties.
Furthermore, it should be competent to hear disputes of
great importance and to impose sentences which severely
affect the individual's rights. Factual disputes should be
settled on the truth and punishment imposed should not be
excessive in relation to the harm done. The individual whose
rights are in jeopardy should have a full opportunity to
participate in the decisions which may affect those rights.
Prerequisites for such participation are the physical and
mental presence of the accused and his ability to understand
the language spoken in court. In order to participate, the
accused also requires notification and specification of
charges and the opportunity to prepare for such
participation. Once the dispute has been concluded by a
jUdicial decision, the state should not persecute an
individual by interfering with his rights in respect of the
same dispute. Finally, any jUdicial decision which affects
an accused's rights should be open to review by a superior
court.
How are these principles to be realized in legal systems
where the mode of procedure is adversary? The examination of
this question will be preceded by an outline of the nature
of the adversary process.
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2 . THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY MODE OF PROCEDURE
r Th e nature of the adversary system is best illustrated by
comparing it with the inquisitorial mode of procedure. The
essential characteristic of the adversary mode is that the
onus is on the litigants to advance their cases for a
decision to be made by a jUdicial officer, who remains
. 1 t t . thpassive throughout the proceed1ngs. In con ras ,1n e
inquisitorial system, the judicial officer plays the most
active role by conducting the proceedings to their
1
. 2cone US10n.
In the adversary system the two parties, the State and the
accused, are responsible for the collection and presentation
of evidence. The evidence gathered by each party is
privileged and the other party has no access to it, either
-b e f o r e or during the trial. The parties may delineate the
area of contest through plea bargaining and admissions. They
determine what evidence should be produced and in what
order. strict rules as to the admissibility of evidence are
1. See W Zeidel "Evaluation of the Adversary System: A
Comparison, Some Remarks on the Investigatory System of
Procedure" (1981) 55 Australian LJ 390 391.
2. For the description of the twO-modes the following sources
were used: J Hermann "Various Models of Criminal
Proceedings" (1978) 2 SACC 3 5; AV Sheenan Criminal
Procedure in Scotland and France (1975); CR Snyman "The
Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Approaches to Criminal
Procedure: Some Points of Comparison between the South
African and Continental System" (1975) 8 CILSA 100 103;
M Damaska "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study" (1972-73) 121
Univ of Pennsylvania LR 506; LH Leigh "Liberty and
Efficiency in the Criminal Process - The Significance of
Models" (1977) 26 Int ~ Comp LQ 516 530; GEP Brouwer
"Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures - A Comparative
Analysis" (1981) 55 Australian LJ 207.
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followed. Questions of admissibility are to be raised by the
parties and decided upon by the judicial officer. The
accused is not a compellable witness, but may choose to
testify. Testing the veracity of the evidence is the
responsibility of the parties.
Although the accused and the prosecution are treated on an
equal footing, the prosecutor is burdened with different and
more onerous duties, as he is required not merely to obtain
a conviction, but to see that justice is done. He must
accordingly place all relevant evidence before the court.
The defence, meanwhile, may act in a partisan manner short
&
~ o f misleading the court. In order to obtain a conviction,
_ the prosecutor must prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while the accused need only raise a
, ~ reasonable doubt to obtain an-acquittal.
The role of the court is on the whole passive: the jUdicial
officer listens to the evidence and arguments presented by
the parties, and makes decisions when called upon to do so.
He does, however, have a subsidiary duty to control the
admission of evidence and the conduct of the parties. He may
put questions to witnesses in order to clarify aspects of
evidence and may even call witnesses mero motu. In the main,
though, the judicial officer bases his decisions on the
evidence produced by the parties. The evidence which he
accepts has been called the 'formal' truth, in the sense
that it is based solely upon the evidence which the parties
Chapter 1 Page 10
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have decided to put before the court.
In an inquisitorial system, the court plays an active role
in the proceedings. The police file is an open document and
lays the foundation for the trial. The court decides which
witnesses to call and conducts their examination personally
in an attempt to establish the truth. To that end the
accused may also be questioned. The prosecutor and defence
may, after the examination of a witness, suggest further
questions and may themselves ask supplementary questions.
They may also suggest the taking of further evidence. There
is essentially a free system of evidence. As there is a duty
on the court to establish the truth, there is no onus on
either party to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused.
since the evidence is not party-orientated, the evidence on
which the court makes its decision has been called the
'material truth,.2 The adversary system is therefore party-
based while the inquisitorial method is centred on the
jUdicial officer. In the inquisitorial mode it is primarily
the jUdicial officer's duty to realize the the principles of
a fair trial while in the adversary mode it is the
responsibility of the litigants.
3. THE PRINCIPLES OF A FAIR TRIAL AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The essence of a "fair trial" lies, as set out by Fuller,3
not in the correctness of the decision made, but in the
1. See Snyman ~ cit 108.
2. Snyman ~ cit 109.
3. Lon L Fuller "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator"
(1963) 3 Wisconsin LR 18.
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procedures by which the correctness of the decision is
guaranteed. The basis of the adversary system, he points
out, "is that each side is accorded a participation in the
decision that is reached, a participation that takes the
1form of presenting proofs and arguments". Due process under
this system thus requires that persons to be affected by a
decision should have some formally guaranteed opportunity to
influence that decision. 2
Although the right to participate in decisionmaking is also
an essential ingredient of inquisitorial systems, the
entral difference in the adversary system is that the court's
decision rests primarily on the evidence and argument
advanced by the participating parties. The court is not
required to participate actively in the process since the
adversary system is predicated on the assumption that each
party to the dispute will protect its own interests. It is
expected that all persons, motivated by enlightened self-
interest, would participate vigorously in the dispute
resolution and that as a result of the accused and
prosecutor strongly promoting and protecting their own
interests, a just decision will eventually emerge. 3
By challenging the state's decision to prosecute him, the
1. Lon L Fuller "The Adversary System" in H Berman (ed) Talks
on American Law (1961) 41.
2. Fuller (1963) 3 Wisconsin LR 19.
3. See MM Feeley The Punishment is the Process (1979) 18;
MM Feeley Court RefOrm on Trial (1983) 10; N Kittrie
"Symbolic Justice: The Trial of Criminal Cases" in C H Foust
& D R Webster (eds) An 'An a t omy of Criminal Justice (1980)
121; H Jacob Urban Justice (1973) 99.
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accused not only protects his own interests, but also serves
a wider function of controlling governmental action in
general. It has been said that
"The adversary system is the institution devised by our
legal order for the proper reconciliation of pUblic and
private interests in the crucial areas of penal
regulation. As such, it makes essential and invaluable
contributions to the maintenance of the free society.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The
survival of our system of criminal justice depends upon
a constant, searching, and creative questioning of
official decisions and assertions of authority at all
stages of the process. The proper performance of the
defence function is thus as vital to the health of the
system as the performancr of the prosecuting andadjudicatory functions".
The adversary process is designed to be self-regulatory as
the responsibility for achieving a fair result is placed
upon the parties. Feeley compares the adversary court to a
market place; it is an open system, reliant upon the
bartering of the contestants to give form and direction to
the proceedings. 2 The role of the jUdge is thus to see that
the adversaries barter "according to the rules of the
game".3 The adversary system, as a result, is characterized
by the absence of rules and structures designed to ensure
that the correct results are achieved, even where the
parties involved fail to protect their own interests. 4
The inquisitorial system is much more bureaucratic. Rules
1. Report of the Attorney-General's Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Criminal Justice under the
chairmanship of Francis-X AlIen (1963) 10-11.
2. The Punishment is the Process 18.
3. Feeley Court RefOrm on Trial 12.
4. Feeley ~ cit 18.
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designed to achieve a just result apply to all cases,
irrespective of the activities of the parties. The court
assumes a more active role in searching for a just result
and is thus less reliant on the activities of the parties.
Damaska1 has taken this analysis further. He identifies as
the basic difference between the adversary and the
inquisitorial systems, the structure and form of jUdicial
decisionmaking. The inquisitorial mode involves a
predominantly hierarchical structure of decisionmaking. Its
central features are the centralization of authority and the
fact that decisions are made in accordance with bureaucratic
principles which give direction and specify rules of
conduct. Rules are precise, prolific and comparatively
inflexible. 2 A court acting in a bureaucratic tradition is
the dominant party in the decisionmaking process and uses a
factual basis established by its own endeavours for its
decisions.
There is no such bureaucratic enforcement of rules in the
Anglo-American adversary system. In the words of Feeley:
"Bureaucracy implies rational organization,
hierarchical control, common purpose and central
administration. None of these accurately characterizes
the courts. Their fragmented organization reinforces
the diversity of values and interests within them. No
single co-ordinator, no single authority exists to
resolve3disagreements or to enforce compliance withgoals".
1. M Damaska "structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure" (1975) 84 Yale LT 480.
2. Damaska ~ cit 505-.--- --
3. Court Reform on Trial 17-18.
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Although the courts are organized in a hierarchical
structure with the appellate court controlling the lower
courts, the process of control is passive and expensive.
Whether the supervisory function of the higher court is to
be invoked depends not on the supervisory court, but on the
accused, whose choice may be determined by his financial
position. 1 with the lack of strict and routine hierarchical
control, the courts are fairly autonomous; they attempt to
reach the decision most appropriate to the circumstances of
each case 2 and display a flexible attitude towards rules. 3
The absence of bureaucratic rules involves a limited role
for the judicial officer, who is consequently reduced to a
passive arbiter. The parties to the dispute are given
supremacy in the conduct of the dispute. Damaska attributes
the basis of this approach to classic English liberalism
which advocated unencumbered individual freedom and a
limitation on governmental powers to encroach on such
freedoms. 4
The principal feature of the adversary model, then, is that
the two litigants, the state and the accused, are
responsible to ensure that justice is done. For the accused
to receive a fair trial is thus largely dependent upon his
desire and ability to protect and promote his own interests.
Consequently there are obvious limitations to the adversary
system.
1. Feeley Court Reform on Trial 14.
2. Damaska ~ cit 509.
3. 2E cit 517.
4. 2E cit 532.
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4. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED
For the adversary system to achieve substantial or
procedural justice, it is essential that the parties should
be highly combative, effective, and evenly matched
adversaries. 1 In the event of inequality between the
parties, the system would fail to achieve the goal of
justice through combat. The court, due to its ascribed
passive role, would not intervene substantially on behalf of
the weaker combatant in pursuit of the principles of a fair
trial. 2
In addition to the obstacles presented by the structure of
decisionmaking under the adversary system, the accused faces
also the criminal justice system's emphasis upon crime-
control. The achievement of this goal requires an efficient
process, based on speed, certainty and finality of
disposition. 3 The occasions for challenges of the decisions
of the administrators of the process, the police and
prosecutors, should be minimized. Reliance is placed on the
accuracy of the fact-finding of the police, and the ability
of the prosecution to screen out innocents. The formal
adversary adjudicative process is de-emphasized and
1. D Danet & B Bogoch "Fixed Fight or Free-for-all? An
Empirical Study of Combativeness in the Adversary System
of Justice~ (1980) 7 British ~ of Law ~ Society 36 58;
AS Goldsteln "The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure" (1959-60) 69 Yale LJ 1149
1192; Justice The Unrepresented Defendent in the MagIstrates'
Court (1972) 4. -- ---
2. Brouwer ~ cit 208.
3. See Packer's descript ion of the crime control model, ~
cit 159.
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cases are best disposed of by a plea of guilty.1 Rights that
would slow down the process, eg bail, legal representation,
and sound proof of guilt in court, are not accorded much
attention.
To counteract the steady march towards conviction, the
accused must positively assert the rights which would
guarantee him a fair trial,2 for the onus rests generally
upon the accused to invoke the protection of his rights.
3
Whether or not the interests of the state prevail, depends
therefore upon the accused's desire, knowledge, ability, and
resources to counteract them.
This reality is well illustrated by the adversarial search
for the truth. The parties are permitted to draw the
parameters of the dispute and the court is called upon for a
decision on the evidence produced by them. 4 The party-
orientation of the evidence may lead to the suppression and
distortion of eVidence,S for the 'truth' that a party may
present is "an account edited with vested interests in
mind".6 In the end the court cannot establish the material
1. Packer ~ cit 161.
2. Brouwer ~ cit 208.
3. Cf Feeley Court Reform on Trial 14.
4. Zeidler ~ cit 395.
5. Brouwer ~ cit 208.
6. McBarnet 17. See also LL Weinreb Denial of Justice (1977)
102; Danet &,Bogoch (1980) Br ~ of Law ~ soCIety 36 40;
B Wootton Crlme and Penal Policy (1978) 19-20. See also
Wootton Crime and the Criminal Law (1963) 33 for her comment
on the unscientific method of extracting the truth from
opp~site distortions. Mc Ba r n e t (1981) 81 calls it "conflicting
carlcatures". Hermann ~ c it 6 describes it as a
stereoscopic view of the offence. (Cont inued on the· next page)
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truth, but merely decides which party has adduced the more
credible evidence. 1
If the truth may be distorted by two equal and combative
parties, it seems highly improbable that the truth will
emerge where one of the parties is undefended, poorly
defended, or does not have the same resources to gather or
present evidence. The parameters of the dispute will in such
a case be drawn by the prosecution; only one comprehensive
and coherent presentation of evidence will be advanced to
the court, and this must inevitably prevail.
A non-bureaucratic system of procedure in which a passive
role is ascribed to the judicial officer, is open to
manipulation by either the accused, asserting his rights to
a fair trial, or the prosecution, pursuing the goal of crime
control. The non-assertion of the accused's rights will
result in the unchallenged pursuit of crime control. 2 The
party-orientation of the proceedings and the passive stance
of the presiding officer means that in the adversary system
there can be little chance of procedural justice without
legal representation for both parties to the dispute.
More favourable is Certoma, who argues that the
truth will emerge as a product of the collaboration
between the parties, C eertoma liThe
Accusatorial System v the Inquisitorial System: Procedural
Truth v Fact?" (1982) 56 Australian LJ 288 291.
1. Zeidler ~ cit 395.
2. ef Packer ~ cit 157.
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As Lord Devlin remarks:
"Indeed, where there is no legal representation and
save in the exceptional case of the skilled litigant,
the adversary system, whether or £ot it remains in
theory, in practice breaks down".
Since a necessary precondition for a fair trial, according
to Packer, is the adherence to the principle of equality,2
legal assistance should thus be provided for the accused who
cannot afford it.
5. LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROVISION
OF LEGAL AID TO THE INDIGENT ACCUSED
The accused's right to legal representation has been called
3the "most pervasive right" of an accused, and of
"fundamental character".4 In the context of adversary
procedure it has been shown that legal representation is
essential to the attainment of a fair trial. Legal services,
controlled by an independent legal profession, have
traditionally been a commodity available only at a price.
However, once the assistance of a defence lawyer is
recognized as an essential requirement for a fair trial, the
doctrine of equality before the law, the cornerstone of legal
systems in the Western liberal tradition, demands that all
accused persons should have access to the services of a lawyer. 5
1. Lord Patrick Devlin The Judge (1979) 67.
2. 2E cit 168.
3. See Yale Kamisar "The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused" (1962) 30 Univ of Chicago LR 1.
4. Powell ~ Alabama 287 US 45, 68 (1932).
5. See AJ Reiss "citizen Access to Criminal Justice" (1974) 1
British ~ of Law ~ Society 50 69; PA Sallman & J willis
Criminal Justice in Australia (1984) 144.
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The response in the Anglo-American jurisdictions to the
indigent, and hence undefended accused, has been the
provision of free legal assistance to certain classes of
accused to ensure, by placing the accused on an equal
footing with the prosecution, a fair trial. It is useful
to consider the rationale given for the provision of
legal aid to indigent accused by the united states Supreme
Court.
The united states Supreme Court in Gideon ~ Wainwright 372
US 335 (1963) finally established that "in [their]
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him". [344] The
appointment of counsel for indigent accused was justified by
Black J as follows:
"Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the pUblic's
interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who
fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare
and present their defences. That government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money
hire ' lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries."[344]
Court-appointed counsel for indigent accused was thus
justified in order, firstly, to equalize the standing of the
accused vis a v{s the prosecutor, and secondly, to equalize
the accused vls a VlS other accused who have the money to
brief counsel. These justifications are the foundations of
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the principles of due process and equal protection
° tOt to 1respectively, as enshrined in the Amerlcan Cons 1 u lone
Rehnquist J in Ross v Moffitt 417 US 600 (1974)
distinguished these two principles as follows:
"'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the state and
the individual dealing with the state, regardless of
how other individuals in the same situation are
treated. 'Equal protection', on the other hand,
emphasizes disparity in treatment between classe2 of
individuals who are arguably indistinguishable".
The appointment of counsel for indigent accused can be
justified on both grounds. It has been stated that equal
protection and due process emphasize the central aim of the
judicial system that "all people charged with crime must, so
far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before
. 3
the bar of justice in every American court"". In Gideon v
Wainwright the Court, by recognising legal representation as
an essential part of due process, extended the entitlement
to counsel of the sixth Amendment, applicable only to
federal courts, through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the state level.
The principle in Gideon formed the basis of the rule
pronounced in Argersinger v Hamlin 407 US 25 (1972) that
no person, in the absence of a knowing and intelligent
waiver, may be imprisoned for any offence without the
1. V & XIV Amendments.
2. 609. See, however, the more general interpretation of "due
process" by Powell J in Argersinger ~ Hamlin 407 US 25 49
(1972): "Due process, perhaps the most fundamental concept
in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than
immutable line drawing as to every aspect of a criminal
trial".
3. Griffin v Illinois 351 US 12, 17 (1956).
Chapter 1 Page 21
assistance of counsel. 1 Powell J, in a separate opinion in
Argersinger, was convinced that the principle could be
extended also to petty cases whenever assistance of counsel
was necessary to assure a fair trial in a particular case.
The doctrine of equal protection has also been utilized to
make post-conviction remedies available to indigent
convicted persons. In striking down a provision that a fee
must be paid before an appeal may be lodged, Black J in
Griffin v Illinois 351 US 12, 19 (1956) said:
"In criminal trials a state can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race or
color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance
bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt
or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial .•. There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has".
Following on Griffin, the principle was succinctly stated in
Mayer ~ Chicago 404 US 189 (1971) as follows: "[The]
principle is a flat 'prohibition against pricing indigent
defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be
available to others able to pay their own way". [196-7]
Furthermore, the fact that a conviction was for a
misdemeanor should not deprive the indigent accused of
obtaining a copy of the record free of charge for the
purposes of appeal. 2
Although equality has been pursued in various aspects of
criminal procedure, it has often been asserted that
1. See also Scott v Illinois 440 US 367 (1979).
2. Mayer v Chicago- 404 US 189 (1971).
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"absolute equality is not required",l and that legal
. . t 2 Iassistance is not always an essent1al requ1remen. n
each instance it must be determined whether "an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and
poor".3 Although the state is not required to relieve the
accused of his poverty, it should not take advantage of
indigence in the administration of justice.
4
The test
remains whether the accused has had an adequate opportunity
to present his claim fairly.5 Fundamental fairness is the
general test, and the state's responsibility is to do all
that is reasonably required to ensure basic compliance with
the requirements of a fair trial. 6 The inclusion of other
forms of assistance, such as investigators, experts etc,
under the equal protection clause has not been settled, but
the Supreme Court at present seems reluctant to grant a
7substantial equalization of resources.
Polyviou concludes that the Supreme Court has
"brought into existence a new and distinct principle of
equality which is primarily if not exclusively
applicable to the problems of the indigent criminal
defendant. This new principle derives support from both
the Equal Protection and the Due Process clauses, and
it is a matter of some doubt whether either clause by
itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the
results reached in the cases considered
above ... ".[532]
1. Douglas v California 372 US 383 (1963); Ross v Moffitt
417 US 600 (1974); united States v MacCollom 426-US 317 (1976).
2. See dissenting jUdgment of Clark J in Douglas ~ California
272 US 353 (1963). 3. Per Douglas J in Douglas 387.
4. Miranda y Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) 472 per Warren CJ.
5. Ross Y Moffitt supra per Rehnquist J. Also in united
states y MacCollom 426 US 317, 326:"The basic question is
one of adequacy of the respondent's access to procedures
for review of his conviction".
6. PG Polyviou The Equal Protection of the Laws (1980) 535.
7. Polyviou 2E cit 509.
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Central to the argument is the principle of equal justice,
between the accused and the prosecution, and between accused
inter se. The moral strength and legitimacy of the legal
system are much dependent on the achievement of equality
between litigants, particularly where there is manifest
social inequality with regard to their positions of power
and status.
In most developed liberal legal jurisdictions equality
before the law is pursued by the provision of legal aid for
indigent accused.
6. THE PROVISION OF LEGAL AID TO INDIGENT ACCUSED
The provision of legal assistance to those who cannot afford
it, is a very costly social service. Because the majority of
persons accused of crime are, for a number of reasons, from
the lower economic strata of society, paid legal services
are usually beyond their means. To provide legal assistance
to a large group of accused requires firstly, legal
resources to provide the service, and secondly, financial
resources to sustain such a service. Legal resources
include, on the one hand, defence lawyers, and on the other,
court personnel and facilities to deal with the increased
court time which frequently results from the presence of
lawyers; all this involves the expenditure of large sums of
money.
The implications of providing legal aid to indigent accused
are therefore far reaching. In examining these implications
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attention will be focused on legal aid in England and
Wales. The reasons for this choice are threefold. Firstly,
South Africa has adopted a legal aid scheme based on the
English system whereby legal services are rendered by
private practitioners. Secondly, the number of persons
accused of serious offences is approximately the same as in
South Africa. Thirdly, most of the accused referred to
above are indigent and qualify for legal aid. Examining the
costs involved in the operation of the English system will
provide some insight into the implications of pursuing equal
justice through the provision of free professional legal
services.
Although legal aid was initially provided in England and
Wales through the court practice of appointing pro Deo
counsel and the so-called 'dock brief',l the accused's
legal entitlement to such assistance came through
legislative intervention. The Poor Prisoners' Defence
Act of 1903, empowered courts to grant legal aid for the
trial on indictment of an indigent prisoner where a defence
was put up at committal proceedings. 2 Although the Poor
Prisoners' Act of 1930 removed this requirement, legal
assistance was reserved for cases where it was in the
interests of justice "by reason of the gravity
1. M Zander "Legal Aid in a Democratic Society" in University
of Na~al Legal Aid in South Africa (1973) 12 14; E Moeran
Practlcal Legal Aid (1982) 133.
2. H Levenson The Price of Justice (1981) 15.
Chapter 1 Page 25
of the charge or exceptional circumstances".l A
comprehensive legal aid scheme was introduced in 1949 by the
Legal Aid and Advice Act of that year. The granting of legal
aid in criminal cases was placed in the discretion of the
court, which was to be exercised when desirable "in the
interests of justice" and in accordance with a means test. 2
Where doubt existed as to whether the accused qualified for
legal aid in terms of the means test or the interests of
justice, he was to be given the benefit of the doubt.[S 18]
The Widgery Committee Report on legal aid in criminal
proceedings3 recommended that legal aid should as a
practice be given at trial and committal proceedings in
respect of indictable offences. In summary trials, it should
be in the discretion of the courts to grant legal aid.
The courts were also liberal in their extension of legal aid
t d
.. 4
o accuse ln serlOUS cases. In Howes [1964] 2 QB 459 the
Court of Appeal held that it would be rare for justice not
to demand that legal aid be granted to an accused facing a
serious charge. Where a court considered the imposition of a
heavy sentence of imprisonment, it should offer legal
aid to the accused where he failed to apply for it
himself. 5
1. Moeran 2E cit 134.
2. S 18(2). See Moeran 2E cit 135.
3. Report of Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal
Proceedings under Chairmanship of Mr Justice Widgery, Crnnd
2934 1966.
4. Hampton 2E cit 442; Moeran ~ cit 139.
5. Serghiou [1966] 1 WLR 1611; O'DOnnell (1967) 111 SJ 809;
Green [1968] 1 WLR 673.
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The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 gave effect to most of the
Widgery Committee's recommendations. 1 The scope of
assistance was further widened by the Legal Advice and
Assistance Act of 1972, which provided for legal assistance
short of representation and permitted the setting
up of duty-solicitor schemes in the lower courts.
2
The
Criminal Justice Act of 1972 provided that nobody, with
certain limited exceptions, could be sent to prison without
being offered legal representation.
3
In terms of the Legal Aid Act of 1974, which replaced the
1967 Criminal Justice Act, criminal legal aid is still to be
administered by the courts. If a person wishes to obtain
legal aid, he has to apply to court,[S 28] which may assign
him any barrister or solicitor in private practice. Legal
aid may be granted to accused appearing in various trial
courts, at committal proceedings, and also for the purposes
of appeal.[S 28] The Act states that a legal aid order shall
be made where it appears to the court that it is desirable
in the interests of justice,[S 29(1)] and the accused's
means are such that he requires assistance in meeting the
costs which he may incur.[S 29(2)] Where doubt arises
whether a legal aid order should be made, the doubt should
be resolved in the accused's favour.[S 29(6)] The court is
also empowered to order the accused to make a monetary
contribution at the conclusion of the case if it appears
1. Moeran ~ cit 140.
2. See below.
3. S 37. See Moeran 2E cit 163; PH Gross Legal Aid and its
Management (1976) 157.
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that he has the means to do sO.[8 32(1)]
The Legal Aid Act of 1982 further extended the powers of the
courts to grant legal aid orders, for example, for
proceedings following a partly suspended sentence.[S 4]
Provision was also made for appeal against the refusal of
legal aid.[S 6]
In England and Wales in 1983 prosecutions were instituted
1against 2 300 000 persons. Of these accused, 23% were
charged with indictable offences (530 000), a further 23%
with summary offences excluding motoring offences (521 000),
and the rest (1 252 000), with motoring offences. 2 In the
superior court the vast majority of the accused and
appellants received legal aid: 95% of the 88 800 accused who
were put on trial at the Crown court;3 99% of the 10 300
accused who appeared at the Crown Court for sentence
following a conviction in the magistrates' court; and
60% of the 18 115 appellants. 3 In these cases applications
for legal aid for proceedings in the superior courts were
invariably granted. 4
In the magistrates' court legal aid cases did not constitute
such a high proportion of all the cases heard, but
constituted more than three quarters of all the legal aid
orders made. Eighty percent of 351 000 accused charged with
1. Home Office Criminal statistics England and Wales 1983
(1984) cmnd 9349, hereinafter referred to as Criminal----
statistics 1983.
2. Table 6.~
3. Tables 6.7, 6.8 & 9.4.
4. Table 9.3.
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an indictable offence applied for legal aid,l and 89% of
these were successful,2 resulting in 71% (249 210) of all
the accused in this category enjoying legal aid.
3
Of 1 773 000
arraigned for summary, or non-indictable offences, of which
70% were minor motoring offences, only 3% (60 000 persons),
applied for legal aid; 62% of those were successful,
resulting in only 2% of these accused receiving legal aid. 4
Of 94 000 accused against whom committal proceedings were
instituted in the magistrates' court for trial at the Crown
Court, 53 000 applied for legal aid and of these 99% were
successful. 5 Finally, in 105 000 proceedings at juvenile
courts, 42% of the juveniles requested legal assistance,
most of them being successful (92%).6 In all there were 545
000 applications, of which 495 000 were successful. 7
The cost of 495 000 legal aid orders amounted to £ 1 2 1
million. The number of contribution orders made totalled
18 000, but these produced a mere £1,32 million or one
percent of the total cost. 8 The number of· criminal legal aid
orders more than doubled in ten years from 244 000 orders
made at a cost of ' £ 1 6 million. 9
The vast majority of accused charged with indictable
offences, whether in the higher or lower courts, qualified
1. Tables 9.1 & 9.2.
2. Table 9.3.
3. Table 9.4.
4. Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 & 9.4.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Table 9.1 & 9.5.
8. Table 9.5.
9. Ibid.
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for legal aid, and were in effect granted such assistance.
In the lower courts, in respect of summary offences, few
accused applied for legal assistance and even less were
granted legal aid. The court practice in this regard has
been described as varying from "the humane to a victorian
1
indifference to the poor".
The picture in England is not complete without reference to
the operation of the duty-solicitor schemes. Solicitors, on
a voluntary basis, provide at the lower courts legal advice
2and temporary assistance to accused persons. A scheme is
constituted and administered by the local law society which,
on a rotation basis, allots days upon which its members will
be on duty at the local criminal court or prison. The duty
solicitor will then be present at court to advise or act for
any person who appears without a lawyer. He will conduct
bail applications, advise on the entering of pleas, make
representations regarding sentence and advise on legal aid
applications. These services complement the formal legal aid
scheme at the initial, yet very important, stages of the
criminal trial.
England and Wales thus have a fairly comprehensive provision
of legal aid involving most accused charged with serious
3offences, a large number of lawyers, and vasts sums of
1. Moeran ~ cit 142.
2. See generally M King The Effects of ~ Duty Solicitor
Scheme: An Assessment of the Impact upon a Magistrates' Court
(1976); Zander ~ cit 17. -





For legal assistance needs to be satisfied by a legal
aid scheme, Reyntjens1 argues, five conditions must be
present:
(a) a relatively small number of indigent persons to be
provided for;
(b) a highly productive economy resulting in a high income
to finance legal aid for the small number of indigents;
(c) a well-organized legal profession with a large number of
members who have a considerable impact on policy-making;
(d) a well established tradition of a constitutionally
strong jUdiciary - independent, respected by the executive,
and bound by the due process of the law; and
(e) a tradition of social welfare and justice as a pUblic
service.
The last four conditions are met in England and Wales, but
half a million offenders charged with indictable offences
and qualifying for legal assistance place considerable
demands on a country's financial resources and the manpower
of the legal profession. Whether this answer to factual
inequality before the law - the provision of professional
legal assistance, particularly through the English referral
system - is at all tenable in a Third World country where
none of Reyntjens' conditions are met, is doubtful.
1. "Legal Aid in Africa - South of the Sahara" in FH Zeemans
(ed) Perspectives on Legal Aid (1979) 12 31.
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South Africa straddles the First and Third Worlds aDd it is
necessary to consider how the Republic has responded to the
challenge of equality before the law and the question of
legal aid.
CHAPTER TWO SOUTH AFRICA: EQUAL JUSTICE AND INDIGENOUS
PROBLEMS
In South Africa the principles of a fair trial are pursued
in the context of an adversary mode of procedure. Thus each
party is responsible for promoting and protecting its own
interests and for that purpose may employ legal
practitioners. Since legal services are a commodity to be
secured by the payment of a sum of money, the financial
status of the parties determines whether they will enjoy
legal representation. The State has at its disposal the
financial resources to employ as prosecutors persons
trained in law. 1 Accused persons with financial means
secure the services of lawyers, but the vast majority of
persons arraigned before court are indigent and hence
undefended. The questions to be asked are, firstly, whether
equal justice is part of our legal tradition, and secondly,
how its demands have been confronted.
1. THE COMMITMENT TO EQUAL JUSTICE
The concepts of "due process" and "equal protection" have
not been widely used in south African law or legal
writing. 2 The traditional approach has been to regard them
1. Cf Report of the Commission to Inquire into the Structure
and Functioning of the Courts of Law in South Africa RP
78/1983 under chairmanship of Mr Justice GG Hoexter, part
VIII par 2(g) (hereinafter referred to as the Hoexter
Commission) which recommended an increase in the
expenditure on salaries of prosecutors to attract and retain
qualified and experienced personnel for this task.
2. Under the influence of American jurisprudence, writers
li~e JD ~an der Vyfer, Die Beskerming van Menseregte in
SUld-Afrlka (1975), and J Dugard, Human Rights and the
South African Legal Order (1978), have given these concepts
greater currency.
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1
as being incorporated in the Rule of Law concept. The
principle of equality before the law is regarded as part of
our common law tradition. Although the Roman-Dutch
authorities did not spell out the doctrine unequivocally,
Voet declared that law preserves equality and binds the
citizens equally.2 As a general overriding principle in
our legal system, however, it has had a checkered career
both in the legislatures and in the courts.
The idea of equality before the law became an accepted
principle during the course of the 19th century in the Cape
colony.3 To the north of the Cape, the 1854 constitution
of the new republic of the Orange Free state included the
guarantee that "De wet is voor alIen gelijki met dien
verstande dat de rechter alle wetten met onpartijdigheid zal
uitoefen, sonder aanzien van personen".[Art 58] In contrast,
the Transvaal constitution of 1858 expressly stated that
"Het'volk wil geene gelijkstelling van gekleurden met blank
gezeten toestaan, noch in Kerk noch in staat".4
No references to equal justice are to be found in the 1910
Union and 1961 Republican constitutions of South Africa. In
1. See eg HR Hahlo ~ E Kahn South Africa: The Development
of its Laws and Constitution (1960) 133-13S;-AS Mathews
Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 14-16.
2. Voet Commentarius ad Pandectus 1.3.5. See generally
HR Hahlo & I Maisels "The Rule of Law in South Africa"
(1966) 52 Virginia LR 1i V d S Centlivres "The South African
Constitution and the-Rule of Law" 1956 Butterworths South
African LR 2 10-12.
3. TRH Davenport "civil Rights in South Africa 1910-1960"
1960 Acta Juridica 11 13.
4. Grondwet art 9.
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the Constitution Act 110 of 1983, however, the preamble
includes as one of the "national goals", "To uphold the
independence of the jUdiciary and the equality of all under
the law". The same constitution provides, nevertheless, for
a tri-cameral parliament and executive founded firmly upon
racial differentiation between Coloureds, Indians and
, f t' , ti i 1Whites, wlth all Blacks excluded rom par lclpa lon.
The South African courts have recognised the principle of
equality before the law as a fundamental principle of the
common law and in the words of Lord de Villiers,
"It is the primary aim of the court to protect the
rights of individuals which may be infringed and it
makes no differen2e whether the individual occupies a
palace or a hut".
In an earlier dictum Kotze CJ declared in In re Marechane
(1882) 1 SAR 27 31: "The court is bound to do equal
justice to every individual within the jurisdiction, without
regard to colour or degree". with equal force Leon ADJP
said in Hurley and another v Minister of Law and Order 1985
(4) SA 709 (D) more than a hundred years later that
"it is perhaps necessary to remind oneself, from time
to time, that the first and most sacred duty of the
Court, where it is possible to do so, is to administer
justice to those who seek it, high and low, rich and
poor, Black and White; to attem~t to do justice between
man and man and man and State".
1. See generally LJ Boulle South Africa and the
ConsociationalOption (1984). ---
2. Zgili Y McCleod (1904) 21 SC 150 152.
3. 715G. See, however, how the principle has not been applied
in the testing of subordinate legislation, Dugard Human
Rights 304ff; Minister of Interior y Lockhat 1961 (2) SA
587 (A); Adams, Werner 1981 (1) SA 198 (A).
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In the field of criminal procedure, direct references to the
principle of "equal justice" are found in various criminal
codes of the pre-Union colonies. In the preamble of a Cape
proclamation of 1813, the establishment of the principle of
open court was justified on the ground, inter alia, that it
would imprint "on the minds of the inhabitants of this
colony the confidence 'that equal justice is administered to
all, ... ".l In the Cape criminal code of 1819 2 the
principle of equality before the law was again mentioned in
a few sections. 3 The same code, however, authorized
discrimination by excluding the necessity for court
authority to arrest a person "beneath the rank of Burghers
or Christian Inhabitants".[S 27] In the Transvaal, despite
the express provision for inequality in the Constitution of
1858,4 the criminal code of 1864 contained the assurance
that equal justice was to be done to all. 5
While the South African social, political and economic
structure is founded upon the racial inequality implicit in
the apartheid system, the notion of equality in criminal
trial proceedings has remained to a certain extent intact.
The rules of procedure, formulated in general terms, have
not discriminated overtly against accused persons on the
1. Proclamation of 25 September 1813, in Theal vol IX 239.
My italics.
2. "Crown Trial: or a Mode of Proceedings in Criminal Cases
at the Cape of Good Hope" enacted by the Chief Justice, in
Theal vol XXV 90.
3. See s 37, 77 & 145.
4. See above.
5. Ord 4 of 1864 s 27 .
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basis of race, religion, or class. 1 The major departure
from the principle of non-discriminatory rules has been the
establishment of separate courts for the prosecution of
Blacks for certain specified offences.
2
The absence of discriminatory rules does not, however,
ensure effective equality between the prosecution and the
accused, or amongst various accused, if the implementation
of the principles of a fair trial is dependent upon the
presence of a defence lawyer.
2. THE NEED FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE
The vast majority of accused persons in South Africa would
not be able to participate effectively in court proceedings
without legal assistance. They are illiterate or
undereducated, inexperienced, and unfamiliar with the
official languages of the court. Yet these accused are also
indigent and therefore routinely confront the criminal
justice process without representation. Those facing the
most serious charges in the regional courts are the least
defended. with the increase in the substantive and
sentencing jurisdiction of the regional courts to include
offences such as rape, and sentences of up to 10 years
imprisonment,3 many cases which were previously tried in the
Supreme Court with the assistance of pro Deo counsel, are
now heard in the regional courts with the accused
1. See ch 3 below.
2. See ch 3 below.
3. Lower Courts Amendment Act 91 of 1977 s 9.
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undefended. 1 The exclusion of candidate attorneys from
appearing in the regional court
2
also limits the
source of legal practitioners for accused arraigned in those
courts. This reality was clearly demonstrated by the writer's
survey in 1984 of the regional court sitting in Durban.
3
Only two of the 24 accused of rape, one of the 35 alleged
housebreakers, one of the 21 charged with motorcar theft,
and none of the 19 alleged robbers were defended. Only two
of the 52 accused who received prison sentences were
represented.
The absence of legal representation has not only made the
legal process inaccessible to the majority of Black people,
but has effectively undermined the legitimacy of the
judicial system. While most accused are Black, the
administrators of the criminal justice system are mostly
White. As most of the Black accused are undefended, they are
reliant, for procedural justice, on the predominantly White
court personnel. Considering the wider political context, it
is understandable that a Black accused, particularly when
appearing without legal assistance, will be sceptical as to
whether there is equal justice before the law. Years of
exploitation and repression, primarily through the legal
system, have led to the increased ques~ioning of its
legitimacy. The following remarks of the Human Sciences
Research Council's Investigation into Intergroup Relations,
1. The number of Supreme Court cases dropped from 3 700 in
1977 to 1 789 in 1979, see McQuoid-Mason (1982) 60.
2. Attorneys' Act 33 of 1979 s 8(1).
3. For details of the study, see section C par 2.1. below.
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are apposite in this context:
"The South African legal system is suspect among large
parts of the population because, on the one h~nd, the
administration of justice is controlled by whltes and,
on the other, because, as a result of various economic,
language and other factors, legal processes and
administrations, as well as penal and litigation
procedures, have become in~ccessible and
incomprehensible to many".
The provision of legal assistance will make the legal
process more accessible to many Blacks and enhance the
legitimacy of the judicial system to some degree.
One of the responses to the demands of the principle of
equal justice has been the provision of legal aid to
indigent accused through the appointment of pro Deo counsel
in the Supreme Court, and a legal aid scheme for the lower
courts. 2
3. THE PROVISION OF LEGAL AID
3.1. PRO DEO COUNSEL
The provision of legal aid through the intervention of the
courts has been limited to the appointment by the Supreme
Court of pro Deo counsel in capital cases. 3 The Court
never developed a legally enforceable rule that an indigent
1. Main Committee: HSRC Investigation into Intergroup
Relations The South African Society: Realities and Future
Prospects (1985) 166. ---
2. The Legal Aid Board has decided in principle that the
provision of legal services in the Supreme Court should
also be brought under the control of the Board, but due to
its financial implications this decision has not been
imp~emented, Legal Aid Board Annual Report for Period
endlng 31 March 1984 8.
3. See chapter three below for development of this
institution.
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accused, even when facing a capital charge, is entitled as
of right to free legal representation; the provision of
t ' 1 Thlegal assistance has remained merely a rule of prac 1ce. e
right to counsel, acknowledged in the Criminal Procedure
Act,[S 73(2)] merely entails that the accused may not be
deprived of the opportunity to engage the services of a
2lawyer. Where an accused cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, he has no right to demand that a lawyer should be
appointed on his behalf.
Nevertheless the Court ensures that most accused arraigned
before the Supreme Court are represented pro Deo,3 mostly
by junior members of the bar who are not usually assisted by
an instructing attorney.4
3.2 LEGAL AID ACT 22 OF 1969
with the enactment of the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969, the
provision of legal aid was for the first time given a
statutory footing. A body corporate, the Legal Aid Board,
was established,[S 2] whose object is "to render or make
available legal aid to indigent persons".[S 3] The Board, a
semi-autonomous body, consists of eleven members; one
nominated by the Bar Council, four by the Association of Law
Societies, five civil servants and a jUdge who acts as
chairman.[S 4] The Board has the power, inter alia, to
1. Mati 1960(1) SA 304 (A) 306; Chaane 1978 (2) SA 891 (A).
2. See ch 4 par 1 below.
3. McQuoid-Mason (1982) 58ff.
4. Cf Gibson 1979 (4) SA 115 (D). See also DL carey-Miller
"Some Aspects of Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings" (1972) 89
SAIJ 71 72.
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obtain the services of legal practitioners and to fix
conditions sUbject to which legal aid is to be rendered.[S
3] Legal aid is not controlled or administered by the legal
profession but by the Board's functionaries, called legal
aid officers, who are all civil servants.
The legal aid scheme was implemented in South Africa on 29
March 1971. 1 The Board issued a Legal Aid Guide which gave
direction and body to the scheme. The English legal aid
scheme of referring cases to attorneys in private practice
was adopted. A person may apply to a legal aid officer and,
if he qualifies in terms of the means test which determines
lIindigence ll,2 he can either be assisted by the legal aid
officer or be referred to a private practioner [Par 20.1]
who is prepared to act for him. [Par 27] Such practitioner is
further required to certify that there is a reasonable
prospect of success. 3 The Guide also lays down rules
Whereby, despite the accused's indigence, legal aid would
not be granted or would be granted only with the approval of
the director of the Board. [Par 12] Legal aid is excluded
generally where, according to the legal aid officer, the
applicant leads a criminal life or is unemployed for no good
reason. [Par 10.1] In respect of criminal cases in
particular, legal aid is excluded where pro Deo counsel is
provided, [Par 12.1(a)] in respect of offences for which an
admission of guilt has been determined or which can be
1. McQuoid-Mason (1982) 27.
2. See Par 5.1 and Annexure E for the means test.
3. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 1984 3.
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compounded, [Par 12.1(b)] where the commission of the offence
is admitted, or where the defence is so simple that it can
be advanced by the accused himself, [Par 12.1(c)] in respect
of traffic offences or any other offence connected with the
use of a motor vehicle, unless the director grants
permission due to exceptional circumstances, [Par 12.1(d)] in
a preparatory examination, [Par 12.1(e)] or to advance
mitigating circumstances for the purposes of sentencing,
unless it is a 'deserving' case. [Par 11.2]
From its inauspicious start in 1972-3, when 465 applications
for legal aid in criminal proceedings were received and 251
were referred to attorneys,1 these figures rose to 5 898
applications and 3 071 referrals for the year ending 31
March 1984. 2 Coloureds and Indians made most of the
applications to the Board (2 494), followed by Blacks (1
961) and Whites (1 443). Criminal legal aid applications
still form a fraction (11,5%) of all applications
. d 3recelve .
The availability of legal aid is broad and goes beyond the
provision of legal representation for accused persons facing
a possible sentence of imprisonment. But to provide legal aid
to all accused persons, or even all those accused of serious
offences, is not yet within South Africa's capabilities. The
large number of indigent accused, a small legal profession,
1. McQuoid-Mason (1982) table 37.
2. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 1984.
3. In 1983-84 5 898 of 51 305 applications. For a similar
pattern in previous years, see McQuoid-Mason (1982) 84 table
24.
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the lack of financial support, and an absence of interest in
legal aid generally, are all daunting obstacles in the way
of providing satisfactory legal assistance to indigent
accused through the present legal aid scheme.
4. PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION OF LEGAL AID
4.1 THE LARGE NUMBER OF INDIGENT AND UNDEFENDED ACCUSED
IN COURT
Figures reveal the extensive use of the criminal courts in
South Africa. In the year ending 30 June 1984, a total of
1 808 978 criminal cases were recorded in the various courts
administered by the Department of Justice. 1 The Supreme
Court dealt with 0,2% (2 450) of those cases, the regional
court with 3,0% (54 633 cases) and the magistrates' courts
with the remaining 96,8% (1 751 895 cases). In the
commissioners' courts, administered by the Department of
Co-operation and Development, more than 100 000 persons were
prosecuted in 1983 for offences relating to pass books and
influx control. 2
The above statistics are misleading in two respects. First,
the figures reflect only the number of cases recorded in the
various courts; the actual number of accused persons
appearing in court would be greater as in
1. Report of the Department of Justice for the Period 1
July 1983 =30 June 1984 40-46.
2. See DJ McQuoid-Mason "Problems Associated with the Legal
Representation of Africans in the Urban Areas of South
Africa ll in Urban Black Law (1985) 181 187. These
courts are about to be abolished, and their functions have
since July 1985 been taken over by the magistrates' courts,
Proc R131 of 10 August 1985.
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many cases there were more than one accused. Secondly,
1 751 895 cases recorded in the magistrates' court do not
represent the actual number of full trials. The Hoexter
Commission estimated that in 1980 half of the cases recorded
in the magistrates' court never came to trial.
1
A further
25,9% (372 415) were petty offences, including motoring
offences, which were disposed of by guilty pleas. The
remaining 24,0% of the cases (347 495) were either contested
or a plea of guilty was entered after judicial questioning.
2
with the exclusion of the cases heard in the commissioners'
courts and the petty offences in the magistrates' . courts,
392 338 criminal trials were conducted, of which the Supreme
Court heard 0,39%, the regional court 11,8%, and the
magistrates' court 87,8%. Making allowances for a large
number of accused jointly tried, this figure approximates
the 486 236 persons prosecuted for serious offences as
recorded by the Central statistical Services for the
statistical year 1981-82. 3 The number of persons charged
with serious offences in South Africa are thus not
significantly less than the 530 000 persons charged with
indictable offences in England and wales. 4
The indigence of most accused can be deduced from their
educational level, age, race, and whether they were in fact
represented in court. Most of the accused were illiterate or
1. 716 974 of 1 434 884 cases (49.9%), part VI par 2.2.1.2.
2. Part VI par 2.2.1.2.
3. Statistics of Offences 1981-82 table 2.
4. The offenceS-regarded as "serious" correspond to the
English classification of indictable offences. See Criminal
Statistics England and Wales 1983 appendix 3 199ff.
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undereducated. The statistics of Offences of 1981-82 reveal
that of the convicted persons 27,8% were illiterate, 48,7%
had had some education up to and including standard 5, 22,7%
had had some secondary education (up to and including
standard 10), and only 0,6% had received post matric
training. 1 Juveniles (between the ages of 7 -17)
constituted 12% of all the convicted, and the 18-20 year old
group a further 18%.2 The low level of education and
youthfulness of a substantial portion of the accused are
indicators of low occupational status, which would place
legal services beyond their means.
A further indicator of indigence in South Africa is the race
of the accused, since Blacks constitute the poorer section
of the community. Although official reports do not disclose
the racial distribution of accused persons, it is apparent
that most of them were Black. The statistics provided by the
Commissioner of Prisons for the year 1983-4 show that of the
252 302 unsentenced and 266 829 sentenced prisoners received
into prison, 79,7% were African, 17,0% Coloured, 0,6%
Indian, and 2,7% White. 3 A conservative estimate would be
that at least 90% of all accused in South Africa are
Black. 4 In a study of bail in the Durban magistrates'
court in 1981, only 5,3% of the sample of 486 accused were
White, 79,9% were African, the rest being Indian or
1. Table 8.
2. Table 3.
3. Report of the Department of Justice for the Period! July
1983 - 30 June 1984 section ~table 9.
~tatIStrcs-o~fences1981-82 table 2.
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coloured. 1 In a survey conducted by the present writer in
both the regional and magistrates' courts sitting in Durban in
1983-84, Whites comprised 8,2% of the sample of 580 accused
and Africans 74,6%, while the rest were either Coloured or
Indian. The courts thus dealt primarily with Black accused
persons, the vast majority being African.
2
The average monthly household income for the different race
groups for 1984 has been calculated as follows: for Africans
R273, Coloureds R624, Indians RI 072, and Whites RI 834.
3
The
household subsistence levels as calculated for September
1984, were as follows: for an African family of six living
in Johannesburg, R300, in Cape Town, R309, in Durban, R297,
and in Bloemfontein, R298. For a Coloured family of five,
the figures were: Johannesburg, R338, Cape Town, R321,
Durban R323, and Bloemfontein, R309. 4 It is further
important to note that the number of unemployed and
underemployed in South Africa and the homelands were
estimated at two million, or about 25% of the workforce. 5
The level of representation in court not only reflects the
relative need for representation, but is also a reliable
indication of the ability of accused persons to secure legal
1. NC Steytler "Deciding on Liberty - A Bail study of the
Durban Magistrates' Court" in Olmesdahl & Steytler 120
table 1.
2. The term Black will be used to indicate all "non-White"
persons unless the contrary is apparent from the context.
3. Race Rela~ions Survey 1984 (1985) 241 quoting Market
Research Afrlca's figures.
4. 2E cit 240-1.
5. 2E cit 244.
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representation. Independent research has shown that most of
the accused arraigned in the Supreme Court were represented
by counsel either on brief or acting pro Deo, the latter
constituting about 90% of the cases.
1
The level of
representation in the lower courts, on the other hand, is
much lower. A survey of 425 cases heard in the Cape Town
magistrates' court in 1980 showed that 84,5% of the Black,
79% of the Coloured and 42% of the White accused were
2unrepresented, while in the regional court sitting at
Retreat, of the 400 cases heard in 1979-1980, 99,9% of
Black, 79% of Coloured and 71,5% of White accused were tried
unassisted. 3 A survey of 500 cases heard in the juvenile
court in Durban, also in 1980, revealed that a lawyer was
present in only 2% of the cases. 4 It has been estimated
that in 1982 only 33 of 56 000 blacks prosecuted in the
Johannesburg commissioners' court had legal assistance.
5
This figure is supported by a survey conducted in the same
courts in 1982 which found that in a sample of 365 cases,
only 0,2% of the accused were represented. 6 In a survey
conducted by the present writer in 1982 in the magistrates'
courts in the greater Durban area, it was found that only
1. McQuoid-Mason (1982) 59 table 4.
2. M Slabbert Justice for All (1981) 28.
3. Slabbert op cit 29.
4. D Hutchinson "Juvenile Justice" in Olmesdahl & Steytler
236 249.
5. R Monama "The Pass Courts Advice Office" in DJ McQuoid-
Mason (ed) Legal Aid and Law Clinics in South Africa (1985)
113, quoting the Minister of Co-operation and Development,
Dr P Koornhof MP.
6. R Monama Is this Justice? ~ study of the Johannesburg
CommissionerS' courts (1982) 29. See also McQuoid-Mason in
Urban Black Law 187.
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7,8% of the 276 accused enjoyed legal assistance.
In a follow-up survey conducted by the writer in 1984 of
both the regional and district courts sitting in Durban,
11,2% of the 582 accused in the sample were assisted by
lawyers. Legal representation according to the race of the
accused was: Africans 6,2%; Coloureds 11,1%; Indians 32,8%
and Whites 24,0%. The unemployed persons, constituting
approximately a quarter of the accused, were, with the
exception of two, without representation. Of the unskilled
labourers, only 8,4% had assistance, while the percentage
for the skilled workers was 42,9%, and for the white collar
workers 72,5%. Representation was clearly linked to
financial position.
The Legal Aid Board determines whether an applicant is
indigent by reference to a means test. 1 In 1984 the means
test was set at the following levels: 2 A single person or
estranged spouse qualifies for assistance if his income is
less than R400 per month (plus R100 for each dependent
child), and R800 if married (plus R100 for each dependent
child); for an African man married with a family of six, his
monthly income must be less than R1400. If the means test is
compared with the average income of Blacks, ~it is clear that
most of the Black population could be classified as indigent
and thus qualify for legal aid. 3
1. Legal Aid Guide par 5.1.
2. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 1984 3.
3. Cf McQuoid-Mason in Urban Black Law 190.
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4.2. A SMALL LEGAL PROFESSION
In 1983 there were 5 654 attorneys and 696 advocates in
South Africa, serving the needs of 26 million
people. 1 It is estimated that 90% of their work consists
of civil matters, with criminal defences receiving little
attention. 2 On the assumption that 90% of all accused are
indigent and would qualify for legal aid, a demand on these
attorneys and advocates to provide assistance for an
estimated 50 000 indigent accused prosecuted in the regional
courts, or 260 000 accused sentenced to imprisonment,
appears impossible. 3 It is clearly not feasible
to implement with any measure of success, the referral
system of England and Wales, where a population more than
double that of South Africa, is served by 45 000 solicitors and
5 000 barristers. 4 It seems clear that, as McQuoid-Mason has
pointed out,5 the legal profession will not at present be
able to deliver the necessary legal services should every
accused entitled to legal aid, be offered such.
4.3. LACK OF FINANCES
The State financing of the legal aid scheme has grown from
its initial R50 000 in 1969-70, to R2,9 million for the year
ending 31 March 1984. 6 These funds finance both civil and
1. McQuoid-Mason in Black Urban Law 183.
2. Ibid.
3. QE cit 193.
4. Guardian 21 January 1986.
5. In Urban Black Law 194.
6. Legal Aid Annual Report for Period ending 31 March 1984.
For previous years, see McQuoid-Mason (1982) 70ff.
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criminal legal aid. Of the 11 342 referrals to attorneys in
1983-4, criminal matters constituted only 3 071 (27%).
1On an average of R300 per case, the amount spent
on criminal legal aid is estimated at R921 300. The cost of
providing pro Deo counsel for at least 2 000 cases in the
2
Supreme Court, calculated at R500 per case, could amount to
R1 million. The total amount spent on criminal legal aid
would then add up to R2 million. To provide legal representation to
all the accused who qualify for legal aid, would require an
3
expenditure many times higher than the present level. The
cost of providing attorneys for 50 000 cases tried in the
regional courts would amount to R15 million (R300 per case)
and for 168 000 persons sentenced in 1983/4 to imprisonment
4
of longer than a month, R50 million (R300 per accused) ·
Increases in expenditure on legal aid are voted for by
Parliament. Dramatic increases in State-funding cannot be
expected in the future since the budget of the Legal Aid
Board for the 1984/5 financial year had to be cut by
R2,2 million. 5 This led to a serious curtailment of its
activities and a freeze on expansion. It suspended all legal
aid for the institution of divorce proceedings and the
prosecution of appeals in civil matters. 6 A further
1. This is estimated on R3,4 million spent on legal fees for
the 11 342 referrals, Annual Report 1984.
2. At present counsel earns R75 a day per accused, plus R25
for consultation.
3. Cf MK Robertson "Is Legal Aid the Solution" in DJ McQuoid-
Mason (ed) Legal Aid and Law Clinics in South Africa (1985)
98 103; McQuoid-Mason in urban Black Law 193-4.
4. See also McQuoid-Mason in Urban Black Law 194.
5. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 1984 4.
6. Ibid.
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increase in the number of .i t s sub-offices was abandoned as
was the plan to sUbstitute the pro Deo system with the
normal legal aid scheme. 1 Despite the finding of the Human
Sciences Research Council that the pUblic is to a large
, , t f I I al'd,2 theextent unlnformed about the eX1S ence 0 ega
advertising campaign has also been abandoned. 3
Through the years, as will be illustrated in the next
chapter, Parliament has shown little concern for the position
of the indigent accused and has exhibited reluctance to
extend legal aid to all accused persons. Concern for
increased spending on legal aid, particularly in criminal
matters, is not a politically popular cause and major
increases in funding may not be forthcoming in the
foreseeable future.
5. THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL AID
The difficulties outlined above are not insurmountable in
the long term. At present there are 18 law schools in South
Africa and the independent states within its borders,
which are capable of training large numbers of lawyers. A
gradual increase in the expenditure on legal aid and the
utilization of other sources of finance,4 are
not improbable. Furthermore, the more efficient use of the
1 . .QE cit 8.
2 . .QE cit 5. See also MK Robertson Preventive Law (1981)
unpublished LLM thesis, University of Natal, Durban.
3 . .QE cit 7.
4. See eg the suggestion that the Attorneys' Fidelity Fund
should contribute to its financing, Daily News 13 June
1985.
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available manpower and finances, could also contribute to
the extension of legal representation to many more accused.
McQuoid-Mason has argued persuasively that the present
referral system is more costly than one based on salaried
1lawyers, and that where public defenders are
employed, more effective use is made of their time and
expertise. [123]
The introduction of student practice rules to grant senior
law students the right of appearance under supervision, has
been approved in principle by the Council of the Association
of Law societies and law students could become a valuable
2additional source of manpower.
These developments will not, however, provide assistance to
the majority of the accused in the foreseeable future. The
lack of legal representation will remain acute and it will
be most widespread amongst the accused whose need for such
assistance is the greatest.
1. McQuoid-Mason (1982) 122ff, 73. See also McQuoid-Mason
"Discretion in the Provision of State-financed Legal Aid and
Services to Indigent Criminal Accused in South Africa" in
Olmesdahl & Steytler 103 111; McQuoid-Mason in Urban Black
Law 194.
~McQuoid-Mason "Student Practice Rules" in DJ McQuoid-Mason
Legal Aid and Law Clinics in South Africa (1985) 137.
For proposed rules see P Ellum Legal Aid Developments in
South Africa: JUly 1973 to June 1975 (1975) 64; McQuoid-
Mason (1982) 194ff. See also Hoexter Commission's approval
of this development, part 11 par 6.4.4.10.
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Alternative stategies and methods to alleviate the plight of
the undefended accused in the pursuit of equal justice
should therefore be investigated.
6. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES AND METHODS OF PURSUING PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE
The following remarks of Reyntjens i n respect of legal aid
in Africa, are also applicable to South Africa.
"It seems unrealistic to propose western style legal
aid provisions, which would only serve a tiny fraction
of the hundreds of millions of needy. A far more
interesting and efficient approach would be to examine
how the need for legal resources can be minimized by
making the legal system easier to use for those without
professional representation".
The need for professional legal assistance can be minimized
by (a) simplifying the proceedings so as to enable the
accused to participate without any assistance, or (b)
placing a positive duty on the court to ensure that the
accused is fairly tried, in an attempt to mitigate the
consequences of his inability to participate effectively in
the proceedings. The latter approach has important
implications for the traditional adversary mode of procedure
for it envisages a restructuring of the role of the court.
In South Africa few attempts have been made to simplify the
procedure. More significant has been the selective use of
customary rules of procedure to facilitate the
participation of Black accused in the proceedings. 2
1 . .QE cit 31.
2. See ch 3 below.
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The judicial officer, on the other hand, has been entrusted
more and more with the responsibility to ensure that the
undefended accused is fairly tried. It has even been argued
that the provision of free legal aid to all accused, was
unnecessary because
"Our whole legal system is designed to prevent the
conviction of an innocent person, whether he is
defended or not, and that is the duty of the jUdicial
officer and the prosecutors who are quite capable of
doing sOlto ensure that no miscarriage of justice
occurs".
In the chapters which follow, the law and practice of
criminal procedure in South Africa will be examined in order
to determine whether the role of the jUdicial officer has
been modified so as to ensure that the undefended accused is
tried according to the principles of a fair trial. If the
fairness of the trial is largely dependent on the jUdicial
officer's active participation, then the successful
performance of such a role will, in turn, depend on the
impartiality with which he approaches this task. In
examining the role of the judicial officer, particular
attention will thus be paid to this aspect.
The next chapter will examine the development of the
statutory basis of criminal procedure in South Africa as it
relates to the undefended accused.
1. Annual Report of "t h e Department of Justice for 1958 4-5.
SECTION B: STATUTE LAW AND THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED
CHAPTER THREE THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN RESPECT OF THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED
In South Africa statute law provides both the broad
framework of criminal procedure and many of the detailed
rules for the conduct of the proceedings. Only in the
absence of specific rules have the courts been able to look
to and develop the common law. Against the background of the
general legislative development of criminal procedure, this
chapter will focus on the statutory rules pertaining
primarily to the position of the undefended accused. In
examining this aspect of criminal procedure, the role that
commissions of enquiry and parliamentary debates have played
in its development, will also be investigated. Since the
services of lawyers are secured only at a fee, the indigence
of an accused will invariably result in him being
undefended. As indigence and a lack of legal representation
are so interrelated, this chapter will cover both indigent
and undefended accused.
1. THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
1.1. 1806-1832: THE INTRODUCTION OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
This period saw the gradual displacement of the
predominantly inquisitorial Dutch mode of procedure by the
English adversary system of the 19th century. At the time of
the second British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope in
1806, it was decreed that the criminal procedure then in
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force was to remain the law of the land. 1 This procedure
followed the law established by the Ordinance of 1570 of
Philip II of spain. 2 There were two modes of prosecution;
the ordinary and the extraordinary process. The ordinary
process was followed where the accused denied the crime and
the evidence was doubtful. The accused was allowed counsel
and could appeal against conviction. The extraordinary
process applied where the accused confessed to the crime or
where his guilt was 'apparent'. It was inquisitorial in
form; the jUdge interrogated the accused, who was not
allowed legal assistance, in order to obtain a confession.
The usual mode of procedure was the extraordinary process
and in neither mode of procedure did the pUblic have access
to the proceedings.
The jUdicial function was performed during the Batavian
period (1803 -1806) by the Raad van Justitie. 3 The accused
generally had no right to legal representation,4 although
under the ordinary procedure legal representation was
5permissible during the trial stage and the Raad van
Justitie could, in its discretion, appoint pro Deo counsel
for a party appearing before it. 6 Two or more of the Raad's
1. Cape Articles of Capitulation of 10 and 18 January
1806, Theal vol VI 125-126.
2. Art 7, 32 and 35 of Ord 1570, Theal vol VI 125-126.
3. CG Botha "Criminal Proceedings at the Cape during the
17th and 18th Centuries" (1915) 32 SALJ 319.
4. S Selikowitz "Defence by Counsel-rn-Criminal Proceedings
in South African Law" 1965-66 Acta Juridica 53 60.
5. Botha ~ cit 322. ----
6. Art 23 of "Provisioneele Instructie voor den Raad van
Justitie aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop" quoted in GG Visagie
Reg en Regspleging aan die Kaap van 1652-1806 (1969) 107.
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members acted as commissioners to deal with minor disputes
with the aim of solving these amicably.1
Soon after the British occupation in 1806, however, the
English law of procedure and evidence began to infiltrate.
Despite the legal provision that the criminal procedure then
in force was to remain the law of the land, the arrival of
British settlers proved to be the determining factor in the
development of criminal procedure in the Cape.
The principle of equal and impartial justice, embodied in
the English legal tradition, became a focus of concern for
the future development of the law. A proclamation issued by
the Governor Sir John Cradock on 25 September 1813, which
opened the courts to the public, reflected the principle of
equal justice. The preamble read as follows:
"And whereas it has appeared to me to be of essential
utility, as well for the dignity of the administration
of justice, as towards imprinting on the minds of the
inhabitants of this colony the confidence 'that equal
justice is administered to all in the most certain,
most speedy, and least burthensome manner,' - that all
jUdicia~ proceedings should be carried on in open
Court" .
This proclamation was of further significance as it
introduced basic aspects of the English law of criminal
procedure for the hearing of minor cases. The mode of
procedure was adversary; the complainant and the accused
were responsible for the production of evidence and only
they had the right to cross-examine witnesses. The accused's
1. Botha ~ cit 319.
2. Theal vol IX 239. My italics.
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right to remain silent was recognised and the court played a
relatively minor role, remaining on the whole passive. The
prosecutor's role, . however, was not that of an adversary,
for he maintained an independent position in respect of the
dispute; he was obliged to summon all witnesses and was not
allowed to cross-examine the defence witnesses.[S 17J
In 1817 lower courts were introduced to the Cape. Limited
criminal jurisdiction was conferred on the Board of
Landdrost and Heemraden,l consisting of lay persons, which
had, until then, been concerned only with the investigation
and prosecution of crime. 2 The secretary of the Board was to
perform the prosecuting function. 3 The accused was not
allowed legal representation. The actual sentencing
jurisdiction of the lower court was not clearly spelt out
but, "in order to prevent any danger", if the sentence
exceeded "domestic correction" or imprisonment of more than
a month, the right of appeal existed and all such cases were
automatically reviewed by the Governor. 4
In 1819 a new mode of procedure ~as introduced by the
pUblication of "Crown Trial: or a Mode of Proceedings in
Criminal Cases at the Cape of Good Hope". · The aim of this
code was "to assimilate the criminal procedure as nearly as
they [the draftersJ considered practical to that of
1. Proc 18 July 1817 in Theal vol XXV 27.
2. Theal vol XXXIII 47.
3. Theal vol XXV 26.
4. Theal vol XXV 25.
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England", this being prompted by "the greater influx of
British subjects into the colony".l The Code did away with
the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary
proceedings [S 136] and established two different procedures
that had to followed depending on whether or not the offence
was sUbject to pUblic punishment. 2 In cases where pUblic
punishment could be imposed, whether in the lower or
superior courts, the jUdicial officer was to follow an
inquisitorial mode of procedure. The questioning of
witnesses was done by the court which could "put such
questions to the witnesses as [might] tend to discover or
disclose the Truth".[S 52] There was automatic review by the
Governor of all sentences involving pUblic
punishment.[S 62] In all other cases the adversary mode was
to be used.[S 91] The prosecutor's role became more
adversary as both he and the complainant could cross-examine
the defence witnesses.[S 110]
The new procedures introduced a measure of
professionalization to the criminal process for considerable
attention was given to detailed rUles, which depended for
their enforcement on the skilled participation of the
accused. At the outset of the court proceedings, for
instance, objections as to the competence of the court or to
the charge could be raised by the accused [S 42] and the
rUling of the court in this regard was appealable.[S 43]
1. Theal vol XXXIII 88.
3. Public punishment included transportation, banishment and
imprisonment.
Chapter 3 Page 59
No legal representation was allowed in the lower courts, but
if the accused was unable to defend himself due to old age
or "other indisposition", the court could allow him the
assistance of an attorney of whom it approved.[S 125] In the
Court of Justice, while the accused was under preliminary
examination no one had access to him without the consent of
the court.[S 67] The accused became entitled to legal
assistance after the indictment had been read and after he
had answered all the questions put to him by the court.[S
65] An advocate could assist him to put questions to
witnesses and to argue points of law.[S 65]
Some attempt was made to see that the right to legal
representation applied equally to all. If the accused was
"in a state of Insolvency, or if he [was] so circumstanced
that his imprisonment put a stop to his means of
subsistence, the Court, where practicable, [should] appoint
the necessary Practitioner to assist him pro Deo".[S 86]
Care was taken to ensure that an accused's indigence caused
him no further deprivation when orders regarding costs were
made. By an order of 1820 prosecutors were prohibited from
claiming costs against an accused who was granted pro Deo
counsel or, if unrepresented, was indigent. 1 Orders as to
costs were not usually exacted from Hottentots, Free Blacks
or poor persons. 2 witnesses were entitled to be
1. General Table of Fees, Charges and Costs in Criminal and
civil Cases, Order by the Governor 7 April 1820 art 8 in
Theal vol XXXIII 223.
2. Theal vol XXXIII 86.
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compensated by the party who summoned them and in case of a
party being unable to bear such cost, they would receive
1
compensation from the Colonial or district treasury.
When representation was not possible, provision was made for
assistance to illiterate accused before the commencement of
the trial, as follows:
"In order to give equal facility to all and every
accused person, the tenor of the said Act of Indictment
shall be communicated to all persons in custody ... ; and
consequently to all Hottentots, Free-Blacks, and
Slaves, to whom, in case of their not being able to
read, the same shall be read and explained."[S 37]
Due proof that this had been done was to be entered on the
record, its absence making the indictment null and void.[S
37]
After the indictment was communicated to the prisoner, he
was required to furnish the prosecutor with the names of his
witnesses and the latter was charged with the duty of
SUbpoenaing them.
The assistance provided for thus involved firstly, making
allowances for the accused's indigence in providing some
free legal assistance and limiting the operation of rules
requiring the payment of money, and secondly, attempting to
compensate for an accused's illiteracy or lack of legal
knowledge by making the procedure more comprehensible.
1. Theal vol XXXIII 76.
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1.2 THE COLEBROOK AND BRIGGE COMMISSION
In 1826 the Colonial Secretary, Lord Bathurst, appointed a
commission of inquiry, with Messrs Colebrook and Brigge as
members, to investigate the administration of criminal
justice in the Cape. The report of the Commission, submitted
in 1827,1 had a profound effect on the development in
general of South Africa's criminal justice system. The
Commission's analysis of the Cape criminal justice system
and its recommendations were based on the principle of
"equal and impartial justice" and thus had important
implications for the indigent and undefended accused.
A fundamental requirement for equality before the law, it
was declared, was the absence of procedural rules
discriminating on the basis of class, race or religion.
Although the Code of 1819 made a few references to the
doctrine of equal and impartial justice,2 the Commission
pointed out that it also contained discriminatory rules. In
the arrest of suspects, for example , the prosecutor did not
require court authority to arrest a person "beneath the rank
of Burghers or Christian Inhabitants",[S 27] a distinction
which the Commission described as "a great departure from
the principles of English jurisprudence, for which we do not
admit that any necessity existed".3
Furthermore, equality before the law implied the equal
1. Reproduced in Theal vol XXXIII 1-388.
2. See s 77, 145.
3. Theal vol XXXIII 89.
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application of rules and enforcement of rights. The
Commission noted that the limited protection afforded to
non-Burghers in theory was not always enforced in practice.
The requirement that after arrest non-Burghers had to be
brought before court within 24 hours was not duly observed
and the commissioners were "much impressed with a belief
that great laxity [had] prevailed in the practice as
respected this large class of the community". [72] They also
found that great delays occurred in bringing slaves and
Hottentots charged with petty thefts to trial and that the
imprisonment before the trial was equal in some cases to the
imprisonment ordered by the sentence. [55]
Where inequality existed in the wider society, the
Commission's approach was that it should not intrude on the
administration of justice. Particular attention was paid to
securing equal and impartial justice for the "servile"
classes, particularly in view of the limited legal
representation they enjoyed. [77, 82] The commission
recommended the appointment by the state, for trials in the
superior court, of a "professional person for the defence of
Hottentots and slaves, who ... comprised so large a portion
of the delinquents". [128] This person, called the 'Guardian
of Hottentots and slaves', would also be at the service of
other indigent accused. If he was not available, the
Commission suggested the introduction of the "dockbrief" - a
prisoner could name any advocate in court to represent him,




The Commission stressed the importance of review by the
Governor for those who did not enjoy representation:
"It should be observed that the prisoners tried and
sentenced by the landdrost and heemraden and by the
commissioned members of the court of circuit have not
the benefit of legal advice or assistance during the
trial or in preparing their appeals and are therefore
entitled to every remedy which the best legal opinions
may suggest to the Governor in the execution of his
great power of confirming or mitigating their
punishment. "[31]
At the same time, however, the commissioners also questioned
the efficacy of the protection that the governor's review of
the proceedings of inferior courts afforded accused persons.
The review was never conducted with the assistance of the
assessors appointed for that purpose and the Governor never
gave reasons for any decision. [31] That the scrupulous
review of the proceedings of the lower courts was necessary,
is apparent from the evidence of the fiscal of that time,
who complained about the great disparities in sentences
passed by different lower courts for the same type of
crime, and the "occasionally observed great defects of form
in criminal proceedings taking place before Landdrost and
Heemraden".[236]
The second strand of "equal and impartial justice" was the
requirement that the jUdiciary should be impartial -
firstly, in deciding matters between the state and the
individual, involving its independence of the Executive, and
secondly, in ensuring the equal treatment of all accused
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irrespective of class or race differences. Both these
aspects had relevance for the undefended accused who was
generally disadvantaged in his competition with the state
and, at the same time, usually belonged to a class or group
sUbjected to discrimination.
The Commission criticized the failure in the Cape to
maintain a clear distinction between the adjudicatory and
prosecution functions of court officials. The fiscal not
only prosecuted in the Court of Justice but also acted as
its vice-president and could, and did, perform both
functions. [50, 63, 234] This was true also of the landdrosts
who acted as prosecutors in the circuit court and presided
over the board of the landdrost and heemraden in a jUdicial
capacity. This meant that persons with too great an
affiliation to the state jUdged issues between the state and
the individual. The Commission thus recommended that the
performance of adjUdicatory and prosecutorial duties by the
same officers of the court should cease. [115] The absence of
jury trials - which embody the principle that the decision
maker in respect of facts is totally autonomous from the
state - was also questioned by the commission. [89-90]
A serious problem in the endeavour to achieve impartiality
was the fact that few of the jUdicial officers were
professionally qualified for their task. The commissioners
expressed this danger as follows:
"The principle objection, however, to which we think the
criminal process is liable, consists in the attribution
of the whole of the jUdicial functions to a body of men
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not sufficiently instructed in the law to give weight
and respectability to their decisions, yet too slightly
distinguished or removed from the Ordinary class of the
population to be exempt from the suspicion of local or
popular influence."[89]
They concluded that the pronounced class antagonisms between
the Burghers and the 'servile' classes also found expression
in the practice of the courts. [9-10]
Impartial justice was to be pursued in the superior
court through the introduction of the jury system. Although
jury members were to be appointed "without distinction of
colour", they had to be "respectable inhabitants of free
condition over the age of twenty one years and householders
or occupiers of houses or leases for terms not less than
three years". [114] No person of the Christian faith should
be tried by a jury whose members were not of the same
religion. [113] The Commission was aware, however, that these
jury trials were to be conducted in a society where class
and racial differences and prejudices were rife. In order to
avoid overt racial bias in jury decisions, they recommended
that "'Bushmen', prize negroes during their term of
indenture, individuals of the frontier tribes then under
contracts of service, and slaves" were to be exempted from
being tried by a jury because of "the peculiar relation in
which all these classes [stood] towards the great body of
inhabitants". [112] The Commission did not wish to exclude
the Hottentots and "bastaard races" from the rights and
benefits of the jury system, but in order to protect them
"against prejudice and sometimes hostile feelings" of jury
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members, who would mostly be Burghers, they were given the
choice whether to opt for a trial by jury or by a jUdge
alone, such choice to be exercised on their behalf by their
official guardian. [113]
In respect of the lower courts the Commission recommended
that the system of lay justice in the Board of Landdrost and
Heemraden should be replaced by a system of trained
magistrates. [115]
Prosecutors, too, came under criticism. The principle that
the prosecutor's goal was the attainment of justice, making
him an impartial "adversary", was not honoured in practice.
While prosecutors had been instructed by the Batavian
Government to "lay open to the court everything which could
plead as well for, as against the accused, without keeping
back or concealing anything relative thereto", [77] the
history and practice of the office of the fiscal did not
accord with this ideal. Under the regime of the Dutch East
India Company the task of the fiscal was to protect the
interests of the company vis ~ vis the inhabitants, and not
to be an impartial investigator. [62] Furthermore, he had
until 1825, a share equal to those of the colonial treasury
and the customs house official or informer in the revenue
produced by the penalties and forfeitures resulting from
infringements of the Company's regulations. 1
1. 43. A practice prohibited by Ord of October 1825 clause
18, Theal vol XXXIII 86.
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The commissioners pointed out the practical consequences of
prosecutorial partiality:
"The spirit of this injunction [ t o impartiality] is not
always observed in the addresses of the Public
Prosecutors, and perhaps is less necessary where the
prisoners have a right to the assistance of an advocate
pro Deo, but upon the Circuit where the Landdro~t is
the prosecutor whither the advocates have not hltherto
proceeded, the prisoners are exposed to the full weight
of local influence and to the effects of their own
unassisted ignorance."[77]
Here is encapsulated the particular relevance of
impartiality (judicial and prosecutorial) in respect of the
undefended accused.
The Commission's analysis and recommendations thus
articulated the basic principles of equal and impartial
justice, which were to be pursued by the introduction of the
English law of criminal procedure and evidence. [129] The
principle of equality between accused of all classes and
races, and between the accused and the state, was seen to be
essential to the whole system of criminal procedure.
Equality between accused persons meant, firstly, the absence
of any discriminatory rules, and secondly, if inequality
existed in the wider society, the presence of positive rules
to remedy that inequality. Rights should thus extend to all
accused persons alike, and where some were precluded from
their benefits because of their 'servile' position in
society, due to status, class or race differences, specific
rules were required to make their rights a reality. In the
Supreme Court where the right to legal representation was
recognized, an accused's indigence would preclude him from
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the benefit of a legal practitioner. The provision of legal
aid to such an accused was thus required.
In the lower courts where legal representation was not
allowed, the dispensing of justice would be wholly dependent
upon the jUdicial officer. Of great importance then was the
principle of impartial justice that the court should treat
as equal all classes of accused, and the accused as against
the state. Thus the jUdicial officer had to be independent
of the Executive and sUfficiently professionalized to be
capable of escaping the influence of local prejudice. The
interdependence of equal and impartial justice was clear.
The extension of procedural rights to all accused would fail
if jUdicial officers exhibited a pro prosecution bias.
Moreover, because the majority of accused persons were not
members of the dominant class, they were particularly
vulnerable to partiality. Only through a professional and
impartial jUdicial officer could equal justice be attained.
1.3 1828-1910
The Charter of Justice of 24 August 18271 implemented the
principal recommendations of the Colebrook and Brigge
Commission regarding the general structure of the courts and
a uniform adversary mode of procedure. Provision was made
for the establishment of a Supreme Court and the Governor
was authorized to establish inferior courts with a limited
1. Reproduced in Theal vol XXXII 274-292.
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, , 'd' t' 1 H of the~entenclng Jurls lC lone owever, none
recommendations aimed at the extension of rights to the
'servile' classes was accepted. In a letter from Viscount
Goderick to Major-General Bourke explaining why not all the
proposals of the Commission had been accepted, these
recommendations were not even mentioned.
2
By ignoring the
Commission's clear identification of inequality amongst
accused and its proposals to prevent such from pervading the
administration of justice, the governing regime displayed
its unwillingness to pursue actively the ideal of equal
justice.
Ordinance 40 of 1828 continued the anglicization of criminal
procedure and established the adversary mode of procedure on
which the South African criminal procedure is based.
3
Legal
representation was allowed at trials in the Supreme Court,
but a prisoner was not entitled to the assistance of a legal
advisor during the preparatory examination;4 nor was he
allowed, as of right, access to his friends or legal
advisors before his committal for trial in the Supreme
Court, although the magistrate could authorize such
access.[S 38] On the other hand, some limited safeguards
for the accused were introduced. At the preparatory
examination before a trial in the Supreme Court, the
accused, when asked his
1. Ordinance 33 of 1927 abolished the Board of Landdrost and
Heemraden and established the court of the resident magistrate.
2. Letter dated 3 August 1827, Theal vol XXXIV 254.
3. SA strauss "The Development of Law of Criminal Procedure
since the Union" 1960 Acta Juridica 157; Dugard 26.
4. Ord 40 of 1828 s 39.
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response to the charge, had to be warned that he was not
required to make any statement that might incriminate him
and that what he said could be used in evidence against
him.[S 34] These provisions established two important
principles: firstly, the accused's right to silence was
extended to all aspects of the proceedings, and secondly, it
was the court's duty to inform the accused of his legal
rights.
An indirect but effective method of control over the
detention of accused persons was the imposition of a duty on
the keepers of gaols in the district of Cape Town to deliver
to the Supreme Court at each session a list of all persons
detained, specifying the date of commitment of each
prisoner, the cause of imprisonment and the name of the
committing magistrate.[S 56] In the other districts the
lists were sent to the circuit court.[S 57] To ensure an
expeditious trial, a prisoner who was not brought to trial
at the second session of the Supreme court held after the
date of committal, was discharged from prison [S 58-59] and
could not be recommitted to gaol either for examination or
for trial for the same offence.[S 62] The importance of
these controlling devices was that they functioned
independently of the accused. Thus, where the accused was
unrepresented, the right to a speedy trial was not dependent
upon on his knowledge or skill to enforce it.
Ordinance 72 of 1830 further professionalized the criminal
process by the introduction of the English law of evidence,
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either by specific rules or by reference. The second Charter
of Justice of 18321 reaffirmed the principles spelt out in
the first Charter and firmly established the English law of
procedure at the Cape.
The most important changes thereafter were the opening of
the lower courts to legal practitioners and the institution
of automatic review of the proceedings of these courts. In
1856 the right to legal representation was extended to the
court of the resident magistrate, although there was still
no provision for representation at the preparatory
examination. 2 At the same time a system of automatic
judicial review of certain lower court cases was introduced.
In cases where sentences of more than a £5 fine or
imprisonment exceeding one month or a whipping of more than
12 lashes were imposed,3 the record of the case was to be
submitted to a jUdge for review. 4 If it appeared to him that
the proceedings were in accordance with "real and
substantial justice", he endorsed a certificate to that
effect.[S 47] If not, the jUdge had to lay the case before a
full court of review which had the power to affirm, alter or
reverse the conviction or sentence, or remit the case back
to the magistrate with instructions on how to deal with the
matter.[s 48] The court could also direct that a question of
law or fact be argued by the Attorney-General and an
1. Proclamation of 13 February 1834.
2. Ord 20 of 1856 s 45.
3. All sentences involving a whipping of an adult were
made reviewable by Act 21 of 1876 s 5.
4. JUdges of the Eastern Districts were given similar powers
of review by Act 10 of 1865 s 2.
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advocate appointed by the court.[S 48J The Court could alter
a sentence only if an irregularity was committed. Where the
sentence appeared to have been "unusually or unnecessarily
severe", the Court or the convicted person could make
representation to the Governor for the mitigation of the
sentence.[S 49J
The concurrence of legal representation being extended to
the lower courts and the establishment of automatic review
was not coincidental. The institution of review was not
designed primarily for the protection of the undefended
accused, as cases were reviewable irrespective of whether or
not the accused was defended. The principal objective was
instead the guidance and the control of the lower courts
whose jUdicial officers, usually not legally qualified, were
confronted for the first time with legal practitioners whose
possibly unscrupulous use of superior knowledge could
perhaps lead to miscarriages of justice. The impact of this
procedure, however, lay in the creation of the opportunity
for the Supreme Court to review on a regular basis the
proceedings of the lower courts, and the undefended accused
would undoubtedly have benefitted from this.
The rules of the magistrates' court of 18561 contained a few
provisions of general application that could have assisted
the undefended accused. In order to avoid unnecessary delays
in the proceedings, the absence of the prosecutor on the day
of the hearing led to the dismissal of
1. Annexed to the Ordinance 20 of 1856 issued in terms of s 59.
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the charge or complaint. 1 If an accused was unable to
afford the costs for sUbpoenaing a defence witness, the
clerk of the court would subpoena the witness free of charge
if such witness was, in the opinion of the clerk, "material
and necessary" to the defence of the accused. [Rule 69J
In 1886 the accused was declared a competent but not
compellable witness. 2
1.4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE 'NATIVE TERRITORIES'
with the annexation and incorporation into the Cape of the
Transkeian Territories in 1884,3 the legal colonization of
the territory followed swiftly. The Native Territories'
Penal code4 contained both substantive and procedural
English criminal law. In the absence of a superior court in
the territory, a special court, consisting of the chief
magistrate and two resident magistrates, was created with
substantive and sentencing jurisdiction similar to that of
the Cape Supreme Court.[S 251] The chief magistrate also
performed the automatic review function of the Supreme
5Court. The Governor could promulgate general rules of
court,[S 257] and until this had been done the rules of the
court of the resident magistrate
1. Rule 74. It repealed Ord 8 of 1852 art 6 which attached
no consequences to the non-appearance of the prosecutor.
2. Act 13 of 1886 s 6. Act 24 of 1886 s 263 incorporated the
same rule for the Transkei.
3. EA Walker ~ History of South Africa (1968) 394.
4. Act 24 of 1886.
5. S 259. This function was abolished by Act 35 of 1901 s 9
and was assumed by the Eastern Districts Local Division.
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were applicable "as far as the circumstances of the country
[would] admit".[S 265] Hardly any attention was given,
however, to accommodating local custom and procedures. The
proceedings of the court were conducted in English with
provision being made for interpretation into the local Black
languages.[S 260] The most significant procedural innovation
was the institution of "Native assessors". The resident
magistrate had the discretion to call not more than five
assessors, chosen from "the principal chiefs, councillors,
headmen and others" who appeared on a list compiled by the
magistrate, "to aid him in the hearing of any trial with a
view to the advantages derivable from their observations,
and particularly in the examination of witnesses".[S 262]
Their role was merely advisory as the final decision vested
in the magistrate, although their opinion, given separately,
could be recorded and formed part o f the proceedings to be
forwarded for review.[S 262] The special court had similar
powers to call upon local assessors.[S 262] There was thus
no creation of separate courts with different procedures for
the Black population; functioning within the equal justice
doctrine, one uniform procedure was followed which made some
allowances for cultural differences.
1.5. CONCLUSION
The introduction of a professionalized adversary procedure,
coupled with the recognition of the right to legal
representation, created two classes of accused, those who
could afford legal assistance, and the indigent majority who
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remained unrepresented. Equal justice before the law as
between accused persons was, however, limited to the absence
of discriminatory rules and the rights of accused were
formulated in universal terms. Scant recognition was given
to the existence of inequality amongst accused persons in
the wider society which would render most of these rights
inaccessible to the indigent and ignorant accused. That
indigence could preclude equality before the law was
recognized only so far as the sUbpoenaing of material and
necessary defence witnesses was concerned.
Commissioners Colebrook and Brigge had espoused the
principle that for rights to be equally extended to all
accused, it was not sufficient to establish rights in
universal and non-discriminatory terms. The possible grounds
of inequality were to be recognized and rules had to be
formulated specifically to prevent the intrusion of those
grounds in the administration of justice. The Cape
Legislature failed to implement this principle. Instead, the
law was increasingly professionalized and the effects of
inequality in resources and education amongst accused
persons became even more pronounced, hindering the




The criminal procedure of Natal closely followed the law of
the Cape. The most important innovation in Natal was the
establishment of a separate court system for the prosecution
of Black accused for certain offences.
2.1. ORDINARY COURTS
When Natal became an autonomous district of the Cape Colony
in 1845,1 a magistrate was appointed2 and a superior
court, called the District Court of Natal, was established
in the same year. 3 The Cape law of criminal procedure was
adopted. 4
various rules governed the issue of legal representation.
The accused had no right of access to friends or legal
advisers while in custody for a preparatory examination in
the magistrates' court, although the magistrate had the
power to allow such access. 5 Nor was a legal advisor
allowed to assist the accused during the preparatory
examination.[S 44] Access thereafter was sUbject to the
discretion of the magistrate and such reasonable
restrictions as"he might impose. 6 In the District Court
1. EH Brooks & C de B Webb ~ History of Natal (1965) 54.
2. Ord 12 of 1845 (C) s 2. This ordinance was complemented by
Ord 16 of 1846 authorizing the appointment of resident
magistrates, s 1.
3. Ord 14 of 1845 (C) s 1.
4. Ord 18 of 1845 (C) for the District Court and Ord 12 of
1845 (C) s 2 for the magistrates' court.
5. Ord 18 of 1845 (C) s 43.
6. Law 16 of 1861 s 4. Law 6 of 1870 s 11 allowed access
to prisoners at all reasonable times as determined by the
magistrate.
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the accused had the right to representation at the trial
but, as in the Cape, the right did not extend to
1
preliminary proceedings.[S 44] The District Court rules,
which contained many complex provisions regarding technical
objections to the charge, [Rule 30] challenges to the jury
[Rule 9] and special pleas, [Rule 30] spelt out the role and
duties of counsel during the trial. 2 Nowhere, however, was
special consideration or attention given to the undefended
accused and legal assistance for indigent accused was not
mentioned. Although in forma pauperis proceedings were
possible in civil matters,3 no mention was made in the rules
of the Supreme Court (as the District Court was
reconstituted by Law 10 of 1857) of pro Deo counsel for
indigent accused, and the Court did not, as a general rule,
assign counsel to defend accused in forma pauperis. 4 The
Court also did not have the power to assign an attorney to
conduct a review in forma pauperis on behalf of an accused
convicted and sentenced in a magistrates' court to a term of
.. 5
lmprlsonment.
The rules of the Supreme Court of 1859, however, attempted
to bring legal assistance within the reach of some Black
accused by placing a limit on the legal fees they could be '
charged. No attorney could charge a Black accused in the
1. Rules of the District Court, annexed to Ord 32 of 1846.
2. Cf rule 37.
3. See Rule of the Supreme court Order 10 rule 1/4 in JJ
Hillier Rules of the Supreme Court of the Colony of Natal
(1906) 21. -- ----
4. Lutyityi (1880) 2 NLR 62.
5. Ex parte Malcolm (1893) 14 NLR 192.
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Supreme Court more than three guineas without the approval
of the Secretary of Native Affairs.
1
This amount was
increased in 1906 to ten guineas. 2 In 1863 Chief Justice
Harding suggested that a fund should be set up to cover
legal costs of Black accused, but this suggestion never
found favour with the Lt-Governor or with the British
3government.
The only provision made for the indigent accused was the
duty imposed upon the clerk of the court to subpoena
material and necessary witnesses on his behalf.
4
Language
and cultural differences between accused persons were
recognized only in the requirement that the indictment had
to be read to the accused by the registrar and explained "if
need be by him or the court interpreter".5 Since most
undefended accused would also have been labouring under
language differences, this would have assisted them.
1. Rules of 30 November 1859, Cadiz Statutes of Natal (1874)
vol 11 1332.
2. Rules of the Supreme Court (1906) order 40 rule 1, Hillier
QE cit 105.
3. PR Spiller "Criminal Justice in the Early Supreme Court
(1858-1874)" (1983) 7 SACC 125 137.
4. In the Supreme Court it also included the fees of such
witnesses, Law 33 of 1865 s 3i Law 13 of 1888 s 3.
In the lower courts, see rules of the
court of the resident magistrate (1 September 1846) in
WJD Moodie Ordinances, Proclamations relating to the Colony
of Natal 1836 to 1855 Vol 2 (1856) 339, rule 8; rules of
the court of the resident magistrate (1878) rule 8i rules
and regulations of the inferior courts of justice of colony
of Natal (6 December 1890) rule 6; rules of the
court of the magistrate (5 June 1897) rule 10; rules of the
magistrates'court (1 December 1906) rule 12.
5. Rules of the court of the resident magistrate (1 september
1846) rule 29.
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Some of the rights of general application recognized in the
District court rules would also have benefitted the
undefended accused. During the preparatory examination the
magistrate had to warn the accused, who would always have
been unrepresented at this stage, that he need not say
anything to the charge, and that if he did, it could be used
' d 't h' 1 A d h d t b b ht tas eVl ence agalns lm. n accuse a 0 e roug 0
trial within two sessions of the court from the date of his
committal for trial. 2 If the state failed to proceed with
the trial within that period, the accused was entitled to a
discharge from imprisonment, although this was not regarded
as an acquittal. 3
The Cape institution of automatic review of some of the
proceedings of the lower court was first introduced in Natal
in 1887. All sentences of more than three months'
imprisonment or 25 lashes were sent for review by a jUdge in
chambers.
4
The system did not take root and
was abolished in 1896,5 not to be revived until 1917. This
meant that for a substantial period of time there was no
routine control over the proceedings in the lower courts.
From the first days of the colony, jury trials were a feature
1. Act 14 of 1864 s 2.
2. S 65 and 69. See also AN Montgomery The Natal Magistrate
(1878) 273.
3. See Trammer (1905) 26 NLR 318.
4. Law 27 of 1887 s 5. Further minor changes were effected
by Law 22 of 1889.
5. Act 22 of 1896 s 3.
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of the proceedings in the superior court.
1
The jury trial
would have been of assistance to many accused since justice was
dispensed by their peers and not by a state appointed judge.
Although Blacks were not excluded from jury duty, "natives
who [had] not obtained their exemption from the operation of
the native law under Law 28 of 1865", were not eligible.
2
By 1874 there was still no record of any Black who was
sufficiently qualified to be placed on a jury list.
3
As
Spiller remarks: "Blacks were invariably tried by the
racially different, dominant class of their neighbourhood".4
The failure to ensure an impartial decisionmaker through
this method was succinctly expressed by Connor J in 1872:
"[The right] that a man shall be tried by his peers,
i.e. by those whose habits and ideas are similar to his
own, is not conceded to the kaffirs of this colony, and
the result is, what might be anticipated, a complete
failure to secure the good sought tg be obtained by the
establishment of the principle .•• "
In the ordinary courts the principle of equal and impartial
justice was pursued through the enactment of formally non-
discriminatory rules which were of universal application.
Little cognizance was taken of the inequality which existed
among accused. The indigent accused were not routinely
provided with legal assistance and there were only a few
attempts to make the process more accessible to Black
accused, for whom the law, procedure and language were alien.
1. Act 14 of 1864 s 2.
2. Law 10 of 1871 s 4.
3. Spil ler ~ cit 137.
4. Ibid. ---
5. Natal Mercury 2 July 1872 as quoted by Spiller ~ cit 138.
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2.2. THE 'NATIVE' COURTS
The most important feature of the Natal legislation was the
creation of a separate court system for the Black
population. Reacting to the application of Roman-Dutch law
to all the inhabitants of Natal,l the British Government
issued the following instructions to the Lt-Governor of the
colony:
"And whereas the said district of Natal is inhabited by
numerous tribes ... whose ignorance and habits unfit them
for duties of civilized life and it is necessary to
place them under special control, until, having duly
been capacitated to understand such duties, they may
reasonably be required to render ready obedience to the
laws in force in the district .•. we have not interfered
with, or abrogated, any law, custom, or usage
prevailing among the inhabitants, except so far as the
same may be repugnant to the general principles of
humanity, recognized throughout the whole civilized
world .•• but that in all crimes committed by any of them
against the person or property of any of them, the said
Natives are ... to administer justice tow~rds each other
as they had been used in former times".
The justification underlying this provision appears to be a
recognition that the wholesale application of colonial law,
with all its complexities, to the Black population would
have created de facto inequality before the law as the
protection offered by the legal process would have been
inaccessible to an illiterate and culturally different
population group. The prosecution of Blacks in separate
courts applying customary law for intra-racial offences
would not prejudice these accused as the procedure
would be both simple and familiar.
1. Ord 12 of 1845 (C).
2. See Ord 3 of 1849 preamble; also Proc 21 June 1849 in
Cadiz ~ cit vol II 1488-9.
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The application of colonial law to the indigenous Black
population in respect of these disputes was thus revoked in
1849,1 and the courts of the "administrators of native law",
then established, had to administer justice according to
"native law".[S 2] This principle was not, however,
consistently applied and a Black could still be prosecuted,
with the consent of the prosecutor, in the ordinary courts
for crimes inter se which might be deemed "repugnant against
the general principles of humanity, recognized throughout
the civilized world".[S 7] A certain percentage of accused,
then, were to face the complexities of the ordinary colonial
procedure, as they did in any intergroup dispute.
In intergroup conflicts the customary law and procedure were
soon to be used, not to the advantage of the Black accused,
but to serve the interests of the White colonists.
In order "to more effectively check and punish the stealing
of cattle" from the white settlers,2 "native law" was used
because it was "better adapted to check the offence of
cattle stealing than the ordinary law of the district".3 To
effect this purpose, it was, however, "expedient to define,
modify and consolidate native law on the SUbject .•• and to
extend its operation to the theft of cattle committed by
natives under all circumstances",4 by creating a separate
court, redefining the offence and stipulating the penalties.
1. Ord 3 of 1849 s 2.
2. Ord 1 of 1855 title. This ordinance was repealed and re-
enacted again by Law 4 of 1868 and again by Law 10 of 1876.
3. Ord 1 of 1855 preamble.
4. Ibid. My italics.
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A "combined court" was established, composed of a jUdicial
assessor appointed by the Lt-Governor, the resident
magistrate and the chief of the tribe to which the culprit
belonged,l with a majority decision to be decisive.[S 9]
Group liability could be imposed on a village or a tribe
associated with the theft, along with a shifting of the
burden of proof. In relation to stock theft offences,
villagers had to exculpate themselves from the presence of
stolen cattle; failing that, the resident magistrate could
make compensatory orders against the whole village.[S 4-6]
The procedure followed was similar to that of the ordinary
magistrates' court,2 but the sentencing jurisdiction was
much more extensive than that of the latter; the court could
imprison an accused for up to three years, order a pUblic
whipping on three different occasions and confiscate all his
property.[S 1] There was no right of appeal, but
administrative control was exercised by the Lt-Governor, who
had to approve such sentences.[S 10] The court specifically
created to prosecute Blacks, neither applied customary law,
nor implemented the safeguards of the ordinary procedure. By
applying discriminatory rules it was in conflict with the
basic requirement of the principle of equal justice, namely
that laws should apply equally to all.
In 1875 the Native High Court was established,3 with
1. S 8. If the accused had no chief, or the chief himself was
a socius, the former two persons would constitute the court,
s 8.
2. See rules of court, Moodie ~ cit 376.
3. Law 27 of 1875.
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jurisdiction to try according to native law most offences
committed by Blacks inter se. The dual system of justice,
initiated by the creation of the courts of the
administrators of native law,l was thus complete. The Court
consisted of a (White) judge, who could be assisted by an
administrator of native law or native chiefs or other native
officers as assessors.[S 7] The rules of court were compiled
by an all-White board consisting of the Chief Justice, the
Attorney-General and the Secretary of Native Affairs, the
judge of the Native High Court and three other magistrates
or justices of the peace.[S 10] The Court had both a trial
and an appellate function. 2 It could try "offences of a
political character" at the discretion of the Attorney-
General, faction-fighting when the latter decided that the
provisions of the native law were more appropriate, or any
offence specially provided for by statute.[S 6] At the trial
the judge could exclude legal representation in certain
classes of cases, as determined by him. 3 Local conditions
were accommodated to a limited extent; "native messengers"
could subpoena other Blacks orally [Rule 8] and the court
proceedings could be conducted in a native
language. [Rule 8] In prosecutions before this Court,
the Code of Native Law of 18784
1. Ord 3 of 1849 s 2.
2. Hearing appeals from decisions of the administrators of
native law, Law 10 of 1876 s 8.
3. Rules of conduct,of Business in the Native High Court,
7 October 1878, Cadlz Q£ cit vol 11 1429 rule 11. Similar
provisions in respect of the courts of administrators of
native law, Law 44 of 1887 s 4.
4. Drafted by the Board i n terms of Act 27 of 1875 s 10,
pUblished in Government Notice 194 of 21 June 1878.
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made the eviqence of an accomplice admissible [S 60] and the
accused could be examined by the Court "on the subject of
the accusation".[S 59]
The special court for the prosecution of cattle theft cases
was continued, now with the jUdicial officer a judge of the
Native High Court, sitting alone or with assessors.
1
The
proceedings were conducted in English2 and the right of
legal representation was not recognized. [Rule 14] In the
absence of legal assistance, there were attempts to make the
court process, which was modelled on the magistrates' court
procedure, more accessible to the Black accused. The court
was empowered to permit the accused "such aid in cross-
examination of any witness in the case as would by Native
usage be allowed". [Rule 21] To assist the indigent accused,
material and necessary witnesses for the defence would be
subpoenaed by the clerk of the court. [Rule 15] The Supreme
Court's appellate and review jurisdiction over these
proceedings was specifically excluded,[S 16] and the Lt-
Governor maintained administrative control over them.[S 15]
A temporary decline of the separate court system for Blacks
was heralded in 1894 by the provision that an appeal from
the Native High Court could be pursued in the Natal Supreme
1. Law 27 of 1875 s 14.
2. Rules of court, rule 25, in Cadiz QE cit vol II 1438.
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court. 1 In the following year, both the Native High Court
and the 'cattle court' were abolished2 and the Supreme Court
and the magistrates' court respectively exercised
jurisdiction in their place.[S 8J The uniform court
structure was reaffirmed in 1896 with the express provision
that the Supreme Court "shall have jurisdiction in all cases
whether affecting Europeans or Natives".3
The Native High Court was revived once again in 1898, and
the court of the administrator of native law was renamed the
court of the resident magistrate in native cases.
4
It was
said that the resuscitation of the Native High Court was
occasioned by the additional court work caused by the
annexation of Zululand in 1897. 5 It had jurisdiction over
all "native cases",[S 25 and 26] Hottentots and Griquas
being included in the category "native".[S 1J Its
substantive jurisdiction covered most intra-racial offences6
and its sentencing jurisdiction was the same as that of the
Supreme Court except for the death penalty,[S 30J a power
granted by one of the last acts of the Natal parliament. 7
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the Native High Court
was again expressly excluded.[S 26J
In Zululand the chiefs' courts were recognized, although
1. Act 2 of 1894 s 2.
2. Act 13 of 1895 s 1.
3. Act 39 of 1896 s 6.
4. Act 49 of 1898. See ES Henochsberg "The Passing of the
Natal Native High Court" (1954) 71 SALJ 221 224.
5. Henochsberg ~ cit 224.
6. See s 6 & 29.
7. Act 30 of 1910 (N) s 1.
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they had limited jurisdiction to try offences committed by
members of their own tribe according to "native law".[S 63]
The rules of the Native High Court of 1903 1 contained a
few provisions in which the interests of the undefended accused
were accommodated. If the accused was in gaol and undefended,
then the person who served the indictment on him had to ask
whether there were any material witnesses required to be
summoned. These witnesses would then be summoned by the
registrar of the Native High Court, free of charge. [Rule 16]
Before a plea of guilty was accepted, care had to be taken
"to discriminate in cases of an admission whether the full
legal meaning and effect thereof be fully understood
by the prisoner. In all instances of silence on the
part of the prisoner, or doubt as to the mea~ing or
intention of his admission, a plea of not guilty must
be recorded."[Rule 22]
A provision for civil litigants to be represented by "any
near male relative or inmate of their kraal",[Rule 61] was
not extended to criminal cases.
An indirect measure of control was achieved by imposing a
duty on the governor of each gaol to submit monthly
returns to the registrar of the Native High Court "of every
native in his custody who [was] accused of any crime
cognizable by the Native High Court".[Rule 49]
The effectiveness of the Native High Court from the
prosecuting point of view must have been apparent, as its
1. Of 16 June 1903 issued in terms of Act 49 of 1898 s 71.
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jurisdiction was extended in 1899 to include accused persons
to whom "native law" would have been alien. "For the better
prevention of cattle stealing"l the definition "native"
not only included Griquas and Hottentots but also
"illegitimate children of mixed European and native
parentage and their descendants",[S 5] and for some offences
even "Asiatics".[S 63]
The establishment of separate criminal courts to try Blacks
according to customary law had the potential to limit
unequal justice in an unequal society. While the accused
would have been deprived of the benefit of any protective
measures provided for in the colonial criminal proceedings,
the full application of customary law would have benefitted
Black accused in the settlement of intra-racial disputes.
The fact that accused were not defended would not be a
source of inequality amongst accused since none were
defended, or as between the prosecutor and the accused,
because the procedure was simple and familiar to the latter.
Customary law was not, however, used solely to settle intra-
group conflicts nor was it applied in its entirety. Instead,
its repressive features were effectively used to prosecute
Blacks for offences involving White interests, while the
more accessible customary law and procedure was diluted. The
1. See Act 1 of 1899 title, my italics.
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result of this selective use of customary law is best
described by a practitioner of those days, JB Moodie. As
counsel for Chief Langalibalele, who faced a charge of
treason in 1874, he commented on the procedure as follows:
"All the disadvantages of both systems, English and
Kafir, were arrayed against him. He had the advantages
of neither. While on the one hand there was a
systematic and consistent prosecution, there was, on the
other, none of the laxity of native law. While the
prosecution availed itself of one of the privileges of
native law, namely, to find a man guilty yithout
evidence, it gave him nothing in return".
The Black accused tried in the separate courts were doubly
prejudiced. They were faced with repressive rules, distilled
from customary law, without the benefit of the full
customary law and did not enjoy the same protection as
accused prosecuted in the ordinary courts. They had neither
a right to legal representation nor any legal recourse to
the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court. The separate
criminal courts created for Blacks thus became just one more
part of a system weighted heavily against the achievement of
equal justice for the indigent and illiterate accused.
1. Quoted by D Welsh Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in




The first constitutional document of the South African
Republic, the Thirty Three Articles of 1844,1 was a
conglomeration of substantive offences, procedural rules,
punishments and election procedures for the volksraad.
2
Trial by jury was established but "bastaards,,3 were
excluded from jury duty. [Art 6] A person could be
represented in court although this need not necessarily be
by a lawyer. [Art 16] The actual mode of procedure was not
specified and in practice ranged from "the accusatorial
procedure in its most primitive form to a moderate type of
inquisitorial procedure".4
The Grondwet of 1858 and Bijlage No ~5 enacted largely
the Cape adversary mode of proceedings.
6
Although the
1. Drawn up at Potchefstroom 9 April 1844 and ratified at
Derdepoort 23 May 1849, in ss Barber, WA MacFadyen & JHL
Findlay statute Law of the Transvaal (1901) 1. For the
earlier history of the administration of justice during the
Groot Trek, see JV van der Westhuizen & D van der Merwe
"Geskiedenis van die Regspleging in die Transvaal
(1835-1952)" (1976) 9 De Jure 250.
2. Cf Van der Westhuizen & Van der Merwe 1976 De Jure 250---257.
3. The word used to describe persons of 'mixed blood'.
4. Dugard 29, 30. See also Ellison Kahn "The History of the
Administration of Justice in the South African Republic"
(1958) 75 SALJ 294 297-299. See also Van der
Westhuizen~ander Merwe 1976 De Jure 256.
5. In F Jeppe & JG Kotze De Lokalen-wette der Zuid-
Afrikaanse Republiek (1849=1885) (1887). --
6. JG K[otze] "The Administration of Justice in the South
African Republic (Transvaal) "(1919) 36 SALJ 128 132. See
also Van der Westhuizen & Van der Merwe 1977 De Jure
92 95.
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Grondwet enshrined racial discrimination ("Het volk wil
geene gelijkstelling van gekleurden met blank ingezeten
toestaan, noch in Kerk noch in staat" [S 9]), the only
expression that this policy found in criminal procedure was
that no White person could be sentenced to a whipping.[S
149] This rule was slowly whittled down until there was no
explicit distinction based on colour.
1
The criminal code of 18642 was based on the Cape
Ordinances 40 of 1828 and 72 and 73 of 1830, and introduced
the Cape procedure almost in its entirety.3 The code made
reference to the doctrine of equality, and in a few
instances affirmatively extended rights to accused who were
disadvantaged by their socio-economic position. section 27
read:
"In order to do equal justice to all accused persons in
the conduct of criminal proceedings, the state attorney
shall cause the service of the indictment mentioned in
Art. 25 to be effected upon all prisoners and persons
accused of crimes, without distinction of person,
consequently also upon free blacks or Kaffirs, and if
they cannot read, the indictment shall be read out and
explained by one of the officials, or if necessary by
an interpreter, which fact shall be duly recorded in
the minute book, as otherwise the progress of the case
might be stopped."
1. See Law 14 of 1880 s 14; Law 4 of 1888; Law 21 of 1892.
2. Ord 4 of 1864, but only ratified two years later in
substantially the same form by Ord 9 of 1866. See Jeppe &
Kotze 2E cit 185; K[otze] 2E cit 132.
3. K[otze] 2E cit 132; Van der Westhuizen & Van der Merwe
1977 De Jure 92 107.
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The code simultaneously contained explicit discriminatory
rules and provided that for "persons not being burghers or
Christian inhabitants or people of the same class" no
warrant of arrest was required.[S 41]
An accused had no right to legal representation during the
preparatory examination [S 88] but could be assisted during
the trial before the High court. 1 If he was an indigent,
there was the novel provision that the Court was obliged to
appoint a pro Deo advocate or law agent for his trial.[S 98]
The additional assistance of attorneys in pro Deo cases was,
however, disapproved of by the Volksraad. 2 A more
investigatory role was envisaged for the court, and the
jUdge and jury were free to put any question to a witness
that could "lead to the discovery or elucidation of the
truth".[S 84] The state attorney was accorded a supervisory
role and he could institute inquiries in respect of any
irregularities in the conduct of any case and "forthwith
redress the same".[S 14]
The rules of the lower courts3 obliged the state to sUbpoena
"important and necessary" witnesses for an indigent accused
[Rule 7] and provided for pro Deo counsel for appeal or
review proceedings. [Rule 17] The costs in criminal cases
would be borne by the state in respect of indigent
accused. 4
1. S 88. See also s 91.
2. Volksraad resolution 9 June 1870 art 172.
3. Issued in terms of Law 1 of 1874.
4. Volksraad resolution 21 June 1870 art 211.
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The code thus took into account the existence of inequality
amongst accused persons, and positively attempted to assist
the indigent through the granting of legal aid in the High
Court and dispensing with certain legal fees for which an
accused could be liable.
After the annexation of the Transvaal by Britain in 1877
1
the new Administrator, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the
architect of the "native" policy in Natal,2 introduced a
separate court system for Blacks. 3 The new dispensation for
Blacks was confirmed in 1885 after the retrocessation of the
Transvaal in 1881. 4 The policy was similar to that in Natal:
"The laws, habits and customs hitherto observed among
natives shall continue to remain in force in this
republic as long as they have not appeared to be
inconsistent with the general principles of
civilization recognized in the civilized world".[S 2]
The administration of justice was to be conducted by "Native
Commissioners" appointed by the State President. In a
district where no such commissioners were appointed, the
landdrost would perform these duties ex officio. The
offences over which the new court had jurisdiction were more
limited than in Natal. The court of the commissioner could
try minor offences of assault and theft [S 6] and other
offences determined by the State attorney after consultation
with the Superintendent of Native Affairs.[S 9] All other
offences committed by Blacks were
1. See Kahn ~ cit (1958) 75 SALJ 297.
2. Brooks & Webb ~ cit 58. ----
3. Law 11 of 1881. See also Kahn ~ cit 396.
4. Law 4 of 1885. ---
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tried in the ordinary courts "in the same manner as if the
crimes had been committed by persons of European descent".[S
11J There was no right to , legal representation in the
commissioners' court, but leave could be obtained from the
Superintendent of Native Affairs. [Rule 2J The prosecutors of
the ordinary court could conduct the prosecution in these
courts. [Rule 21J The rules regulating the conduct of the
proceedings merely reproduced the rules operative in the
ordinary lower courts. The control over these courts was not
entrusted to the Supreme Court; instead, the State
President, in conjunction with the Executive Council, could
review the proceedings.[S 7J The rationale given for the
creation of separate courts for Blacks - that they would
apply customary law and procedure - was never reflected in
the law. The procedural rules of the ordinary courts were
followed and the same jUdicial officers and prosecutors
applied them. Black accused were not, however, granted the
benefits of legal representation or the Supreme Court's
supervision. Separate courts were thus not designed to
assist illiterate or tribal Blacks by either fUlly embracing
customary law and procedure or incorporating the important
safeguards of the ordinary courts.
The annexation of the Transvaal by Britain in 1900 saw the
introduction of a court structure similar to that of the
cape,l while the existing rules of procedure and evidence
remained in force.[S 11J The Cape institution of automatic
1. Proc 6 of 1901 s 1, 6.
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review was introduced. At first, it was carried out
administratively by the "Legal Adviser of the Transvaal
Administrator" in relation to sentences passed by
magistrates that exceeded ~ 1 0 fines, three months'
1imprisonment, or 12 lashes, but by 1902 this duty was
assumed by the High Court of the Transvaal,2 which reviewed
sentences of the magistrates of more than three
, d h i 3months' imprisonment, a flne of ~ 2 5 an any w lpplng.
The separate courts for Blacks deviated even further from
the initial goal of applying customary law, to include
prosecutions for statutory offences. A "native court" with a
jurisdiction similar to a magistrates' court, was
established for Johannesburg,[S 56] to try all
contraventions of "provisions of any law or regulation
applicable exclusively to natives ll • 4
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1903, although more
comprehensive than all the other colonial codes, added
little to the existing law. The accused's rights were laid
out in general terms, with no special consideration being
given to special classes of accused, such as the indigent,
illiterate or undefended. For example, the accused's right
to counsel both at the preparatory examination and the trial
was acknowledged but no mention was made of pro Deo
1. Proc 19 of 1901 s 3.
2. Proc 14 of 1902 s 1. See also Ord 2 of 1902.
3. Proc 21 of 1902 s 39.
4. S 57. Proc 40 of 1902 s 1 further increased its
jurisdiction to include contraventions o f the Native Pass




The Transvaal statutes, with a few exceptions, incorporated
the principle of formal equality before the law, ie, the
absence of discriminatory rules. In the earlier republican
statutes, ironically, more cognizance was taken of the
existence of indigence and provision was made for legal
aid. The comprehensive code of 1903 failed to give
recognition to inequalities that could have existed amongst
accused persons and rights were expressed in general terms
with no attempt to extend equal justice to all accused.
The use of "native courts" for the prosecution of Blacks was
not as extensive in the Transvaal as in Natal, and little
attempt was made to incorporate customary law in its ·
procedure. The separate courts were eventually used not to
settle intra-racial disputes but to enforce "native" policy.
with the establishment of what were to become known as the
"pass courts", the justification for separate courts finally
fell away, since the intention was patently no longer to
apply customary law. In the face of political considerations
the doctrine of equality before the law was abandoned.
Little emphasis was placed upon a unified court structure
which formally, at least, would guarantee equal justice to
all accused.
Chapter 3
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The 1854 constitution of the new republic of the Orange Free
State provided for the basic regulation of the
administration of justice and expressed as fundamental the
principle of equal and impartial justice: "De wet is voor
alIen gelijk; met dien verstande, dat de rechter alle wetten
met onpartijdigheid zal uitoefen, sonder aanzien van
personen".[Art 58] The rules of criminal procedure of the
Orange Free State were based on the Cape Ordinances of 1828
and 1832 and few innovative measures were introduced. 1 Where
the rules were silent on a point the court had to follow the
Cape law. 2
At first the right to legal representation was not
recognized before or during the preparatory examination of
an accused,3 but both of these rights were granted in 1891. 4
During the trial the accused was entitled to employ a legal
practitioner, including a "wetsagent".5 If no lawyer was.
available, the accused could be assisted by any other person
approved by the Court. [Ch 4 s 57] No provision was made for
the representation of indigent accused, but reference was
made to pro Deo counsel who could be appointed for appeal
proceedings. 6 For the indigent accused provision was made
1. See rules issued on 31 May 1856 for the High Court and
rules of 27 September 1856 for lower courts. See also
Hahlo & Kahn South Africa 244.
2. High Court Rules 31 May 1856 rule 47.
3. Ord 4 of 1856 s 40, 41.
4. Wetboek of 1891 ch 8 s 45, 46.
5. Wetboek of 1891 ch 4 s 58.
6. High Court Rules 31 May 1856 rule 17; Wetboek of 1991 ch 8 s 1 5 0 ~
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that the prosecutor would subpoena defence witnesses free of
1charge.
In 1885 automatic review by the superior court was
introduced for sentences of the lower courts that exceeded
one month's imprisonment, fines of £ 1 0 or 15 lashes.
2
The
reviewing judge was called upon to certify whether the
proceedings were in accordance with "feitlijke recht en
billijkheid".3 He could not, however, withhold the
certificate merely because the sentence was "onnodiglik
overdreven of buitengewoon" but could in this event
recommend clemency to the state President. [Rule 167] If the
judge required argument on review, he could appoint counsel
for the accused. [Rule 169] Likewise, if the prosecutor
exercised his right to ask for a review of lower court
d i 4 th . .procee 1ngs, e Court of reV1ew could appo1nt counsel on
behalf of the accused. [Rule 176] Judicial control over the
detention of accused persons was facilitated by the
compulsory submission of lists of detainees by the prison
keepers at each session of the circuit court. 5
The colonization of the Orange Free state in 1900 by the
British brought the introduction of the Cape court structure
but little change in the law of criminal procedure. 6 The
1. Rules of the lower courts 27 September 1856 rule 7; See
also Wetboek of 1891 ch 4 schedule rule 142; ch 8 s 143.
2. Ord 5 of 1885 s 76; Wetboek of 1891 ch 4 s 76.
3. Wetboek of 1891 ch 4 schedule rule 166.
4. Wetboek of 1891 ch 4 s 77.
5. Ord 4 of 1856 s 61; Wetboek of 1891 ch 8 s 148.
6. Ord 7 of 1902 s 18.
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accused's right of access to friends and a legal advisor
while in custody prior to the preparatory examination was,
1however, revoked.
The criminal procedure of the republic of the Orange Free
state was a classic expression of the 19th century doctrine
of equal and impartial justice. The doctrine was enshrined
in the constitution and the procedure was characterised by
the absence of overtly discriminatory rules. However, there
was scant provision for the active pursuit of the ideal
and attempts to ensure that equal justice was meted out to
indigent and undefended accused were few and far between.
5. Ord 12 of 1902 s 44.
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5. SOUTH AFRICA 1910-1985
5.1. THE CONSOLIDATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 and the
Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1917 consolidated criminal
procedure in the various provinces. These acts, based on the
Transvaal Proclamation of 1903, contained few innovatory
measures. 1 The undefended accused received no attention in
the parliamentary debates preceding these Acts
2
and the
limited protective measures already applicable in the
provinces were adopted.
There was a recognition of the right to legal
representation during the preparatory examination3
as well as during the trial.[S 218] The only reference to
legal aid was in a provision to the effect that the counsel
assigned by the court to defend the accused pro Deo was
entitled to a copy of the record of the preparatory
examination free of charge.[S 93] The lack of legal
representation in criminal proceedings was clearly accepted,
as several sections referred to the "accused or his legal
representative".4
1. Strauss 1960 Acta Juridica 157 159.
2. Debates of the-HOuse of Assembly 2 March, 30, 31 May
1917.
3. Act 31 of 1917 s 97(2).
4. Eg the opening address to the court or jury, (s 221(4));
the exa mination o f wi tness e s (s 221(4)); addressing the
court (s 22 2) or jury (s 223) on the merits.
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Some provision was made that neither the accused's indigence
nor his ignorance should prevent him from participating
effectively in the trial. 'The clerk of the court had to
subpoena defence witnesses if he was satisfied that the
accused was indigent and the witnesses were "necessary and
material".[S 244(2)] To guard against the accused's
ignorance impeding his participation, the court was under a
general duty to explain the existence of some of his rights
to him, in particular, his right to remain silent, to
produce evidence,[S 74(1), 221(4)] and to challenge the
jury. [S 193]
The expeditious completion of proceedings was ensured by the
provision that the detention of awaiting trial prisoners was
to be limited to the duration of the court session for which
they were committed.[S 322-323] Furthermore, gaolers had to
submit a list of all unsentenced prisoners at each criminal
session to the circuit court, specifying the date of
admission and commitment, and the authority for the
imprisonment.[S 324]
The jury trial was maintained for trials in the Supreme
Court [S 165-214] but in "political trials" the Minister of
Justice could direct a trial without a jury.1 The accused
also had the right to choose a trial without a jury.[S
216(1)] In such cases the jUdge could summon two assessors
1. S 215. It was already provided for by Act 27 of 1914.
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to advise him on questions of fact.[S 216] This was
important for Black accused because the only exception,
introduced in 1931, to an all-White male jury, was an all-
White woman jury empanelled at the request of a female
1accused or a male under the age of 18 years. Whether,
however, the average Black accused was aware of this right,
what it meant and how to exercise it, is doubtful.
The system of automatic review was made uniform and extended
to the province of Natal. The function of this review, the
Minister of Justice declared in Parliament, "was [as] a
safeguard for the protection of people convicted before the
Magistrate".2 All sentences in which the punishment exceeded
three months' imprisonment, or fines of £ 2 5 or any whipping,
were sUbject to automatic review.[S 93] The whipping of
juveniles under the age of 16 years was excluded.[S 93]
The policy of separate courts for Black offenders was
partially continued when the courts of the native
commissioners were confirmed and extended by the Native
Administration Act 38 of 1927. The commissioners' courts had
concurrent and similar jurisdiction to that of the
magistrates' courts regarding any offence committed by a
Black,[S 9] and the procedure to be followed was exactly
the same as in the magistrates' court.[S 9] The
commissioners were, however', at liberty to call to their
assistance, in an advisory capacity, any native assessors
1. Act 20 of 1931.
2. Debates of the House of Assembly 27 Feb 1917.
Chapter 3 Page 103
they might deem necessary.[S 19(1)] The offences tried in
these courts were eventually limited to those committed by
Blacks under laws relating exclusively to Blacks.
1
The
chief's court was also retained with criminal jurisdiction
over members of the chief's tribe in respect of offences
punishable under native law and custom.[S 20(1)]
In 1926 the accused was afforded greater protection when the
Supreme Court was given the power to initiate review
proceedings mero motu when it was brought to its notice that
proceedings had not been in accordance with justice, even
though the case was not automatically reviewable. 2
In 1935, however, the scope of automatic review was narrowed
by the exclusion of all sentences of whipping of males below
the age of 21 years. 3 This process was continued by the
Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944. The sentence passed in
respect of each count - and not the cumulative effect of the
total sentence - would determine whether the case was
reviewable.[S 96(2)]
5.2 THE LANSDOWN COMMISSION
The Lansdown Commission, which reported in 1947,4 addressed
for the first time since the Colebrooke and Brigge
Commission 120 years before, the problem of inequality
1. Hoexter Report part V par 2.3.7.
2. Act 39 of 1926 s 55.
3. Act 46 of 1935 s 91.
4. Report of the Penal and Prison Reform Commission
UG 47 of 1947~hairman Mr Justice Lansdown, hereinafter
referred to as the Lansdown Report.
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amongst accused persons and attempted to deal with the
effects which poverty, illiteracy and differences in
language and culture had on the administration of justice.
The Commission's basic premise was the principle of equality
before the law. The factor most likely to lead to unequal
treatment, it observed, was the inability of an accused
person to engage a legal practitioner. since legal
representation was a commodity to be purchased, the
financial status of an accused determined whether he could
obtain the services of a lawyer. The point of departure of
the Commission, therefore, was that "it is a cardinal
principle of democracy that the ability to obtain justice
should not be defeated by poverty". [Par 222] Conscious of
the fact that the majority of South Africa's accused were
indigent and therefore unrepresented, the Commission's
response to the ideal of equal justice was twofold. First,
free legal ~ssistance should be given as far as possible to
accused who could not afford it themselves. Secondly, in the
absence of legal aid, the procedure in court should be so
adapted that the lack of legal representation would not
materially jeopardize the attainment of equal justice.
The legal services available to indigent accused at the time
were; (a) pro Deo counsel in capital cases, (b) a "dock
brief" in the Supreme Court in non-capital cases where the
accused could select any counsel present in the court on his
tendering of a small fee of between 3 and 10 guineas, and
(c) Court-appointed counsel to argue matters on review
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without a fee. [Par 226, 227J In the lower courts legal aid
was provided on an irregular basis by various legal aid
bureaux situated in a few urban centres. [Par 227J
The Commission stated as an ideal that, since legal
assistance was necessary in all the courts, it should be
possible to obtain legal aid in all criminal courts from the
Appellate Division downwards. [Par 266J In practice it
recommended the retention of the system of pro Deo counsel
in the Supreme Court, with the proviso that the court might
call in the aid of an attorney, not only to assist counsel
at the trial, but also to represent accused facing capital
charges at their preparatory examination. [Par 226J A general
State-funded legal aid scheme for all 'suitable' criminal
cases was also proposed. Although the scheme was to be
State-funded, it should not be controlled by the State as
the confidential nature of the relationship between attorney
and client would be threatened if the applicant had to deal
with government officials. [Par 259J The Commission was aware
of the realities of South African political life and
observed that
lithe Coloured and Native sections are sensitive to, and
suspicious of officialdom, and would not have the
necessary confidence in the government legal aid
officials. Officials would not enjoy the full
confidence of the accused inasmuch as they would
always suspect collusion between a state defender and
the prosecutor. 11 [Par 259J
The Commission therefore recommended that the control of the
legal aid scheme should be placed in the hands of the law
societies of each province, whilst the Department of Justice
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would bear the financial costs. [Par 268]
since the provision of legal aid to all accused was an
ideal, the Commission devoted much of its attention to the
position of those accused who would remain unrepresented for
the then foreseeable future. In a chapter entitled "possible
simplification of procedure in criminal cases, especially
those in which ignorant non-Europeans are concerned", the
Commission described the difficulties which confronted
undefended accused, particularly when they were Black.
The procedure followed in the criminal courts was totally
alien to most Blacks. For those accustomed to the
informality of the traditional tribal court, the rigidity of
the court procedure confused participants and stifled
participation. In the tribal court, for example, the accused
could at any stage interpose by statement or argument. [Par
272-273] A cause of particular confusion in the ordinary
court, then, was the inability of the accused to participate
in the proceedings until the state case had been closed.
Accused persons frequently tried to tell their story after
they had pleaded, only to be silenced by the magistrate.
Black accused who did not understand the official languages,
furthermore, frequently suffered injustice through their
failure to comprehend the rules and the proceedings. [Par
272] The situation was further complicated by the
"lamentably low" standard of the interpretation by the
official court interpreters. [Par 296] No minimum education
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qualification was required [Par 297] and there was no check
on the accuracy of the translation as only in exceptional
cases was the magistrate or the prosecutor conversant in a
Black language. [Par 298]
\- The "untutored Native" could plead guilty without fully
appreciating the implications of this step, while he might
even have had a valid defence to the charge. [Par 275, 279].
The difference between an unsworn statement by the accused
and evidence under oath was usually fully explained but
"seldom fully appreciated by the accused."[Par 285] This was
equally true of undefended Whites and detribalized
Blacks. [Par 273]
~ These problems were further compounded by the haste with ~
which the proceedings were conducted. The large numbers of
petty cases in the large urban areas prevented magistrates
from spending sufficient time on individual cases. [Par 274-5]
The solutions which the Commission offered in regard to the
undefended accused were twofold; first, to inform the
accused of his rights before and during the trial, and
secondly, to omit features in the procedure that cause
confusion. The Commission rejected as follows the notion
that a different procedure should apply for Blacks:
"It would be undesirable to deny to the non-European
population of the Union, or to any section of them,
principles of law which operate in favour of the
European section of the community; nor would it be easy
in application."[Par 278]
The chief's court, operating within the tribal structure and
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context and still serving a useful function, should,
however, be allowed to continue. [Par 278]
The accused was to be fully apprised of his rights and of
the implications of any decision he might make. To begin
with, the charge was to be fully explained to him, both in
court and by a policeman when a summons, with an admission
of guilt attached to it, was served on the accused. [Par 281]
The accused should further be instructed in the basic
features of court procedure. This should preferably happen
before the start of the trial. An explanatory notice should
be displayed in the prison or police cells in both the
official languages and the Black language of the area. If an
accused could not read, then the notice should be explained
to him. The Commission suggested the following explanation:
"What will take place in court.
(1) When your case is called, the charge against you
will be read to you, and you will be asked to plead
guilty or not guilty.
(2) If you do not fully understand the charge, ask the
magistrate or the interpreter, before you plead, to
explain what you do not understand.
!( 3 ) with your plea you may, if you wish, tell the
magistrate briefly what your position in the matter is,
and what your defence will be.
1( 4 ) The evidence of witnesses will then be heard. The
whole object of this is that the court may know whether
the charge against you is true or false.
(5) Immediately after each witness for the prosecution
has finished his replies to all the prosecutor's
questions, you may put to the witness such questions as
you think might help you in your case - for instance,
by showing that the witness is not telling the truth,
or that he has left out facts in your favour.
(6) After all the witnesses for the prosecution have
been heard, you will, unless you have pleaded guilty,
be able to call any witness who may help you in your
case, and you may give evidence yourself. You may ask
each of these witnesses questions to get from him what
you want the court to know; the prosecutor will then be
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able to put questions to him; and after that, you may
put further questions to him.
(7) After your witnesses have been heard and the
prosecutor has addressed the magistrate, you will be
permitted to address the magistrate and argue the
matter, whether you have given evidence or not, but
'y ou r statements in argument will not have the value of
evidence because you are not making them under oath and
so have not given the prosecutor the opportunity of
testing their truth by questioning you. 11 [Par 289]
The Commission's view of the accused's rights was thus
limited as the focus of this explanation was only on the
production of evidence. No mention was made of the rights Y
regarding remands, bailor legal representation, all
of which are fundamental to a fair trial.
To simplify and make the procedure more comprehensible to
the "untutored Native", the Commission recommended the
abolition of the opportunity to make an unsworn statement;
instead, the accused should be advised that he could only
give evidence under oath. Thereafter, whether he gave
evidence or not, he should be informed that he could address
the court. [Par 288]
To assist Black accused, the Co~ission also suggested a
procedure which, it said, was present in customary
procedure, ie, permitting the accused to offer with his plea
a brief explanation of his position in relation to the
charge and an account of the nature of his defence. [Par 283]
This innovation, the Commission thought, would assist the
undefended accused, as it would enable the presiding
jUdicial officer to test more effectively the evidence of
the prosecution and thus render him better able to assist
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the accused in presenting his defence. [Par 283] The same
reasoning was employed in argument for the retention of the
preparatory examination for trials in the Supreme Court. In
undefended cases or cases where the accused was
unsatisfactorily defended, the record of the preparatory
examination frequently enabled the judge to test the
evidence of the state more fully. [ Pa r 321]
To improve the competency of interpreters, the Commission
suggested that all interpreters should have obtained
matriculation, have a competent knowledge of both official
languages and a Black language, and have an elementary
knowledge of legal procedure. [Par 299]
The Commission, in recommending the creation of intermediate
courts between the Supreme and magistrates' courts, [Par 352]
stressed that these courts should be presided over by
impartial jUdicial officers. It suggested that they should
be appointed from the ranks of senior advocates, because
magistrates would not be suitable since "there is the danger
of pro-Crown bias resulting from court training exclusively
as pUblic prosecutors and from the exercise over many years
of both jUdicial and administrative functions". [Par 352] The
Commission thus reaffirmed the importance of impartiality if
equality before the law was to be achieved.
The Report was therefore in the same liberal tradition as
that of the Colebrook and Brigge Commission. The touchstone
was "equal and impartial justice". Equal justice meant more
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than framing rights in general terms. The Commission
identified specific factors, such as economic, social,
cultural and political differences, which caused de facto
inequality before the law. It directly linked indigence with
its most negative effect - the inability to obtain legal
representation. The Commission proposed specific rules to
minimize the effect of those factors and to extend the
possibility of a fair trial to all accused persons. The
Commission's realistic assessment of the viability of legal
aid for all led to the investigation of alternative methods
to implement the principle of equal justice. The then former
Minister of Justice, HG Lawrence MP QC, justly hailed the
Report as "a remarkable illuminating document which
undoubtedly is going to be of vast assistance to the
Department of Justice in its task in the future".l
The Lansdown Report was not, however, of "vast assistance"
to the new Nationalist government that came into power in
1948. Despite the repeated questioning by HG Lawrence MP QC,
as to whether the Government intended to ~mplement the
recommendations of the commission,2 CR Swart MP, the
Minister of Justice, refused to deal comprehensively with
the Report. One of the few recommendations that was
implemented was that of intermediary courts; these were
1. House of Assembly Debates vol 64 col 101 11 Aug 1948.
2 . House of Assembly Debates vol 72 col 5145 26 April 1950;
vol 79 col 6918 2 June 1952.
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established in 1952. The suggestion that the jUdicial
officers for this court should be drawn from the ranks of
senior advocates was not, however, adopted. The courts,
called regional courts, had a sentencing jurisdiction of
three years' imprisonment and fines of up to £300.
1
Sentences of more than one year imprisonment or fines
exceeding £100 were sUbject to automatic review,[S 25(a») as
the Lansdown Commission suggested,2 but this provision was
3revoked three years later.
The consolidating Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 did not
alter the position of the undefended accused; the limited
protective measures of the 1917 Act were merely affirmed.
5.3. LEGAL AID ACT 22 OF 1969
After a number of privately and partially State-funded legal
aid bureaux had failed to provide legal aid on a consistent
and permanent basis,4 the Department of Justice in 1962
established a National Legal Aid Scheme. The scheme did not
succeed, however, partly because all legal services were
to be provided on a voluntary basis. 5 During the same time a
private fund, the Defence and Aid Fund, was created to
provide legal assistance to indigent
1. Act 40 of 1952 s 21(b).
2. Lansdown Report par 352.
3. Act 62 of 1955 s 25.
4. See N Abramowitz "Legal Aid in South Africa" (1960) 77
SAIJ 351.
5. See GW Cook "A History of Legal Aid in South Africa" in
Legal Aid in South Africa 28 31 .
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accused charged with political offences.
1
When this was
declared an unlawful organization in 1966, the Government
promised to provide funds for legal defence in political
trials. 2 From 1966 to 1969 assistance was provided in only
24 cases. 3 State-funded legal aid was eventually given
statutory form in 1969,4 and Dugard contends that this was
largely as a result of the adverse criticism which the
Government received after the banning of the Defence and Aid
Fund. 5 The legal aid was not regarded as a right but rather
as a privilege and the Minister of Justice, PC Pelser MP, was
adamant that it was certainly not for the benefit of "the
skolly who loafs about, snatches handbags and steals
people's money" as "that is not legal aid, but 'subsidizing
crime,,,.6
The Act created a body corporate [S 2], the Legal Aid Board,
whose object was "to render or make available legal aid to
indigent persons".[S 3] The details of the scheme were not
spelt out and were left to the Board to develop.? Thus the
first step had been taken towards relieving the huge lack of
legal representation. However, the tight conditions and
requirements to qualify for legal aid, coupled with a lack
of resources and poor marketing of the service,8 meant that
1. Cook 2E cit 32~ Dugard Human Rights 245.
2. Dugard Human Rights 246.
3. Cook 2E cit 33.
4. Legal Aid Act 22 of 1966.
5. Human Rights 246.
6. House of Assembly Debates vol 25 col 1509 26 Feb 1969.
7. See Minister of Justice's comments, House of Assembly
Debates vol 25 col 1495 26 Feb 1969. See ch 2 above for details
of scheme.
8. See ch 2 above.
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the scheme did not resolve the problems presented by
indigent accused in the criminal courts.
5.4 THE BOTHA COMMISSION
Proposals made in 1963 and 1965 by Mr Justice VG Hiemstra
1
that jUdicially controlled interrogation of accused should
replace the preparatory examination, led to the appointment
of the Commission of Inquiry into Criminal Procedure and
Evidence in 1970, with Mr Justice DH Botha of the Appellate
Division as the only member. The Commission reported in
1971,2 but its proposals were eventually implemented only in
1977. 3
The Commission expressed at the outset its awareness of the
predominance of undefended accused in the criminal courts:
"The Commission accepts ..• that the vast majority
of persons who find themselves before our courts, are
illiterate and unsophisticated, and find it difficult
to adapt themselves to the complexities of modern
civilization. They are mostly unaware of their rights,
and measures which may be fair to others, may affect
them extremely unfairly. All the recommendations of the
Commission are m~de in the light of the above mentioned
considerations".
The 'Hiemstra proposals' that the Commission had to
consider, involved the question of replacing the preparatory
examination with a pre-trial jUdicial interrogation of
accused. This was prompted by Hiemstra's belief that too
1. "Abolition of the Right not to be Questioned" (1963) 80
SALJ 187 and (1965) 82 SALJ 85.
2. RP 78/1971, hereinafter referred to as the Botha
Report/Commission.
3. See Dugard 51-56.
4. Introduction 4.
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many acquittals occurred in the Supreme Court as accused
benefitted unduly from the disclosure of the state evidence
at mandatory preparatory examinations. In his written
memorandum to the Commission, Mr Justice Hiemstra proposed
that an accused should be brought before a magistrate as
soon as possible after arrest and that the charge should be
put to him. In the event of a plea of not guilty, he was to
be interrogated by the magistrate to establish the basis of
his plea. If he remained silent, a negative inference should
be drawn from that fact. The accused should not be allowed
legal representation during the proceedings as no
represented accused would, on the advice of his lawyer,
participate. [Par 1.14]
~he Commission rejected the notion that legal representation
should be excluded. Instead, it recognized the importance of
legal assistance in order for the accused to protect his
rights at the initial stages, accepting that the basis of a
conviction may be laid at the pre-trial interrogation, and
that subsequent legal representation at the trial stage
would then come too late to be of any assistance to the
accused. [Par 1.13] The inherent dangers of the questioning
for the undefended accused were realized and the Commission
felt that "illiterate and ignorant accused would ... probably
speak out of ignorance, and it would be extremely unfair to
deny him legal representation who is most in need
thereof". [Par 1.12]
The Commission also rejected the suggestion that a negative
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inference should be drawn from the accused's decision to
remain silent on the following basis:
"The content of the adverse inference is not known to
... the illiterate, and to avoid the unknown he may
regard himself obliged to speak. It would be grossly
unfair, and against all the recognized principles as
accepted by our courts, in any way to compel a
suspect to reply to questions which may incriminate him
and thus to assist in building up the case against _J
him". [Par 1.17]
The Commission found unconvincing Hiemstra's argument that
the interrogation proceedings could lead to an early release
of the innocent accused person. The prima facie case on
which a charge is based would not be impaired by the
explanation of the accused alone, without an actual testing
of the state witnesses. [Par 1.19] The explanation of a not
guilty plea was not comparable to a preparatory examination
where evidence was led; an accused's explanation of his plea
could thus not lead to his discharge. [Par 1.30]
The Commission proceeded, however, to recommend that the
accused be brought before a magistrate in order to plead to
a charge, whether or not it was cognizable in the
magistrates' court. [Par 1.31] If the accused 'p l e a d e d guilty,
this might lead to his conviction without any evidence being
led. [Par 1.32] If he pleaded not guilty, he could make a
statement indicating the basis of his defence or his
attitude towards the charge. The reason given for the
introduction of the explanation of plea was
"~o afford to the accused . . . the opportunity to put his
slde of the case against him to the magistrate at an
early stage, which may either lead to his early
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release, or which may considerably shorten the trial,
if there should have to be one."[Par 1.33]
The recommendation contradicts all the objections which the
Commission itself had levelled against the proposals of
Hiemstra. The importance of legal representation to protect
the accused from self-incrimination at the pre-trial stage
had been stressed, [Par 1.13] but the Commission did not
address itself to the question whether the proposed pre-
trial questioning per se would prejudice the undefended
accused. As most of the accused would be unrepresented, they
would most likely, as the Commission admitted, [Par 1.12]
make a statement, even though given a choice. If such a
statement would not lead to the early release of the
accused, as the Commission itself had found, the resurgence
of this justification is inexplicable. The more compelling
reasons that were advanced by the Lansdown Commission in
this regard, [Par 283] that it is more in line with customary
procedure for the illiterate Black accused to tell his side
of the story right from the outset of the trial, or that the
magistrate may use such an explanation in testing the state
witnesses, were not mentioned by the Commission. The
recognition that the explanation of plea could be used in
evidence against the accused, [Par 1.33] suggests a more
likely purpose and function of the procedure; the assistance
of the state in its prosecution task. within the
Commission's own reasoning, the recommendation is
contradictory and ill-conceived and in conflict with its
stated concern for "illiterate and unsophisticated" accused.
Chapter 3 Page 118
In contrast, the procedure proposed to follow upon a plea of
guilty is more consistent with the stated philosophy of the
Commission. The requirement that after a plea of guilty, the
state still had to prove the commission of the offence with
evidence aliunde, afforded the accused no real protection as
the evidence was required only to prove the commission of
the offence, not who committed it. [Par 6.10-1] The new
procedure proposed required that before a plea of guilty was
entered, an accused had to admit the presence of all the
elements of the offence and it had to be clear to the court
that he understood the charge and had no defence to it. [Par
6.12]
The Commission recommended the abolition of the unsworn
statement by the accused since it was a source of confusion,
especially for the illiterate and undefended accused who
might be prejudiced by such confusion. [Par 7.02, 7.12] For
the rest the Commission found no other rules of procedure
which were unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome for the
layman. [Par 10.01]
The institution of automatic review was strongly defended by
the Commission for as long as legal aid was not available to
all accused charged with serious offences:
"It is of the utmost importance to the accused persons,
the vast majority of whom are still illiterate and
usually unable to afford legal representation. It
ensures a measure of uniformity in the administration
of justice and the imposition of sentences in the
magistrates' court".[Par 4.01]
The system was aimed at controlling inexperienced
Chapter 3 Page 119
magistrates and those who laboured under pressure in the
urban courts. [Par 4.02] It was not necessary to extend the
system to the regional courts as they were presided over by
senior and experienced magistrates who did not work under
pressure [Par 4.09} and the existing system should be
retained in its present form. [Par 4.18]
In general, the Commission's approach to the administration
of justice did not exhibit a deep commitment to the
principle of equal justice. Although it was stated that all
recommendations were made with a view to the fact that the
majority of the accused in court were illiterate,
unsophisticated, and unaware of their rights, the rules
recommended by the Commission failed to protect
sUbstantially the rights of the undefended accused. No
duties were expressly placed on the court to inform the
accused of his right to a lawyer, or his right to remain
silent, before the judicial interrogation commenced. Rules
were formulated in the traditional universal fashion,
without accommodating the inequality which the Commission
identified among accused persons. It thus paid little more
than lip service to the principle of equal justice.
In 1971 a bill containing the main recommendations of the
Botha Report1 was made available for comment; the most
1. GN No R 2231 GG No 3328 of 10 December 1971.
Chapter 3 Page 120
contentious aspect of the bill was the compulsory
questioning of an accused by a magistrate after a plea of
not guilty.
In introducing the bill once again in 1973,1 the Minister of
Justice, PC Pelser MP, made his ideological stance quite
clear. Despite his consistent claims that the compulsory
jUdicial questioning of t~e accused was to the advantage of
the accused, who could state his defence and thus obtain an
early release or shorter trial, and could not be accused of
fabricating his defence,2 his emphasis was on the advantages
which would accrue to the state for the efficient and speedy
prosecution of crime. He stated that "our whole system [was]
balanced hopelessly against justice and in favour of the
criminal,,3 and that the system "lean[ed] over backwards to
protect and to pamper the accused".4 The innovations,
especially the compulsory questioning after a plea of not
guilty, constituted an attempt to secure the conviction of
'guilty' accused and to improve the efficiency of the
system. 5 The state would benefit from the procedure, the
Minister admitted, since accused persons would not be able
to fabricate a defence. To elicit the truth from accused
persons, it was necessary to question them at the right
"psychological moment", which is shortly
1. AB 38 of 1973.
2. House of Assembly Debate vol 43 col 4464 10 April 1973;
col 4708, 4710 12 April 1973; col 4466 10 April 1973.
3. Vol 43 col 4711 12 April 1973.
4. Vol 43 col 4454 10 April 1973.
5. Ibid; col 4492.
Chapter 3 Page 121
after arrest, when they admit their crimes before they have
1
had a chance to think up a story.
The Minister rejected a suggestion by the General Bar
Council and the Cape Bar Council that before an accused was
asked to plead at his first appearance, he should be
notified by the magistrate that (a) he was entitled to a
postponement in order that he might consider his position
and take legal advice, and (b) he could apply to the Legal
Aid Board for legal aid. This would, according to the
Minister, merely lead to a waste of time as only a small
number of accused who wanted legal representation did not
have it already. That the Minister was not enthusiastic
about extending legal aid can be deduced from his statement
that it was not "fair to expect the taxpayer to bear the
costs of all litigation or a large portion of it, in this
country".2
In opposing the jUdicial questioning, the opposition
spokesmen based their arguments on the fact that most
accused were undefended and illiterate and that the
questioning could only be prejudicial to them since they
would be unaware of their rights and might assist the state
3in establishing its case. Furthermore, by imposing an
inquisitorial duty on the magistrate to question the
accused, it was feared that he might compromise his role as
an impartial arbiter and a person who assisted undefended
1. Vol 43 col 4464 10 April 1973.
2. Vol 43 col 5689 3 May 1973.
3. Vol 43 col 4488; 4492; 4493 10 April 1973.
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accused, especially in the eyes of the Black population.
1
The bill was not passed in 1973 as the committee stage was
I
, t ,2not completed before the end of the par 1amen ary seSS1on.
Before it was re-introduced, a Commission of Inquiry into
the Penal System under the chairmanship of Mr Justice G
Viljoen was appointed. The introduction of the Criminal
Procedure Bill would be postponed until that Commission had
3reported.
5.5. THE VILJOEN COMMISSION
One of the underlying concerns of this Commission, which
reported in 1976,4 was the overpopulation of the prisons,
and many of its recommendations were aimed at reducing the
number of prisoners. The Commission suggested that this
might be achieved by increasing the granting of bail and by
the more expeditious completion of proceedings.
In regard to bail, the Commission merely urged jUdicial
officers to apply the common law principles of bail and to
consider applications "most anxiously".5 The prisoners'
friends attached to the courts in bigger centres should be
"untiring in their efforts to arrange bail". [Par 4.2.3.4J
The Commission did not, however, address the position of the
1. Col 4492 10 April 1973.
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 66 col 428 31 January
1977. See also Dugard 55.
3. Dugard 55.
4. RP 78/1976.
5. Par 4.2.3.4. See also par 4.4.1.
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undefended accused, who might not know of the existence of
bail, or that the onus was on him to apply, or how to
substantiate an application.
In contrast, the Commission tackled the question of the
expeditious completion of cases in a far more robust way.
One of the factors identified as contributing to the excess
of awaiting trial prisoners was the number of remands
necessitated by various administrative arrangements. The
rule that the list of previous convictions should be
obtained before it could be decided in which court an
accused should be arraigned, caused endless unnecessary
remands. [Par 4.2.4.1] Although numerous other factors caused
delay, often no sufficient reason for the adjournment
appeared from the record. [Par 4.2.4.7] The Commission
rejected the administative regulation of remands as
inadequate and proposed instead that a statutory duty should
be placed on the magistrate to justify the granting of a
postponement after a certain number of remands. [Par 4.2.4.9]
The Commission recommended an amendment to the Criminal
Procedure Bill to the effect that no case could be adjourned
for more than two weeks, or for a third or sUbsequent time,
unless the court was "satisfied that good and sufficient
reason exist[ed] for such adjournment". The reasons for such
adjournment should be entered on the record. If a third or
subsequent adjournment was granted, the court had to
consider the release of the accused on bailor warning. [Par
4.2.4.10] The Commission argued that such a statutory
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injunction would remind magistrates to expedite matters and
would assist judges in their review of cases. [Par 4.2.4.9]
This recommendation was of great importance for the
undefended accused since the principle of a speedy trial
would thereby be enforced independent of his own efforts
which, due to his ignorance, were unlikely to be
forthcoming.
In its consideration of legal representation in court, the
Commission noted that most accused were indigent and
therefore unable to afford the services of legal
practitioners. [Par 4.3.1.2] The Commission maintained,
however, that these persons were not wholly deprived of
legal representation "as sufficient funds [were] made
available by Parliament" every year for pro Deo defence or
legal aid. [Par 4.3.1.2] On examining the legal aid scheme's
operation, the Commission found for the year ending 31 March
1976, that of the 10 600 applications received, only 568 were
for criminal matters. [Par 4.3.2.10] Although it was unable
to pinpoint the reason for the lack of interest in criminal
legal aid, it mentioned two possible reasons. Firstly,
pUblic ignorance of the scheme, especially among il~iterate
Blacks, and secondly, the fact that the Black person is, as
far as criminal cases are concerned, "rather suspicious and
sceptical of a service for which he is not required to
pay". [Par 4.3.2.12] To improve the situation, the Commission
recommended the establishment of more sub-offices to
pUblicize the scheme more effectively. [Par 4.3.2.15] The
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Commission was hesitant, however, to recommend the easiest
method of promoting the scheme, namely notification from the
bench; it merely made a half-hearted attempt to involve the
magistracy in the promotion of legal aid. It stated:
"The Commission is conscious and deeply appreciative of
the solicitude displayed by magistrates to ensure a
fair hearing for accused who are not represented. In
such cases valuable assistance is invariably rendered
from the bench by magistrates to accused persons and
ample care is taken to avert a travesty of justice.
There may be instances, however, where the magistrate
concerned may in the interests of justice and for the
sake of his own easiness of mind, recommend to the
accused to obtain the services of a legally trained
representative. It is suggested that jUdicial officers
should be requested in a fitting case to bring the
legal aid scheme to the notice of the accused
concerned". [Par 4.3.2.15]
Only in cases involving "difficult issues of fact and law"
were magistrates "requested" to bring the legal aid scheme
to the notice of undefended accused. [Par 4.4.5] The
prevailing practice and institutions of legal aid and pro
Deo counsel were thus left to continue unchanged. [Par
4.3.1.5]
This Commission did not make the principle of equal justice
for the accused, its point of departure. It devoted little
attention to the inequality existing among accused persons
and the effect which that had on the administration of
justice. Its approach was problem-orientated - how to solve
overcrowding in the South African prisons. The importance of
legal representation was not stressed, and the provision of
legal aid and the conduct of proceedings in the lower courts
was regarded on the whole as adequate and unproblematic.
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The Commission's recommendations in respect of a speedy
trial constituted an attempt to guide and control jUdicial
officers' discretion to adjourn proceedings through
statutory rules. The aim of these rules was to force
judicial officers to assume a more active role by
questioning the reasons for adjournments, and in the
process, considering the granting of bail.
The Viljoen Report thus continued along the path followed by
the Botha Commission, equal and impartial justice not
constituting an overriding concern in its deliberations.
5.6. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
When the 1973 bill was again introduced in 1977, the
recommendations of mandatory questioning by the magistrate
after a plea of not guilty had been abandoned; however, the
magistrate was to be granted the power to ask questions at
his discretion and the bill proposed that where an accused
refused to answer a question of the magistrate, an inference
that was reasonable in the circumstances could be drawn from
such a refusal. 1
The Opposition's objection to this provision of the bill was
again based on the fact that the majority of accused were
undefended and illiterate, and would thus be prejudiced
1. B5 of 1977 clause 115(3); Minister of Justice House of
Assembly Debates vol 66 col 429 31 January 1977.
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through their ignorance of their rights. 1 Government
speakers, on the other hand, gave little attention to the
position of the undefended accused, and when it was
mentioned their attitude was that this category of accused
received sufficient protection. FW de Klerk MP expressed
this complacency as follows:
"The endless trouble that magistrates and prosecutors
take to ensure that an undefended accused has a fair
trial is quite admirable. I can therefore give the hone
member the assurance that special attention is given to
the interests of the undefended accused in the
magistrates' courts. Day in
2and
day out one comes
across this in the courts".
In defending the provision that a negative inference could
be drawn from an accused's non-participation in the
questioning, the Minister of Justice, JT Kruger MP, adopted
Hiemstra's argument, that innocence speaks out while guilt
, '1 3 , ,rema1ns Sl ent. In the wake of strong Oppos1t10n from the
'l e g a l profession, however, the Minister in the end abandoned
the provision. 4
The Minister attempted to justify the more active role that
magistrates would play as a result of their discretionary
questioning of accused persons. The questioning, he argued,
did not compromise the magistrate's position as he was not
merely an arbiter; the function of the jUdicial officer was
as follows:
1. See for eg vol 67 col 3209-10 9 March 1977; col 3243 9
March 1977; col 3649 15 March 1977; col 4161, 4173, 4188
23 March 1977.
2. Vol 67 col 4438 25 March 1977.
3. Vol 67 col 3353 10 March 1977.
4. Vol 67 col 4181 23 March 1977.
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"Our presiding officer has a specific task, i.e. that
he is seeking justice, not for or against the state,
and not for or against the accused, but justice in
itself ..• It is an active, strong and powerful role
which he has to-play in ~ court case. He is not there to
score points off people; he is there to perform a task
and to see that justice is done, whomever it may be.
This is the approach we adopted when we were preparing
this Bill".l
This active role was not, however, extended to encompass the
mandatory disclosure of all the accused's due process
rights. The Government rejected the suggestion2 that the
accused should be informed Ca) that he is entitled to ask
for an adjournment of the proceedings to consider his
position and/or to take legal advice; and Cb) of his rights
under, and facilities provided by, the Legal Aid Act. The
Minister argued ,that as magistrates were informing the
accused of these rights in any case, there was no need to
impose such a duty. Furthermore, if such a duty was created,
and the magistrate failed to comply with it, this could lead
to an unwarranted interference with the conviction on appeal
or review.
3
Also rejected was the suggestion4 that the
accused should be informed of his right to remain silent
during the jUdicial questioning. Such a warning would,
according to the Minister, affect the spontaneity of the
accused's answers as he might refuse to respond to any
questions.
5
In this statement the Minister implicitly
rejected the principle of equality before the law; the
1. Vol 67 col 3349 10 March 1977. My italics.
2. Vol 67 col 3473-4 11 March 1977; col 3645 15 March 1977.
3. Vol 67 col 3475, 3477 11 March 1977; col 3650 15 March;
col 4215 23 March 1977.
4. Vol 67 col 4188 23 March 1977.
5. Vol 67 col 4207 23 March 1977.
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undefended accused need not be placed in the same position
as the defended accused, who would be aware of his rights.
To keep the undefended accused ignorant of his rights was
functional, as his co-operation in the interrogation would
principally benefit the prosecution. The procedure was thus
geared towards the aim that Hiemstra advocated - greater
crime control.
The scope of automatic review was narrowed down to lighten
the load of the Supreme Court, and its protection was
restricted to undefended cases. 1 Finally, it should be noted
that the attempt of the Viljoen Commission to structure and
guide the discretion of the court with regard to the
granting of adjournments and bail, was not included in the
bill. 2
The provisions eventually adopted in the legislation of 1977
constituted a watered down version of those proposed in the
bill of 1971. Since these provisions are discussed fully in
the chapters to follow, only their broad outline will be set
out in this section.
The Act provides that after a plea of guilty, the presiding
jUdicial officer has to determine whether the accused admits
every element of the offence. If the judicial officer is
satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence, he may
convict him on his plea of guilty.[S 112(1) (a)]
1. As proposed by AS pitman MP, vol 67 col 4438 25
March 1977.
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 67 col 3214 9 March 1977.
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If an accused pleads not guilty to a charge, it is in the
discretion of the judicial officer to ask the accused
whether he wishes to make a statement indicating the basis
of his defence.[S 115(1)] If he refuses to make a statement
or if it is unclear from his statement to what extent he
denies or admits the issues in dispute, the judicial officer
may question him in order to establish which issues are in
dispute. [S 115(2) (a)]
Preparatory examinations are made the exception rather than
the rule, and will be conducted only on the direction of the
Attorney-General.[S 123] Instead, the so called "mini-
preparatory examination" is instituted. In respect of
charges which exceed the magistrates' substantive and
sentencing jurisdictions, the charge may still be put to the
accused on his appearance in that court. The procedure the
magistrate then has to follow depends on the nature of the
accused's plea.[S 121-122]
In this Act, for the first time, the special position of the
undefended accused was given recognition by the restriction
of automatic review to undefended cases.[S 302] Cases were
now to be reviewed only if the accused was undefended and
had to serve an effective term of imprisonment or undergo a
whipping.[S 302] Furthermore, a distinction was drawn
between senior and junior magistrates. Sentences of a
magistrate who had not held the substantive rank of a
magistrate or higher for a period of seven years, where they
exceeded three months' i mprisonment or R250 fine, were
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I
reviewable, while for magistrates of more than seven years
standing, the limits were six months and R500
respectively.[S 302(1) (a)] The indigent accused is still
entitled to a free copy of the record of the preparatory
examination [S 143(2)] and "necessary and material"
witnesses may be subpoenaed free of charge.[S 179]
Rules of general application relevant to the undefended
accused are: (a) the duty on the court to inform the accused
about his right to give evidence and call witnesses,[S
151(1) (a)] and (b) the duty of the head of every prison to
deliver lists of all unsentenced prisoners to the Supreme
Court at each of its sessions.[S 340] The previous statutory
rules for the release of awaiting trial prisoners not
brought to trial within a certain period of time,l were not,
however, re-enacted.
Since 1977, few changes of importance have been enacted.
After a number of Supreme Court decisions pointed out the
injustices which might result from reviewing suspended prison
sentences only when they were invoked, and called for the
amendment of the Act,2 the criteria for automatic review
were made applicable to suspended prison sentences as well. 3
In 1984 the monetary limits for reviewable fines were
increased to R500 and R1 000 for junior and senior
magistrates respectively. This coincided
1. Act 56 of 1955 s 294-5.
2. See Paulsen 1982 (4) SA 91 (T); Mokoena 1983 (2) SA
312 (0). See ch 10 below for further discussion.
3. See Act 59 of 1983 s 22 deleted s 302(2) (b).
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with the increase in the magistrates' court sentencing
jurisdiction for fines from R1 000 to R3 000.
1
5.7 THE HOEXTER COMMISSION
The final report of the Hoexter Commission, [RP 78/1983]
published in 1985, recommended fundamental changes in the
structure of the administration of justice.
2
Many of the
recommendations were directly relevant to the trial of the
undefended accused, while others touched tangentially on his
position. Underlying these recommendations was a strong
adherence to the principle of equal and impartial justice.
Equal justice
Equality before the law, the Commission declared, implied
firstly, the absence of rules discriminating on the basis of
the race of the accused, and secondly, that procedural
rights should be available effectively to all accused
irrespective of their financial position.
The criminal jurisdiction of the commissioners' courts,
trying Blacks in terms of the ordinary procedure, was a
patently discriminatory measure. The Commission stated:
"That inhabitants of the same country should purely on
the grounds of race be criminally prosecuted in
separate courts for any offence whatever is ... by any
civilised standard, unnecessary, humiliating and
repugnant" [Part V par 6.1] and added that
"There is no moral justification for separate court
structures. Such a system is a negation of the
principle that all are equal before the law."[Part V
par 4.4(c)]
. Act 109 of 1984 s 8.
2. See NC Steytler Editorial (1984) 8 SACC 107.
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Furthermore, a dual system was objectionable as it was not
pO'ssible to maintain equal standards in two different court
systems. [Part V par 4.4] The Commission therefore
recommended the abolition of the commissioners' courts,
proposing that all criminal cases heard in the
commissioners' courts should be tried in the magistrates'
and regional courts. [Part V par 7.2.2] The chiefs' courts,
however, should be retained for as long as they continued to
meet the needs of rural Blacks still living under the
authority of their chiefs. [Part V par 7.1(a)]
The absence of discriminatory rules did not in itself ensure
equality before the law. Although legal rights may be
expressed in non-discriminatory terms, a jUdicial system
could by its own structure and functioning preclude certain
individuals from exercising those rights simply on the basis
of their poor financial status. The Commission opined that
"high priced lawyers, complex adversary proceedings, and
relatively passive jUdges [were] ill-suited in many cases to
the important new rights on behalf of the poor, consumers,
tenants, labourers and the like". [Part II par 6.3.2.2]
The principle of equality before the law therefore required
that rights should be extended assertively to all concerned:
"In truth, effective access to justice is increasingly
seen to be of great and perhaps of crucial importance
to the protection of human rights, since the mere
existence of the rights is worthless without the means
to assert them. A legal system should not merely proclaim
rights - it should guarantee the effective enforcement
of those rights."[Part IT par 6.6.5]
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In the same vein the Commission approved the truism that
"unknown rights are no rights at all". [Part 11 par 6.6.7]
In the adversary system, legal representation was identified
as a prerequisite for the enforcement of rights. Access to
legal services, the Commission declared, should not be a
mere privilege:
"Any state that prides itself on a democratic way of
life should not regard legal representation of parties
before its courts as pure luxury or a fortuitous
benefaction of the government, but as an essential
service. Indispensable to the achievement of the
democratic ideal in any modern state is access to its
courts for all its inhabitants ... For any person who has
to appear in court without counsel, whether as an
accused in a criminal trial or as a litigant in a civil
action, the excellence of his country's judicial system
is small comfort and any claim by the state that the
courts are open to all has a hollow ring". [Part 11 par
6.4.1]
To realize the principle of equality before the law, the
commission set as a goal the provision of legal aid to all
persons of limited means. The present State-funded legal aid
fell far short of this ideal. The Commission found that the
pro Deo counsel system was inadequate. Counsel did not have
sufficient preparation time and were not assisted by an
attorney during the preparation and conduct of the
trial. [Part 11 par 6.4.3.6] The fees paid for such work were
also inadequate. [Part 11 par 6.4.3.7] The Commission
accordingly recommended its abolition and replacement by the
ordinary legal aid scheme. [Part II par 6.4.4.4]
The legal aid scheme itself was underutilized by accused
persons, particularly by Blacks. In the year ending 31 March
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1983, only 3 414 of 29 019 applications for legal aid were
for criminal matters,[Part II par 6.4.4.2] despite the fact
that there were 46 294 and 1 434 884 criminal cases recorded
in the regional and magistrates' courts respectively in
1980, while a further 199 487 cases were heard in the
commissioners' courts. [Part IV par 2.2.1.2] The Commission
accepted as one of the reasons for the reluctance of Blacks
to use the scheme, the suspicion with which they viewed it:
many legal aid officers were identified with the state as
they were either commissioners or magistrates. [Part II par
6.4.4.8] In this regard, however, the Commission merely
noted the recommendation of the General Bar Council and the
Association of Law Societies that the legal aid scheme
should be placed under the control of the legal profession
and that the employees of the Board should not be civil
servants. [Part II par 6.4.4.10] A further cause for the
underutilization could be the ignorance of the general
public regarding the existence of the scheme, and the
Commission merely suggested that the existence and functions
of the scheme should be actively pUblicised. [Part II par
7.13]
The Commission was also of the opinion that the test of
indigence was too restricted and that legal aid should be
available to all persons of limited means. [Part II par
6.4.4.6] The Commission did not attempt a definition of
limited means, nor did it make any suggestions as to how the
scheme was to be financed. However, some practical
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recommendations, aimed at promoting legal aid through
less conventional means, were made. Official recognition
should be given to legal aid clinics and salaried legal
practitioners, funded by the Legal Aid Board, should be
employed in such clinics. The idea of student practice rules
was also viewed favourably by the Commission. [Part IV par
4.1.9]
Impartial justice
For impartial justice to be attained, the independence of
jUdicial officers in both the Supreme Court and the lower
courts was vital. The principle should be maintained in the
Supreme Court and extended to the lower courts.
structurally, magistrates were not in the same independent
position as judges of the Supreme Court. They could be
transferred without consent and were dependent on merit
assessments by the Department of Justice for promotion and
salary increases. There was no tenure of office or security
of salary. [Part II par 1.4.2] Due to their position as civil
servants, magistrates could be exposed to undue influence by
the state. [Part IV par 4.2.1] The Commission recommended
that magistrates should be independent of the pUblic
service. The appointment, disciplining and discharge of
jUdicial officers in the lower courts should be the
responsibility of a proposed Judicial Council. 1 All aspects
of conditions of their service should be controlled by
1. See Part II par 4.1.2-4.1.7 for its composition and function.
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statute. There should be no differentiation between salaries
of the various officers so as to create the impression that
magistrates were prompted by financial incentives to aspire
to higher office. [Part 11 par 3.2] The Commission also
stressed that the identification of magistrates with the
state would continue as long as magistrates were appointed
solely from the ranks of pUblic prosecutors. [Part IV par
5.1.3]
The Commission noted that various administrative duties
which they had to perform, some being overtly political,l
compromised their impartiality. The administrative burden
that magistrates had to carry, the Commission recommended,
should be the responsibility of a new jUdicial officer, the
proposed resident magistrate. Apart from his administrative
duties, the resident magistrate would be vested with limited
criminal jurisdiction. [Part IV par 5.10.3]
Also to attain a greater degree of independence and
impartiality, the Commission recommended the greater parti-
cipation of the pUblic in the adjudication process by their
appointment as assessors in the lower criminal courts. 2
The Hoexter Report heralded the unequivocal return of the
principle of equal and impartial justice as espoused by the
earlier commissions. Equality before the law was not
1. Part IV par 4.2.1. For example, their powers in terms of
Demonstrations in or near Court Buildings Prohibition Act 71
of 1982 s 2(2); Internal Security Act 72 of 1982 ss 19(1),
20,21,22,29(9),31(5),46,53(2),70(2).
2. See part IV par 5.12.1.5.; ~ar 5.12.1.4; par 5.12.2.4.
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possible while Blacks were, in respect of certain offences,
subject to a separate court system. The inability of most
accused to engage the services of lawyers resulted in
unequal treatment in court and the extension of legal aid to
I
persons of limited means was the solution proposed by the
court in respect of criminal cases. The major failing of the
Commission, however, was that it did little to suggest ways
of implementing the rhetoric of equal justice. No specific
recommendations were made, for example, as to how the
availability of legal aid should be communicated' to
undefended accused. with the full implementation of the
legal aid system set as a goal, the Commission failed to
address the problem of how the principle of equal justice
could be pursued until such time as the ideal could be
realized. By contrast, the Commission's recommendations in
respect of civil procedure - the establishment of the small
claims court - innovatively tackled the problem of
litigation without legal representation. 1
The goal of impartial justice, on the other hand, was boldly
pursued. The Commission made recommendations which would
fundamentally restructure the court system and promote the
independence of the jUdiciary.
The Hoexter Commission's approach to law reform differed
markedly from the Viljoen Commission's problem-solving
orientation. Although the Hoexter Commission also faced the
problem of overcrowded prisons, and
1. See par 5.8 below.
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recognized the financial implications of its innovative
measures, the Commission's view was that "in all law reform
the interests of the general pUblic should be the deciding
factor whenever conflicting interests are weighed". [Part II
par 6.1.7]
In a motion to discuss the Report, the Minister of Justice,
HJ Coetzee MP, cautiously accepted some of the
recommendations but merely noted the more fundamental
changes proposed. 1 The important principle of a uniform
court structure for all the population groups was accepted,
as was the recommendation that all the judicial functions of
the commissioners' courts be exercised by the Department of
Justice. 2 While accepting the principle that the
administrative and jUdicial duties of magistrates should be
separated, the Minister did not find it necessary that the
magistracy should be removed from the control of the
executive. 3 He argued that the jUdiciary, whether in the
Supreme Court or the lower courts, was independent of the
executive, and that it was therefore unnecessary to reflect
this reality in a statutory separation of lower courts from
th 0 01 0 4e C1Vl servlce. Apart from the unification of the court
structure, the Government has initiated no significant
1. For criticism of the Minister's response, see DJ Dalling
MP House of Assembly Debates vol 113 col 4873-78 12 April
1984.
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 113 col 4913 12 April 1984;
House of Assembly, Debates of the Standing Committee col
9 17 May 1984.
3. House of Assembly, Debates of the Standing Committee col
115 17 May 1984. -- ---
4. Ibid.
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changes with regard to the position of the undefended
accused. The provision of legal aid has not been extended;
to the contrary, the 1984/85 budget of the Legal Aid Board
'11' 1had been cut by R2,2 ml lone
5.8 SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACT 61 OF 1984
In the Hoexter Commission's Fourth Interim Report, the
establishment of a small claims court was recommended to
facilitate litigation in respect of small civil claims
without the assistance of lawyers. The Commission found that
civil litigation had become inaccessible to many individuals
in respect of small claims. Most individuals found it
difficult, if not impossible, to proceed without assistance
in a court of law due to the complicated and
professionalized procedures and the passive role played by
the presiding officer. Access to law thus necessitated the
employment of lawyers, but lawyers' fees often made it
economically unfeasible to sue for small -amounts. Justice
would thus be denied to many. To remedy the situation, the
Commission devised a method by which the individual could
proceed without the assistance of lawyers. The Commission's
solution to the problem was the creation of a more active
and inquisitorial jUdicial officer, whose duty it would be
to see that justice was done. It advocated the principle
that "above all, the jUdge's function must be recognized as
first and foremost the task of investigation, with
adjudication being an ancillary role". [Par 3.5] It would be
1. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 1984 4.
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the court's duty to unravel the facts of a particular case,
and then decide the claim in accordance with the law. [Par
10.4.10] The court should not be bound by the strict rules
of evidence [Par 10.3.11] and the procedure should be
characterized by informality. [Par 10.4.10] Due to the
manpower shortage, the jUdicial officer would not be drawn
from the civil service, but be appointed from the ranks of
practising lawyers. [Par 13.1]
These proposals materialized in the Small Claims Courts Act
61 of 1984, which established an inquisitorial procedure by
which small civil claims may be settled without the
assistance of lawyers.[S 7(2)] The procedure to be followed
requires the judicial officer, called a commissioner,[S 8]
to adopt an active inquisitorial role to establish the
relevant facts of the case. This duty of the commissioner is
set out as follows:
"A party shall not question or cross-examine any other
party to the proceedings in question or a witness
called by the latter party, but the presiding
commissioner shall proceed inquisitorially to ascertain
the relevant facts, and to that end he may question any
party or witness at any stage of the proceedings:
provided that the commissioner may in his discretion
permit any party to put a question to any other party
or any witness".[S 26(3)]
In executing his inquisitorial duty the jUdicial officer is
not bound by the rules of evidence and may establish any
fact in any manner.[S 26(1)] Evidence may be submitted in
writing or orally.[S 26(2)] The right of a litigant to call
witnesses is SUbject to the court's power to decide whether
sufficient evidence has been adduced and thus to exclude
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further evidence.[S 27]
Although the procedure relates to civil matters, it may be
of considerable importance for criminal procedure as it
marks the first departure from the traditional adversary
process, and recognizes the important role that the
presiding jUdicial officer may play where the litigants are
unrepresented.
6. CONCLUSION
The legislative development of criminal procedure in respect
of trial proceedings was characterized by the steady
professionalization of the adversary process. The
introduction of the English law of procedure and evidence
established a framework within which the accused was
burdened with the responsibility to protect his own
interests, yet complex rules meant that he required the
knowledge and expertise of a lawyer to do so successfully.
Accompanying the professionalization of the process was the
recognition of the right to legal representation, and to a
large extent the rules applicable in court proceedings -
although assumed to be available to all - were in practice
accessible only to lawyers. Little attention was paid to the
position of the undefended accused and few provisions were
made to incorporate the principle of equal justice into
legislation.
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6.1. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE
The commissions of enquiry have exhibited varying degrees
of commitment to the principle of equal and impartial
justice. It formed the frame of reference for the Colebrook
and Brigge, Lansdown, and Hoexter Commissions. Having
identified great inequality amongst accused persons on the
grounds of financial status and/or race, they envisaged the
realization of equality before the law, where the mode of
procedure was adversary, through the provision of legal aid
to indigent accused. The same commitment to the principle
was not shared by the Botha and viljoen Commissions and
they paid little attention to the plight of the undefended
accused.
Most Commissions, however, failed to address themselves to
the problem of how to ensure equal justice for indigent
accused without lawyers. Only the Lansdown Commission
attempted to address the issue with its recommendation
that procedure should be simplified and basic rules should
be explained to the accused. In this regard the
recommendations of the Hoexter Commission - that a small
claims court should be conducted in an inquisitorial manner
- could serve as a model for criminal procedure.
The Colebrook and Brigge, Lansdown, and Hoexter Commissions
saw impartial justice, and its prerequisite, an independent
jUdiciary, as an essential corollary to equal justice. This
is of particular significance for the undefended accused,
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because where the fairness of a trial is largely dependent
on the efforts of the judicial officer, only an impartial
jUdicial officer can ensure equal justice.
The principle of equal and impartial justice has found some
expression in statutes regulating criminal procedure. Since
the Cape Ordinance of 1813 1 there have been scattered
references to these standards of justice in the Orange Free
state2 and the Transvaal. 3 The adoption of the principle did
not, however, prevent the enactment of overtly
discriminatory rules in respect of criminal procedure, nor
the creation of separate courts for different races.
Furthermore, it was not uniformly recognized that an
undefended accused did not, ' in a professionalized adversary
system, receive the same justice as those who were defended.
The active pursuit of equal and impartial justice has never,
however, been a priority in Parliament. When parliamentary
commissions and parliamentarians exposed the inequality of
treatment that undefended accused received, and recommended
improvements, the Government of the day showed little
enthusiasm for the reform of the legal structure or rules.
They responded either by ignoring any exposure of inequality
(and the ensuing recommendations to ameliorate the position
of the undefended accused), or, more recently, by denying
1. Ord of 25 Sept 1813, Theal vol XI 239.
2. Constitution of 1854 s 58.
3. Ord 4 of 1864 s 27.
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that unequal treatment of accused persons occurred. with the
majority of accused persons being Black, the Government's
lack of concern is explicable in terms of the prevailing
socio-political conditions. In a society structured on a
policy of discrimination on the basis of race and colour,
where equality under the law has never been a goal, unequal
treatment before the law has been regarded as being
acceptable.
6.2. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS OF ASSISTANCE TO DISADVANTAGED
ACCUSED
The statutes governing criminal procedure have, however,
made some specific provisions to alleviate the inequality
which could flow from the economic and racial status of an
accused. There have also been a number of general
provisions whose application would also have benefitted the
undefended accused.
(a) The indigent accused
The indigent accused is assisted by the free sUbpoenaing of
material and necessary defence witnesses. He is able to
obtain a free copy of the record of the preparatory
examination. The most important development in this regard
has been the enactment of the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969 which
could - in theory - provide free legal assistance to most
indigent accused. Due to an acute shortage in manpower and
lack of finances, however, this ideal has remained unrealized.
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The disadvantages that Blacks may suffer under a foreign
legal system due to cultural, educational and economic
differences, were first acknowledged in the colony of Natal.
The retention of customary law to settle intra-group
disputes was aimed at preventing inequality in those
situations. However, the selective use of customary law to
prosecute Blacks in inter-group conflicts ran counter to the
whole purpose of the retention of a separate court structure
for Blacks. The enforcement of racial policies eventually
became the overriding purpose of the separate court
structure. The commissioners' courts, established on a
country wide basis in 1927, used the same procedure as the
ordinary magistrates' courts; there was no attempt to
accommodate customary procedure in the process and thus no
intention that the use of separate courts would facilitate
the participation of the usually undefended Black accused in
the court proceedings.
(c) The undefended accused
The restriction of automatic review to undefended cases was
the first clear recognition that this class of accused
called for special attention and care. There were, and still
are, a number of rules which, although generally formulated,
can assist the undefended accused in particular. Some of
these consist of duties imposed upon the jUdicial officer,
which are to be performed in all cases. After a plea of
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guilty, the jUdicial officer has to establish
inquisitorially whether the accused's plea has a factual
basis and the accused has to be informed that he can produce
evidence at the close of the state's case. On the whole,
however, ~he proce~ure has remained adversarial and the
judicial officer has retained his passive adjudicatory role.
The absence of a thorough legislative commitment to the
principle of equal and impartial justice and the failure of
the legislature to provide adequately for the protection of
the undefended accused in a demanding adversary system, has
meant that the only alternative source of assistance in this
regard is the court. In particular, the Supreme Court is
left with the responsibility to see that "justice" is done
to all accused, for this institution may, through the power
of review over lower court proceedings and its power to
interpret applicable legislative provisions, develop a mode
of procedure which will protect and advance the rights of
the undefended accused. In the chapters to follow an
examination will be made of the Supreme Court's
interpretation and implementation of the legislative
provisions governing the important stages of the trial
process, more particularly, those provi~ions with important
implications - one way or another - for an accused
unassisted by a lawyer. The aim will be to establish
whether the Supreme Court has incorporated the
principle of equal justice into legal rules. This
examination will in each case be followed by an empirical
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analysis of the application of the law (legislative and
judicial) in the lower courts, with the view of establishing
(a) the extent to which protective rules are complied with
in practice; and (b) whether, if those rules are followed,
they are adequate to ensure a fair trial.
SECTION C THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED ON TRIAL: LAW AND
PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION 1. THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, THE PRINCIPLES OF
A FAIR TRIAL AND THE SUPREME COURT
Judges of the Supreme court1 have acknowledged that the
majority of South Africa's accused are indigent,2
illiterate,3 and undefended. 4 A further complicating
factor that the Court has frequently encountered, is that
many accused in the rural areas are still in the grip of
tribal customs and belief in witchcraft. 5 Accused persons
have at times been described as "untutored tribesmen",6
"unsophisticated",7 or even primitive. 8 The Courts have
often remarked that no legal knowledge can be expected from
such accused
9
and that they may have, at best, only a vague
idea of their rights. 1 0
The Supreme Court has thus been confronted with the problem
of how it can ensure that illiterate and indigent accused
appearing without the assistance of a lawyer, are tried in
1. In the text "Court" spelt with a capital C refers to the
Supreme Court while "court" spelt with a lower case c,
refers to the lower courts.
2. Nhlapo 1954 (4) SA 56 (T) 57; Songongo 1984 (2)
SA 14"6 (EC) 150; Abrahams 1981 (2) PH H209 (0).
3. Mokubung, Lesibo 1983 (2) SA 710 (0) 715C. See
also Matonsi 1958 (2) SA 450 (A) 458G; Mawolaula
1922 TPD 33 35; ~ ·1982 (1) SA 240 (N) 242D.
4. Mokubung, Lesibo supra 715C. See also
Maphinda 1979 (2) SA 343 (N) 343G; M supra 242D.
5. Mhlati 1976 (2) SA 426 (Tk) 427C~
6. Lebang 1965 (3) SA 774 (SR) 775C.
7. Mhlati supra 427C; Shangase 1972 (2) SA 410 (N) 431B;
~ supra 2420.
8. Shangase supra 431B.
9 · Mawolaula supra 35; Finger 1981 (1) PH H65 (0).
10. Taylor 1972 (2) SA 307 (C) 311G.
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accordance with the principles of a fair trial. Unable to
ensure legal aid for all indigent accused, the Court sought
the solution in the presiding jUdicial officer's general
duty to see that justice is done; he was thus entrusted with
the responsibility to ensure that the undefended accused is
fairly tried. In Kekwana 1978 (2) SA 172 (NC) Van der Heever
J summed up the problem and the Court's solution as follows:
"Die persone wat in my ondervinding hier in die
binneland cannabis besit en soms daarmee, werklik of
· teoreties, handel dryf, is in die oorgroote meerderheid
van gevalle swart of bruin, en meerendeels 6f
ongeletterd of met geen ho~ opvoedingspeil nie en
betreklik ongesofistikeerd. Hierdie feite maak die taak
van die landdros om toe te sien dat die beskuldigde----
bIII~verhoorword, 'n moeilike, wat sonder die
medewerking van die aanklaer amper onmoontlik word, by
die bew1erde oortreding van art 2(a) [van Wet 41 van
1971]".
The jUdicial officer is thus accorded primary responsibility
for ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial. In
order to achieve this, he is expected to adopt a role
different from that followed in defended cases; his active
intervention in the proceedings is envisaged. He is also to
receive the co-operation of the prosecutor in carrying out
this task.
The role of the jUdicial officer has traditionally been a
passive one - that of an impartial arbiter - in the
adversary process. 2 This role has been best described by
Holmes JA in Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A):
1. 175A. My italics.
2. Enslin ~ Truter (1852) 1 se 215; Grootboom 1982 (1)
PH H78 (E); Nkosi 1972 (2) SA 753 (T) 763H.
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"A jUdicial officer should ever bear in mind that he is
holding a balance between the parties and that fairness
to both sides should be his guiding star, and that his
impartiality must be seen to exist. There are
occasions, particularly where a party is unrepresented,
when the jUdicial officer will properly take some part
in the examination of witnesses; but in the main, and
as far as is reasonably possible, he will usually tend
to leave the dispute to the contestants, interrupting
only when it is necessary to clarify some point in the
interests of justice. Thereby he is better able to form
objective appraisals of the witnesses who appear before
him, and he also avoids creating wrong impressions in
the minds of those present". [568G-H]
Important here is the concession that it may be necessary
for the jUdicial officer to act differently, more actively,
in the case of an undefended accused. This exception is
founded on the general consideration that it is the
overriding duty of the jUdicial officer to see that justice
is done. In the words of Curlewis JA in Hepworth 1928 AD
265:
"A criminal trial is not a game where one side is
entitled to claim the benefit of any omission or
mistake made by the other sid~, and a jUdge's position
in a criminal trial is not merely that of an umpire to
see that the rules of the game ,a r e observed by both
sides. A jUdge is an administrator of justice, he is
not -merely a figure ,h e a d ; he has not only to direct and
control the proceedings according to recognise~ rules
of procedure but to see that justice is done".
In the following chapters, procedural law will be analysed
with a view to ascertaining whether special provision has
been made by the Supreme Court for assistance to undefended
accused in circumstances where the governing legislation and
common law rules would create difficulties and/or
disadvantages for this accused. This analysis will be
1. 277. See also Seheri 1964 (1) SA 29 (A) 34H-35A;
Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (T) 293G.
\
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followed in each instance by an account of the results of an
empirical study conducted in the lower courts to examine the
operation of the legal rules and principles in practice.
2. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN THE LOWER COURTS
In order to ascertain the manner in which the undefended
accused is dealt with by the courts - the extent to which
the legislative and jUdicial procedural rules designed to
secure a fair trial for this accused are adhered to and the
areas in which further legal protection is required - a
study of the court proceedings in Durban's lower courts
was conducted in 1984 and 1985. The nature of this empirical
research will be described in terms of the methodology adopted,
the material examined and some of the difficulties
encountered.
2.1. METHODOLOGY AND MATERIAL
A quantitative analysis of criminal justice, confined to
court statistics,l has increasingly been abandoned by
researchers.
2
The limitation of this method is that the
1. See eg M Zander "Unrepresented Defendants in the Criminal
Courts" 1969 Criminal LR 632; Zander "A study of
Bail/Custody Decisionsln London Magistrates' Courts"
1971 Criminal LR 191; Dr Warren "Justice in
Recorder's Court: An Analysis of Misdemeanor Cases in
Detroit" in JA Robertson (ed) Rough Justice (1974) 326;
RG Hann Decision~aking in the Canadian Criminal Court System:
~ Systems Analysls (1973).
2. See Feeley 123.
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statistics can only establish statistical relationships. The
causal explanation of these relationships cannot be sought
in terms of the same statistics. In the end the statistics
reveal how the system operates, but not Why.1 statistics
reveal little of the important dynamic interaction which
characterizes court proceedings. 2 On the other hand, a
purely descriptive account of events without statistical
validation tends to be selective, more SUbjective, and hence
not entirely convincing. The combination of these types of
knowledge, however, can enhance the understanding of court
t ' 3prac lces.
In the present study both quantitative and qualitative
methods were adopted. The proceedings in the magistrates'
and regional courts sitting at the Durban magistrates' court
building were recorded during February 1984. Five observers
participated; they included three final year LLB students,
one LLB graduate and the writer.
six of the nine Durban magistrates' courts (also called
district courts) were selected and the proceedings in these
1. D Van Zyl Smit "Criminology and Criminal Justice: New
Directions for Research in South Africa" (1983) 7 SACC 107;
D Hansson structural Ambiguity of Evidence as a Determinant
of Evidence Credibility (1984).
2. Van Zyl smit ~ cit 107.
3. See eg M Mileski trCourtroom Encounters: An Observational
Study of the Lower Criminal Courts" (1970-71) 5 Law and
Society Review 473; FeeleYi Hansson ~ cit.
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courts were recorded on structured questionnaires. The
juvenile court and two courts dealing predominantly with
traffic offences were not included in the observation. In
the courts observed, petty cases that were disposed of
following a plea of guilty [8 112(1) (a)] were not recorded, as
the emphasis of the study was to investigate how accused
faced with more serious charges were tried. The six courts
were observed intermittently for a period of three weeks and
then on four successive Fridays in March. Since the number
of court observers was limited, they circulated among the
courts in order to obtain a representative sample of each of
the magistrates presiding in those courts.
The direct observational method of recording court
proceedings proved to be difficult and time-consuming. The
magistrates' courts seldom adhered to the official court
h~urs and each day was characterized by late starts,
extended tea and lunch breaks, and early adjournments. A
further problem experienced was that not all cases were
completed on the same day or even within the three week
observational period. Due to the heavy court rolls and
absent witnesses, few cases were completed in one day.
Consequently, not all the cases which commenced during the
period were fully recorded.
The study covered the remand, bail and plea proceedings, the
presentation of evidence, judgment, sentencing and the
invocation of suspended sentences. A separate case form was
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completed for each accused. A total sample of 272 cases was
obtained in the magistrates' courts, including cases which
dealt only with certain aspects of the trial, for example
the plea and bail proceedings.
A different method was employed for the recording of the
proceedings in the regional courts. Direct observation would
have been difficult as there are 18 regional courtrooms in
the Durban magistrates' court building. The trials were
usually lengthy and protracted, involving numerous remands.
The court hours kept by the regional courts were even less
punctual than those of the magistrates' courts. It was
therefore decided to utilize the tape recordings of the
regional court proceedings as the primary source. This
method also facilitated the recording of the complete case
history of each accused.
The cases in which the accused had been convicted were
filed in the record room according to the date of the
commencement of the proceedings. The first 90 such cases
that commenced from 1 July 1983 (a number of which were
completed only in January 1984), were recorded. The records
of the cases where acquittals were returned, were filed
separately according to the date of their completion.
Because these records are destroyed three months after the
date of completion of the case, some of the records of cases
commencing in July 1983 were no longer in existence when the
survey was conducted. From the court record book it was
calculated that approximately 18% of the accused were
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acquitted during that period. To make a comparison between
cases ending in convictions and acquittals possible, it was
decided to analyse the records of the first 16 cases in
which acquittals were recorded during November 1983.
since the two samples did not represent a finite group, it
was difficult to establish accurately the influence which
lawyers had upon the conviction rate. For this purpose,
recourse was then had to the records of non-petty cases
which commenced in four magistrates' courts during March
1984. A sample of 212 cases were so recorded . .
In analyzing the data, the need to investigate the role of
the interpreters soon became apparent since they 'p l a y e d a
part in the majority of cases. During July 1985 a further
observational study was embarked upon to examine this
aspect. The aim of the study was to uncover modes of conduct
rather than to record statistically the accuracy and extent
of interpretation. The same regional and magistrates' courts
of the previous study were observed and most of the
interpreters encountered the previous year, were still
performing the same task. Three Zulu-speaking law students,
armed with a structured questionnaire, observed the various
interpreters on a rotating basis. A total of 100 cases were
recorded.
The statistics used in the text refer to 272 magistrates'
court cases and 106 regional court cases. Individual cases
are cited as Case (a number) with RC or DC, indicating a
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regional or magistrates' court respectively. The cases
recorded in the study on interpreters, are prefixed by the
letter A, for example, Case A19 RC. These cases were not
used in the calculation of statistics. References to race,
age and sex of accused will be made where these
characteristics may be relevant to the accused's
participation or the conduct of court officials. It should
be noted that reference will be made to other empiricial
studies of the prosecution of undefended accused in Anglo-
American jurisdictions in order to complement - and
sometimes supplement - the results of this writer's study.
The methods employed to gather data were not without their
difficulties. The presence of an observer could possibly
have influenced the behaviour of magistrates, prosecutors
and interpreters. A magistrate may, when he becomes aware of
the presence of an observer, change his usual mode of
behaviour, or alternatively, have the observer removed from
the courtroom. 1 In evaluating the data, the possibility
that the personnel in the magistrates' court could have
varied their conduct, should be kept in mind. This
consideration did not, however, apply to the recording of
the regional court proceedings. In the court observation,
the observer's immediate surroundings - a crowded pUblic
gallery with poor acoustics
1. This occurred on a few occasions. For similar jUdicial
conduct see Doreen McBarnet "Magistrates' Courts and the
Ideology of Justice" (1981) 8 British Journal of Law and
Society 181 190.
/
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and mUmbling court officials - were not always conducive to
accurate recording. The tape recordings of the proceedings,
on the other hand, were free from these impediments but many
of the finer nuances and non-verbal interactions remained
unrecorded. Finally, as mentioned above, the data on the
magistrates' court include many uncompleted proceedings due
to the delays in the process~ng of the cases. Despite those
difficulties, some of which impede statistical analysis, it
is submitted that the data presented below nevertheless
provide an accurate account of the dynamics of courtroom
behaviour and decisionmaking.
The aim of the empirical study was to investigate the
methods by which decisions were reached, rather than
to describe merely the results of the decisions. The emphasis
is thus on the way proceedings were conducted; the
statistical analysis of decision outcomes is used to
illustrate the consequences of those modes of conduct.
2.2. THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED IN COURT
The majority of accused persons arraigned before the lower
courts in Anglo-American jurisdictions have been from the
lower socio-economic strata, usually occupying a marginal
position in the dominant society,l and seldom
1. See eg SR Bing & SS Rosenfield "The Quality of Justice in the
Lower Criminal Courts of Metropolitan Boston" in JA Robertson
(ed) Rough Justice (1974) 259 270; P Cashman "Representation
in Criminal Cases" in J Basten, M Richardson, C Reynolds & G
Zdendowski (eds) Criminal Inj ustice System (1982) 195 196.
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1
enjoying the assistance of defence lawyers. For the
majority of accused their court appearance is their first
encounter with the formality of legal rules and procedures.
This accused is thus the "one-shot" or occasional actor who
lacks the knowledge which is at the command of the other
actors in the system, the jUdicial officer and the
prosecutor. 2 The undefended accused has accordingly
been described as "scared, inarticulate, unfamiliar with the
procedure and commonly unable to understand what is going
on".3 Such a person lacks the ability to make any headway in
the foreign, if not hostile environment. Ericson and Baranek
describe his position as follows:
"An accused person is no more competent in the criminal
process than a jUdge would be in using language and
obeying other rules of social organization that pertain
among youths who regularly congregate in the parking
lot of a hamburger stand. The difference is, of course,
that the jUdge can leave rather than to pay lip service
to thoughts and actions he might find foreign or even
repulsive; he would only suffer embarrassment". [20]
Studies have shown that accused persons' "anxiety, despair,
and alienation that arise from the strangeness of the
proceedings", often lead to their withdrawal and passivity
in the proceedings. 4 They lack the ability to participate
and, more importantly, to participate correctly and
effectively in asserting their procedural rights. without
1. Cashman 2E cit 195.
2. RV Ericson & PM Baranek The Ordering of Justice: ~ study
of Accused Persons as Dependents in the Criminal Process
(1982) 3. -- ----
3. Justice The Unrepresented Defendant in the Magistrates'
Court (1970) 15. See also S Dell Silent in Court (1971);
PA Sallman & J Willis Criminal Justice in Australia (1984) 139.
4. Ericson & Baranek ~ cit 192.
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legal representation, their participation in the proceedings
remains superficial and their rights are ineffectually protected.
In South Africa the majority of accused arraigned before the
lower courts are from the lower socio-economic classes.
socio-economic status being significantly related to race in
South Africa, the accused are also predominantly Black. The
racial distribution of the accused in this survey was as
follows: Blacks 75,6%; Indians 10,4%; Whites 8,2% and
Coloureds 5,8%. Most of the Black accused required the
assistance of an interpreter. Of those accused whose age
could be assessed, 63% were under the age of thirty. It was
determined that 21% of the accused were unemployed at the
time of their court appearance. JUdging from their dress in
court,1 the vast majority of the accused appearing in the
magistrates' court were unskilled labourers, with only a few
being skilled or white collar workers. The majority of the
accused (73,5%) appeared alone. There was a co-accused in
15,1% of the cases and more than two accused in 11,4%. Of
the 378 accused only 11,6% were represented. A single charge
was brought against most of the accused (85,7%). The most
common offences were theft and other property offences (43,9%).
The other offences involved were assaults and culpable
homicide (15,9%), drug-related offences (15,9%), house-
breaking (10,1%), rape (8,3%) and pUblic order offences (5,8%).
The majority of the accused in the sample, then, were
indigent, Black, unskilled and probably uneducated persons
1. For the use of this indicator, see Warren 2E cit 334.
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who were not versed in the language of the court. Even if
they were familiar with English or Afrikaans, they would be
confounded by the legal jargon used by the court personnel.
The rules of court conduct were quite alien to them and they
would have had a minimal idea of any of their legal
rights. 1
In contrast to the accused, the court personnel - the
jUdicial officers and prosecutors - showed great ability,
skill and legal knowledge. Most of the prosecutors were LLB
graduates and were able to match the skills of attorneys and
advocates in defended cases. Most of them had more than a
year's experience, and the few who were inexperienced quickly
gained the necessary skills. The magistrates, though not law
graduates, were well versed in the law and were astute in
practice. Generally, the court personnel did not lack legal
skills or experience and were probably equal to the best in
the Department of Justice. with the exception of two Indian
prosecutors, the prosecutors and the judicial officers were
White, and thus did not share the same social, cultural and
linguistic background as the majority of the accused.
1. Cf MK Robertson Preventive Legal Education (1981) 73.
CHAPTER FOUR GENERAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS .
1. PARTICIPATION BY THE ACCUSED IN THE PROCEEDINGS
One of the fundamental principles of a fair trial is that
the accused should be afforded the opportunity to
participate in the decisionmaking processes which may affect
his interests. To assist him in such participation he is
entitled to be represented by a lawyer, whose duty it will
be to ensure that the opportunity to participate is afforded
and utilized fully. In undefended cases, on the other hand,
the accused bears that responsibility. A prerequisite for
participation is the accused's presence at his trial. His-- -- . _ -
presence is required on three levels, namely the physical,
the cognitive, and the communicative. Where the accused is
undefended the court bears the duty to ensure that these
prerequisites are met.
1.1. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION
An accused person has th~-Eig~~ to b~ _~ep~e~ented by ~
lawyer at criminal proceediEgs. 1 This right also extends
to every person whose liberty may be infringed, for example,
a recalcitrant witness. 2 The importance of legal
representation for securing a fair trial is widely
1. Act 51 of 1977 s 73(2) (Unless specified otherwise, all
references to sections of an act hereinafter, refer to Act
51 of 1977). See generally S Selikowitz "Defence by Counsel
in Criminal Proceedings under South African Law" 1965-66
Acta Juridica 53.
2. Heyman 1966 (4) SA 598 (A) 604F-G. See also- J Dugard
liThe Right to Counsel: South African and American
Developments" (1967) 84 SALT 1.
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recognized. In Ngula 1974 (1) SA 801 (E) Eksteen J commented
as follows in this regard:
"It is to my mind a matter of considerable importance
in the interests of justice and the administration of
justice that every accused person should be accorded
every opportunity of putting his or her case clearly
and succinctly to the court and this can only be
properly done when it is put by a person who is trained
in the law. Such a person must obviously be in a better
position to put the case of an accused person much
better and more clearly than that person could fairly
do himself". [804E-F]
Where an accused at his first appearance in court is not
represented, it cannot be assumed that he is aware of this
right (or of the availability of legal aid), and that he
chooses not to avail himself of it. 1 The court is not,
however obli ed to render the right accessible to him.
1.1.1. INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
The Natal Provincial Division in Mthetwa 1978 (2) SA 773
(N) ruled that there is no duty on the court to inform the
accused that he has a right to engage the services of a
lawyer, but that it might be desirable to do so. [776F] The
Transvaal Provincial Division expressed a similar opinion in
Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (T), stating that if the accused
does not seek legal representation and is not de rived of
the 0 ortunity~o do so _ no irregularity is
committed. [293F] Margo J added, however, that
1. SE van der Merwe Handleiding tot Artikels 112 en 115
van die Strafproseswet (1980) 10~
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" where an accused is not legally represented - and
this is especially so in the case of an illiterate or
foreign accused who is not familiar with the jUdicial
process, the court will be careful to draw attention to
the advisability of ,b e i ng legally represented". [293G-H]
In Kunene 1984 (1) PH H66 (A) the Appellate Division
confirmed that in the absence of a bona fide request for
legal assistance by a recalcitrant witness, the Court is
under no obligation to suggest or to arrange for such
assistance, and its failure to do so does not constitute an
~-
irregularity.
There is also no general duty on the court to inform
undefended accused of the existence of legal aid or how to
apply for such assistance. Margo J in Baloyi, however,
intimated that there are cases where the gravity of the
charge or the complexity of the matter is such that "in the
interests of justice" the accused ought to be represented
even though he cannot afford it.[293F] In such cases, the
jUdge declared obiter, it would be the duty of -the court
either to appoint pro Deo counsel or to refer the case to
legal aid or other professional bodies to appoint a lawyer
pro bono. [294A] This obiter dictum is in sharp contrast to
*the Appellate Division's decision in~Chaane 1978 (2) SA 891
(A) that there was no legal duty on a court to appoint pro
Deo counsel on a capital charge, even if the accused himself
requested such assistance. 1 The Court held that it was
merely a rule of practice to appoint pro Deo counsel for
indigent accused, and no irregularity was committed if an
1. See also Mati 1960 (1) SA 304 (A) 306H.
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indigent accused facing the death penalty was denied a
court-appointed counsel. If the Appellate Division was
reluctant to create a duty to appoint counsel in such
extreme circumstances, it is difficult to imagine other
cases in which a judicial officer would be obliged "in the
interests of justice" to appoint counsel for the accused
because of the gravity of the offence. Even if the
guidelines formulated in Baloyi were to be accepted,
however, their vagueness would prevent their being of much
use. The criterion of the complexity of a case is
difficult, if not impossible, to apply.1 To enable the court
to assess the complexity of a case, there should be a
considerable amount of information available to it;2 this is
not always forthcoming before the commencement of the trial,
particularly when the accused failed to disclose his defence
at an early stage of the proceedings. It is also possible
that the complexity of a case may only become apparent
during the trial. Finally, a case apparently straightforward
from the court's point of view may present an illiterate
accused with severe difficulties. More practical guidelines
are therefore re9Uired if the cases most needy of legal
assistance are to be identified.
various recommendations have been made that the jUdicial
officer should play a more active role in respect of the
· f 1 1 · 3 ·lssue 0 ega representatlon. Kentrldge has suggested
1. Cf Justice Unrepresented Defendent (1972) 19.
2. Q£ cit 21.
3. See ch 3 above for the proposals in Parliament in 1973 and 19 77 .
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that in 'serious' cases an undefended accused should at
least be asked whether he wants a lawyer, whether he has
applied for legal aid, and if not, be told how he can
apply.l McQuoid-Mason argues ~hat the common law right to
counsel is not satisfied if the presiding officer does not
enquire whether an undefended accused wishes to be
represented.[118] If the accused answers that he cannot afford a
lawyer, the court should then advise him how to apply for
legal aid. This duty should apply primarily where an accused
runs the risk of a sentence of imprisonment. [ll8] Mr Justice
AJ Milne, however, has argued that this suggestion does not
go far enough and may in any case be difficult to apply in
t ' 2 't t th t th 1 rob fprac lce. He pOln s ou a ere are a arge nu er 0
offences for which a prison sentence is competent; that
there is always the risk of a prison sentence being imposed--
in default of a fine, and finally, that the previous
convictions of an accused, adduced only after conviction,
may warrant a prison sentence despite the minor nature of
the offence. The solution he suggests is that in certain
classes of off~nc~~t should automatically be the duty of
the magistrate to inform the accused, whereas in others it
would be left to_ h i s ~iscretion . [687] It is submitted that----
the latter is the most practicable method of introducing the
entitlement to legal aid, but that no such restrictions
should be placed upon the court's duty to inform the accused
1. Sidney Kentridge in University of Natal Legal Aid in
South Africa (1974) 265.
2. AJ Milne "Equal Access to Free and Independent Courts"
(1984) 100 SALJ 681.
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of his right to legal representation.
It is submitted that it should be the duty of the court to
inform the accused in every case of his right to
representation. It has been suggested by Mr Justice Milne
that the law should be amended so as to require courts to
inform accused of this right. 1 It is submitted that no
legislative intervention is required to impose such a duty,
as the Supreme Court can accomplish this simply by viewing
the non-disclosure of this right as an irregularity. It
should be regarded as an irregularity which per se leads to
a failure of justice, because by keeping the accused
ignorant of this right, he is denied one of the fundamental
elements of a_fair trial. 2 The irregularity may also
--~ '"'--
affect the sUfficiency and reliability of the evidence
produced in court. The denial of the right would prejudice
the accused as it cannot be said, in the absence of a
defence lawyer, that all the evidence is before court or has
been tested properly. There must therefore be some doubt as
to whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. 3
The appropriate time for this apprisal is at the accused's
first appearance. This would enable him to engage the
services of a lawyer forthwith and would obviate the
adjournment of the proceedings for this purpose later on.
1 '. 2..E cit 685. See also J van den Berg "Legal Representation:
Right or Privilege" (1984) 47 THRHR 454.
2. See Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A) 758F; Mushimba
1977 ( 2 ) SA 82 9 (A) 84 4 D.
3. See Tuge 1966 (4) SA 565 (A).
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1.1.2. GRANTING THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
Since an accused is entitled to obtain legal representation,
he should be afforded an opportunity to do so.l A refusal
to allow an accused such an opportunity was described in
Blooms 1966 (4) SA 411 (C) as "such a gross departure from
established rules of procedure that the accused in such
circumstances has not been properly tried and this brings
per se a failure of justice".2 An accused's request for a
remand to retain a lawyer may thus not be refused out of
hand. The court is not, however, obliged to acquiesce to
each and every application for a remand to secure a lawyer:
the accused bears the onus to convince the court that the
remand is justified. 3 To succeed in his application, Van
den Berg argues, the accused must show (a) good cause,
and (b) absence of prejudice to the State. [450] Good cause
would be shown if the accused would be prejudiced by a
refusal to postpone the case, and if the absence of the
legal advisor is not due to the fault of the accused. Since
this onus may present difficulties for an accused,
particularly if he is illiterate or poorly educated,
provision has been made that the court should assist him by
ensuring that all the facts relevant to the consideration of
the application are put on record. In Seheri 1964 (1) SA 29
(A) the accused's lawyer did not appear in court on the
1. Mtetwe 1957 (4) SA 298 (0): Nel 1974 (2) SA 445 (NC).
2. 420. See also Mkize 1978 (3) SA 1065 (T) 1066G.
3. Van den Berg (1984) 47 THRHR 447.
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trial date and when the accused requested a remand to secure
legal representation, the judge refused without affording
them an opportunity to substantiate their application. Botha
JA commented that the accused were probably unaware of how
to substantiate their application and that the court, with a
few questions, could have assisted them in their
predicament.[34G] The convictions were thus set aside
because the accused were denied their right to legal
representation.
Where the accused does not timeously secure the services of
a lawyer, he may be refused a further opportunity to effect
this. The right to be afforded the opportunity to obtain
legal representation is thus not an absolute one, and it may
on occasions become a 'privilege,.l Van den Berg therefore
suggests that the court should warn the accused that the
right may become a privilege if he is at fault in
not securing in time the presence of a lawyer at his
trial. [452-3]
since the exercise of the opportunity to obtain legal
representation is dependent upon the accused's knowledge
thereof, it is submitted that the jUdicial officer should be
required to inform the accused of his general right to such
an opportunity, subject to its being exercised in a timely
manner.
1. Van den Berg 2E cit 452.
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1.2. THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED
section 158 makes the presence of the accused obligatory at
all criminal proceedings. 1 section 159(1), however, makes
provision for the conduct of the proceedings in the absence
of the accused, if he, through his conduct in court, makes
the continuation of the proceedings impracticable. Since an
undefended accused would generally be unaware of such a
provision, it has been decided that there is a duty upon the
court to warn him that should he continue with his
disruptive conduct, the trial will be conducted in his
absence. 2
1.3. THE ACCUSED'S MENTAL CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND THE
PROCEEDINGS
section 77(1) states that if it appears to the court at any
stage of criminal proceedings that the accused is, by reason
of mental illness or defect, not capable of understanding
the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court is
obliged to send him to a mental institution for
observation. 3
Where an accused is not represented by a lawyer who, in his
communications with his client, could assess the latter's
ability to comprehend legal proceedings, the referral of an
undefended accused for observation will usually depend upon
1. Price 1955 (1) SA 219 (A); Ey en 1982 (4) SA 141 (T);
Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (C 620D; Motlatla 1975 (1)
SA 814 (T). See also Moko 1985 (1) SA 350 (0) 355F.
2. Mok 1985 (1) SA 350 (0). See also Hiemstra 341.
3. See ~ 1984 (1) SA 33 (T) 37E.
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the initiative of the police or court personnel. They will
be acting, however, on their perfunctory observation of the
accused and perhaps on information received from his
relatives. Hiemstra CJ has thus pointed out in Morake 1979
(1) SA 121 (BSC) that there is little information available
to the court pertaining to the mental condition of an
undefended accused. [122G] This means that his mental
incapacity may not always be detected by the court. The only
safeguard is for the court to order an enquiry if it has any
doubt as to the accused's capacity to stand trial. 1 In
such an instance it is desirable for the court to indicate
that the enquiry should cover both the accused's capacity to
understand the proceedings and his criminal capacity at the
time of the commissi~n of the offence, as the court may not
know which field of enquiry would be the most
. t 2approprla e.
1.3.1. THE ENQUIRY
In the case of a non-capital charge, the enquiry is
conducted by the medical superintendent of a mental_hospital
or by a psychiatrist appointed by him.[S 79(1) (a)] The court
has the discretion to appoint an additional psychiatrist who
is not in the full-time service of the State.[S 79(1) (b)]
The appointment of a second independent psychiatrist is
- -- - - -- - - -
compulsory in capital cases. The court may also direct that
-- - -
a psychiatrist appointed by the accused participate in the
1. Y.. supra 37E.
2. Morake supra 122F. See also V supra 37H.
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enquiry in both instances.[S 79(1) (b) (iii)] Although the
Code provides the accused with the opportunity to dispute
and contest the findings of the state psychiatrist,[S 77(2)]
an undefended accused is unlikely to be able to do so, due
to the specialized nature of the enquiry, even if he is in a
sane condition, let alone where his mental capacity is in
doubt. The only real safeguard against an incorrect
diagnosis by a solitary state psychiatrist is the
participation of an independent psychiatrist in the enquiry.
It is therefore submitted that in undefended non-capital
cases the court should, as a rule, appoint a second ~~
psychiatrist who is not in the service of the state.1~Y/ y
1.3.2. THE TEST FOR TRIABILITY
The Code bases the test of triabilit on whether the accused
"is by reason of mental illness or mental defect, not
capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a
proper defence".[S 77(1)] The accused's ability "to make a
proper defence" has traditionally been ascertained according
to his ability to give his legal adviser sufficient
instructions on the basis of which a defence may be put
forward.
2
This test thus has little applicability where
the accused is undefended. 3 No other criterion which could
accommodate the undefended accused has yet been formulated
1. For a critique of state psychiatrists see JE wild
"Mad or Bad: The Psychiatrist's Discretion" in Olmesdahl
ey er 224.
2. SA Strauss in Hiemstra 165.
3. T Verschoor & PHJ van Rensburg "Kriteria vir
Verhoorbaarheid" (1983) 7 SACC 16 17.
Chapter 4 Page 173
by the Court. It is submitted that a ~ore appropriate test
would simply be to determine whether the accused can,
firstly, communicate and secondly, understand the
-- --
proceedings. 1 The accused's ability to give instructions
to a legal practitioner should therefore be regarded as
merely one of the factors which can be used to jUdge his
capacities for communication and comprehension.
1.3.3. THE DECLARATION AS A STATE PRESIDENT'S PATIENT
The accused is entitled to a hearing before the court makes
a decision regarding his triability. He may challenge the
evidence of the psychiatrist and present evidence on his own
behalf. 2 For an undefended accused whose mental capacity
is in issue, this provision may not be of much value. The
jUdicial officer is seldom in a position to be of much
assistance to the accused in testing the psychiatric
evidence, as he would not know the accused's background or
any additional information which may contradict the
psychiatrist's findings. The appointment of an independent
pSYChiatrist, as suggested above, may not obviate the
problem, particularly where there is a conflict in the
experts' opinions. The only solution to the pro~!e~ j~ for
.th~ ~ourt to apP9int counsel for the accused, who could
p~ovide the necessary forensic skills to assist the court in
1 t ' th 'd 3eva ua lng e eVl ence. The need for legal assistance is
1. Verschoor & Van Rensburg ~ cit 18.
2. S 77; Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (C) 620E.
3. See wild ~ cit.
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increased by the fact that the order declaring the accused a
state President's patient is not sUbject ~o automatic
. 1reVlew.
If the court finds that the accused is not triable, it must
direct that he be detained in a mental hospital or
a prison pending the signification of the decision of the
state President.[S 77(6)J If the enquiry · is conducted before
the trial, then there is no certainty as to whether the
accused was in fact involved in the offence. 2 The Rumpff
commission3 did not deem it necessary that there should be
any 'trial of facts', and assumed that the accused would not
have been charged unless there was evidence linking him to
the offence. Such an assumption may be erroneous and without
an independent assessment of the evidence, the possibility
cannot be excluded that a person may be accused and
consequently detained without probable cause. A 'trial of
facts' is thus essential, particularly in the case of an
undefended accused, because he may be unable, without the
assistance of a lawyer, to challenge the State's allegations
which could prove to be unfounded.
The detention of an accused as a state President's patient
could in many cases be unreasonable because the punishment
1. See s 302; Blaauw 1980 (1) SA 536 (C).
2. Verschoor and Van Rensburg ~ cit 17.
3. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the
Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related
Matters RP 69/1967 57 under the chairmanship of
Mr Justice Rumpff.
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the court would otherwise have imposed for the offence
might be negligible in comparison to the detention, which
may be for a considerable length of time. The court is not,
however, obliged to declare the accused a state President's
1
patient if the prosecution abandons the case altogether. If
the prosecutor withdraws the charge before the accused has
pleaded, or stops the proceedings where pleading has taken
place, there would be no proceedings before the court and
the latter would therefore not be obliged to make such a
declaration. The prosecutor is thus burdened with the
onerous responsibility of determining whether the case
should proceed. This requires the jUdicious exercise of his
discretion on a matter which has far reaching consequences
for the accused. 2 A defence lawyer would render valuable
assistance to the prosecutor by advancing information and
argument as to how he should exercise his discretion. This
underlines again the importance of the appointment of
counsel for the accused in these proceedings. In the absence
of a lawyer, though, it is submitted that the prosecutor, in
the exercise of his discretion, should take due cognizance
of the interests of the undefended accused and the court may
well advise him in this regard.
1. Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (C); Dweba 1983 (1) PH H16 (Ck).
2. Kahita supra 620E.
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1.4. COMMUNICATING WITH THE ACCUSED
Effective communication with the accused is an essential
prerequisite for a fair trial. Consequently, if no
communication is possible, as in the case of a
mute,l or a person speaking only a foreign language,2
the accused cannot be tried and any trial of such a person
would be regarded as a nullity.3
The Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944 places a duty on a
magistrate to call a competent interpreter if he is of the
opinion that the accused is not sufficiently conversant in
the language in which the evidence is given, irrespective of
whether it is one of the official languages.[S 6(2)] The
magistrate should not wait until the accused complains about
communication difficulties but must himself ascertain
whether the accused can follow the proceedings. 4 A formal
enquiry is not, however, necessary on a regular basis when
it is obvious that the accused is conversant in the
language of the court. 5
As Black accused are not always conversant in the official
languages, interpreters are an integral part of most court
proceedings. They must translate accurately,
comprehensively, and without bias all communications in
1. Pachourie y Additional Magistrate, Ladysmith 1978 (3)
SA 986 (N).
2. Mafu 1978 (1) SA 454 (C).
3. PaChourie supra.
4. Mackessack y Assistant Magistrate, Empangeni 1963
(1) SA 892 (N). See also Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337.
5. Geidel y Bosman NO 196~4~A 253 (T).
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1court in a language which the accused can understand. As
most Black accused, particularly when they are undefended,
are dependent on the interpreters for their understanding of
and participation in the trial, it is the duty of the court
to ensure that the function of these officials is properly
executed. Should the court fail to exercise the necessary
control over the translation of all court communications,
then the accused's other rights and duties, all of which
presuppose effective communication between all the court
participants, may be rendered worthless.
2. THE EXPEDITIOUS COMPLETION OF PROCEEDINGS AND
ADJOURNMENT
The expeditious completion of proceedings is a well
recognized criterion for a fair trial. 2 The rationale
underlying this principle is, inter alia,
"to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
pUblic accusations and to limit the possibilities that
long delay will ~mpair the ability of the accused to
defend himself".
Ensuring that trials are expeditiously completed, is today
almost exclusively4 the responsibility of the jUdicial
1. See Mzo 1980 (1) SA 538 (C) 539E; Mafu 1978 (1)
SA 454(C). See generally ON Channon The Role of the
Court Interpreter (1982). --- ---- -----
2. Yontolo 1977 (2) SA 146 (E) 149H. See also Makata
1975 (2) SA 315 (T) 319; Mokoena 1983 (4) SA 401 (TkSC);
Du Toit 136; Michael Donen "In Search of Rights of a Fair
Trial" (1985) 102 SALJ 310.
3. Unite d states ~~ll 383 US 116 (1966).
4. But s ee s 340 for submission of prison lists of
unsentenced prisoners in custody for longer than 90 days.
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officer. 1 section 168 vests the court with the discretion
to remand proceedings if it "deems it necessary or
expedient". The discretion must, however, be exercised
, d i , 11 2JU a c i a y. '
with no time limit set by statute for the commenc~ment or
the completion of the trial, the court's decision is guided
3by principles formulated by the Supreme Court. While
defence lawyers tend to object readily to further remands,
4especially if state witnesses are absent, undefended
accused, unaware of the right to object, accept repeated
" ' t d f "1 t ' 1 5remands as part of the V1C1SSl u es 0 a crlmlna rla.
Although the courts have occasionally acted in favour of the
accused,6 no clear principle has been articulated
in this regard to guide jUdicial officers in dealing with
undefended accused.
It is submitted that the correct approach to the matter
would be for the court to conduct an enquiry before
1. For previous statutory regulation see Act 56 of 1955 s
150, 294-295, 298. See also the Viljoen Commission's
recommendation of a statutory injunction to jUdicial
officers that they should apply their minds to the
expeditious completion of proceedings and the granting
of bail (par 4.2.4.10). See further ch 3 above.
2. Zackey 1945 AD 505 511; Magoda 1984 (4) SA 462 (C).
3. See Geritis 1966 (1) SA 753 (W); Paweni 1985 (1)
SA 301 (ZHC) 307; Magoda 1984 (4) SA 462 (C); Mokoena
1983 (4) SA 401 (TkSC). See generally N Steytler "The Right
to a Speedy Trial" (1985) 9 SACC 173.
4. Snyman & Morkel 311. ----
5. See eg Mokoena 1983 (4) SA 401 (TkSC).
6. See eg Magoda 1984 (4) SA 462 (C).
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making this decision. 1 Since the decision entails
mediating between the interests of the accused and the State on
the basis of policy considerations, the court bears the
responsibility to inform itself 'a b ou t the relevant factors
involved and thus be in a position to make a considered
decision. It should first afford the State and the accused
the fullest opportunity to advance relevant information and
argument. If they fail to provide a sufficient factual
basis, the court should establish this inquisitorially. It
is therefore submitted that the court should question the
prosecutor if it is not sUfficiently informed of the reasons
for his application for a remand. If the accused, having
been invited to participate in the decisionmaking, fails to
submit any relevant information, the court may also question
him.
Recognizing that the expeditious completion of proceedings
is the court's duty, the implementation of a routine enquiry
for the execution of that duty would place the remand
process on a sound theoretical footing. Such an
administrative-type decision based on policy considerations
is best made by means of an enquiry into all relevant facts.
More importantly, however, this approach would assist the
undefended accused to secure a speedy trial. The process
would become less adversarial and the undefended accused
1. For a fuller exposition of the concept and principles of
an enquiry preceding the exercise of a discretion, see the
discussion of the bail decision in par 3 below and sentencing,
ch 9 below.
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would accordingly suffer less prejudice due to his inability
to perform his role as an adversary. No onus would be placed
upon him to contest the prosecution's requests for remands
and he would be invited to participate before any decision
was made. At the same time, the court would be in a position
to exercise the necessary control over the prosecutions's
application for further remands.
3. THE JUDICIAL RELEASE OF AWAITING-TRIAL PRISONERS
The release of an awaiting-trial prisoner is an expression
of the fundamental principle that the accused is presumed to
be innocent until proven guilty.1 The rule that all bail
arrangements are terminated on conviction, whereafter it is
in the discretion of the court to extend it,[S 58] is
evidence of this relationship between bail and the
presumption. Where an accused is not likely to prejudice the
administration of justice by either absconding or
interfering with State witnesses, he should be released on
warning [S 72] or bail.[S 60(1)] The release of an accused
in this way not only gives effect to the presumption of
innocence and an individual's right to liberty, but it also
facilitates an accused's challenge of the State case by
making it easier for him, for example, to engage the
services of a lawyer, search for witnesses and generally
prepare his defence. Judicial release will be examined in
terms of the rules applicable to the bail process since this
1. See eg Stack v Boyle 342 US 1 (1951).
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is more prevalent than release on warning.
The accused may at his first appearance in court apply to be
released on bail.[S 60(1)] In Liebman v Attorney-General
1950 (1) SA 607 (W) it was held that the accused is
required to put forward a prima facie case that his release
would not prejudice the administration of justice" in that
he would not abscond or interfere with State witnesses.
1
This prima facie case has to be proved by the accused on a
balance of probabilities. 2 The onus is therefore on the
accused to apply for bail and to convince the court that
bail should be granted; failure to do both will mean his
continued detention. There is no duty placed on the court to
inform the undefended accused of his right to apply for
bail, making this right invariably inaccessible to most
undefended accused. They would be ignorant in the first
instance of the fact that they may apply to be released on
bail and secondly, that the onus is on them to apply. Even
if they are aware of bail and the onus, they may not know
how to substantiate a successful bail application. 3
While this procedure prevails, it is submitted that the
undefended accused should be informed thoroughly of his
rights and duties in respect of bail. It -wi l l be argued,
however, that the rules outlined above are not only
1. 611. See also Maharaj 1976 (3) SA 205 (D) 208A;
Hiemstra 132; Lansdown & Campbell 324; Snyman & Morkel 187.
2. ~ 1955 (1) PH H93 (C); Hlongwa 1979 (4) SA 112 (D).
3. See Steytler "Bail" in Olmesdahl & Steytler 124.
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prejudicial to the undefended accused, but are also
theoretically unsound. It is submitted that the correct
procedure to be followed in the determination of bail is an
enquiry by the court, relieving the parties of adversarial
responsibility in this regard.
3.1. THE BAIL DECISION AS AN ENQUIRY
The release decision lends itself less to an adversary mode
of procedure than does the decision on the merits; the two
types of decisions are essentially different. The decision
on the merits of the case involves the settlement of
disputed facts. The release decision, on the other hand, is
concerned with regulating human behaviour - ensuring that
the accused will stand trial and not interfere with
witnesses. It deals thus with future events and the court
bears the responsibility to make a decision which will serve
the ends of justice. Schmidt accordingly describes the
granting or refusal of bail as an administrative rather than
a judicial act. [67] To arrive, then, at an appropriate
decision, the court should first conduct an enquiry.
The basic structure of an enquiry is the following: Firstly,
where the court bears the responsibility of arriving at a
decision which will serve the interests of justice, no party
bears an onus to prove a particular correct decision.
Secondly, the court can arrive at an appropriate decision
only if information is available regarding all pertinent
considerations which it should take into account. To this
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end, the court should afford the parties the fullest
opportunity to present information and argument. Thirdly, if
they should fail to inform the court sufficiently, it should
establish inquisitorially an adequate factual basis for its
decision. Such a routine enquiry into the bail question
would be the most appropriate means of determining whether
bail should be granted, for the court would equip itself
with all the relevant considerations - either by means of
the parties' contributions or through its own questioning.
Where an undefended accused is unable to put forward his
circumstances, then, these would be elicited by the court'
and in this way he would have a greater chance of release
than at present.
There is support in the case law for the view that the bail
process should be regarded as an enquiry. It has been held
that the court bears the responsibility to ensure that an
accused is not unnecessarily incarcerated. In Budlender 1973
(1) SA 264 (C) Van Zijl JP stated that "the courts do not
like ever to deprive a man of his freedom while awaiting
trial".l More forthright is the dictum of Milne JP in
Mdhluli 1968 (2) PH H303 (N):
"The Magistrate, even without an application from the
accused, should insist on bail being granted wherever
possible in order to ensure that the accused will not
be kept unnecessarily in custody. It is not every Bantu
man who knows that he has the right to apply to be
released on bail".
1. 269E. See also McCarthy v Rex 1906 TS 657 659.
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In Joone 1973 (1) SA 841 (C), Steyn J clearly stated that
the correct bail decision is the courtls responsibility and
that neither it nor the prosecutor is a rubberstamp of the
decision of the investigating officer as to whether bail
should be granted or what the amount should be. Arriving at
a just decision requires an assessment based on the relevant
information. In this regard Steyn J said the following:
IIln Strenge, onafhanklike beoordeling van die feite van
elke saak wat sal insluit In versigtige oorweging van
die omstandighede van elke beskuldigde, die erns van
die misdaad en die belange van die gemeenskap, behoort
deur die voorsittende beampte in elke geval gedoen te
word. 11 [847A]
Such an assessment presupposes that the information is
available to the court. Where it is not provided by the parties,
the court should establish such inquisitorially. The enquiry
has already been recognized as essential in the
determination of the amount of bail to be granted. In making
this decision it is an established principle that the
financial ability of the accused person is a factor the
t h Id t k · t 1cour s ou a e 1n 0 account. If the court is not
SUfficiently informed in this regard, Steyn J held in Visser
1975 (2) SA 342 (C), it is under a duty to investigate the
ability of the accused to pay a suggested amount of bail. 2
Clearly, an enquiry would be unnecessary where the accused
and the prosecution had reached an agreement on the matter
1. Mohamed 1977 (2) SA 531 (A); Budlender 1973 (1) SA
364 (C) 269E-F.
2. 343C. See also Budlender 1973 (1) SA 264 (C) 269E-F.
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of bail. In the case of the undefended accused, however,
where negotiations between the prosecutor and the accused
may be difficult to conduct and the accused may be a weak
adversary, it should be the duty of the court to address the
issue of bail in every case.
Imposition of such a duty upon the court would quite likely
be resisted on the basis that a routine enquiry would be
extremely time-consuming in a process geared towards maximum
efficiency in crime control. While it is this writer's
submission that the protection of the majority of accused
persons' rights to liberty should supercede any such
practical drawbacks, it should be noted that a continuation
of the present procedure is not the only alternative. If a
strict adversary mode is to be retained at this stage of the
trial, then there remains scope for protecting the interests
of the undefended accused in a manner not as satisfactory as
an enquiry, but more effective than the present system and
more in line with general principles of procedural law. This
would be to burden the state with the onus of proof that
the accused should not be released.
3.2. PLACING THE ONUS ON THE STATE
The presumption of innocence of which bail is an expression,
holds that the individual's liberty can be interfered with
only once the state has shown reasonable cause for such
infringement. The police must show reasonable cause for the
arrest of a person [S 40] and in a habeas corpus application
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the detaining body, the state, is called upon to show why
the detention is lawful. 1 Furthermore, the state bears the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In exactly the same way, the onus should be placed on
the state to convince the court that the accused's liberty
should be infringed upon before he is found guilty. Clearly
the continued detention of the accused can be justified only
if the prosecutor can show a probability that the accused
will not stand trial or would interfere with state
witnesses. There is thus no basis in logic or in principle
for the decision in Liebman y Attorney-General placing the
onus on the accused to prove that he will stand trial.
Although s 60(1) mentions that the accused may apply for
bail, it is submitted that this is not a sufficient
indication that the common law presumption of innocence has
been overruled by statute and the onus is to be placed on
the accused. Moreover, s 72 makes no suggestion that 'a n
accused should apply to be released on warning.
Were the legislature or the Supreme Court to impose a duty
to enquire upon the court or an onus of proof upon the
prosecutor, there is no certainty that these would be
adhered to in the absence of a defence lawyer. The Supreme
Court faces serious difficulties, however, in imposing
duties on the lower courts in respect of bail. Despite
irregularities in the bail process, the conviction and
1. Ganyile v Minister of Just ice 1962 (1) SA 647 (E) 654B.
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sentence will stand, as it is assumed that neither of these
decisions was directly affected by the bail determination.
The possible range of sanctions is therefore limited. In
Visser 1975 (2) SA 343 (C) Steyn J, after confirming both
the conviction and sentence on review, could only reprimand
the magistrate for his irregular conduct in routinely
setting high bail amounts as a deterrent for drunken
drivers. The only sanction available to the Court on review
is the subtraction of any time unduly spent in custody prior
to sentencing from the sentence imposed. The fact that the
accused in Mdhluli 1968 (2) PH H303 (N) spent more than
two months in custody pending the proof, if any, of his
previous convictions, moved the Court to reduce his sentence
by half. 1 The rule need not be restricted to cases where a
sentence of imprisonment is imposed. It can also be applied
to fines. The length of the pre-sentence custody can be
subtracted from the length of imprisonment set in default of
the payment of the fine. The portion of the fine to be paid
can thus be calculated with reference to the length of
"default" imprisonment already served.
3.3. THE BREACH OF BAIL CONDITIONS OR THE FAILURE TO APPEAR
Where the state alleges that a bail condition has been
breached, the onus is on the prosecution to prove such an
allegation. The accused is given the opportunity to contest
such evidence.[S 66(1)] If the court finds that there was a
1. See also Mokoena 1983 (4) SA 401 (TkSC)i Grey 1983 (2) SA
536 (C) 539Ei Du Toit 273.
Chapter 4 Page 188
failure to comply with a condition, and such failure was due
to the accused's fault, the court may cancel the bail and
declare the money forfeited to the State.[S 66(3)]
The forfeiture of the bail money does not, however, follow
automatically on the cancellation of bail. The court has a
discretion in this regard and may take into account
considerations other than those applicable to the
cancellation of bail. It must therefore apply its mind
specifically to the issue1 and conduct an enquiry to
consider such factors as may be relevant to the question of
the forfeiture as opposed to the cancellation. 2
In conducting the enquiry, it is submitted, the court should '
invite the accused to advance relevant considerations, and
where he is not able to do so adequately, it should
inquisitorially establish a sufficient factual basis for its
decision. By assuming an active role in the proceedings, the
court will compensate for the undefended accused's inability
to participate as a skilled adversary.
If the accused fails to appear in court on the remand date
or fails to remain in attendance, the court must cancel his
bail provisionally and the money will be provisionally
forfeited to the State.[S 67(1)] The accused can prevent the
final forfeiture of the money if he can show within 14 days
that it was not his fault that he did not appear on the
1. Sebe y Magistrate, Zwelitsha 1984 (3) SA 885 (CkSC) 890C.
2. Sebe supra 891C. See also Hiemstra J's reference to an
enqulry in Pillay y Regional Magistrate, Pretoria 1977 (1)
SA 533 (T) 535Fi Hiemstra 143.
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court date or did not remain in attendance.[S 67(2)] The
onus is placed on the accused to convince the court of his
1innocence in this regard. It is submitted that the court
should inform the accused of this onus and, where necessary
and feasible, assist him in advancing relevant information.
Once the 14 day period has expired without an application by
the accused, the money is finally forfeited to the state,
even if the accused was not at fault.[S 67(2) (c)] The only
recourse for the accused would be to apply to the Minister
of Justice for the remission of the whole or part of the
money.[S 70] It is submitted that the court should inform an
undefended accused whose bail money has been forfeited
either in terms of s 66 or 67, about the avenue open to him
to reclaim his money.
1. Sibuya 1979 (3) SA 192 (T) 192.
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4. GENERAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. LEGAL REPRESENTATION
In accordance with the case law, all but one magistrate did
not at any stage of the proceedings apprise the accused of
their right to legal representation. Even in the regional
court, where serious charges were tried and long terms of
imprisonment imposed, the right to counsel was never
mentioned, let alone the existence of legal aid. Only one
magistrate attempted to make the right more accessible by
routinely asking the accused, "Do you have a lawyer?" or
when he remanded a case, warning the accused that if he had
a lawyer, the latter should be in court at the next hearing.
In a survey by Bekker et al in 1984 of a number of lower
courts in KwaZulu and Natal, it was found that in only 2% of
the cases in their sample was the accused informed of this
right. [4]
Since undefended accused are not routinely informed in court
of this right, knowledge of and access to lawyers depends
upon outside sources. In this regard awaiting-trial
prisoners may face considerable difficulties. One possible
source of assistance outside the courtroom is the prisoners'
friend, a Department of Justice official. His task of
assisting prisoners consists principally of arranging for
sentenced prisoners to pay fines in instalments, and
arranging bail hearings where the granting of bail is
opposed by the State. In practice, he is mainly occupied
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with the receiving of monies for the payment of fines and
bail. One person is designated as the prisoners' friend and
he serves all the accused in the court building. His office
is located below the courtrooms and prisoners have access to
it. Assistance is given on a reactive basis; the onus is on
the prisoner firstly, to locate his office and secondly, to
seek the required assistance.
The prisoners' friend at the Durban magistrates' court
proved not to be very helpful in the arrangement of legal
assistance. When she was asked whether she assisted
prisoners in obtaining legal aid, she replied that she
handed them the telephone directory to enable them to trace
the telephone number of an attorney. When questioned
specifically about the legal aid scheme, she replied that
she had heard of it, but had no further knowledge thereof. A
colleague of hers ventured the information that it was the
institution through which a cheap divorce could be obtained.
The Legal Aid Board did not advertise its services. No
notices about legal aid were found in the magistrates' court
building nor in the cells below. It was in fact the policy
of the police officer in charge of the cells that no notices
were to be displayed in the cells for fear of their being
defaced. The appearance of a lawyer instructed by the Legal
Aid Board was indeed a rare occurrence and it happened only
twice in the sample.
On the rare occasions where the accused was aware of his
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right to a lawyer and indicated that he desired to consult a
lawyer before pleading to the charge, he had to follow
the correct procedure and adopt an assertive manner in order
to succeed, as is illustrated by case 390 DC.
Case 390 DC
A young working class male appeared on a charge of
drunken driving. Before the court proceedings started the
prosecutor asked him what he was going to plead and showed
him the district surgeon's report, which stated that he had
been drunk. When the court was in session the prosecutor
read out the charge, phrased in legal jargon, and asked the
accused to plead.
Accused (A): I have to speak to my lawyer.
Prosecutor (P): All I am asking is what do you plead!
A: According to the doctor I must plead guilty.
A friend of the accused, casually dressed, walked up to the
dock and audibly told the accused not to plead. The
magistrate immediately ordered the court orderly to remove
the person from the court and that was promptly done.
Magistrate (M): What do you plead, accused?
A: I want to see my lawyer.
M: You want to see your lawyer first?
A: Yes.
Only then did the magistrate remand the case.
The prosecutor, unencumbered by any legal duty to respect
the accused's wish to see a lawyer, was eager to record the
plea, which seemed likely to be one of guilty. The
magistrate acknOWledged the accused's legal right to consult
a lawyer only when the right was claimed in the proper
adversary manner - clearly and correctly formulated. To halt
the case's progression towards conviction, the accused had
to assert his right to be represented forcefully.
It was thus not the policy of the courts to assist
undefended accused in the matter of legal representation.
Accused were not referred to legal aid even though most of
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them would have qualified in terms of the means test.
Furthermore, they were not encouraged to seek legal advice
despite the fact that some faced serious and complex
charges. The established norm was thus that accused were
tried undefended, and little effort was made to change the
situation.
4.2. THE ADJOURNMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR EXPEDITIOUS
COMPLETION
4.2.1. THE FIRST REMAND
Most of the undefended accused were in custody at their
first appearance in court. The charges against a few accused
were withdrawn and they were simply told, "You may go". The
majority of the accused in the magistrates' court were asked
to plead to the charge forthwith and where they pleaded
guilty and were convicted, a few were sentenced immediately.
In the cases where the accused were not asked to plead, they
were not informed what the charges against them were. In the
cases other than those where the charges were withdrawn or
sentence imposed at the first appearance, a remand was
requested by the prosecutor. Forty per cent of the remands
recorded in the regional courts were requested for further
investigation, the rest for trial or sentence.
The remand procedure exhibited a great measure of co-
operation between the prosecutor and the magistrate; the
prosecutor's requests were always granted without further
discussion. The magistrates hardly ever invited the accused
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to participate in the decisionmaking and merely informed
them of the remand date and the reason for the remand. The
interpreters approached the proceedings in the same
expeditious way. They would, as a rule, only translate the
court order - the date to which the proceedings were
remanded. Neither the application nor the reason for it was
interpreted and the accused was usually confronted with the
result - the remand date.
4.2.2 SUBSEQUENT REMANDS
with the first remand it would have been unnecessary for the
court to conduct an enquiry as the reason for the remand was
clear and well-founded. In considering subsequent
applications for remands, which were most often made by
the state,l it should have been the task of the court to
enquire whether these were justified. The matter was generally
not treated as an enquiry and the prosecution's request,
never challenged by an undefended accused, was invariably
granted. A few jUdicial officers, however, approached the
matter as an enquiry. They questioned the prosecutor
regarding his reasons and invited the accused to participate
in the decisionmaking. In Case 176 DC, after the accused was
convicted of theft, the prosecutor asked for a remand in
order to obtain his record of previous convictions. The
magistrate asked why this was still outstanding since the
accused had been arrested six weeks before. When the
1. ef Steytler "Bail" 122 table 4. Bekker et al (4) found
that the State requested remands in 77% of~he-cases.
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prosecutor was unable to offer any explanation the
magistrate refused the application and sentenced the accused
on the same day. There was only one magistrate who routinely
attempted to include accused in the decisionmaking process,
asking whether they wished to comment on the prosecutor's
request for a remand. In Case 191 DC, for example, the
prosecutor requested a remand in order to obtain a further
state witness. The magistrate asked the accused what his
attitude was. The accused informed the court that he would
prefer the case to go ahead that day as he had already lost
two jobs and was starting a new one the following day. The
prosecutor's request was refused and he had to close his
case without leading any evidence. By inviting the accused's
participation, the court was placed in a position to be able
to exercise its discretion after considering all the
relevant information.
Because few jUdicial officers routinely conducted enquiries
before remanding the proceedings, the cases were not always
completed expeditiously. In a number of cases, however, the
court refused further remands. Of the 18 discharges of
accused at the end of the state case, three were occasioned
by the court's refusal to allow further remands for the
prosecution to obtain absentee state witnesses.
The possibility of the accused's participation was further
minimized by the conduct of the interpreters. The latter
failed to translate the prosecutor's request to the accused
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and in most instances the accused merely heard the remand
being granted by the court. Although it was obvious even to
an observer not familiar with Zulu that the accused was not
kept informed, the court did not instruct interpreters to
translate all the verbal exchanges to the accused.
1
In
fact, the interpreters' conduct merely reflected the lack of
interest displayed by the court in involving the accused in
its deliberations.
In the absence of clear rules governing the conduct of
remand proceedings and burdening the court with the
responsibility to ensure the expeditious completion of
proceedings, inconsistent court practices, invariably
prejudicial to the undefended accused, resulted.
4.3. THE RELEASE OF AWAITING-TRIAL PRISONERS
In Anglo-American jurisdictions bail practices in the lower
courts have exhibited a number of common problems. The bail
determination process usually takes place without the
assistance of defence lawyers who would be able to present
relevant information and marshal applicable legal
. . I 2pr1nc1p es. Where the accused's right in regard to bail
is not asserted at the correct time in the correct manner,
there are few sanctions which would compel courts to observe
this right. Bail is routinely set according to the offence
1. Bekker et al (4) also found that in 38% of all remands
the reasonS-were not translated to the accused.
2. RB Flemming Allocating Freedom and Punishment: Pretrial
Release Policies in Detroit and BaltImore (1982) 8;
MM Feeley Court Reform on Trial (1983) 78.
Chapter 4 Page 197
charged and criteria which are legally objectionable, like
the race and economic status of the accused, frequently
become the more important determinants,l with little or no
investigation as to whether the accused will stand trial.
2
There is usually a dearth of information regarding the
accused's ties with his community, and when information
is given, usually by the police, it tends to be of a negative kind,
supporting the need for a custodial remand rather than
stressing the accused's suitability for bail.
3
The
importance of legal representation in order for an accused
to be released on bail has thus been widely recognized,
particularly in cases where bail is opposed by the
police. 4 The bail decision is not only important for the
liberty of the accused, but may also influence subsequent
decisions such as the verdict and sentence.
5
These
problems are not only applicable to the granting of bail in
South Africa, but are exacerbated by the large number of
undefended accused.
1. JS Goldkamp Two Classes of Accused: A study of Bail
and Detention in American Justice (1979) 228.
2. Packer 214: Goldkamp ~ cit 77.
3. PG Ward "Bail statistics" in University of Sydney,
Proceedings of the Institute of Criminology Seminar on
Bail (1969) 72.
4. Zander 1971 Criminal LR 74; New Zealand Criminal Law
Reform committee.Report on Ba~l (1982) 41; Hann ~ cit 294.
5. Goldkamp ~ Clt 229: ML Frledland Detention before Trial:
~ study of Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magistrates'
Court (1969) 110-111; AK Bottomley Dec isions in the Penal
Process (1973) 88ff. -- ---
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4.3.1. INITIATING THE BAIL DECISION
-
In South Africa the onus rests upon the accused to apply for
bail and to convince the court that he will stand trial.
Most undefended accused in this study did not appear to be
aware of the possibility of bailor that the onus rested on
them to make and substantiate an application. In the sample
only a quarter (24,4% of 128 observed cases in the
magistrates' court) took the initiative on their first
appearance to apply for bail. Although not legally bound to
initiate the process, prosecutors are instructed by
departmental circulars to suggest to the court, where
appropriate, the granting of bail and a suitable amount of
money. The prosecutors raised the issue in 41,7% of the
cases, either suggesting or objecting to bail. Where
prosecutors failed to do this, the court in a further 12,2%
of the cases raised the question. 1 In the remaining 21,7%
of the cases bail was not raised by anyone, resulting in a
custodial remand for the accused.
A study of the Johannesburg commissioners' courts conducted
in December 1982, revealed similar bail practices. 2 It was
found that commissioners did not explain to the accused
their right to bail, and where the accused did not apply for
bail, the matter was never considered. 3
1. Bekker et al (5) found the percentage to be 13.
2. R Monama Is this Justice? ~ Study of the Johannesburg
CommissionerS' ('Pass') courts (1983).
3. QE cit 28.
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Whether the question of bail was discussed thus depended on
the initiative of the court officials. As there was no well-
established legal duty on the court to address mero motu the
question, the exercise of this discretion, guided only by
unenforceable administrative directives, was open to
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking resulting in
disparate bail practices. In the bail study conducted in the
Durban magistrates' courts in 1981, wide divergences were
found among the release rates of magistrates. 1 Similarly,
prosecutors differed considerably in the extent to which
they initiated the bail process. 2 The highest number of
accused were granted bail where the court actively
participated in the process. On a multiple regression of the
factors that influenced the bail decision, it was found that
the type of magistrate, ie whether active or passive, was
the most impor~ant factor. 3 A mUltiple regression of the
factors which influenced the decision of magistrates with
low release figures, showed that the race of the accused was
the most significant; Black accused were released less than
all other accused. For the active magistrates with high
release figures, on the other hand, the race of the accused
was irrelevant. 4 In the absence of a duty to investigate
the issue of bail in each case, a legally objectionable
factor, such as the race of the accused, was allowed to play
a dominant role.
1. Steytler "Bail" 125 table 5.
2. 2E cit 126 table 6.
3. 2E cit 131 table 8.
4. 2E cit 132 table 9.
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Where the accused did make an application for bail, and the
state opposed it, a different procedure was followed. The
court routinely refused to entertain the application and
referred the accused to the prisoners' friend to make a
"formal application". This involved the following steps:
The accused first had to locate the prisoners' friend. Once
located, the latter filled in a roneoed bail application
form, which was to be forwarded to the clerk of the court.
From there the application went to the control public
prosecutor who contacted the investigating officer. If the
latter still opposed the granting of bail,he would appear
in court to testify in support of his objection.
Thus the accused's bail application was not always
sufficient per se to initiate the bail process. In an
opposed application, he had to take the further step of
mobilizing the state witness who was opposing bail. If,
however, the accused failed to reach the prisoners' friend,
the process was terminated. On investigation it was found
that very few accused contacted the prisoners' friend. This
was hardly surprising as one interpreter translated the
magistrate's instruction, "Tell the accused to see the
prisoners' friend", as, "someone down there will help
you."[Case A8? DC] The prisoners' friend informed the writer
during 1985 that one or two bail cases were brought to his
notice per week; these consituted only a fraction of the
number of accused referred to his office every week. This
could account for the fact that not once during the
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observation period in 1984 did an investigating officer
testify in support of his initial objection to bail. The
result was that the state's initial opposition to the
granting of bail remained on the whole uncontested. This
procedure, which has been in operation for at least the past
five years,1 epitomizes the consequences of a legally
unstructured bail process and the inaccessibility of
"normal" adversary process to the undefended accused.
4.3.2. THE BAIL PROCESS AS AN ENQUIRY
Where the question of bail was raised, magistrates did not
routinely conduct an enquiry to establish a factual basis
for the bail decision by questioning either the accused or
the prosecutor. The court seldom sought further information
from prosecutors regarding their reasons for objecting, even
though in 63% of the 30 cases where the State objected to
the granting of bail, no reasons were advanced. The accused
were never invited to participate in the decisionmaking
process; little information was elicited regarding their
suitability to be released and less than a quarter of the
accused (22,8%) were questioned regarding their ties with
their community. Moreover, the questioning usually remained
superficial and on average only 2,3 questions were asked of
each of the accused. In the end 79,2% of the prosecutors'
suggestions rega~ding the granting or the refusal of bail
were accepted without question. Only two objections to bail
1. See Steytler ~ cit 128.
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were not upheld. In a further 11,8% of the cases the
objections to bail were questioned, but eventually accepted.
The standard court practice is illustrated by the following
two cases:
Case 349 DC
A 50 year old accused man appeared in the magistrates'
court.
Prosecutor (P): 1 March for further investigation.
Magistrate (M): 1 March for further investigation, in
custody.
Case 193 DC
After the conviction of an accused for the possession of
dagga, the prosecutor asked for a remand to ascertain the
accused's previous convictions.
M: (to the prosecutor) Object to bail?
P: Yes.
M: Case remanded to [date]. In custody.
A few magistrates, however, conducted enquiries of varying
degrees of thoroughness before reaching their decision as
illustrated by the following two cases.
Case 191 DC
An accused pleaded guilty to the theft of a 25 kg bag of
sugar which he picked up on the shunting yard where he was
employed by the Transport Services. The prosecutor asked for
a remand of three weeks to obtain a record of his previous
convictions.
M: Bail?
P: The police say no fixed abode.
M: He is in fixed employment. I'm getting a bit sceptical
about 'no fixed abode' stories.
P: Yes.
M: Bail fixed at R80.
Case 320 DC
An accused in his late twenties was arraigned on a charge
of aggravated assault. The prosecutor asked for a remand of
three weeks for further investigation.
M: What about bail?
P: The state opposes bail.
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M: On what grounds?
P: It is a serious offence.
M: Not sufficient grounds.
P: Not opposed to R200 bail.
M: Accused, what do you say, can you get R100?
A: Yes.
M: Bail fixed at R100. If you want to phone anyone, speak to
the prisoner's friend.
On the whole, however, the prosecutors dominated the
proceedings and the magistrates played a passive role.
The negative approach of both magistrates and prosecutors
regarding the liberty of the accused, was also reflected in
the attitude of some of the interpreters who, by their
conduct, effectively excluded the accused from participating
in the process. In an extreme case (Case A87 DC) an
interpreter refused to translate the accused's application
for bail.
Case A87 DC
The case was remanded for sentence and both the
prosecutor and magistrate failed to initiate bail. The
accused then spoke to the interpreter.
A (Zulu): Please ask for payment so that I will be out.
I (Zulu): That is not my business. Go down! (indicating
towards the cells).
This conversation was not translated and the magistrate
did not instruct the interpreter to interpret it.
The accused was only on rare occasions informed by the
interpreter that the prosecutor was applying for a remand
and/or that bail was being opposed and for what reason. Case
A78 DC illustrates this exclusionary practice.
Case A78 DC
After applying for a remand, the prosecutor said the
following:
P: Since the accused have no fixed abode and have no
address the State is opposed to bail being granted.
I (Zulu): You have no fixed abode and no address and the
court will not give you bail.
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The interpreter, fully conscious of the fact that the court
would not conduct an enquiry, transformed an allegation by
the state into a court order and thus, by confronting the
accused with a fait accompli, effectively precluded his
participation.
As noted above, magistrates did not always exercise strict
control over the interpretation of all verbal exchanges. On
many occasions they even delegated the explanation of bail
conditions to the interpreter, who performed this function
with varying degrees of thoroughness.
4.3.3. ENQUIRING ABOUT AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF BAIL
The determination of an appropriate amount of bail, taking
into consideration the resources of the accused and the
likelihood of his absconding, did not receive much of the
court's attention. This inevitably led to a failure to
individualize the bail amount. In the 1981 bail study, the
amount was fixed at R50 in almost half (47,8%) of the cases
where bail was granted, irrespective of the circumstances of
the case. 1 The result was that only 42,2% of the accused
could pay the amount on the same day while 31,1% were never
able to raise the required money.2
In the present study, few of the judicial officers enquired
into the accused's ability to pay bail. The questioning,
1. Steytler "Bail" 135 table 11.
2. 2E cit 136, 137 table 13.
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when it did occur, was often superficial. It seldom went
beyond, "Can you pay this amount of bail?". The accused's
financial position was hardly ever investigated. Common here
too was a tendency of the court to accept, without question,
the bail amount suggested by the prosecutor, as in Case 225
DC.
Case 225 DC
On a charge of assault with the intention to do grievous
bodily harm, a young accused pleaded not guilty. The
prosecutor suggested that bail be fixed at R100.
M: Why such a high amount?
P: That is the amount suggested by the police.
M: Case remanded to 2 April for trial. Bail fixed at R100.
Once again, however, there were exceptions. Case 220 DC is
an example of both the prosecutor and the magistrate
participating inquisitorially to arrive at a considered bail
decision.
Case 220 DC
When an accused, charged with bag snatching,
appeared in the dock the prosecutor questioned him
extensively about his place and length of employment, his
marital status, any dependents, and his ability to pay R400
bail. The accused said he could manage R100. When the
prosecutor thereupon suggested R300 to the magistrate, he
was questioned about the high bail amount.
The prosecutor replied that the matter would be
going to the regional court because of the nature of the
offence. The magistrate then asked the accused how much he
could pay. He replied that he had R136 in his savings
account. The magistrate let the matter stand down and
instructed the prosecutor to investigate whether the
accused had in fact been working for four years at the
stated place and what his bank balance was.
A lack of interest in individualizing the bail amount was
also evident among some of the interpreters. In Case A45 DC,




A (Zulu): There is no one to pay such money for me.
I (Zulu): Go down, don't tell me that, just go down!
(indicating the cells below)
The accused's problem was not translated to court and the
magistrate did not insist that the interpreter disclose what
had been said.
4.3.4. THE GRANTING OF BAIL
The accused, unaided by a lawyer, faced formidable obstacles
in firstly, raising the bail decision, secondly, knowing how
to participate in the process, and thirdly, securing a
reasonable amount of bail. Unassisted, the accused was, at
times, exposed to the arbitrary exercise of discretion by
the prosecutor, the magistrate and the interpreter. In the
sample 35,9% of the 128 undefended accused were not released
on bail at their first appearance, and where bail was fixed
the most common amount was either R100 or R150, an amount
which few accused could afford. The presence of a lawyer
made a considerable difference to the granting of bail both
at the charge office and at court. In the regional court,
for example, six of the nine defended accused (66,6%) were
granted bail at their first appearance while only 20,3% of
the undefended accused were so fortunate.
There was no onus on the prosecutor to justify the further
detention of the accused or duty on the court to enquire
into each case. Although the right to bail existed, the
legal structure did not facilitate its uniform enforcement
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in respect of undefended accused. Any assistance that the
undefended accused happened to receive from the prosecutor
and magistrate was despite the legal position, not because
of it. The result was disparate court practices marked by
arbitrary or even biased decisionmaking.
5. CONCLUSION
The majority of persons arraigned in court are Black,
indigent, undefended, probably uneducated, and in custody;
at their first appearance in court they face unfamiliar
proceedings in a foreign language. Little or no perception
of their procedural rights and no forensic skills can be
attributed to them. To receive a fair trial they are totally
reliant on the jUdicial officer for the enforcement of their
procedural rights and on the interpreter for their
comprehension of and communication in the proceedings. such
assistance, however, is neither clearly prescribed in law
nor routinely rendered in practice. The Supreme Court does
not require that undefended accused should be informed of
their right to legal representation, of the existence of
legal aid (for which most accused would qualify), that the
proceedings may be remanded to afford an opportunity for
seeking legal assistance, or that they may be released on
bail during an adjournment of the proceedings. In
consequence, jUdicial officers do not apprise undefended
accused of these rights. The suggestion in Baloyi 1978 (3)
SA 298 (T) that the court should, in complex or serious
cases, refer an accused to the Legal Aid Board, is not only
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vague and impracticable, but also obiter so that it is
valueless. Moreover, the Supreme Court has not deemed it
necessary that counsel be appointed to represent an accused
in enquiries into his capacity to stand trial despite the
complexity of such proceedings and the accused's suspected
mental defect or disease.
The basic information which would put undefended accused in
a position to become effective adversaries in the trial by
means of legal representation is thus routinely withheld.
While lip-service is given to the extension of legal
assistance as a solution to the problem of achieving equal
justice for the indigent accused, no attempt is made in
legal or practical terms to realize this goal. It is thus
important to ascertain whether, in the absence of dedication
to the ideal of legal representation, the other possible
sources of assistance to this accused - assistance geared to
make him a competent adversary or inquisitorial intervention
on his behalf by the jUdicial officer - are pursued
meaningfully in the ensuing stages of the trial.
Little attention is paid, however, to the accused's rights
relating to the remand of proceedings or in the granting of
bail. The Supreme Court has failed to encumber the jUdicial
officer with the duty to ensure the accused's participation
in the decisionmaking process regarding remands or to bring
about an expeditious completion of proceedings.
In bail proceedings, where the onus is on the accused to
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apply for bail and to substantiate such an application, no
rule requires the jUdicial officer to inform him accordingly
or to conduct an enquiry in order to arrive at an
appropriate decision. The lack of structuring of the bail
decision leads to disparate and arbitrary decisionmaking and
the development of informal procedures, some of which may
effectively infringe upon. the accused's rights to bail.
The accused's understanding of and participation in the
proceedings is further hampered by the frequently low
standard of translation in the courts. Some interpreters,
functioning within a jUdicial environment which exhibits
little concern for the accused's procedural rights,
incorporate this attitude into the performance of their task
and produce incomplete and incorrect translations.
Instead of being informed of their legal rights, then, the
majority of the accused in the lower courts are confronted
at their first appearance with their most important choice
during the proceedings - how to plead to the charge. Their
decision at this stage can only be adversely affected by the
effective denial of their right to legal assistance, their
right to an opportunity to consider their position and seek
advice, and their right to possible release from custody in
the interim period.
CHAPTER FIVE PLEA PROCEEDINGS
Of all the constituent parts of the criminal trial, the plea
proceedings have the most important consequences for the
accused. At the same time, however, they are the most formal
and hence the least comprehensible to the undefended
accused. To formulate a charge the prosecutor must transform
an event to fit into the legal strictures of a criminal
offence. To plead to the charge the accused must reduce his
perception and assessment of an event to a single,
simplified response. Both the charge and the pleas are, by
the artificiality of their construction, far removed from
the everyday experiences of most accused persons and belong
to the professional domain of the legal practitioner. To
make the proceedings more comprehensible to the accused, it
is essential that he be fully informed of the charge that he
has to meet and of the possible pleas to the charge. When
the significant consequences which may flow from a plea are
taken into account, the importance of the accused's right to
consider the plea and, if possible, to obtain legal advice,
becomes clear.
1. INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF THE CHARGE HE HAS TO MEET
1.1 A CLEAR AND DETAILED CHARGE
For the accused to know the case he has to meet, it is first
and foremost essential that he be provided with a clear and
detailed charge. It is thus peremptory "that the charge
shall set forth the relevant offen c e i n such manner and with
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such particulars ... as may be reasonably sufficient to inform
the accused of the nature of the charge".[S 84] It is open
to an accused to object to the charge on the ground that it
does not contain essential allegations or elements of the
offence, or sufficient particulars of any matter alleged in
the charge.[S 85(1)] If the court finds that the objection
is well-founded, it may order the amendment of the charge
and, should the prosecutor fail to comply with the order,
quash the charge.[S 85(2)] The accused is further entitled
to request further particulars to the allegations made in
the charge.[S 87] The onus thus rests formally on the
-------accused to raise any objection or request further
particulars.
These rights are not, however, readily accessible to
undefended accused as they may not be aware of their
existence, or the means of exercising and enforcing them.
There is thus often no challenge to charge sheets which are
too terse to provide an accurate outline of the act which
the accused is alleged to have committed. Didcott J observed
in Mapinda 1979 (2) SA 343 (N) that "most people who
face .... charges are undefended, and further particulars are
seldom sought or furnished. Unless they are forthcoming, the
State may enjoy what turns out to be an unfair
advantage". [343F-G]
The presiding officer has, however, a supplementary or
residual duty to ensure that the charge meets the various
requirements, even if the accused fails to object. He must
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ensure that charges are formulated in clear language,
outlining the specific allegations made against the
accused. 1 Some protection has been extended to the
undefended antl illiterate accused in decisions to the effect
that he must be given an adequate explanation by the
, ' t h i 2judicial officer of the preclse charge made agalns lm.
1.2. PRESUMPTIONS
If any statutory presumption is to be relied upon by the
State, the accused should be apprised thereof before he
pleads to the charge. 3 The approach of the Court to this
matter was expressed by Harcourt J in Shangase 1972 (2) SA
410 (N) as follows:
lilt is in general undesirable and unfair to permit
definitions, inferences and statutory presumptions to
operate to the prejudice of an accused without him
being aware of toe potential danger to which he is
subjected .•.. lf, however, he is undefended, the court
sliould see that by means of a properly framed and
explained charge sheet ••• the accused is effectively
alerted to such dangers and to the manner in which he
can seek to meet or avert them".[452E]
The best way in which the accused can be alerted to the
operation of presumptions is by including these in the
charge sheet. It is not sufficient merely to explain the
existence of a presumption; it is also necessary to explain
the allegations which form the factual basis for putting it
into operation. It is therefore submitted that the charge
1. Mapinda supra. See also Hiemstra 198.
2. Nsibande 1935 TPD 370; Maketi 1979 (4) SA 569 (C).
3. Mthalane 1968 (4) SA 256 (N) 259A; Fikizolo 1978
(2) SA 676 (NC) 679.
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should contain references to the presumption and to the
factual allegations on which it is based.
1
1.3 COMPETENT VERDICTS
The Code makes provision for the conviction of accused
persons of offences other than those proferred in the charge
sheet, on the so-called competent verdicts.[S 256-270] A
competent verdict has two possible sources. Firstly, if the
evidence does not prove the offence with which the accused
was originally charged, but proves the commission of some
other offence, all the elements of which are contained in
the original or main charge, then conviction upon the latter
is competent.[S 270] The principle is that by facing the
main charge, the accused automatically faces the lesser
charge by the mere fact that the latter is contained in the
former. Secondly, any offence may be made a competent
verdict by statute even if the elements of such an offence
are not all contained in the main charge. 2 As competent
verdicts are not alternative charges, they need not normally
be included in the charge sheet. 3
The possibility of prejudice to the undefended acc~sed is
obvious if the competent verdict involves elements different
to those mentioned in the original charge; he would be
1. See Mapinda 1979 (2) SA 343 (N) 344A.
2. See eg s 256, 257, 258(c)&(f)&(g), 259(b)&(e)&(f),
260 (e) &(f), 261 (1) (d) & (e) &(g) & (h), 261 (2) (b) &(d) &(e) ,
264 (a) &(b) &(c), 265 (b) &(a), 266 (c), 267, 268 (a) &(b) &(c) ,
269.
3. Velela 1979 (4) SA 581 (C) .
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oblivious of the fact that he faces conviction on different
elements. Due to the "dictates of common fairness" to the
undefended accused, it has been held that it is incumbent on
the court to ensure that these accused are informed of the
existence and implications of such competent verdicts.
1
Most decisions, however, state that it is merely desirable
that the undefended accused be so informed. 2 Nevertheless,
where explanations have been omitted and the accused were
prejudiced thereby, the convictions have invariably been set
aside. 3 Where the offence which constitutes the competent
verdict places an onus on the accused, the Court has more
readily regarded apprisal as a duty.4 It is submitted that
the duty should apply to all competent verdicts containing
elements other than those in the charge, and particular care
should be taken where an onus is placed on the accused.
The duty of informing the accused at the outset of the trial
should fall on the state as only it would know whether it
intends to rely on any competent verdict. If the accused is
informed later, the court must take the necessary steps to
prevent any prejudice being caused thereby.5 It is submitted
1. Mkize 1961 (4) SA 77 (N) 78A. See also Mtimkulu
1959 (4) SA 597 (0) 598.
2. Velela 1979 (4) SA 581 (C); Van Eck 1958 (2) SA
182 (0) 183H; Mogandi 1961 (4) SA l~(T) 114A;
Arendse 1980 (1) SA 610 (C) 613B, 613H.
3. See eg Velela supra; De Bruyn 1981 (2)
PH H121 (C); Muller 1959 (1) PH H99 (0).
4. Velela supra; Mkize 1961 (4) SA 77 (N) 78; Prinsloo
1958 (1) SA 77 (T) 78C; Mtimkulu supra 598.
5. Van Eck supra 184.
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that it should be incumbent on the court to remind the
accused once again at the close of the state case of the
possibility of the competent verdict since the giving of
evidence in respect of different elements could be of
importance to the defence.
The decisions have not been ad idem regarding the form which
the notification should take. In Dayi 1961 (3) SA 8 (N) it
was held that if the state contemplates asking for a
competent verdict, this should formally be put to the
accused as an alternative charge. 1 In Mkize 1961 (4) SA
77 (N) the Court merely required that a notice "of some
sort" be given, not necessarily in the form of an
alternative charge, and this could be done at any stage of
the trial. 2 The notification should, however, be
recorded. 3
Hiemstra argues that the effect of Dayi would be to
nullify the use of competent verdicts, as the state would
then be restricted to alternative charges. [533] It is submitted,
however, that the approach of Dayi is to be preferred in
proceedings against undefended accused. If this accused is
to be warned at the outset of the trial,4 and the warning
should entail an exposition of the various elements of the
offence contained in the competent verdict, then the
competent verdict is de facto given as an alternative charge in
1. 9. See also Prinsloo 1958 (1) SA 77 (T) 78B-C.
2. 78A. See also Arendse 1 98 0 (1) SA 610 (C) 613A-B.
3. Ndlovu 1963 (1) PH H77 (N) .
4. Van Eck 1958 (2) SA 182 (0) 184; Hiemstra 554.
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any event. The formalization of the competent verdict into
an alternative charge has the advantage of ensuring that the
accused is fully informed and that the charge is at the same
time put on record. Furthermore, where the competent verdict
is included in the charge sheet, the accused is in fact
notified of the possibility that he may plead guilty to a
lesser charge.
Merely informing the accused on the day of the trial of a
host of competent verdicts may not totally eliminate
prejudice. He should also be given an opportunity to prepare
his defence in respect of those charges. In Dayi the court
expressed this requirement as follows:
"In an undefended case particularly the presiding
officer should at least ensure that the accused is
given an opportunity of appreciating the nature of the
alternative offence'lincluding the answer he may raise
in defence thereto".
A conviction will be set aside where an accused has not
been informed about the intended use of a competent verdict
and has been prejudiced 'b e c a u s e of this. 2 Whether the
accused was prejudiced is a factual question. 3 In Arendse
1980 (1) SA 610 (C) the Court had to decide whether an
accused charged with theft would have been prejudiced if,
without prior warning, he -was convicted of contravening s 36
of Act 62 of 1955. section 36 makes it an offence for a
person to be found in possession of goods where there is a
1. 9G. See also Mogandi 1961 (4) SA 112 (T) 113.
2. Johnson 1970 (1) PH H19 (NC) i Mogandi supra 114Ai Arendse
1980 (1) SA (C) 613B.
3. Velela 1979 (4) SA 581 (C).
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reasonable suspicion that they are stolen, and the accused
cannot give a reasonable account for their possession.
Although the Court agreed that it was desirable that the
accused should be warned, the question remained whether he
was prejudiced by such an omission. [613H] The Court decided
that s 36 does not place an onus on an accused and if the
state proves all the elements of the offence, there exists
little, if any opportunity for the accused to be
prejudiced. [613A]
It is respectfully submitted that the Court overlooked an
important aspect of the offence. section 36 enables the
accused to escape liability by giving a reasonable
explanation any time before conviction, despite the fact
that he did not give such an explanation to the person who
found him in possession of the goods. 1 Since the accused
was not made aware of this competent verdict, he was not
given an opportunity to offer an explanation for his
possession of the goods. Although the State proved all the
elements of the offence, if the accused's attention was not
drawn to the different charge, he could not have been in a
position to dispute the allegations. He would not be able to
cross-examine, testify and search for possible witnesses.
The possibility of prejudice could therefore not have been
excluded.





For a number of offences specified penalties are obligatory
in the absence of any mitigating circumstances.
1
It has
been held that, while legally it is not necessary to include
the penalty clause in the charge sheet,2 it may be
desirable to do so.3 In the trial of an undefended
accused, however, it has been held to be "highly desirable"
1
.. 4
for the charge sheet to refer to the pena ty prov1s10ns.
This is in order that the accused may be in a position, from
the outset, to assess the ful l effect of any plea he may
enter.
Despite the fact that the Court in Seleke set out the
various ways in which undefended accused should be assisted
by the magistrate during the t r i a l , it was hesitant to lay
down any rules governing the explanation of penalty
provisions, including when this should be done. The Court
expressed the fear that if a rule is laid down, non-
compliance therewith would lead to an unjustified attack on
an otherwise fair trial. The only requirement that the Court
laid down was that as much information must be given as is
reasonably necessary to inform the undefended accused of the
1. See eg Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 s 4(1) which
created a mandatory penalty of two years' imprisonment if
a person over the age of 18 years uses a dangerous weapon in
an assault in a prescribed area, unless circumstances exist
justifying a lesser sentence.
2. Mzolo, Mangele 1976 (1) SA 49 (N) 50C.
3. Seleke 1976 (1) SA 675 (T). See also Mokoena 1958 (3)
SA 437 (T) 438; Motsoeneng, Moloi 1975 (4) SA 297 (0);
Mzolo, Mangele supra 50.
4. Seleke supra 682; Mzolo, Mangele supra 50G.
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penalty provisions. How that should be done, the Court
concluded, depends on the circumstances of each case. The
only requirement set in Motsoeneng, Moloi 1975 (4) SA 297
(0) was that the accused should be informed of the
provisions of the section before sentencing and should then
be given the opportunity to advance mitigating
circumstances. [303B]
This approach cannot be supported. Because of the fear that
convictions might be set aside, the Court has produced a
guideline which is so vague and general that it provid~s no
guidance at all. A general rule compelling judicial officers
to inform undefended accused of the possible penal
consequences of a conviction is more likely to be followed
than a vague guideline which leaves the form, content and
timing of the apprisal to the discretion of these officers,
and it is submitted that the more stringent measure is
essential for the protection of the undefended accused.
There has been support in the case law for such a duty to
inform. In Ackerman 1972 (1) SA 130 (C) the Court insisted
that s 4(1) of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968, had to
be included in the charge sheet on the basis that an accused
ought to be informed fully of the case he has to meet,
including the possible penalty.1 It was pointed out that
the knowledge of the provisions of s 4(1) could lead an
accused who would otherwise plead guilty, to plead not
1. 131G. See also Innocent 1966 (2) SA 362 (R); Ndlovu
1974 (4) SA 567 (N) 569F; Malosi 1983 (2) PH H101 (N).
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guilty. While the accused remains uninformed, therefore, the
possibility of prejudice cannot be excluded.
1
2. GUARDING AGAINST AN IMPROPER SPLITTING OF CHARGES
An accused may object to an improper splitting of charges
where one cul~able act has been made the basis of more than--
one charge. 2 The principal aim of the rule against an
improper splitting of charges is that an accused should not
be punished more than once for what is sUbstantially one
offence. MUltiple convictions could also adversely affect---the sentencing of the accused in sUbsequent criminal
d
. 3procee J.ngs.
Should the onus be on the accused to raise this issue, the
undefended accused would suffer considerable prejudice since
it is unlikely that he would have any understanding whatever
of this complex legal concept. In recognition of this
position, Harcourt J held in Makazela 1965 (3) SA 675 (N)
that in the case of an undefended accused the magistrate
should consider it as part of his duty to order the
prosecutor to amend a charge sheet if a splitting of charges
is present. On review, the Supreme Court has in numerous
cases involving undefended accused, altered convictions to
avoid a mUltiplicity of convictions on the same culpable
1. Pheka 1975 (4) SA 231 (NC) 231.
2. See Grobler 1966 (1) SA 507 (A).
3. Ndovu 1962 (1) SA 108 (N). In the past the sentences
following upon a splitting of charges could also have
qualified an accused unjustifiably for corrective training,
Makazela 1965 (3) SA 675 (N) 676.
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facts. 1 If it is apparent at the outset of the trial that
there is an improper splitting of charges, the court should
act immediately as all the available information is before
it. If there is any doubt, or if it is not clear that there
is a splitting of charges, the court should consider the
matter again before judgment is given.
3. AMENDING THE CHARGE SHEET
section 86 grants the court wide powers to correct a charge
sheet,2 subject to the consideration of whether the
accused will be prejudiced in his defence by the
amendment. 3 The accused is entitled to object to an
amendment perceived to be prejudicial. The undefended
accused, however, will normally be unaware of this right;
indeed, such an accused probably has little way of knowing
when an amendment is prejudicial. Only the court, then, can
ensure that no prejudice befalls the accused, and protection
of the accused should require it to order an amendment when
this favours the accused, and to refuse an amendment which
would be to his detriment. In Makazela 1965 (3) SA 675 (N)
Harcourt J, in ordering a consolidation of charges after an
improper splitting of charges, expressed the former duty as
1. See eg Xowanisa 1947 (4) SA 399 (T); Sakombunda 1953
(1) PH H91 (SWA); Maloko 1959 (1) SA 569 (0); Peter 1965
(3) SA 19 (SR); Zulu 1965 (4) SA 103 (N); Ndovu 1962 (1)
SA 108 (N); Ntswakele 1982 (1) SA 325 (T).
2. Grey 1983 (2) SA 536 (C) 539A.
3. S 86(1). See also Grey supra 539A; Magwana 1958 (3) SA
135 (T) 137C-D.
Chapter 5 Page 222
follows:
n[T]he magistrate had the power to act mero motu in
regard to an amendment (see sec 180 of the Code) and,
in any event, would be quite within his rights, and
indeed should have considered it part of his duty, to
use that undoubted and considerable influence which the
court has over the conduct of prosecutions to obtain an
amendment of the charge. If prosecutors are
inexperienced a court should be alert to see that
accused are not prejudiced by the unfortunate state of
affairs. This is particularly so when the accused is
unrepresented". [676D-E]
Where the magistrate orders an amendment of the charge, the
accused should be fully apprised as to the effect thereof
and, if necessary, his right to lead further evidence and
recall witnesses should be explained. 1
4. POSTPONING THE 'PLEA PROCEEDINGS
Once an accused is arraigned, the charge may be put to him
and he shall be required by the court forthwith to plead
thereto.[S 105] If the accused refuses to plead, the court
is obliged to enter a plea of not guilty.[S 109] section 105
mentions only two exceptions to the rule that the accused
must plead forthwith; firstly , if the accused is by reason
of mental illness or defect not capable of understanding the
proceedings so as to make a proper defence,[S 77(1)] and
secondly, if he wants to object that the charge does not
comply with the essential requirements as set out in s 85.
Section 105 does not, however, regulate the position
eXhaustively. Where an accused has indicated to the court
that he wishes to consult with a lawyer before pleading to
1. See Grey 1983 (2) SA 536 (C) 537.
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the charge, it would be a gross irregularity for the court
to refuse him such an opportunity by insisting that he
plead to a charge forthwith. 1 Furthermore, the
accused is entitled to a postponement of the plea
proceedings to afford him an opportunity to consider his
plea or to be arraigned in a court having territorial
jurisdiction.
4.1. THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO CONSIDER HIS PLEA
The accused's r~ght to an opportunity for considering his
position before pleading or facing a trial has been firmly
established. 2 A refusal by a court to grant an accused's
request for a remand for this purpose would be a gross
irregularity, leading to the setting aside of the
----
conviction.
Problems arise, however, in respect of the undefended
accused who, being unaware of this right, is in no position
to enforce it. No duty has been placed upon the court to
inform the undefended accused of this right and it was held
in Siqodolo ~ Attorney-General 1984 (2) SA 172 (E) that the
court commits no irregularity if it fails to determine
whether the accused requires an opportunity to consider his
position before he is asked to plead to a charge.
1. Mkize 1978 (3) SA 1065 (T) 1066G. See also Mtetwe 1957
(4) SA 298 (0); Blooms 1966 (4) SA 417 (C); Nel 1974
(2) SA 445 (NC).
2. Thane 1925 TPD 850; Khumbusa v The State 1977 (1) SA 394
(N); Yontolo 1977 (2) SA 146 (E); Sigodolo v Attorney-General
1985 (2) SA 172 (E).
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Nevertheless, relief has on occasions been granted on review
to accused who claimed that they were too hastily _tried and
convicted. In Yontolo 1977 (2) SA 146 (E) the accused, an
illiterate elderly Black woman, was arrested at 12 noon for
the possession of 117 gm dagga. She was kept in custody
incommunicado until 2 pm when she was brought to court and
charged with the offence of dealing in dagga. After the
explanation of the presumption contained in s 10 of the
'Drugs' Act 41 of 1971, and an enquiry as to whether she
required an attorney, she was called upon to plead. She
pleaded guilty and was convicted of dealing in dagga, only
to realize then that the mandatory sentence (as it then was)
was five years' imprisonment. On review the accused claimed
that she had been confused, bewildered and nervous and had
no knowledge of court procedure. In setting the conviction
aside Addleson J said:
"Whether or not the present applicant would have
pleaded guilty after mature consideration and with full
knowledge of the stakes, is not presently the issue.
She said she would not have done so, but the important
factor is that she does not appear to have had a
reasonable opportunity to weigh her position, to seek
advice if she wanted to do so and to come to a mature
decision with full knowledge of the implications of the
decision .... (I)t is essential that, when an accused is
brought to court to face such a possible sentence, the
procedure which is followed must leave no room for
doubt as to whether such an accused has had an
opportunity to understand and appreciate the
seriousness of a charge and its consequences". [150A-C]
It has been held that the Court on review is likely to
intervene more readily in cases where the charge is complex




It is submitted that the protection of the undefended
accused's right to have an opportunity to consider his plea
is inadequate. Firstly, there is no duty on the court to
establish whether the undefended accused requires an
opportunity to consider his plea. The majority of undefended
I
accused are thus denied this fundamental right. The
principle of equal justice holds that all rights should be
accessible to all accused and not only to those who are
defended. It is therefore submitted that the presiding
jUdicial officer should inform every undefended accused that
he may seek a remand to obtain legal assistance or to
consider his defence.
Secondly, when the right is asserted after conviction, it is
recognized only in very restricted categories. 2
I
To demand that the accused failed to appreciate the
seriousness of the matter due to illiteracy or any other
specific reason seems to be unrealistic. Even educated
persons have a very rUdimentary knowledge of law in general,
let alone of criminal procedure. Charges that do not seem
complex to a lawyer could be confounding even to a person
with a school education, especially in the unfamiliar and
hasty atmosphere of a courtroom.
1. Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (T) 294.
2. See NC Steytler "The too Speedy Trial - the Right to be
Prepared" (1985) 9 SACC 180 . .
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The requirement that the penalty should be severe (which it
is a fortiori if it is compulsory), is untenable. The
deprivation of liberty for any length of time is surely
viewed by most accused as of the utmost importance and
rights should not merely be enforced to temper the harshness
of severe or mandatory sentences1 or forfeiture orders.
2
The overriding principle should be that all accused are
entitled to e gyal protection under the law no matter what
penalty they ultimately receive.
4.2. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
section 106(1) (f) provides that the accused may plead "that
the court has no jurisdiction to try the offence". Should
he, however, fail to object to the court's lack of
territorial jurisdiction, the court is deemed to have such
, 'd' t' 3Jurls lC lone
The onus is thus on the accused to raise the question of
territorial jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule is
that the accused may tacitly waive his right to be tried by
a court which has territorial jurisdiction. 4 The basis of
this rationale, in turn, can be found in a dictum of Gane J
in Mpili 1935 EDL 183:
1. Cf Yontolo supra.
2. Cf Siqodolo y Attorney-General supra.
3. S 110(1). The section does not confer jurisdiction on a
court for an offence committed outside the borders of
South Africa (Ngozi y Magistrate, Stutterheim 1977 (2)
SA 150 (E); Ntwana 1979 (2) SA 1160 (Tk», or for an
offence falling outside its substantive jurisdiction (M
1979 (2) SA 959 (T) 969F). -
4. Hiemstra 217.
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"Moreover, the accused, like everybody else, is
presumed to know the law, and should have been aware of
the legal situs of the offence. The magistrate is not
called upon to explain the position to him at every
stage. I can even conceive of a case where a magistrate
himself noticing the apparent excess of jurisdiction,
keeps silent, and waits for the accused to make his
request. I need hardly say I must not be taken as
recommending such a course. It would be kinder for the
magistrate to explain the position to the accused. But
I cannot say that there is an absolute obligation to
do so". [185-6]
In Wells 1965 (1) PH H60 (N) Fannin J went so far as to
say that the court may not transfer the case to the court
which has appropriate jurisdiction unless the accused
requests this, and if no such request is made, the court is
obliged to continue with the trial despite its original lack
f ' 'd' t' 1o Jurls lC 10n.
This approach by the legislature and the Supreme Court is
indefensible in the light of the predominance of undefended
accused in South Africa's courts. The assumption that every
person knows the law is patently fictitious, particularly in
respect of a technical objection to the court's territorial
jurisdiction. Since the practice exists of putting the
charge to the accused at the first possible opportunity,
usually at his first appearance, the right to object, if not
exercised there and then, will be lost irrevocably.
There are, however, arguments which challenge this approach.
Ferreira argues that section 7 5 could have a limiting effect
on the operation of s 110.[96-97] section 75 states
peremptorily that an accused shall be tried at a summary
1. See also Shangase 1964 (1) SA 776 (N).
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trial in a court that has jurisdiction. The only exceptions
mentioned are pleadings to charges justiciable in the
Supreme [8 119] or regional court [S 122A] or a preparatory
examination.[S 123] 'Jurisdiction' here can refer only to
sentencing or territorial jurisdiction. Hiemstra
suggests that it refers only to the former. [162] There is,
however, no indication that the term is to be given such an
interpretation. If the accused, because of his
previous convictions, merits punishment which would exceed
the sentencing jurisdiction of the magistrates' court, the
court would still have jurisdiction to try the case but
would then commit the accused for sentencing in a regional
court.[S 114] It is therefore submitted that the term
'jurisdiction' used in s 75 refers to territorial
jurisdiction, and that if the court does not have such
jurisdiction, the prosecutor must request the court to refer
the accused to the appropriate forum. Placing a duty on the
prosecutor to ascertain the correct forum accords with the
rule that the onus is on him to prove that the court has
territorial jurisdiction. 1 He would also have access to
the necessary information as contained in the police docket.
Finally, it is suggested that it would not be irregular for
the jUdicial officer to act mero motu where it is apparent
that the court has no territorial jurisdiction. The
operation of s 110(1) would thus be limited to those
situations where neither the prosecutor nor the judicial
officer was aware that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction.




section 106 sets out eight pleas which are open to an
accused. Only the most common pleas - of double jeopardy,
guilty and not guilty - will be discussed.
5.1. THE PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The plea of double jeopardy is available not only to protect
the accused from being punished twice, but also to prevent
him from being put on trial for a second time. The onus is
on the accused to raise the plea,l and if he intends to do
so, he must give reasonable notice to the prosecutor and
state the grounds on which he bases his plea.[S 106(3)] The
prosecutor may, however, waive his right to such notice
and the court may, on "good cause shown", dispense
therewith.[S 106(3)] The appropriate time to raise the plea
is at the commencement of the trial and not on appeal. 2
These rules will operate harshly if applied to undefended
accused pnaware of their existence. The Court in Mgilane
1974 (4) SA 303 (Tk) has consequently allowed the plea to
be raised on appeal for the first time. Lansdown and
Campbell justify the deviation from the general principle as
follows:
"There may be circumstances, especially in the case of an
unsophisticated and uneducated person who is not
represented, when a rigid application of this ruling would
be repugnant to one's feeling of fair play and
justice."[437]
1. Lansdown & Campbell 446; Hiemstra 232.
2. Burns (1901) 19 SC 477.
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This approach was also adopted by Eloff J in Kgatlane 1978
(2) SA 10 (T), who said that entertaining the plea at a
late stage of the proceedings still serves the objective of
the plea by preventing the accused from being punished
twice. similarly, where the court rejects the plea at the
outset of the trial, but during the proceedings it becomes
apparent, in the light of new evidence, that the plea is
good, the court should uphold it.
1
It has been held that the court should raise the issue mero
motu if, during the proceedings, it comes to its notice that
the accused could have raised a plea of double jeopardy.2
The decision in Motsepa 1982 (1) SA 304 (0), where the
Court opined that an accused is not obliged to raise the
plea and where he does not, he is deemed to have waived
it,[306E] cannot be interpreted to allow a judicial officer
to ignore knowingly the possibility of such a plea when it
comes to his notice and the accused fails to raise it.
Firstly, for a valid waiver, the accused should have been
aware of the existence of the plea and of the possibility of
entering it, and have intelligently waived that right.
Secondly, if the court is aware that the accused may be
placed in jeopardy a second time, it would surely be an
abuse of the court process knowingly to punish or put a
person on trial twice for the same offence. It is therefore
submitted that whenever the possibility of such a plea
1. Lampbrecht 1958 (2) SA 622 (C).
2. See Serote 1960 (2) SA 670 (0) 674.
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exists, the trial court or the Court of review should raise
the issue mero motu and, where appropriate, record such a
plea.
When the plea of double jeopardy has been raised, eit~er by
the accused or by the court, the question arises as to the
proof thereof. Formally the onus is on the accused to prove
his plea. He may do so by submitting to court a verified
copy of the record of the previous trial [S 235] or an
extract thereof.[S 233] It cannot, however, be expected of
an illiterate or poorly educated person to trace the record
of the previous proceedings and make a copy thereof. That
his adversary, the prosecutor, should assist and conduct
such a search, is a possibility in the light of the latter's
duty to present the truth to the court, but the adversary
nature of the process does not provide a healthy basis for
such an investigation. Should the duty of the court in this
regard also extend to the investigation of the plea?
In Ngcobo 1979 (3) SA 1358 (N) the accused, having pleaded
not guilty, added that he had been acquitted by the same
court on a similar charge. without settling the point in
limine, the cases for the State and the accused were
concluded. The magistrate then called the accused to give
evidence in support of his plea of autrefois acguit before
remanding the case. At this stage the magistrate personally
examined the court record books and the prison records but
could not find any evidence of a previous acquittal. When
the trial resumed the magistrate once again cross-examined
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the accused on the previous acquittal, but eventually ruled
against him. On review the conviction was set aside because
the magistrate in his investigation assumed the role of a
witness for the prosecution and thus committed a gross
irregularity which per se vitiated the proceedings. [1359G-H]
The magistrate here clearly recognized the importance of his
intervention on the question of a previous acquittal. It is
sUbmitted, however, that the court correctly held that the
magistrate misapprehended the nature of his inquisitorial
powers. He may not investigate extra curia and then bear
witness in court on his findings. He was competent and
indeed under an obligation to call the necessary
witnesses,l for example, the clerk of the court and the
keeper of the prison records. It is submitted that it is
indeed the court's duty, whenever the possibility of a plea
of double jeopardy is raised at a trial of an undefended
accused, to conduct an enquiry and, by means of its
inquisitorial powers, call the appropriate witnesses to
establish whether or not the plea is good.
5.2. THE PLEA OF GUILTY
An accused may plead guilty ·t o the proferred charge or to
any competent verdict thereon.[S 106(1) (a)] Once the
prosecutor has accepted the plea . of guilty, the provisions
of s ~12 apply. In terms of this section the accused may be
convicted without any evidence being led, except that the
1. In terms of s 186. See further ch 7 below.
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death penalty may not be imposed unless the accused's guilt
is proved as if he had pleaded not guilty.[S 112(1) (b)] In
minor cases which do not merit a punishment of a fine
exceeding R300, the court may convict the accused merely on
his plea of guilty,[S 112(1) (a )] while in all other cases
the court must first, by questioning the accused, be
satisfied that he is in fact guilty.[S 112(1) (b)]
5.2.1. CONVICTING ON A GUILTY PLEA ONLY
section 112(1) (a) vests the judicial officer with the
discretion to convict an accused on his guilty plea only, if
he is of the opinion that the offence does not merit a
sentence other than a fine of not more than R300. Van der
Merwe et al describe the procedure as follows:"The accused
indirectly becomes the arbiter of his own case and the
formal conviction by the court simply follows the accused's
conclusion that he is guilty as indicated by his plea".[21]
Because of the accused's determination of his own guilt,
this procedure contains the danger that an undefended
accused may mistakenly believe that he is guilty. In the
implementation of this procedure, is the undefended accused
afforded some protection against such a possibility?
Although the aim of the procedure is the expeditious
disposal of minor cases, it is not totally without
safeguards. A duty rests on the judicial officer to
determine whether a particular offence is a minor one and
whether the case may thus be disposed of merely on a guilty
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plea. 1 The court must exercise this discretion jUdicially,
which, in turn, requires the consideration of all the
information pertaining thereto. 2 The court must consider
the nature of the offence, the maximum penalty provided for,
and the particulars of the charge. 3 The prosecutor may
also place before the court such particulars as he would
have furnished to the accused had he been so requested. On
the basis of this information the court should assess the
seriousness of the offence and the likely penalty.4 Where
there is doubt about what the appropriate penalty may be,
the court should not apply the procedure. 5
In the past Courts have stressed that the summary procedure
was to be used only for trivial offences,6 but since the
permissible penalty was first increased to R100 in 19747
and now to R300, the potential scope of its application has
been dramatically increased. 8 It could clearly be
misguided to regard all offences sUbject to a penalty less
than R300 to be trivial. Nevertheless, the Courts have
exercised their discretion jUdicially and in order to avoid
1. Cook 1977 (1) SA 653 (A).
2. Block 1960 (1) SA 570 (C) 571-2. See also Paterson
1977 (1) SA 27 (E) 28F.
3. Vabaza 1948 (1) SA 451 (E) 456; Nzimande 1957 (4) SA
430 (0); Silva 1975 (4) SA 104 (N) 107B; Paterson




7. Act 32 of 1974.
8. Silva supra 106B; Paterson supra 28F.
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unjust results, have sometimes refused to apply this
procedure, for example, to common law crimes.
1
It is
submitted that this cautionary approach should continue and
the court should follow the s 112(1) (b) procedure where
there is a likelihood' of injustice resulting from the
application of the s 112(1 ) (a) procedure.
These requirements do not, however, afford the undefended
accused much protection as the court's focus is on the
offence and not on the accused's plea. It is therefore
unlikely that a mistaken guilty plea will be detected. From
a number of older decisions2 there emerges a possible
means of preventing undefended accused from mistakenly pleading
guilty. In Nsibande 1935 TPD 370 Tindall AJP said that if
an accused pleads guilty, then the magistrate should see
that the essential elements of the offence are put to him
separately in order to determine whether he agrees with each
one. The jUdge observed that where this was done, it was
frequently found that the accused never intended to plead
guilty at all. This procedure was again advanced in Matswele
1940 TPD 348 and in the Appellate Division decision of
Mutimba 1944 AD 23. 3 It is submitted that this procedure
should be consistently followed as it affords a measure of
protection to ignorant undefended accused. 4 The court must
1. Vabaza 1948 (2) SA 451 (E); Silva 1975 (4) SA 104 (N).
Ferreira 338 suggests that this practice should continue also
under the present Code.
2. See Ferreira 339 n 63.
3. See also Mawolaula 1922 NPD 33 35.
4. Van der Merwe Ha ndleiding (1980) 11 also advocates this
procedure in the case of an u ndefended accused who pleads
guilty to a complicated statutory charge.
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put to the accused each element of the offence, which he can
either deny or affirm. This procedure differs from the
s 112(1) (b) procedure in that the magistrate need only be
satisfied that the accused knows and admits the elements of
the offence; he need not establish whether there is a
reliable factual basis for those admissions.
The prosecutor may also play an important role in the
protection of the undefended accused in this regard. In
terms of s 112(1) (b) he may call on the court to question
the accused in a case which otherwise may be disposed of by
, a guilty plea only. If so requested, the court is obliged to
proceed with a s 112(1) (b) enquiry. One of the purposes of
this discretion is, no doubt, to allow the magistrate to
impose a sentence which may be in excess of a R300 fine
where, although the offence may seem trivial, the accused's
criminal record - which at this stage is known only to the
prosecutor - warrants a more severe sentence. This power can
also be used in favour of the undefended accused. Van der
Merwe et al argue convincingly as follows:
"The police docket, which is in the possession of the
prosecutor, provides the backdrop against which the
plea of guilty must be seen. Factors such as the
accused's level of education and occupation, and the
circumstances of the case, place the prosecutor in a
particularly favourable position to know whether the
undefended accused knows what he is doing when he
pleads guilty. If he suspects that the accused does
not understand the nature of the charge or the
consequences of his plea, then it would be proper for
the prosecutor to request that the plea be explored in
terms of s 112(1) (b). Such a course of action
accords with the prosecutor's function and is in
harmony with the provision of the section". [44]
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Although the prosecutor need not make such a request in
every case, he is in a position to select the appropriate
ones where the accused is at a disadvantage because of his
level of education and/or lack of comprehension of the
proceedings.
5.2.2 SECTION 112(1) (b) PROCEDURE
section 112(1) (b) enables a court to convict an accused who--
has pleaded guilty if, after questioning him, it is
satisfied that he is in fact guilty. The procedure thus
dispenses with the previous requirement that the commission
of the offence had to be proved by evidence aliunde.
1
The
procedure is mandatory,2 even if the accused changes his
plea from not guilty to guilty during the trial.
3
The
procedure constitutes an important departure from the
adversary mode of procedure by imposing an inquisitorial
duty on the jUdicial officer to determine whether an accused
who pleads guilty, is in fact guilty of the alleged offence.
5.2.2.1 EXCLUDING THE COURT'S INQUISITORIAL DUTY
The accused is, however, able to obviate the need for the
court's inquisitorial questioning by handing in a written
statement setting out the facts which he admits and the
charges to which he pleads guilty.[S 112(2)] If the court is
satisfied on the strength of the statement that the accused
1. Act 56 of 1955 s 158 (1) (b) •
2. Fikizolo 1978 (2) SA 676 (NC) 679.
3. Abrahamse 1980 (4) SA 665 (C) 668.
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is guilty, it may convict him without any questioning. The.
court may, however, put questions to the accused in order to
clarify any matter in the statement. This provision is
almost exclusively used by lawyers and it enables them to
determine, with the consent of the prosecution, which
1
factual information about the offence is placed on record.
Although this procedure is available to all accused, very
few who are undefended would know about its existence or how
to utilize it. As the protective features of s 112(1) (b) are
excluded, the use of the procedure may not be in the best
interests of undefended accused. The dangers inherent in the
procedure were illustrated in Khiba 1978 (2) SA 540 (E)
where the accused's statement to the police was tendered as
a statement in terms of s 112(2) and served as the basis for
a conviction. The adoption of the s 112(2) procedure, which
must have occurred at the instance of the police or the
prosecutor, effectively curtailed the court's inquisitorial
powers to establish the factual basis of the accused's plea,
since its questioning was then limited merely to clarifying
matters raised in the statement. 2 Such a circumvention of
the safeguards of s 112(1) (b) should not be countenanced,
yet the Court on review merely remarked that it was in order
for the jUdicial officer simply to have questioned the
accused in respect of the voluntariness of the statement. It
1. See GA Barton "Standards for the Acceptance of the Plea
of Guilty - a Comparative Evaluation of S 112(1) (b) of Act
51 of 1977" (1981) 5 SACC 212 215.
2. See Van der Merwe et al 46 .
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is submitted that the court should not allow its protective
function to be usurped and should accept such a statement
from an undefended accused only with the greatest
circumspection.
5.2.2.2 THE COURT'S INQUISITORIAL DUTY
Since defence lawyers invariably make use of the s 112(2)
statement, the court's inquisitorial duty in terms of s
112(1) (b) is performed primarily in respect of undefended
accused. As the jUdicial supervision of the plea of guilty
in relation to all non-minor offences is aimed at the
prevention of convictions on mistaken pleas of guilty,1
the procedure is potentially one of the most important
protections that is afforded the undefended accused. The
protective value of this procedure will depend, however, on
how the court executes its inquisitorial duty. It has been
suggested by Van der Merwe et al that the function of the
-
jUdicial interrogation is to ensure that (a) an accused who
has pleaded guilty understands the legal consequences of
such a plea, (b) the accused freely and voluntarily admits
all the elements of the offence with which he is charged,
and (c) the accused is not mistaken in making a plea of
guilty. [32] These functions, if they are all legally
obligatory, would ensure not only that the factual basis of
the accused's guilty plea is established, but also that no
undue advantage is taken of the undefended accused's
1. Nkosi 1984 (3) SA 345 (A) 353C; Magabi 1985 (3) SA
818 (T) 822J.
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ignorance and vulnerability in the absence of legal assistance.
(a) ADVISING THE ACCUSED OF THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
PLEA
An accused, by pleading guilty, waives certain rights and
safeguards which he would have enjoyed had he contested the
charge: these include the protection that the State must
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and his right to
test the veracity of the evidence against him. A defended
accused would be well aware of these consequences. Van der
Merwe et al contend that it is incumbent on the court to
inform the undefended accused of the implications of a
guilty plea:
"The proper administration of justice requires that an
accused should only take such a decision when he is
aware of all the options, in much the same way as it is
customary to inform the undefended accused of his
rights at the end of the case for the State in a
contested criminal trial". [33]
While it is clearly important, in order to provide equality
before the law, that the court should place the undefended
accused in the same position as one legally represented,
there is unfortunately little support in the case law for
the imposition of such a duty on the court. In Mthetwa,
Kanyile 1978 (1) SA 773 (N) Law AJ held that "there is no
obligation cast on a jUdicial officer by the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Act ... to explain ••• the
consequences of a plea of guilty to an accused
person ... "[776E] He did add, however, that it may be
desirable to do so in the case of illiterate or uneducated
persons. The same opinion wa s expressed in Yontolo 1977 (2)
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SA 146 (E), where it was held that it was not even
obligatory to inform an accused that the consequence of a
plea of guilty to dealing in drugs, was a mandatory sentence
of five years' imprisonment.
As the plea decision is one of the most important choices an
accused makes during the proceedings, the court should only
attach consequences to a considered and informed plea. As
much as the accused should be afforded an opportunity to
consider his plea, he should be informed about the
considerations relevant to it. It is an established
principle that a court only accepts as binding the
consequences of an informed choice. In Daniels 1983 (3) SA
275 (A) the Court held that an admission of an undefended
accused is admissible only if he was informed that the
effect of making it was to relieve the State of the onus of
proving the admitted fact and that he was under no
obligation to assist the state in proving the case against
him. 1 Since a plea of guilty consists of a series of
admissions covering all the allegations, the same cautionary
approach should be adopted. Only if it is clear that the
accused appreciated the various options open to him and the
consequences pertaining to them, should his plea of guilty
be accepted.
(b) ESTABLISHING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA
The plea of an accused s hould be made freely and voluntarily
1. 315F-G. See also Mavudla 1976 (4) SA 731 (N) 732E.
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and without undue influence. 1 The first step to prevent
involuntary pleas would be to i n f o rm the undefended accused,
before he pleads, that he is not obliged to plead guilty,
and secondly, after he has pleaded, to question him about
the voluntariness of his plea. 2 The court is not, however,
obliged to do either.
In Nkosi 1984 (3) SA 345 (A) Jansen JA dismissed the
argument that the accused, if not informed about his right
to insist that the state prove his guilt, might wrongly
plead guilty because of intimidation from the police in
whose control he may be. The jUdge was adamant that the
court's questioning of the accused would detect an
involuntary plea and added that, in respect of s 119
proceedings, the accused could always raise the
involuntariness of his plea in the magistrates' court when
he was put on trial before the Supreme Court. [351I]
This decision cannot be endorsed. The Court's confidence
that any form of inducement would be exposed during the
questioning is, it is submitted, misplaced. The appearance
of an accused in court does not necessarily terminate the
influence that the police, for example, may exercise over
him. He will very likely continue to be under the control of
the police after pleading, either directly, if detained in
the police cells, or indirectly, if detained in prison. It
is thus unlikely that an accused sUbjected to pressure would
1. Chetty ~ Cronje 1979 ( 1) SA 294 (0) 297G.
2. Van der Merwe et al 34 .
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volunteer information about intimidation, as suggested by
the jUdge. Furthermore, even if the questioning follows the
guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, it is unlikely
that it would uncover such irregularities. As long as the
accused appears to be guilty on the face of his statement,
the court is not obliged to probe behind what he has said,
for example, to enquire whether he has been induced in any
way to plead guilty.1 Finally, the possibility of an
accused having a second chance to contest the voluntariness
of his plea, applies mainly to trials in the Supreme Court
where the s 119 proceedings in the magistrates' court are
distinct and separate from the trial. The majority of
accused appearing in the lower courts in summary
proceedings will be deprived of such an opportunity,
particularly where the conviction and sentence occur on the
same day.
Support for establishing the voluntariness of pleas can be
derived from the rules pertaining to confessions. Since the
guilty plea has been equated to a jUdicial confession,2 it
is submitted that the principal requirements for
admissibility of confessions should also be applicable in
respect of guilty pleas in facie curia. In order that a
confession be admissible, it must be proved that it was made
1. See t~e examples in the case law where prima facie the
statements were made voluntarily but later proved not to be,
Van der Merwe et al 28.
2. Ndlela et al 1984 (4 ) SA 1 31 (N) 132 in fin; Becker
1929 AD 167 171.
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voluntarily and without any inducement.
1
The basis for the
provisions is twofold. Firstly, an involuntary confession
may not be truthful and secondly, even if it is truthful,
illegal police behaviour which led to a coerced confession,
should not be countenanced. For the same reasons, a judicial
officer should establish the vOluntariness of admissions
before convicting an accused on the basis of these. Where it
is found that there have been undue pressures or promises
influencing the guilty plea, the plea should not be accepted
as its truthfulness may be affected thereby and outside
interference in the determination of the accused's guilt
should not be tolerated. It is therefore submitted that the
court should, in addition to informing the accused that he
is not obliged to plead guilty, enquire specifically whether
the plea and admissions were made freely and voluntarily and
without undue inducement.
(c) ESTABLISHING THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE ACCUSED'S PLEA ~
The primary purpose of the questioning is to establish
whether there is a factual basis for the accused's belief in
his own guilt. It thus serves as a safety device against
mistaken guilty pleas,2 particularly in respect of
1. Barlin 1926 AD 459 462; Schmidt 529. Where, on the face
of the document containing the confession, there is no positive
assertion as to its VOluntariness, the onus rests on the
state to prove such (s 217(1)). See Hoffmann 183; Schmidt
527. If it appears on the face of the document that the
confession was voluntarily executed, the onus is on the
accused to prove the contrary (s 217(1) (b) (ii)).
2. Nkosi 1984 (4) SA 345 (A) 353C; Gresse 1985 (4) SA
410 (T) 404F.
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1illiterate and undefended accused, whose statements could
alone found a conviction. Didcott J in M 1982 (1) SA 240
(N) described the protective function of s 112(1) (b) as
follows:
"The safety device is an important one. Accused persons
sometimes plead guilty to charges, experience shows,
without understanding fully what these encompass. The
danger of their doing so is obvious in a society like
ours in which many are illiterate and unsophisticated
coming before the courts with no legal assistance. The
danger is greater still, it goes without saying, when
such a one is a young child with a limited grasp of the
proceedings". [242D]
The court's inquisitorial duty is thus to be performed to
protect the undefended accused from mistakenly pleading
guilty. The procedure may therefore not be used to prove the
guilt of the accused where the latter disputes his guilt,
and so the court may not cross-examine the accused to prove
that his denial of an allegation is wrong,2 or use its
power to call witnesses [S 186] to establish any allegation
which the accused disputes. 3
The Court has urged that the section be applied with great
care and circumspection, especially where the accused is
undefended and apparently unsophisticated. 4 A number of
principles have thus been developed to guide jUdicial
officers in their inquisitorial task. The court must
establish whether (i) the accused admits every element of
the offence and the factual allegations on which the
1. Baron 1978 (2) SA 510 (C).
2. Londi 1985 (2) SA 248 (E).
3. Jada 1985 (2) SA 182 (E).
4. Phikwa 1978 (1) SA 397 (E) 398E.
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elements are founded, (ii) his admissions are truthful, and
(iii) whether they are reliable.
(i) Establishing whether the accused ad~its every element of
the offence and the factual allega~10ns on which the
elements are~ui1ded
In Jacobs 1978 (1) SA i176 (C) it was said that the
questioning should ascertain that an accused who pleads
guilty knows what the elements of the offence are and that
he admits everyone of them. Van der Merwe et al also
contend that "the accused's understanding of the charge must
be a cardinal factor in deciding whether his admissions are
persuasive of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". [35]
In conducting the qUestioning the court must explain the
various elements of the offence in a language which the
accused understands and the accused must admit each one of
them. 1 It is insufficient, however, for the accused's
answers merely to be a repetition of the elements of the
offence;2 in addition to admitting every element of the
offence, the accused must admit the factual allegations on
which the elements are based. The accused is not required to
admit all the factual allegations contained in the charge
sheet and the court may convict him as long as his
admissions of facts cover all the elements of the
offence. 3 The court therefore need not put every factual
1. Phikwa 1978 (1) SA 397 (E) 398A.
2. Doud 1978 (2) SA 403 (0) 404.
3. Magabi 1985 (3) SA 810(T) 823E. The prosecutor may reject
admissions which fail to correspond with the allegations
contained in the charge sheet and the court must then enter
a plea of not guilty.
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1
allegation contained in the charge sheet to the accused,
but the questioning must reduce the elements of the charge
to a factual basis. 2 The court may not make deductions
from what the accused has said, to decide whether he admits
a particular allegation. 3 Furthermore, incomplete
admissions cannot be supplemented by argument.
4
If it
becomes apparent that the accused may have a defence, the
court is obliged to investigate it. 5 This duty does not,
however, compel a court to examine all possible defences
where they are not even suggested by the evidence.
6
Presumptions, which per definition presume the existence of
unproven facts, cannot be used in s 112(1) (b) proceedings.
The task of the court is to determine the guilt of the
accused on the basis of what the accused ,says and admits and
this is incompatible with the operation of presumptions.
Flemming J stated in Mossendu 1981 (1) SA 323 (0) that
"Die Wetgewer het gewis nie bedoel dat In beskuldigde
skuldig bevind kan word sonder In navraag omtrent In
onontbeerlike feit waarheen 'n vermoede oenskynlik lei,
maar sonder In geleentheid waartydens dit mag blyk dat
die betrokke feit nie erken word nie".[326A]
1. Magabi supra.
2. Van der Merwe et al 35. See Tito 1984 (4) SA 363 (CkSC)
where the Ciskei Supreme Court debated the length to which a
court should go to establish the factual basis of the
accused's admission that he escaped from lawful custody.
The minority decision of Rees AJ, which held that the court
should have investigated the factual basis of the lawfulness
of the custody, is, it is sUbmitted, correct.
3. Londi 1985 (2) SA 248 (E) 250I.
4. Tsoali 1983 (1) PH H59 (0 ) .
5. Tshurni 1978 (1) SA 129 (N) .
6. Tito supra 364Ei Booysen 1985 (2) SA 95 (C) 96J.
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It was therefore held insufficient for a conviction of
dealing in dagga, merely to establish that the accused was
in or near a vehicle which transported dagga and then to
rely on the presumption, contained in s 1D(e) of Act 41 of
1971, to supply the remaining elements. Instead, the accused
should be questioned specifically as to whether he actually
dealt in dagga.
(ii) Establishing whether the accused's admissions are a
truthful reflection of his views
The court's questioning should be directed towards
discovering whether the plea of the accused and his
admissions express his views truthfully. Questions which may
tend not to establish the truth are therefore irregular. The
asking of leading questions, the answers to which are either
yes or no, may not elicit the truth since the answer may
have been suggested in the question.! The practice of
asking leading questions has therefore been consistently
disapproved of by the Supreme court. 2 It is also
irregular for a prosecutor to relate the state's version of
the case before the accused is questioned and for the court
then merely to ask the accused whether he agrees with it.
Such a procedure may influence the accused's response for he
might adopt the suggestions made by the state. 3 "Th e
1. See Schmidt 282.
2. Mkize, Nene ~ The State 1981 (3) SA 585 (N) S86A;
Moblabi 1981 (2) PH H109 (0); Mokoena 1982 (3) SA 976 (T);
Absolon 1983 (1) PH H52 (C); Sof 1984 (1) PH H22 (0).
3. Sethole 1984 (3) SA 620 (0~22.
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accused should instead simply be invited to relate his
account of the event. 1
~iii) Establishing the reliability of the accused's
admissions
For a conviction to be based on an accused's admissions, the
court should be satisfied that such admissions are reliable
proof of the accused's guilt. 2 Answers for which legal
knowledge is a prerequisite cannot have much probative value
if given by an undefended accused unversed in law.
3
It is
therefore the duty of the court to avoid any 'legal'
questions. 4 At times it could be difficult to elicit
answers which would establish elements such as unlawfulness,
knowledge of unlawfulness, negligence, dolus eventual is , and
other legal concepts that sometimes baffle lawyers, let
alone laymen. 5 The only solution to the problem is for the
court to establish from the accused the factual basis of an
admission pertaining to a legal concept. The court should
then decide, on the basis of this information, whether the
legal requirement has been met.
Where an admitted fact is not within the personal knowledge
of the accused, such an admission cannot be a reliable
1. Mkize ~ The state 1981 (3) SA 585 (N) 587;
Chonco 1984 (2) PH H168 (N).
2. See Naidoo 1985 (2) SA 32 (N) 37G.
3. Finger 1981 (1) PH H65 (0); Mathe 1981 (1) PH H68 (NC).
4. Moblabi 1981 (2) PH H109 (0).
5. Cf P van Warmelo "Die Romeinse en Romeins-Hollandse Reg en
Sommige Moderne Strafregbegrippe - 'n Pleidooi vir Eenvoud"
(1984) 8 SACC 44.
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indicator of that fact, and consequently the court can
attach little value to it. In Chetty 1984 (1) SA 411 (C)
the Court refused to accept the accused's admission that the
drug he dealt in was a prohibited drug, since that could be
established only by chemical analysis, which was beyond the
accused's capability. The Court could therefore not base the
conviction on the accused's admission since the offence was
not one of dealing in a substance which the accused thought
was prohibited, but one which was in fact proscribed.
Although the accused might have had the necessary mens rea,
the actus reus would be absent, as his admissions would be
unreliable to establish the latter element of the offence.
This requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
the accused to plead guilty to certain offences, the
elements of which are not dependent on any action or
knowledge on his part. 1 The Courts' approach to this
problem has not, however, been uniform. 2
The Natal Provincial Division in Ndlela et al 1984 (4) SA
131 (N) seemed to favour the view that a court should not
accept an admission where the fact that the accused admits
falls outside his personal knowledge,~ but in Naidoo 1985
(2) SA 32 (N) a more pragmatic approach was followed
whereby an admission would be accepted as admissible
1. See Arendse 1985 (2) SA 103 (C).
2. See generally J van der Berg (1985) 9 SACC 163; G
Barton (1980) 4 SACC 260 276.
3. For a similar approach in respect of a charge of
possession of suspected stolen goods, see Shabalala
1982 (2) SA 123 (T); Hiemstra 778.
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provided certain criteria are met. It was held that the
court could be satisfied of the existence of a fact even if
it was not within the accused's personal knowledge, so long
as the probative force of those sources of information on
which the accused based his admission, was sufficient to
render such admission reliable. 1 In Naidoo the accused
pleaded guilty to a charge of driving a motor vehicle with
more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood; he
complemented his admission regarding his blood/alcohol level
by handing in a certificate containing the results of a
scientific analysis of a sample of his blood and gave
further details of his alcohol consumption on the day in
t
. 2ques lone
In Booysen 1985 (2) SA 95 (C) the Court accepted that the
accused could admit possession of or dealing in a prohibited
drug without indicating on what grounds such an admission is
made. 3 The Court held that as long as the accused
realizes the significance of making the admission, it is not
necessary for the State to cover possible defences which the
1. 401. See also Zuma 1984 (1) PH H85 (N); Ndlela et al
supra Leon J's minority jUdgment 132. -- --
2. See also Chetty 1984 (1) SA 411 (C). Although the
Court in Gresse 1985 (4) SA 401 (T) claimed to have accepted
the decision in Naidoo, the acceptance of the plea of guilty
without any further information from the accused, except that he
drank beer (which he did not even regard as strong liquor!),
does not, it is sUbmitted, comply with the requirement that
the accused's admission should be based on reliable sources.
The decision is more in line with Booysen 1985 (2) SA 95 (C),
see below.
3. 96G. See also Gresse 1985 (4) SA 401 (T) 407Ai Sipiri
1979 (2) SA 1168 (NC).
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accused did not raise. [9GI] The Court thus rejected the view
that there should be either a scientific analysis of the
drug or cogent reasons why the accused believes it to be a
prohibited one.
The approach in Booysen cannot be supported. The aim of the
s 112(1) (b) procedure is to protect accused from mistaken
pleas. It could not have been the intention of the
Legislature that the accused should be convicted merely on
his own belief in his guilt. The duty of the court is to
establish inquisitorially whether there is an objective and
reliable basis on which a conviction can be founded. The
court cannot therefore take any admission at face value but
must be convinced that it is reliable proof of the existence
of a fact.
5.2.2.3 THE DUTY TO CHANGE A GUILTY PLEA TO NOT GUILTY
concomitant with the duty of the court to establish whether
the accused is in fact guilty, is the obligation under s 113
to change the guilty plea to one of not guilty if;
(a) there is any doubt whether the accused is guilty of the
offence according to the law;
(b) satisfied that the accused does not admit an allegation
in the charge;
(c) the accused has incorrectly admitted any allegation; or
(d) the accused has a valid defence to the charge.
The test to be applied in assessing whether the plea should
be accepted does not vary from the standard of proof
Chapter 5 Page 253
required for conviction; the court must be convinced beyo~
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.1 Any
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused would
suffice for the change of plea. In Phikwa 1978 (1) SA 397
(E) the Court thus held that
"Where there is room for any other reasonable
interpretation of the accused's plea and his answers it
is imperative that a plea of not guilty be entered and
the matter clarified by the leading of evidence". [398GJ
The duty to safeguard the accused from the consequences of a
mistaken or incorrect plea prevails until the sentence is
passed.[S 113J The court is thus obliged to set aside the
conviction if any doubt arises regarding the accused's guilt
during evidence in mitigation of sentence. 2 The change of
plea may be entered by the court mero motu or on application
by the accused. 3
The duty to set aside a conviction based on a mistaken plea
of guilty also rests on the regional court when it is called
upon to sentence an accused who has been convicted in terms
of s 112(1) (b) in the magistrates' court but an appropriate
sentence would exceed the latter's jurisdiction.[S 114] If
the regional court is satisfied that a plea of guilty or an
1. Munshelele 1980 (2) SA 110 (V). See also Van der Merwe
et al 35.
2. Du Plessis 1978 (2) SA 498 (C) 498D; Thomane 1979 (3)
SA 1195 (0). See also Van der Merwe et al 53; A Caiger
"section 113: More Questions than Answers?" (1982) 45 THRHR
196.
3. See Van der Merwe et al 54; J van der Berg "Change of Plea:
A Plea for Change" (198 5) 9 SACC 279 for the controversy
regarding different criteria when the accused applies for a
change of plea.
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admission was incorrectly recorded, or that the accused is
not guilty of the offence, a plea of not guilty should be
entered and the guilt of the accused be established by
trial.[S 114(3)] An undefended accused would clearly benefit
from this type of "review" by a regional court of the
magistrate's decision to convict.
1
In Loggerenberg 1984 (4) SA 41 (E), however, Mullins J
held that the regional magistrate is restricted to the
record of the proceedings in the magistrates' court and the
accused has no right to re-open the question of whether the
verdict should be guilty or not. [471] Support for this was
drawn from the provision of s 116 that an accused, after a
plea of not guilty and a full trial in the magistrates'
court, having been convicted and referred to the regional
court for sentencing, cannot re-open the case in the latter.
The jUdge said that the accused who has pleaded guilty
should be in no better position than the accused who has
been convicted after a full trial.
with respect, the Court's reasoning cannot be accepted.
Firstly, the regional magistrate's power to change a plea
should not be more restricted than that of the magistrate.
The former merely performs the sentencing function of the
latter. Since the magistrate is able to reopen the question
of guilt after conviction but before sentence, regional
magistrates should have the same power . As s 114 proceedings
1. Cf DJL Kotz e "Die Pleit v a n Skuldig: Beske rm i ng t e e n
Benadeling" (1978) 2 SACC 294 296 .
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are an extension of the procedure required by s 112, s
113 should be equally applicable to proceedings in terms of
s 114.
Secondly, the jUdge's reference to s 116 does not offer
support for his argument, but in fact points in the other
direction. After a full trial and a conviction, the court
cannot reverse its own conviction. By contrast, where no
evidence has been led, the court is specifically instructed
to change a plea if there is any doubt about the accused's
guilt. This is a special safeguard which is not necessary
after an accused's guilt has been established by evidence.
The consequence of a change of plea is that the prosecutor
is called upon to lead evidence to prove the commission of
the offence. The change of plea does not render the
proceedings in terms of s 112(1) (b) a nUllity. The proviso
to s 113 holds that any allegation admitted by the accused
up to the stage that the plea is changed, will stand as
proof of that allegation.
5.2.2.4. SECTION 112(1) (b): CONCLUDING REMARKS
sections 112 and 113 do not establish an infallible safety
device that will invariably detect mistaken pleas. Too much
of their efficacy is dependent on the manner and depth of
the court's questioning. 1 It has also been observed that
some magistrates may be too easily satisfied of the guilt of
1. Kotze (1978) 2 SACC 294 300.
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the accused. 1 A busy magistrate with a heavy court roll
may exploit the time saving methods that the procedure
contains without pursuing vigorously its protective aims.
Furthermore, since the court is not obliged to ensure that
the plea is voluntarily, the possibility of coerced and
unduly influenced pleas cannot be excluded. On the whole,
however, the conclusion must be that this procedure provides
a significant device to prevent undefended accused from
being wrongly convicted. The protective role that the
defence lawyer plays before a guilty plea is entered is
performed for the undefended accused by the jUdicial
officer. The procedure thus establishes the important
principle that, in the absence of a lawyer, the principles
of a fair trial should be pursued through the active and
inquisitorial participation of the jUdicial officer.
5.3. THE PLEA OF NOT ·GUILTY
By pleading not guilty, the accused places every allegation
in dispute and burdens the state with the proof thereof.
section 115 makes provision for the active intervention of
the court at this stage, in order to narrow down the issues
in dispute.
2
The elimination of issues which are not in
dispute clearly assists the state by lightening its burden
to prove every allegation. Unlike the procedure under s
112(1) (b), s 115 is not aimed at the protection or
1. RG Nairn "Section 112 of Act 51 of 1977: More Insights
and Interpretations" (1978) 2 SACC 201.
2. Seleke 1980 (3) SA 745 (A) 754A.
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assistance of the accused; on the contrary, it may well be
to his prejudice, particularly where he is undefended.
5.3.1 NARROWING DOWN -THE DISPUTE: THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
After a plea of not guilty the court may ask the accused
whether he wishes to make a statement indicating the basis
of his defence.[S 115(1)] If he chooses to do so, but his
statement does not clearly indicate which allegations he
puts in dispute, the court may question him in order to
clarify his defence.[S 115(2) (a)] Even if the accused
declines to make a statement, the court may question him as
to the allegations in dispute.[S 115(2) (a) & (b)] If the
accused does not dispute an allegation, the court must---
enquire from him whether that allegation may be recorded as
a formal admission. If the accused consents to its formal.------
recording, this is sufficient proof of the fact so
admitted.[S 115(2) (b)]
The purpose of the court's intervention is to rationalize
the contested criminal trial by identifying and iso~ating
the factual and legal conflicts between the parties. The
court takes the initiative to determine what issues are in
dispute~ much like a pre-trial conference presided over by a
t
jUdicial officer in civil proceedings.1~Since the
accused's co-operation in narrowing down the dispute is
voluntary (he retains his right to remain silent) he will
1. See Act 32 of 1944 s 54 (1). See CF Eckard Grondtrekke
van die Siviele Prosesreg in die Landdroshowe (1984) 249ff.
Supreme Court RUles, rule 37.
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participate if he believes it to be in his interest. The
undefended accused, however, may co-operate with the court
without assessing the consequences. It is therefore
important to assess whether co-operation with the court may
afford the accused any advantage.
In Moloyi 1978 (1) SA 516 (0) the early determination of
disputed facts was mentioned as one of the objectives of the
procedure.[519H] Such a determination, made at the accused's
first court appearance, will clearly shorten the trial and
save costs,l but most of the advantages derived from it
accrue to the State. From the outset, the State can focus
its attention and all its resources on the area of dispute
and thus prepare fully for trial. The identification of the
accused's defence also ensures that the prosecutor will not
be surprised at the trial. Furthermore, if the procedure
leads to the recording of admissions, this will ease the
"------
State's onus of proof.
Although a shortened trial may lessen the time spent by the
accused in court, the early and final determination of the
disputed facts carries considerable disadvantages for the
accused. Firstly, the accused ties himself down to a
specific defence from the outset. 2 In view of the fact
that the accused can be called upon to plead at his first
1. See Mayedwa 1978 (1) SA 509 (E) 511C.
2. Van der Merwe Handleiding (1980) 53; CF Klopper "The
New Criminal Procedure Act in Practice" (1979) 11 CILSA
320 323.
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court appearance, the disclosure of his defence may be ill-
advised if he has not had the opportunity to consider it
properly. Secondly, evidence which he later gives in court
may conflict with the statement made at the outset of the
trial, and this would damage his credibility as a witness.
This may happen even to the most honest witness if there is
a considerable time lapse between the initial pleadings and
the trial.
The disclosure of his defence also holds no specific
advantages for the accused. An exculpatory statement not
repeated under oath has no evidential value,l while an
incriminating statement can be used as evidence against the
accused. 2 Where a formal admission has been made, the
scope of the permissible range of cross-examination of state
witnesses on that issue will be limited. 3 The state will
know more about the defence case than the accused will know
of the state case. Furthermore, the disclosure is not likely
to lead to the early release of the accused. The Botha
Commission concluded that the prima facie case on which the
charge is based would not be impaired by the explanation of
the accused alone, without an actual testing of the state
witnesses. [Par 1.19] One possible advantage for the accused
is that in the unlikely event of the prosecution alleging
1. Malebo 1979 (2) SA 636 (BH); Van der Merwe et al 137
n 107. But contra Mogoregi 1978 (1) SA 13 (0) ;~oabisa
1983 (1) PH H82 (0).
2. Sesetse 1981 (3) SA 353 (A). See also PM Bekker
"Vernuwing van die suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses: Die Proses
van Pleitverduideliking" (1978) 11 De Jure 200 298.
3. Klopper 1978 CILSA 320.
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that the accused's evidence is a recent fabrication, the
accused may be able to rely on his s 115 statement to dispel
the allegation. 1 It has also been suggested that the
undefended accused may gain some benefit from disclosing his
defence as the court could then assist him in putting his
defence to state witnesses.
2
The accused, on the whole, is likely to gain little
a~nfage from co-operating with the judicial officer. 3
Although defence lawyers tend to disclose their defence
under the new procedure, they participate on such a limited
scale that they cannot be prejudiced by it. They have ample
time and skill to develop a considered response, present it
at the commencement of the trial proper, and indicate only
the basis of their defence. 4 The prejudicial impact of the
court's enquiring function would therefore be felt primarily
by undefended accused, who will mostly be unaware, firstly,
of their right not to participate, and secondly, of the
legal implications which may flow from their participation.
In view of the real possibility that the undefended accused
may be prejudiced by the procedure, it is important to
determine how the jUdicial officer should take the interests
of such accused into account when exercising this function.
1. Van der Merwe et al 140.
2. Thomas 1978 (2--)SX-408 (BSC) 409H.
3. Under the 1955 Code the accused could voluntarily disclose
his defence (s 169(5», but in practice this seldom occurred,
Van der Merwe et al 51.
4. See par 6.3~ ca) below.
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5.3.2 THE COURT'S FUNCTION TO DETERMINE THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF THE DISPUTE
(a) THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF THE DISPUTE DETERMINATION
Once an accused has pleaded not guilty, s 115 becomes
applicable. 1 Section 115(1) provides that the court may
ask the accused the basis of his defence,2 thus giving the
court a discretion whether or not to conduct the enquiry.
The discretion must be exercised judicially.3 It has been
accepted that after the court has changed a plea of guilty
in terms of s 113, there is usually no need to enquire into
the defence of the accused as this would be apparent from
the court's questioning. 4 The principle seems to be that
where the defence is clear, the purpose of, and thus the
need for the questioning falls away. Questioning which is
not aimed at establishing the basis of the accused's defence
should therefore be regarded as irregular.
(b) DETERMINING THE BASIS OF THE ACCUSED'S DEFENCE AND
PROTECTING HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
The aim of the court's intervention is to ascertain the
basis of the accused's defence. It should be made clear to
1. Mjoli 1981 (3) SA 1233 (A) 1238B.
2. The decision of Hiemstra CJ in Bepela 1978 (2) SA 22 (B)
imposing a mandatory duty, has not been followed. See
Herbst 1980 (3) SA 1026 (E) 1031. DJL Kotze (1980) 13 De
Jure 416 420 interpreted Seleke 1980 (3) SA 745 (A) 755B as
imposing a mandatory duty to question an accused. As Van der
Merwe et al 80 correctly point out, it is mandatory to apply
s 115, but the section does not make it mandatory to
interrogate.
3. Herbst 1980 (3) SA 1026 (E) 1031E.
4. Ncube 1981 (3) SA 511 (T) 514C.
Chapter 5 Page 262
the accused that it is not an opportunity to place his
version of the events before the court, but merely to give
an indication of the basis of his defence. To ask the
accused, for example, "What happened?" may lead to a full
disclosure which may inadvertently undo his plea of not
guilty.1 Where the purpose of the procedure is not
explicitly stated, then, the court commits an irregularity
which should render the accused's statement inadmissible.
The court's power to enquire from an accused whether he
wishes to disclose the basis of his defence has not
curtailed in any way the accused's right to remain
silent. 2 His refusal to disclose his defence merely places
all the allegations in dispute. 3 After some prevarication
in the law,4 the full bench of the Cape Provincial
Division in Evans 1981(4) SA 52 (C) imposed a duty on the
jUdicial officer to inform the accused of his right to
remain silent. 5 This decision subsequently received
1. Nkosi 1984 (3) SA 345 (A) 353F-G; Mahlangu 1985 (4)
SA 447 (W) 452A.
2. Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C) 550, 56A; Hill 1981 (2) PH
H152 (C).
3. Rakanang 1978 (1) SA 591 (Ne) 593F.
4. Hiemstra CJ at first maintained that there was no duty on
the court to inform the accused of his right to remain
silent, see Thomas 1978 (2) SA 408 (BSC) 410; VG Hiemstra
"Hervorming van die Strafprosesreg" 1977 TSAR 116 119.
In Muzikayifani 1979 (2) SA 516 (N) 520B Law J declared
it to be desirable that the accused be explicitly informed
of his right to silence. For criticism see Van der Merwe
Handleiding (1980) 95.
5. 58G. Previously there had been a number of calls by
writers for such a duty: see RG Nairn "S 115 of Act 51 of
1977: The New Inquisition Clarified" (1978) 2 SACC 89
90; A st Q Skeen "Procedures following Pleas of Not Guilty
in South Africa" (1980) 4 SACC 277 282 (a call for a
statutory intervention); PM Bekker (1978) 11 De Jure 200
208. ' - --
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appellate confirmation in Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275
(A).l In Evans Vivier J stressed the importance of
explaining the right to the accused in such a fashion that
he would be able to understand it. [59A-D] The precise
wording was not prescribed but the warning given must be
fully and meticulously recorded. [59B-C] Where an accused
faces more than one charge, he should be informed of his
2right to remain silent in respect of each charge.
The effect of a failure to inform the accused in this regard
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 3 In
Chilwan 1982 (1) PH H87 (C) the accused was not informed
that he was not obliged to make a statement. Since the
statement that he made was never again referred to, either
during the trial or in the jUdgment, Vivier J held that the
accused was not prejudiced by the omission and the
conviction was confirmed. In Hill 1981 (2) PH H152 (C) the
Court adopted a different approach for the more extreme case
where a magistrate had told the accused that they were
~bliged to disclose their defence. The Court held that the
accused were thereby denied a fundamental right - the right
to remain silent. The denial of such a basic right amounted
to a gross irregularity per se, reSUlting in the setting
aside of the conviction. Most irregularities would probably
fall between these extremes and their effects will depend
upon the individual case.
1. 299F . . See also Hill 1981 (2) PH H152 (C).
2. BouIllon CC244/1984 (D & C LD) unreported.
3. Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C).
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The question then arises whether it is sufficient - in order
to protect the undefended accused - to apprise him only of
the existence of the right, without disclosing the material
considerations which should be taken into account when
exercising his choice. Can it be said that the accused
exercises an informed choice if he is not made aware, for
instance, that a statement under s 115 could only be used as
evidence against him in subsequent proceedings? 'I n Daniels
1983 (3) SA 275 (A) Van Winsen AJA regarded it as irregular
if the accused is not informed that the formal admissions
which he makes may, at a later stage, be used against
him.[309E] Even though the jUdge referred only to the
recording of formal admissions, it is submitted that the
same principle is applicable to the making of a statement
which contains informal admissions. Since these admissions
have evidential value as well,l they can also be used
against the accused. Similarly, in order to alleviate the
accused's fears that reticence at this stage will be held
against him,2 it is submitted that he should be apprised of
the fact that no negative inference may be drawn from his
silence. 3
The question arises as to the court's duty where the
undefended accused, invited to disclose his defence, relates
1. Sesetse 1981 (3) SA 353 (A).
2. As was suggested by Hiemstra CJ in ~ 1979 (4) SA 1044
(BR) .
3. Cf JR van Rooyen "Some Doubts regarding Aspects of the
1973 Criminal Procedure Bill" 1976 De Rebus 207 209.
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his whole story. Should the court actively intervene and
terminate the accused's statement once it is clear what the
basis of his defence is, or is it legitimate to allow him to
ramble on and disclose more than what is necessary? On the
one hand, the court will probably not be able to determine
what the accused's defence is if a full factual account of
the events is not given. On the other, by giving a full
disclosure, the accused may inadvertently contradict his
plea of not guilty.1 As far as Hiemstra CJ was concerned
- /
in Thomas 1978 (2) SA 408 (BSC), it would be wrong to stop
an accused when he goes beyond a mere explanation of his
plea and only irrelevancies should be eliminated. This
approach cannot be supported.[The invitation should not be a
trap for the accused to disclose the factual basis of his
case. 2 It is submitted that as soon as the basis of the
defence becomes apparent, the purpose of the enquiry is
achieved. For the court to allow the accused to continue
with his story is irregular, as no legitimate purpose is
served thereby.
(c) CLARIFYING THE DEFENCE AND THE LIMITATIONS ON
QUESTIONING
When the accused makes a statement, the court's power to
question him is limited3 to the purpose of clarifying [S
1. Nkosi 1984 (3) SA 345 (A) 353F-G; Mahlangu 1985 (4)
SA 447 (W) 452A.
2. See JR du Plessis "Some Decisions on section 115 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 1977" (1979) 96 SALJ 4 11.
3. Moloyi 1978 (1) 516 (0) 522.
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115(2) (b)] the dispute if "it is not clear from his
statement to what extent he denies or admits" the
allegations in the charge.[S 115(2) (a)] The purpose of the
questioning is to obtain certainty as to the accused's
defence, and is not to disprove or discredit a defence that
the accused has put forward. 1 Cross-examination of the
accused to this effect is thus not allowed,2 and the court
is precluded from investigating the facts which are in
dispute. 3 Questioning that goes beyond the purpose of
determining the basis of the accused's defence would thus be
01 4J.rregu are
In Mathogo 1978 (1) SA 425 (0) the court held that
evidence elicited by irregular questioning should not be
taken into account when assessing the guilt of the accused.
It has also been held that extensive questioning may place
the impartiality of the magistrate in doubt, and that this
t Ot t 0 1 °t 5may per se cons J. u e a gross J.rregu arJ. y.
If the court deems it necessary to ask further questions for
elucidation, it must inform the accused of this purpose. 6
Since the accused is entitled to refuse to answer any of the
1. Mathogo 1978 (1) SA 425 (0) 426Ei Simelane 1979 (2)
PH H170 (T) i Mahlangu 1985 (4) SA 447 (W) 453A.
2. Seleke 1980 (3) SA 745 (A) 754Ai Govender 1984 (1)
PH H24 (0).
3. Moloyi 1978 (1) SA 516 (0) 520E; Seleke supra 753A.
4. Muzikayifani 1979 (2) SA 516 (N) 517H.
5. Grootboom 1982 (1) PH H78 (E).
6. Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C) 55Gi Maye dwa 1978 (1) SA 509
(E) 511E.
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questions put to him,l the court must also inform him of
this right. 2
(d) MINIMIZING THE DISPUTE BY THE RECORDING OF ADMISSIONS
section 115(2) (a) empowers the court to question the accused
despite his refusal to disclose the basis of his defence, in
order to establish which allegations are in dispute. If the
accused does not dispute an allegation, then the court is
obliged to enquire from him whether his reaction to this
allegation may be recorded as a formal admission.
The court, by utilizing its power to determine the
allegations in dispute, is thus able to circumvent the
accused's decision not to disclose his defence. By
determining whether the accused disagrees with each
allegation, the court may, by a process of elimination,
establish his defence. To avoid this questioning, it seems
to be necessary for the accused to state that he disputes
every allegation contained in the charge. To question the
accused after this would be irregular as it would be a
denial of his right to remain silent. 3 It is unlikely,
however, that an undefended accused would assert his right
in the correct manner and most accused would thus be exposed
to a second round of questioning. Moreover, there is a
strong probability that an accused will succumb to the
questioning at this stage since his previous choice to
1. Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C) 56A.
2. Evans supra 58G; Rakanang 1978 (1) SA 591 (NC) 593F.
3. Cf Hill 1981 (2) PH H152 (C).
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remain silent was not respected and therefore appears to
have been of no avail. It is clearly difficult for an
accused to remain silent in the face of questions addressed
to him and, as Malherbe AJ perceptively remarked, "an
undefended accused will probably accede more readily to such
a request emanating from the presiding officer than from
somebody in a lesser positionn. 1 This provision may in
practice effectively undermine the accused's right to remain
silent. It should therefore be incumbent on the jUdicial
officer to inform the accused once again that he need not
answer these questions.
In Khumalo 1979 (3) SA 708 (T) the Court cautioned against
the unjust use of this power. Where an undefended accused
elects not to make a statement, where the nature and
implications of admissions or denials he is expected to make
would probably not. be understood by him and where the area
of dispute is limited, there is no valid reason for the
court to insist that the accused should further limit the
area of dispute.
If an accused does not dispute an allegation, the court is
obliged to enquire from him whether it may be recorded as an
admission.[S 115(2) (b)] If the accused consents, such
admission would be sufficient proof of the fact so
admitted.[S 115(2) (b); s 220] Through a series of formal
admissions, covering all the allegations in the charge, the
1. Govender 1984 (1) PH H24 (0).
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foundation may in fact be laid for the accused's conviction,
despite his plea of not guilty.1 In such a
situation the accused's attention must be drawn specifically
to the discrepancy between his plea and the effect of the
allegations he admits. If he persists, however, in his
admissions, he may be convicted on the basis of them.
2
When the undefended accused is asked whether he consents to
the recording of an admission, he should be informed of the
nature and consequence of this recording. The Appellate
Division in Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275 (A) required that
"an accused should be told that the effect of making a
formal admission is to relieve the State of the
necessity of proving the admitted fact by evidence; and
that he is under no obligation to make any admission or
to assist the state in proving the case against him.
This is in accordance with the salutary rule of
practice in South African courts which requires that an
unrepresented accused should not, without his having
been fully informed of his rights, be asked whether he
makes a formal admissio~ of a fact the onus of proving
which is on the state".
Van Winsen AJA added that an irregularity would be committed
if the accused was not also apprised of the fact that the
admissions could later be used against him, and that the
effect of recording an admission is, as provided by s 220,
that it will be sufficient proof of the fact admitted. [309D-EJ
The jUdicial officer's failure to record the warning is also
1. Talie 1979 (2) SA 1003 (C); Simelane 1979 (2) PH H170 (T).
2. Talie supra 1005Ai Simelane supra.
3. 299H-300A. See also Van Winsen J1s dictum 309D-Hi Botha JA
315F-H.
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a fatal irregularity which renders the formal admissions
inadmissible. In Daniels the majority of the Court viewed
the failure to record the warning as constituting an
irregularity per se,l while it was suggested in the
minority judgment that an incomplete recording may be
rectified by evidence at the trial. 2 The majority's
approach is preferable since it is more likely to produce
compliance with the rule that the proceedings must be fully
recorded and it also obviates the difficulty of
establishing, after a lengthy period of time, whether the
warning was in fact given.
The recording of formal admissions by an undefended accused
involves the danger that he may wrongly or mistakenly admit
the truth of an allegation. There are no safeguards,
however, to prevent such an occurrence since the s 115
procedure, unlike s 112(1) (b), is not designed to, and in
consequence cannot, determine the reliability of such an
admission. 3 The court is not obliged to investigate
whether the admission, formal or informal, has a sound
factual basis. All that is required is the accused's
intention that an admission be recorded as such. The court
is not even obliged to satisfy itself that admissions are
1. Per Nicholas AJA 300D; Van Winsen 310A. See also Mahlangu
1985 (4) SA 447 (W).
2. Per Botha JA 317D-E. See generally T Geldenhuys "'n Nuwe
Perspektief op Artikel 115 van die Strafproseswet" (1985) 9
SACC 177.
3. Cf Snyman (1975) 8 CILSA 100 106.
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made freely and voluntarily.1
The Supreme Court has on occasion given special attention
to limiting the possible dangers associated with admissions
made by undefended accused during a trial. In Mavundla 1976
(4) SA 731 (N) Didcott J required that a jUdicial officer
must satisfy himself, before accepting such an admission,
that the accused's decision has been taken in the full
understanding of the meaning and effect of such an
admission, and that he was under no misapprehension that he
was obliged to supply the state or the court with it. 2
Furthermore, "extra caution is •.• needed when an
unrepresented accused offers to admit a fact unlikely in the
nature of things to be within his own knowledge".3 In
Marshell 1978 (2) SA 742 (T) the Court held that an
admission of an accused as to his age may be accepted only
if it rests on reliable knowledge of the fact. 4
The unquestioned acceptance of formal admissions was also
questioned by Botha JA in Daniels.[3.18D-319A] Even if the
accused does not dispute the truth of the admissions, he
contended, it remains the duty of the court to assess all
the evidence at the end of the trial to determine the guilt
of the accused. The judge likened the formal admission to
1. Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275 (A) 310A per Van Winsen AJA.
2. 732E. See also sithole 1967 (2) PH H292 (N);
Q 1967 (2) SA 537 (N) 538Ai ~ 1967 (1) SA 70 (N) 71D.
3. Mavundla supra 733A.
4. 743 . • See also Ndlovu 1978 (3) SA 533 (T) 535B; Sithole
suprai M supra 71E.
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the making of an extra-judicial confession. In the latter
case it remains the duty of the court to be certain beyond
reasonable doubt of the truth of the confession despite its
admissibility and compliance with the provisions of s
209. 1 without expressing a final opinion on the matter,
the judge suggested that the same approach should be adopted
in respect of admissions recorded in s 115 proceedings. It
is submitted that the Court's approach places a question
mark behind the central tenet of the adversary process,
namely that the judicial officer may rely on the "formal
truth". The court is not to regard itself as bound by what
the parties agree is the truth but is obliged to determine,
on the information before it, whether the material truth has
been established. This approach is both justified and
essential in proceedings against undefended accused.
5.3.3 SECTION 115: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The rules and principles which the Supreme Court has
developed to make the execution of the jUdicial officer's
function more equitable towards the undefended accused, do
not in the end afford the accused much protection. Although
he is informed of the right to remain silent, he need not be
apprised of the material considerations that should be taken
into account in deciding whether to co-operate. Although the
court participates actively in the proceedings, this does
not signify a departure from the adversary process. To the
1. Cf Mbambo 1983 (2) SA 379 (A).
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contrary, the procedure becomes more adversary as evidence
is produced by consent through the recording of admissions,
whether formal or informal, and not by the court searching
for the truth through the examination of witnesses. The
undefended accused's prejudice may correspondingly be
increased because of his inability to play the role of a
skilled adversary in the production of formal evidence. In
contrast to the s 112(1) (b) procedure, then, the court's
active role in s 115 is not of assistance to the undefended
accused, but rather benefits the state. The procedure thus
exacerbates the inequality which already exists between
defended and undefended accused and tilts the scales of
justice in favour of the state in the prosecution of the
latter.
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6. PLEA PROCEEDINGS - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Because of the technical nature of the pleadings and the
degree of artificiality in their expression, undefended
accused face considerable difficulties in making sense of
the procedure. In the sample the charge was usually framed
in terms of the essential legal requirements of the offence,
while the factual allegations on which the charge was based
were kept to a minimum. The accused invariably remained
uninformed not only about the charge itself, but also about
his right to an opportunity to consider the charge and his
plea.
6.1. INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF THE CHARGE
In Durban's lower courts the prosecutor usually read out the
charge fully, including all references to acts and sections
thereof. Presumptions applicable were mentioned - complete
with reference to the relevant sections - especially in
respect of possession of and dealing in drugs. How they
operated was usually explained only after the accused had
pleaded. Reference to competent verdicts was scarce. The
charge generally contained very little information regarding
its factual basis. The charge sheet was usually a roneoed
form which left little space for particulars pertaining to
the events in question. Reading out the various elements of
an offence to the accused did not reveal the factual
allegations which the accused had to meet. The charge sheet
merely stated, for example, that the accused had in his
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possession a prohibited dependence-producing drug, to wit a
small quantity of dagga. Such a charge did not disclose the
case of the state. 1 Obtaining information through the
formal process of requesting further particulars was beyond
the capabilities of the undefended accused. They were not
informed about that right nor did they utilize it. The court
seldom objected to the formulation of the charge; in the few
isolated cases where it did, the charge sheets were found
wanting because the legal requirements of the offence were
incorrectly formulated. There was no insistence that the
accused should be more fully informed of the factual
allegations on which the charge was based.
Interpreters did not exhibit the same measure of formalism
as the prosecutors, but conveyed to the accused only the
bare essentials. 2 They related only the legal aspects of
the charge, but without using the precise and sometimes
incomprehensible language of the charge sheet. They thus
conveyed to the accused only what was intelligible to him.
Any reference to a section of an act was SUbstituted by "the
law", robbery with aggravating circumstances merely became
robbery (Case A2 RC), a precise quantity of dagga expressed
in grams became either a "little" or a "lot" (Case A45 DC),
and dif·ficult concepts such as "proof on the balance of
probabilities" were omitted altogether (Case A76 DC). At
times, however, this reductionist process led to the wrong
translation of the charge. In Case A89 DC the accused was
1. Cf McBarnet 83.
2. See also Monama ~ cit 22.
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charged with the possession of property in regard to which
there was a reasonable suspicion that it was stolen and he
was unable to give a satisfactory account of his possession
of it. The interpreter simplified the charge to: "You have
been found in possession of stolen property", to which the
accused's confused reply was: "I did not steal it."
In a large number of cases no charge was interpreted for the
accused, and the interpreter simply asked the accused
whether or not he was guilty. In Case A54 DC the prosecutor
read out the following charge:
"The charge against the accused is that he contravened s
2(b) of Act 41 of 1971 read with s 10(3) in that on
[date] at or near Warwick Avenue in the district of Durban
he had wrongfully and unlawfully in his possession a
prohibited dependence-producing substance, to wit a small
quantity of dagga. How do you plead?
I (Zulu): Do you find yourself guilty or not?
A (Zulu): I do have a case against me.
I (English): I plead guilty.
This practice is a direct indictment of the technical nature
of the plea proceedings and their lack of meaning for the
undefended accused. If the interpreter perceived the charge
as being so formalistic that conveying it to the accused
would not contribute to the latter's understanding of it,
then he made a very rational decision to omit the
translation of the charge altogether. The charge disclosed
no more than would have been known to the accused through
his dealings with the police. On the other hand, had the
prosecutor alleged that the police found in his pocket one
stick of dagga, then the translation of that would have been
more meaningful; the non-technical information would have
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been comprehensible, and hence useful to the accused. By
concentrating on the legalistic and hence formal aspects of
the charge, the prosecution, the court and consequently the
interpreter gave little effect to the accused's right to
know the charge which he had to meet.
6.2 THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER
HIS PLEA
The majority of the accused in the magistrates' court were
called upon to plead at their first appearance. No judicial
officer informed an accused that he had the right to an
opportunity to consider his position before pleading to the
charge. Nor did any of the undefended accused decline to
plead on this ground. One magistrate did enquire whether the
accused was ready to proceed with the pleadings, but this
was done in such a manner that the information was bereft of
any benefit to the latter. Case 213 DC is an example of this
practice.
Case 213 DC
At his first appearance in court, an English-speaking
accused, who had been in custody, pleaded guilty to a charge
of possession of dagga. Before the magistrate commenced to
question him in terms of s 112(1) (b), the following
questions were put to him:
M: Accused, are you ready to proceed?
A: I am guilty.
M: (raising his voice) Are you ready to proceed with the
matter?
A: I do not understand.
M: Are there any reasons why this case must be remanded?
The accused shook his head and the magistrate proceeded to
question him on his plea of guilty.
Extending the right to ask for a remand at this stage of the
proceedings was of little value to the accused as he had
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already made the most important decision of the proceedings
by pleading guilty. This was the decision for which time,
consideration and advice were most necessary. Furthermore,
the explanation was given in such a way that it could not be
utilized in any case by the accused. He clearly did not know
of possible legal grounds on which he could have requested a
remand, or, equally important, whether he could be released
from custody for the duration of the adjournment. Unlike
defended accused, the undefended, by virtue of their
ignorance of their rights, were forced to plead at the
earliest opportunity once the state had managed to formulate
a charge.
6.3. PLEADING TO THE CHARGE
The prosecutors usually rounded off their reading of the
charge sheet with the question: "Do you plead guilty or not
guilty?" More than half of the undefended accused in the
sample pleaded not guilty, indicating general resistance to
the inevitable road to conviction. Only 43,4% of the accused
in the sample pleaded guilty. Black males, particularly
between the ages of 21 and 25 years, were the least inclined
to plead guilty and only a third did not contest the charge.
Choice of plea was not significantly related to legal
representation.
6.3.1 TRANSLATING THE ACCUSED'S RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE
In many cases, the translation of the accused's response to
the charge did not convey accurately the accused's
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intention. Some interpreters, for instance, regarded it as
their duty to convert that response into a plea where this
had not been the import of what the accused said. In Case A3
RC, the translation of the accused's response into a neat
legal plea resulted in the amplification and distortion of
its original meaning.
Case A3 RC
The accused, a 22 year old Zulu male, was charged with
house-breaking with the intention to steal and theft. The
charge was fully translated to him.
A (Zulu): I did have the goods in my custody.
I (English): I understand the charge against me and plead
guilty.
Not only was the translation inaccurate, but it also
ascribed to the accused a knowledge of the legal
requirements of the offence of housebreaking and the
admission of facts not acknowledged. Similarly, in many
cases additional comments, such as "guilty but 1 ..• " were
never conveyed to the court.
These problems of interpretation may partly be due to the
fact that a plea of guilty is a legal term, an equivalent of
which has not been fully developed in the zulu language.
More important, however, is the interpreters' perception of
their role at this stage as being to transform laymen's
responses into a legal term. The pleading stage requires
the simplification of the conflict to guilty or not guilty.
This artificiality was not understood by most accused but
the interpreter, conscious of the intended goal, adapted his
role to facilitate its achievement.
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6.3.2. THE COURT'S INQUISITORIAL DUTY TO ESTABLISH THE
FACTUAL BASIS OF THE ACCUSED'S GUILTY PLEA
None of the undefended accused who pleaded guilty handed in
a statement setting out the allegations they admitted and
the court was thus called upon to question them in terms of
s 112(1) (b). The rules governing the procedure, specifically
designed to protect the accused against a mistaken guilty
plea, are unambiguous - the magistrate may only convict an
accused who has pleaded guilty if he is satisfied, on
questioning him, that he is in fact guilty.
In the cases studied, jUdicial officers single-mindedly
questioned accused to establish the factual basis for their
pleas, giving little recognition to further protection of
accused in regard to plea proceedings. They never informed
accused of any of the consequences of a plea of guilty. Even
the few accused who were charged with dealing in mandrax
tablets were not warned that the direct consequence of a
guilty plea and conviction would be a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years' imprisonment. Nor did the
magistrates ascertain whether guilty p ieas were made freely
and voluntarily and without undue influence.
The thoroughness with which the questioning was conducted
varied according to the type of court. In the regional
court, the jUdicial officers proceeded carefully to elicit
from the accused the factual basis for their guilty pleas.
They informed the accused of the purpose of the questioning
and invited them in 77,8% of the cases to give their account
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of the incident. They assiduously avoided leading questions
and through comprehensive questioning invariably obtained a
full account of the incident. In only 11,1% of the cases
were five or less questions asked; more than ten questions
were posed in 63,1% of the cases. The more serious the
offence, the more intensive was the questioning.
In the magistrates' court the questioning of accused was
more cursory. Little time was spent explaining the purpose
of the questioning and the court frequently resorted to
leading questions. In only 35% of the cases were the accused
invited to relate the circumstances of the offence. Five or
less questions established the guilt of 39,7% of the accused
and in only 21,3% of the cases were more than ten questions
asked. Magistrates faced with a large number of cases,
particularly those dealing with the offence of possession of
dagga, approached them in much the same way as the
magistrate conducted the enquiry in Case 213 DC.
Case 213 DC
After the accused pleaded guilty to the possession of dagga,
the magistrate proceeded as follows:
M: Were you in possession of one gram of dagga?
A: Yes.
M: Is dagga a prohibited dependence-producing drug?
A: I beg yours?
M: (getting irritated) Is dagga a prohibited dependence-
producing drug?
A: (quickly) Yes.
M: Are you a holder of any licence or permit?
A: No.
The magistrate thereupon convicted the accused.
In only 16% of the cases of possession of dagga did the
magistrate venture to elicit from the ~ccused the facts of
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the incident. Where the court was placed under time
constraints, then, the desire for expeditious disposal of
guilty pleas for minor offences led to the relaxation of the
rules.
In the study by Bekker et aI, more positive results were
recorded.[7-8] In 62% of the cases where magistrates had to
implement s 112(1) (b), they explained the section to the
accu~ed. The questioning of the accused was fairly
extensive; in 28% of the cases 5 or less questions were
asked; in 39%, 6 to 10 questions; and in 24%, 11 to 15
questions. Even where a few questions were asked, Bekker et
al contended, this did not mean superficial questioning and
they concluded that comprehensive questioning occurred in
the majority of the cases.
The interpreters also attempted to establish from the
accused the factual basis of their pleas. Individually they
tried to extract information from the accused and to clarify
ambiguities in answers given. Where the court, however, put
leading questions, the interpreters followed this hasty
approach as well. In case A34 RC the accused pleaded guilty
to a charge of theft and after the regional magistrate had
established the actus reus through a number of leading
questions, he asked:
M: Did you know it was wrong?
I: Wanazi ukuthi ku-wrong? (Do you know it is wrong?)
The accused murmured a few words which were not an answer to
the question. The interpreter in a high tone demanded in
Zulu: "Yes or no?", to which the accused meekly replied,
"yes".
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6.3.3. CHANGING A GUILTY PLEA TO NOT GUILTY
In the cases observed, magistrates followed the provisions
of s 113 scrupulously and changed guilty pleas if there was
any doubt as to the accused's guilt, despite the extra work
and time involved in the leading of evidence and even, at
times, against the vociferous opposition of the accused
themselves. The decision to change the plea did not appear
to be significantly related to the extent of the
questioning. Although the questioning by the magistrates was
not as thorough as that of their brethren in the regional
court, both courts changed 34,5% of the pleas of guilty to
not guilty.1 In respect of offences where the mens rea
element is particularly specific, for example assault with
the intention to do grievous bodily harm, theft and fraud,
there was a significantly higher number of plea changes.
The prpsecutors played no significant role in the process.
They did not readily object when the accused's story varied
from the state case or argue that his plea should therefore
not be accepted. This resulted in a form of informal plea
bargaining; if the accused's acknowledgement of his guilt
did not accord with all the factual allegations contained in
the charge, the prosecutor tended to accept his plea rather
than incur the trouble of proving by evidence the exact
extent of his guilt.
1. Bekker et al (9-10) found a much lower percentage of
changes of plea (16%); they attributed this to the fair
comprehension that undefended accused had of the
substantive criminal law.
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with a clear and unambiguous duty imposed by statute and
clear and explicit guidelines formulated by the Supreme
Court, the lower courts on the whole executed their duties
under s 112(1) (b) with certainty and a sense of direction.
In the magistrates' court, high case loads led at times to
the speedy and efficient disposal of cases without full
observance of all the safeguards. Despite the pressures,
however, some magistrates managed to follow the rules
without adversely affecting their efficiency. The danger
that some magistrates might be too easily satisfied about
1the guilt of the accused, was only partially realized.
Superficial questioning of some accused meant that no
reliable base was established for a conviction, but where
there was any doubt as to the accused's guilt, the courts
without exception ordered a trial to establish the accused's
guilt by evidence. One cannot, however, conclude that
without informing the accused . about the consequences of a
guilty plea and questioning him about the VOluntariness of
his plea, the court was in a position to ascertain beyond
reasonable doubt in all cases that the accused was in fact
guilty of the alleged offence.
6.3.4. PLEADING NOT GUILTY
Over half of the undefended accused (56,6%) pleaded not
guilty and it was thus incumbent on the State to prove their
guilt. Once a plea of not guilty has been recorded, the
1. Kotze (1978» 2 SACC 294 300.
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court may participate actively in the proceedings to
establish the basis of the accused's defence and perhaps
record formal admissions. In respect of the undefended
accused, however, the court's role is inherently ambivalent.
By establishing the defence of the accused, the court
assists the prosecution in a number of ways. At the same
time, however, the court must inform the accused that he
need not co-operate by disclosing his defence. Should the
accused decide not to disclose his defence, the prosecution
is consequently denied those advantages. The court is thus
empowered, on the one hand, to assist the prosecution while
it is obliged, on the other, to protect the accused's right
to remain silent.
How did the court resolve the ambivalent task of aiding the
state and, at the same time, protecting the rights of the
accused? Since the primary intended purpose of the procedure
is to assist the State, it is not surprising that the courts
advanced the interest of the State while de-emphasizing the
accused's right to silence.
(a) DISCLOSING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
without exception all the jUdicial officers asked the
accused who had pleaded not guilty whether they wished to
disclose the basis of their defence. The invitation to the
accused ranged from a formal repetition of the section, liDo
you wish to disclose the basis of your defence?" to the more




The case law does not specify how the information of the
right to remain silent should be conveyed, nor does it
require that the accused be informed of the material
considerations that should be taken into account when
exercising his choice. In most cases (85,4%) the accused was
informed that he had the right to remain silent,l but this
entailed little more than mentioning the existence of the
right. The way in which the information was conveyed,
however, limited the possibility of assertion of the right.
The court usually disclosed the right in the first sentence
of its explanation and then went on to explain how to make
the statement, pointing out that the basis and not the whole
version of the defence should be divulged. The court would
end off by asking: "Is there anything you want to say?" The
right to silence, tucked in at the beginning of the
explanation, would be lost in the explanation itself, which
concentrated in any event on the making of a statement. 2
Even if the accused was aware of the right, it remained
meaningless to him as he was not informed about its
significance; that a statement could be to his prejudice and
that he was not obliged to assist the state in proving the
case against him. The accused might be reluctant not to
answer a question by the magistrate, if only out of
1. Bekker et al (12) also reported a high measure of
compliance (92%) with this requirement.
2. See Case 68 RC below.
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deference for his position. He might fear that an unco-
operative stance would not endear him to the person in whose
hands his fate rested.
Some magistrates did give the accused some advice on how the
choice should be exercised, but in most cases the advice
encouraged accused to make statements. In not a single case
was the accused informed that he would not be prejudiced at
all if he remained silent.
Case 68 RC is a good example of firstly, how the right to
remain silent is hidden in the general explanation of the
procedure, and secondly, how the considerations that are
disclosed encourage the accused to co-operate.
Case 68 RC
A male aged 21 pleaded not guilty to a charge of rape.
The magistrate apprised him of his rights as follows:
"Accused, you may if you wish make a statement
indicating the basis of your defence. You are not
obliged to say anything at all. On the other hand you
may explain to the court what will be in dispute
between yourself and the State case. That may serve a
good purpose in that it may shorten the proceedings,
and more importantly, it will place the court in a
position where it could, if necessary, assist an
unrepresented accused with his cross-examination of a
state witness. The court may ask you questions
regarding the basis of your defence. You are not
obliged to answer these questions. The prosecutor,
however, may ask you your reasons for refusing to
answer these questions when he cross-examines you.
Anything you wish to say?"
Ending off the explanation with a broad invitation to the
accused, it was not surprising that the accused not only
indicated the basis of his defence but told his full story
to the court.
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One magistrate routinely informed the accused that "this
statement is not evidence but has evidential value". If an
accused could understand this bit of information which,
although legally correct, must patently be confusing for a
layman, he might perceive it to be in his interest to tell
his story, as it has some evidential value. The magistrate
omitted, however, the more important piece of information,
namely that it has evidential value only against the
accused.
One magistrate, aware of the damaging effects which such a
statement may have upon an accused's case, informed the
latter that "what you say here can be used against you. If
you tell a different story than what you tell at a later
stage it can cast doubt on your credibility."[Case 276 DC]
Again the information is correct, but again it encourages
participation rather than silence. The accused might well
imagine that remaining silent after such a warning would
create the impression that he intends to tell a different
story later.
The interpreters did not assist to make the process more
comprehensible to the accused. Following the example of a
number of magistrates, they seemed to view the explanation
of rights as a mere formality, since most accused disclosed
their defence in any event. The explanation was thus to be
given as expeditiously as possible. One court observer, a
Zulu-speaking law student, had great difficulty in following
the translation of the explanation and remarked that the
,
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interpreter "went off like a tape recorder singing a
song". [Case A6 RC]
(b) THE ACCUSED'S DISCLOSURE OF THE BASIS OF HIS DEFENCE
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of the
undefended accused (86,3%) decided to participate.
l
Most
accused did not know what was required of them when they
were requested to indicate the basis of their defence. The
difficulty that the accused experienced in grasping the
difference between indicating the basis of his defence and
relating his full story is well illustrated by Case A42 DC.
Case A42 DC
M: Do you wish to disclose the basis of your defence?
I: (Zulu) Can you tell the court the reasons for your plea
of not guilty?
A: (Zulu) I can narrate the incident.
I: (Zulu) They do not say narrate it. Do you have anything
to say?
The accused thereupon started to narrate his story.
I: (Zulu) You may talk until sunset but this will not help
you. Tell me why do you plead not guilty?
Eventually the interpreter gave up the attempt to extract
only the basis of his defence and allowed the accused to
relate his story.
The majority of the participating accused (85,2%) gave a
full account of their version of the incident while the rest
sufficed with what could be called a 'legal' defence. The
statements were at times so detailed that one regional
magistrate, when the accused elected to give evidence,
merely asked the accused: "Do you want to add anything
1. Bekker et al (11) reported that all the undefended
accused who pleaded not guilty disclosed their defences.
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further to your statement?" The accused indicated that that
was his evidence. [Case 61 RC]
The court made frequent use of its power to put additional
questions to the accused. Of those who gave a full
statement, 37,3% were questioned further while more than
half (53,8%) of the few who restricted their disclosure to a
legal defence, faced further enquiries. The magistrates,
although inclined in general not to waste time, asked
significantly more questions in this regard than their
brethren in the regional court. Although magistrates often
said that they did not wish to hear the full story of the
accused, few of them actually stopped the accused after the
basis of his defence became apparent from his statement.
Interpreters, following the example set by some magistrates,
frequently elicited independently further information from
the accused. Case A35 DC illustrates this point.
Case A 35 DC
On a charge of contravening the Dangerous Weapons Act, the
accused pleaded not guilty.
M: Do you wish to disclose the basis of your defence? You
may remain silent.
I: (Zulu) You may state reasons for your plea but you need
not tell me the whole story. You may say nothing if you
like.
A: (Zulu) I did not point a firearm, it was a knife.
I: (Zulu) Is that all? Is there anything else?
The accused thereupon narrated the whole story which the
interpreter translated until the magistrate eventually
intervened when the accused got side-tracked by
irrelevancies.
Even those accused who wished to remain silent were not left
alone, as the court was empowered to question them despite
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their refusal to disclose their defence. Case 50 RC
illustrates how the court could successfully circumvent the
accused's initial refusal by asking him whether he was
placing every allegation in dispute.
Case 50 RC
On a charge of robbery the accused pleaded not guilty.
After the regional magistrate informed the accused
of his right to remain silent, he continued as follows:
M: Do you want to tell me the basis of your defence?
A: No.
M: I may still question you but you may remain silent.
Were you in the cells in CR Swart Square.?
A: Yes.
M: Do you know the complainant?
A: Yes.
M: Did you take any money?
A: Yes, he gave it to me.
Despite the disclosure of his right to silence, it was made
very difficult for the accused to refuse to answer a
straightforward question by the court. Mere politeness or
fear of the court may have caused him to respond readily. By
acting in a manner sanctioned by the law, the court overcame
the accused's initial refusal to co-operate and established
his defence.
Cc) RECORDING FORMAL ADMISSIONS
Little use was made of the provisions relating to the
recording of formal admissions made in the course of a s 115
statement; this occurred in only 10,7% of the undefended
cases. Even in cases where the accused did not deny an
allegation and the court was by law obligated to ask the
accused whether this could be recorded as a formal
admission, this was frequently not done. Non-compliance with
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this rule invokes no sanction and in the run of the mill
cases in the magistrates' court formal admissions were of
limited value. The advantage to be gained from these was not
worth the trouble involved in explaining the significance of
a formal admission and the accused's rights in respect
thereof, particularly in view of the considerable evidential
value which informal admissions in any event had.
(d) THE USE OF S 115 STATEMENTS
The advantages which the prosecution derived from an
accused's s 115 statement were manifold. with the accused's
case disclosed in full, the prosecution was assisted in the
preparation of its case, even to the extent of being able to
alter or reconstruct its case in view of the defence
case. 1 The statement lightened the state's onus of proof
where formal admissions were recorded or informal admissions
. made and could be used to attack the defence case. Any
discrepancy between the accused's statement and his
subsequent testimony was valuable material for attacking his
credibility. Such discrepancies were most evident when there
was a long time lapse between the plea proceedings and the
testimony of the accused. In 11,1% of 72 cases where the
accused testified prosecutors and even magistrates used the
explanation of the plea to cross-examine the accused.
The accused, on the other hand, gained little advantage from
their extensive statements. As the magistrate in Case 68 RC,
1. Cf McBarnet 84.
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quoted above, pointed out to the accused, the statement
could be used by the court to assist the accused in his
cross-examination. The fact that there is no obligation for
the court to do so, may explain why this occurred in only
three cases.
On the whole the value that the procedure had for the
prosecution was evident and in their application of the
section the judicial officers did little to prevent these
benefits from accruing to the state. Moreover, it was
the undefended accused who bore the full prejudicial
impact of the procedure.
Bekker et al view the s 115 procedure favourably on the basis
that it promotes the "whole hearted" participation of Black
accused in the process. [11, 19] This is because of the
coincidence of the s 115 procedure with Black customary
procedure. 1 It is important to realize, however, that
the similarity is one of form only as the effect of an
accused's participation in the s 115 procedure is vastly
different from that in customary procedure. In the latter
procedure, with a free system of evidence, the accused's
participation at any stage of the proceedings could advance
his case. In the s 115 procedure, on the other hand, his
participation generally cannot, and indeed is not designed
to work for him. What he says is evidence, not in his
1. 11. See also Verloren van Themaat (1964) 2 Codicillus
19 20.
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favour, but only against him. The more he participates and
the more information he divulges, the greater the possible
prejudice. Because the s 115 proceedings correspond with
Black customary procedure in form only, the dangers which
are inherent in the procedure are compounded in respect of
Black undefended accused, because the consequences of the
procedure are so vastly different from what they expect. In
essence the procedure remains a trap into which no lawyer
would walk with open eyes, but into which the courts
carefully and consistently lead the unsuspecting undefended
accused.
(e) SECTION 115 AND DEFENCE LAWYERS
Lawyers differed quite markedly from the undefended accused
in the way in which they approached the s 115 proceedings.
Although the percentage of defended accused who participated
was also very high (82,4%) and a third of them made formal
admissions, there were a number of fundamental differences.
Firstly, while most of the undefended accused disclosed
their defence at their first court appearance, , t h e defended
accused usually did this on the day of the trial, sometimes
a few weeks ~fter their first appearance. There was usually
no time lapse between the statement and the accused's
testimony, thus minimizing the possibility of
contradictions. Secondly, the defence disclosed by a lawyer
was a well-considered and thoroughly prepared written
statement, as provided for in s 115(3). Thirdly, and most
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important of all, their statements gave only a very terse
legal defence, providing the state with hardly any factual
details of the defence case.
The common notion that silence is indicative of guilt, may
explain the willingness of most lawyers to make a statement.
In avoiding such a negative impression, they nevertheless
participated only on a symbolic level. The statements were
so terse that they added little to what the prosecutor
already knew, but at the same time they conveyed the
favourable impression that the accused was willing to co-
operate and shorten the proceedings. Although no tangible
advantage was gained by such a statement, the possibility
that the client would be prejudiced by his disclosure was
minimized. In dealing with s 115, then, the lawyers, aware
of the dangers involved, co-operated in such a way that the
state could not benefit from their participation.
7. CONCLUSION
Because the plea proceedings bear such crucial implications
for the criminal trial, they have the potential to be
extremely prejudicial to an undefended accused, who may not
understand the purpose, meaning or consequences of the
professionalized and artificial way in which a criminal
trial commences. Little has been done, however, to limit the
dangers for this accused and his informed and considered
participation in the plea proceedings is neither encouraged
by the law nor pursued in practice.
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since a full apprisal of the factual allegations that the
accused has to meet, is dependent on the discretion of the
court, it did not occur in practice. The interpreter, in
translating the charge, conveyed to the accused only that
which was comprehensible to the latter. An unintelligible or
uninformative charge might consequently remain untranslated.
The right to an opportunity to consider the plea (and the
possibility of bail during that time), and the material
considerations pertaining to the plea choice were not
disclosed to the accused. The first information which an
undefended accused received, usually at his first appearance
in the magistrates' court, was the charge against him and
the choice of pleading either guilty or not guilty
forthwith. The accused's choice in the hurried and
intimidating atmosphere of the courtroom might well be ill-
considered, prompted by external pressures, or simply wrong.
Furthermore, the interpreter, conscious that the aim of the
plea proceedings is the simplification of an accused's
response to the charge, often forced the accused's
unstructured response incorrectly into the artificial mould
of a guilty or not guilty plea.
In order to safeguard against mistaken guilty pleas, the
court is obliged to determine inquisitorially the factual
basis of the accused's plea. But this does not involve
ascertaining whether the plea is tendered in full
consideration of the consequences or whether it is
voluntary. As the decision of whether there is a sufficient
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factual basis for the plea, is in essence discretionary,
disparate questioning practices were observed. Where,
however, there was any doubt as to the accused's guilt, the
plea was invariably changed to one of not guilty.
Where the accused pleads (not guilty, the court is confronted
with contradictory tasks; to assist the state by determining
the basis of the accused's defence and, at the same time, to
inform the latter of his right not to disclose such. The
paradox is resolved in favour of the state since the
disclosure of the right to silence means nothing to the
accused; this is because there is no corresponding
obligation to inform him that his participation will
primarily assist the state case and be to his detriment.
Undefended accused invariably disclose their cases in full
as a result of the court's incomplete and hence misleading
information. The prosecution is thereby assisted
considerably in its task to prove the accused's guilt during
the state case and to disprove his innocence during the
d=fe~~~ case. Defended accused, conscious of these dangers,
participate only on a symbolic level, disclosing little that
can b~nefit their adversary.--- - - --
The undefended accused, uninformed of any of his procedural
rights before he is asked to plead, is ill-equipped to face
this vital choice of pleading guilty or not guilty and the
possibility of prejudice is sUbstantial. Although the
court's inquisitorial intervention after a plea of guilty
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goes a long way to protect the accused, it remains an
incomplete safeguard against ill-considered and coerced
pleas. In respect of a plea of not guilty, the undefended
~
accused benefitted little from the occasional obligatory
information he received, since the additional explanations
required to put him in a position to acquit himself as a
competent adversary were not given. Where equal protection
is sought by means of assistance designed to make the
undefended accused a competent adversary, the assistance
should clearly be thorough in order to achieve that purpose.
Similarly inquisitorial intervention by the jUducial officer
cannot satisfactorily protect this accused where it is half-
hearted. The undefended accused at present receives little
benefit from inconsistent and inadequate attempts at each
type of assistance. The plea proceedings thus remain formal,
professionalized and hence prejudicial to the undefended
accused.
CHAPTER SIX THE STATE CASE
Once the accused contests the charge against him, the
presumption of innocence places the onus on the state to
prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt by means
of evidence. The production of evidence is firmly based on
the adversary mode of procedure; it is expected that,
through confrontation, the truth will emerge. The state must
lead evidence to prove every allegation in dispute and the
accused's task, in contesting the state case, is to show
that the evidence is either inadmissible or unreliable.
Because of the undefended accused's lack of forensic
knowledge and skills, he may not be able to execute this
task adequately. The establishment of the truth should
nevertheless be pursued by the prosecutor and the court to
compensate for the undefended accused's inability to play
his part in the adversary contest.
1. THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTIES AS "MINISTER OF THE TRUTH"
The general duty of the prosecutor to pursue impartially the
ideal of justice assumes a special significance in the trial
of an undefended accused, as the fairness of the proceedings
may depend much on the way in which the prosecutor conducts
the State case. 1 The task of the pUblic prosecutor is more
comprehensive and demanding than that of a defence lawyer,
since the former represents the State, the community at
large and the interests of justice in general. 2 As
1. See Kekwana 1978 (2) SA 172 (NC) 175A.
2. Riekert 1954 (4) SA 254 (SWA) 261C-E.
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"minister of the truth"l he has a special duty to see that
, t 2 h i I d t h bthe truth emerges 1n cour. T 1S genera u y as een
1 I
crystallized into two specific ones; firstly, to ,p r odu c e all
relevant evidence to court, and secondly, to ensure that the
evidence produced is truthful.
The duty of the prosecutor to produce all elucidating
evidence available to him, has been well established in
South African law. In Filanius 1916 TPD 415 it was said
that the prosecutor should place before the court all
material necessary for the investigation of the truth.
3
The rule is justified on the ground that the prosecution has
all the resources of the State, including finances, the
police and vital information at its disposal. 4 In Van
Rensburg 1963 (2) SA 343 (N) it was stressed, more
specifically, that it is part of the duty of the prosecutor
to bring to the notice of the court information in his
possession which may be favourable to the accused. 5 This
duty acquires special significance in respect of an
undefended accused, who cannot be regarded as an adversary
equal to the state. 6 Referring to the prosecution of
juveniles, Didcott J said the following:
1. See Gardiner and Lansdown South African Criminal Law and
Procedure vol I 6th ed by CWH Lansdown, WG Hoal & AV Lansdown
(1957) 384.
2. Riekert supra 261F-G.
3. 417. See also Heilbron 1922 TPD 99; Motshe 1960 (1)
PH H84 (T).
4. Filanius supra 417.
5. 343. See also Takaendesa 1972 (4) SA 72 (RAD) 75A.
6. Cf Lansdown & Campbell 511.
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"He [the prosecutor] had a duty, it goes wit~out
saying, to bring to her [the court's] attent10n
anything tending to exonerate or mitigate the conduct
of a young child who had no legal assistance and relied
on him to see that justice was done".
The same duty applies equally, it is submitted, to all
accused who cannot fend for themselves adequately.
In Filanius 1916 TPD 415 it was conceded that the prosecutor
need not call a witness whom he believes to be untruthful,
hostile or in league with the accused. [417] He should,
however, place these witnesses at the disposal of the court
or the accused if he does not call them. 2 But the
prosecutor is not compelled to hand over the statements of
the witnesses as they remain privileged documents.
3
In the
Supreme Court, the practice has arisen whereby witnesses
subpoenaed but not called by the State, or the statements of
such witnesses, are handed over to the defence. 4
If and when the prosecution makes such witnesses available,
problems may arise in the case of the undefended accused who
may have difficulty in utilizing this opportunity because of
his illiteracy or lack of legal knOWledge and skill.
The most practical procedure, it is sUbmitted, would be for
the prosecutor to inform the court of favourable evidence
either by handing in witnesses' statements or by giving
sufficient information to the court for the latter to assess
1. ~ 1982 (1) SA 240 (N) 244E.
2. 417. See also Lansdown & Campbell 512.
3. Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A) 337A; B 1980 (2) SA 946 (A)
952; Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 (W) 540H.
4. See eg Thuntsi ~ Attorney-General, Northern Cape 1982
(4) SA 468 (NC).
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their value for the accused. Where the witnesses could
contribute to the elucidation of the truth, the court could
have them called in pursuance of its duty to call witnesses
if it "appears essential for the just decision of the
case".l This would substitute the court's expertise for
the possibly fatal incompetence of the undefended accused
and make the rule requiring prosecutors to disclose all
relevant information, meaningful for such accused.
The second duty of the prosecutor involves the disclosure of
discrepancies between a state witness' evidence and his
prior statement to the police, by making the latter
available to the defence for the purposes of cross-
, t' 2examlna lone The rationale underlying this rule is,
according to Botha JA in Xaba 1983 (3) SA 717 (A), to-- .
provide a safeguard against the danger of an accused being
convicted on the evidence of an unreliable witness. 3 The
duty arises only when a serious discrepancy comes to
light. 4 Whether the discrepancy is serious enough to
warrant disclosure, depends upon the effect the disclosure
will have on the cross-examination of the witness. In Xaba
Botha JA held a discrepancy to be serious
"whenever there is a real possibility that the probing
of it by means of cross-examination could have an
adverse effect on the assessment by the trial court of
the witness' credibility and reliability. Such a real
possibility is not created by a discrepancy of a minor
or trivial nature". [729H]
1. S 167 and 186. See further ch 7 par 3.
2. Hassim 1971 (4) SA 492 (N) 494B.
3. 729F-G. See also Twopenny 1981 (2) PH H179 (A).
4. Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A); White 1962 (4) SA 153 (FSC);
Twopenny 1981 (2) PH H179 (A); Xaba 1983 (3) SA 717 (A) 728H-729A.
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If the prosecutor is in doubt as to whether the discrepancy
is serious or trivial, he should be bound to disclose it. As
Botha JA observed, no harm is done if it appears that the
discrepancy was trivial, as little time would be wasted to
establish this; if it was serious, however, a failure of
justice would result from its non-disclosure. [730D]
Once again, problems arise due to the fact that the
undefended accused may not be able to utilize a disclosure
of discrepancies to his advantage. It has therefore been
suggested that the prosecutor should, in the case of the
undefended accused, disclose the serious discrepancies to
the court. 1 Once the court is so informed, it should
disclose to the accused the nature of the discrepancy and
its relevance so as to enable him to question the witness
about it. Should the accused be incapable of utilizing the
opportunity adequately, it is submitted that the court
should be obliged to take the matter further and to test the
witness's credibility in view of the conflicting statements.
Since the witnesses' statements and other information in the
police docket are not accessible to the accused until the
proceedings (inclUding any appeal) have been
completed,2 the decision whether a discrepancy is a
serious one, and whether it will be disclosed, depends
1. Xaba supra 730B.
2. Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A); ~ 1980 (2) SA 946 (A);
Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 (W) 539H. For criticism see C Norman-
Scoble (1966) 83 SALJ 233, (1967) 84 SALJ 136.
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solely upon the prosecutor's good judgment and sense of
fairness. 1 The duty to disclose is therefore only an
ethical one, as there is no way in which the court can
ensure that the prosecutor does in fact comply with it.
It is submitted that the disclosure of the statements of all
witnesses whom the state calls, to the court and the
defence, is essential to give effect to the principle that
the criminal trial must establish the truth. The main reason
for such a disclosure is to establish in all cases the
consistency and credibility of the witnesses' evidence. The
prosecutor's ethical duty to evaluate the consistency of his
witnesses' evidence and to disclose discrepancies, will be
more thoroughly performed by a defence lawyer or by the
court should the accused be undefended, since neither will
be hampered by the prosecutor's conflict of interests in the
matter.
The disclosure of the state case is not foreign to the
adversary system; to the contrary, it has been an integral
part thereof. Before 1977 most Supreme Court trials were
preceded by preliminary examinations in which the evidence
of each state witness was disclosed in full. Furthermore,
where a witness, who did not give evidence at that
examination, testi~ied at the trial, it was customary to
1. J van den Berg "Duty of the Prosecutors to Disclose
Inconsistent statements by state Witnesses - S v Xaba
1983 (3) SA 717 (A)" (1984) 8 SACC 204 207. - - ----
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hand a copy of his police statement to the defence.
1
The
Lansdown Commission found that the record of those
proceedings enabled not only the defence but also the trial
court (where the accused was unrepresented or poorly
defended) to test the evidence of the state witnesses more
carefully. [Par 321] In other jurisdictions the trend has
been towards more and fuller disclosures of the state case.
In guidelines issued by the British Attorney-General
the prosecution has been directed to disclose the
statements of all witnesses, including those who are not
going to be called by the Crown, sUbject to certain limited
exceptions, where those statements were not already in the
possession of the defence before the committal proceedings. 2
The Canadian Law Reform Commission has similarly recommended
that the defence be supplied with copies of the statements
of witnesses. 3 If the need for full disclosure in defended
cases is acknowledged, the case for such disclosure is far
stronger where the accused is undefended and cannot
independently test the veracity of witnesses' evidence.
1. steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A) 336A. See also Lansdown &
Campbell 512.
2. Practice Notice [1982] 1 All ER 734-736.
3. Law Reform Commission of Canada Disclosure EY the
Prosecution (1984) 24.
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2. THE ROLE OF THE COURT DURING THE STATE CASE
The prosecutor's duty as "minister of the truth" does not
ensure that the evidence he presents to court is admissible
or reliable. Since the undefended accused is not always able
to exert control over the admission of evidence, .o r to test
its credibility, the enforcement of the rules of evidence
and the establishment of the truth may be largely dependent
on the efforts of the jUdicial officer.
2.1. CONTROLLING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE STATE EVIDENCE
The prosecutor may only adduce "such evidence as may be
admissible"[S 150(2)] and although there is no formal onus
on the accused to object to the introduction of inadmissible
evidence, the task of the defence lawyer in the adversary
system is to ensure that the prosecutor abides by the rules
of evidence, and to object if he does not. Due to the
complexity and the unfamiliarity of the rules of evidence,
the undefended accused is patently unable to perform a
similar function. It is therefore the court's duty in this
situation to control the production of evidence by the
prosecution and prevent the admission of inadmissible
od 1 °eVl ence. For lnstance, the court must stop improper
leading questions2 and intervene if the prosecutor attempts
to disclose the accused's previous convictions. 3
1. Janke 1913 TPD 382. See also Nkosi 1957 (1) SA 495
(A) 500G.
2. Mhlanga 1955 (2) PH H151 (C).
3. Tyomb 1983 (1) PH H60 (0).
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with the knowledge that the undefended accused is in no
position to object to inadmissible evidence, the court
cannot assume a passive role in this regard.
2.2. TESTING THE EVIDENCE OF STATE WITNESSES
The accepted way of establishing the truth in an adversary
system is by means of cross-examination. This has been
lauded as the best instrument to discover the truth
1
and
is regarded as a skill which lawyers develop through years
of experience. 2 Cross-examination is, however, a
formidable task for the undefended accused and without the
assistance of the jUdicial officer, it may be an impossible
one. It is thus the court's duty to facilitate this
accused's cross-examination of state witnesses by advising
him of his rights and duties in this regard and assisting
him in the exercise thereof. Less certain is whether the
court should independently test the evidence of these
witnesses where the accused has failed to do so himself.
2.2.1 INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
An accused has a right to cross-examine any witness called
on behalf of the prosecution. 3 He must therefore be given
the opportunity to exercise this right and a denial thereof
will per se constitute a failure of justice. 4 When dealing
1. Wigmore Evidence Sed par 1367.
2. G Colman Cross-Examination (1970) 1.
3. S 166(1); Ndawo 1961 (1) SA 16 (N) 17; Mcolweni 1973 (3)
SA 106 (E). This right also exists in relation to a witness
who has been recalled by the prosecutor, Makaula 1961 (4) SA
600 (E).
4. Montse 1969 (1) PH Hl19 (N); Ndawo supra 17.
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with an undefended accused, the court should invite the
accused to cross-examine every witness. This is not,
however, an absolute rule. In Hughes 1969 (1) PH H14 (N)
the accused, with a record of seven previous convictions and
facing a charge of rape, cross-examined the first three
witnesses vigorously. When the district-surgeon testified,
the magistrate inadvertently failed to invite the accused to
cross-examine, and the accused did not ask for the
opportunity. The Court held that in view of his previous
convictions and behaviour in court, the accused knew full
well that he had a right to cross-examine. The failure to
invite him was thus not an irregularity. It is submitted
that although such a conclusion may have been justified in
casu, a court should not lightly assume that an
undefended accused knows his rights and deliberately
refrains from exercising them.
The usual time for the court to extend such an invitation is
once the evidence-in-chief of the witness has been
completed. In Magwaza 1976 (4) SA 282 (N), however, it was
suggested that the accused should be apprised of the right
at the commencement of the trial. [282 in fin] Much is to be
said for the idea that the accused should be apprised of the
purpose of cross-examination before a witness gives
evidence, as this would enable him to listen purposefully to
tpat evidence. It should still remain obligatory, though, to
explain his right again after the evidence-in-chief has been
completed.
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For the undefended accused appearing for the first time in a
court, the invitation to cross-examine may be
incomprehensible. 1 To assist such an accused, Ferreira
[42] has suggested · that the following questions should be
put to him: (a) Did you hear what the witness has said? (b)
Do you deny or admit what he has said? If he denies it, he
must be told to argue (stry) with the witness . .If he admits
the evidence he should be asked whether there is anything
else which he wants the witness to say. Although this
explanation is better than the usual "Do you have any
questions?", it does not cover all the important aspects of
cross-examination. In sithole 1959 (2) PH H82 (N) a more
comprehensive explanation was suggested:
"It ought to be made very clear to him that he now has
the opportunity of suggesting to the witness any aspect
in which he, the accused, claims that the evidence is
wrong, and any reason why he should give false evidence
or incorrect evidence, eg, that the witness has some
motive for giving false evidence against the accused.
He should further be told that now is the opportunity
to invite the witness to admit any fact not yet
mentioned by him in his evidence which he desires to
have on record and that he has the right to cross-
examine the witness generally with regard to his
credibility."
In Field 1967 (2) PH H308 (N) the Court opined that it is
desirable that the accused be further informed that if he
fails to question the witness, the court may, but will not
necessarily, draw the inference that the evidence is not
challenged and therefore impliedly accepted by the
accused.
2
It is submitted that he should also be informed
1. See Ferreira 42.
2. See also Ajam 1983 (1) PH H84 (C) .
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that if he fails to disclose his defence to the witness, it
could be regarded as a recent fabrication. 1
It is not clear whether the failure to give such a
comprehensive explanation would lead to the setting aside of
a conviction. It was said in Field that it was "competent"
and "desirable" that the trial court should properly inform
the accused as to the functions and purposes of cross-
examination. It is submitted, however, that the failure to
give a full explanation should be regarded as an
irregularity leading to the setting aside of a conviction,
as it directly affects the undefended accused's ability to
participate in the production of evidence. If this accused
is not informed of the purposes of cross-examination, and
the consequences attached to a failure to carry it out, he
will not be in a position to utilize the opportunity
adequately.
An accused has the right to apply to court for the recall of
a state witness for further cross-examination. As the need
to recall a witness does not often present itself, there
seems to be no general duty on the court to inform the
accused of the right. 2 Where, however, it becomes apparent
that there is such a need, it is incumbent on the judicial
officer to notify the accused of this right
accordingly. 3
1. Mngomezulu 1983 (1) SA 1152 (N) 1153G.
2. Shula 1924 TPD 449 449.
3. Mtetwa 1974 (4) SA 252 (D) 254C.
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2.2.2 ACCOMMODATING THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED'S INABILITY TO
CROSS-EXAMINE.
Undefended accused usually lack the skills necessary to
cross-examine a witness effectively, and their efforts have
been described as "very often lengthy, tedious, repetitive,
' 1
irrelevant and ineffectual". In many instances the
questions asked are few or none at all.
2
Even if the
accused is given a full and correct explanation, the
obstacles to utilizing the opportunity effectively remain
immense. In the words of Didcott J:
"It does not follow, however, that he understood what
was really required of him, or that he had any idea of
how to achieve it. One is not unaccustomed to trained
lawyers, after all, to whom the art of cross-
examination is a mystery, to whom it means little else
than "putting" perfunctorily to the witness that he 'is
not speaking the truth. More familiar still is the kind
of performance one tends to get from laymen. Few have
the wit to appreciate every point they should challenge
or make, and to sort the wheat from the chaff in this
respect. Few have the memories to store every detail of
the evidence they hear, and not many more the literacy
to note such as the trial progresses, or the means of
doing so when it comes to that, the writing pads and
ballpoint pens which jUdicial officers, prosecutors and
defence counsel take for granted and without which each
would soon be at sea. And scarcely any know how to set
about the task when the moment arrives. So many records
one sees on appeal and review show a layman doing his
best, only to find himself pulled up time and again for
assertions instead of questions, or for questions that
are muddled or irrelevant, repetitive or ~rgumentative,
until eventually he tires of the effort".
The Court has made some attempts to accommodate the
undefended accused's inability to cross-examine
1. Nkomo 1975 (3) SA 598 (N) 599G.
2. Sebatana 1983 (1) SA 809 (0) 812H.
3. Mngomezulu 1983 (1) SA 1152 (N) 1153B-E. See also Moggaza
1984 (3) SA 377 (C) i Leeuwner 1972 (1) PH H51 (E).
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professionally by not penalising him for his incompetence,
by disallowing confessions inadvertently elicited by him and
by allowing him the fullest opportunity to pursue his
questioning.
Two important rules of cross-examination, predicated on the
assumption that the examiner is a skilled lawyer, may
operate unfairly in respect of the undefended accused. The
first is that where an allegation is not placed in dispute
~ during cross-examination, it can be regarded as admitted by
the defence,l and the second that where the accused
conceals his defence without giving the state witnesses an
opportunity to comment on it, the court may take such
concealment into account in later rejecting the accused's
version "as a concoction brewed late in the day".2 The
Court has been reluctant, however, to apply these rules to
3the undefended accused, as he cannot be expected to have
the lawyer's insight into the purpose of cross-examination
or an understanding of the rules regulating it. 4 It is
therefore undesirable to draw the conclusion that the
evidence of a witness is the truth simply because the
1. Van Wyk 1977 (1) SA 412 (NC); Mngomezulu 1983 (1) SA
1152 (N) 1153G.
2. Mngomezulu supra 1153H; Swanepoel 1968
(1) PH H134 (GW). See also ~ 1974 (1) SA 581 (RA).
3. Mehlape 1963 (2) SA 24 (A) 34F; Petersen 1982 (1) PH
H93 (A); Shasha 1972 (1) PH H17 (C); Sebatana 1983 (1)
SA 809 (0) 813D-E; Khumalo 1966 (1) PH H220 (N).
4. Mvimbi 1982 (1) PH H76 (0); Mngomezulu supra 1153F.
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accused has failed to cross-examine him.
1
Even if the
accused has been duly warned of the consequences of a
failure to contest the evidence of a witness, it is
submitted that it still cannot be assumed that he
appreciated the full and complex consequences of such a
failure.
Another potentially prejudicial rule is that pertaining
where a confession of the accused is revealed through his
cross-examination of a witness. If an otherwise inadmissible
confession of the accused is elicited from a state witness
by an accused or his lawyer during cross-examination, such a
confession will be admissible as long as it was a direct and
fair answer to a question. 2 The rationale for this rule,
Steenkamp J stated, is that accused or their lawyers are
presumed to be right-thinking (regdenkend) and if they
choose to elicit an inadmissible confession, then they must
bear the consequences. 3 Aware that an undefended accused
cannot be deemed to have the same legal knowledge as a
lawyer, the jUdge added that in such a case the court must
be satisfied that he fully appreciated the risk involved. 4
It is submitted that an undefended accused will seldom know
or understand what a confession is, that admissibility
1. Jawke 1957 (2) SA 187 (E) 190Di Qgatsa 1957 (2) SA
191 (E) 193-4.
2. Olifant 1982 (4) SA 52 (NC) 59Ci Bosch 1949 (1) SA
548 (A) 533i Mokoena 1978 (1) SA 229 (0) 235F-Gi Ncanga
1983 (2) PH H154 (0). But see Magagula 1981 (1) SA 771 (T)
778-780.
3. Olifant supra 59A.
4. 59D. See also Mokoena supra 235F-Gi Ncanga
supra.
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criteria exist, and that by his own mistake it may be placed
on record to his prejudice. To obviate an enquiry into all
these aspects, it is submitted that the only satisfactory
solution to this problem is simply to 'regard a confession so
elicited as inadmissible in the case of an undefended
accused. 1
The Courts have also been prepared to make allowances for an
undefended accused's lengthy, albeit ineffectual cross-
examination, and a line of questioning should be halted only
if it appears that the examiner is attempting to tire the
witness unreasonably.2 In general, the unjustified
limitation of his cross-examination will constitute an
irregularity which 'may lead to a failure of justice where
uninterrupted cross-examination might have brought new
evidence to light,3 or where the court might be precluded
from properly assessing the remaining evidence because of
the irregularity.4 The Court of review might be unable to
say whether, on the evidence unaffected by the irregularity,
the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2.2.3 ASSISTING THE ACCUSED IN HIS CROSS-EXAMINATION
There have been tentative suggestions that the court should
actively assist the undefended accused in his cross-
examination where the latter fails to conduct it
1. See Magagula 1981 (1) SA 771 (T) 778-780.
2. Mogqaza 1984 (3) SA 377 (C) 385.
3. Ntshangela 1961 (4) SA 592 (A) 599B.
4. Mngogula 1979 (1) SA 525 (T).
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competently. What the extent of the court's assistance
should be, however, is not clear.
Miller J in Mngadi 1973 (4) SA 540 (N) regarded it as
"proper and laudable to give assistance to an undefended
accused person who has difficulty in formulating questions
which need to be put to the witness". [541H] In Sebatana
1983 (1) SA 809 (0) Malherbe AJ contended that the court
should go further than merely performing a subsidiary role
by formulating the accused's questions. He said
"dat die voorsittende beampte in 'n geval soos die
onderhawige 'n plig het om die beskuldigde te help om
sy verdediging by wyse van kruisverhoor voor die hof te
plaas deur, bv, vir hom uitdruklik te vra of hy
saamstem met elke wesentlike bewering wat teen horn
gemaak is deur die Staatsgetuie. Op so 'n wyse behoort
dit in die meeste gevalle gou duidelik te wees watter
getuienis betwis word en kan die voorsittende beampte
self die nodige vraag aan die Staatsgetuie stel of
stelling aan horn maak. Dit sal minstens darem vir die
beskuldigde die indruk !kep dat hy billik behandel word
gedurende die verhoor".
Van Niekerk J in Dipholo 1983 (4) SA 757 (T), however,
disagreed that there is a duty on the judicial officer to
assist the accused to place his defence before court by
means of cross-examination, but thought that it would be
desirable for him to ask the accused expressly whether he
agrees with the essential allegations made against him by
the State witness. [760D] It has also been suggested that,
where an accused has disclosed his defence in terms of s
115, the jUdicial officer may ensure that it is put to the
1. 812H-813A. See also Kumalo 1961 (2) PH H220 (N);




It is submitted that from these cases three duties should be
distilled. Firstly, the court is obliged to assist the
accused in the formulation of questions where the latter
experiences difficulties in doing so efficiently. Secondly,
it must determine the facts in dispute by ascertaining from
the accused the extent to which he disputes the witness'
evidence. Thirdly, where the dispute is identified and
localized, either as a result of the second duty, or the
accused's s 115 statement, the court must assist in putting
the accused's defence to the State witnesses.
2.2.4. QUESTIONING THE STATE WITNESSES
In recognizing and carrying out these duties, the court may
render valuable assistance by reformulating the accused's
questions and ensuring that he contests all the disputed
aspects of the witness' evidence. The more difficult
question to be addressed is whether the court should be
duty-bound to test independently the credibility of the
State witnesses' evidence where the accused fails to do so
himself. The purpose of such a duty, which is in essence
inquisitorial, would be to determine whether the State
evidence provides a reliable basis for a possible
conviction.
1. See Thomas 1978 (2) SA 408 (BSC) 409H; Lansdown Report
par 283. But see Shezi 1984 (2) SA 577 (N) where the
magistrate's failure to assist the accused in this regard
was not even commented upon by the Court on review.
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The traditional approach has always been that the court
should remain impartial and aloof from the contest and not
actively participate in the questioning of witnesses.
1
-This means, for instance, that the court should not infringe
upon the domain of the prosecutor. In the words of Wylde CJ
in Enslin v Truter (1852) 1 SC 207 "a nominal pUblic
prosecutor, with all his functions to be discharged by the
Magistrate who is also to try the case, cannot legally
exist".[215] The judicial officer may thus not assume the
role of the prosecutor,2 or direct the prosecutor as to
how to conduct the prosecution in his court. 3 This does
not, however, prevent the court from questioning a witness
on an aspect of the charge that the prosecutor has omitted.
As much as the court has the power to call witnesses who may
benefit the prosecution,4 it would enjoy the right to ask
questions, even though these may aid the state case.
In respect of court assistance to the undefended accused,
the Court has been cautious in considering the imposition of
an inquisitorial duty upon the jUdicial officer to test the
reliability of state witnesses' evidence. The Appellate
Division has recognized that a jUdicial officer, in the
trial of an undefended accused, need not adhere strictly to
the duty not to intervene in the proceedings and a greater
1. See ch 7 below for a full discussion of the court's
questioning of the accused and his witnesses.
2. Hepworth 1928 AD 265 270; Impey 1960 (4) SA 556 (E) 561;
~ 1962 (1) SA 197 (A) 205.
3. Mtembu 1965 (1) PH L7 (T). Contra see Ferreira 37.
4. See below ch 7 for a full discussion of the court's power
in terms of s 167 and 186 to call witnesses.
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latitude in the questioning of witnesses is allowed.
1
In
Appel 1982 (1) PH H31 (A) the Appellate Division adopted
an even more robust approach. Dealing with a case where the
accused, both young, i~experienced and undefended, failed to
question the complainant about her ability to identify them,
the Court quoted with approval the following dictum from the
unreported decision in Shekelete Mjufu ~ Rex November 1947
AD:
"A bald statement that the accused is the person who
committed the crime is not enough. Where the accused is
an ignorant native who is unrepresented by counsel or
an attorney and who is therefore unable himself to
probe the evidence of identification and where the
prosecutor has not done so, the Court should undertake
this task as otherwise grave injustices may be done".
The Court thus accepted the principle that it is the duty of
the jUdicial officer to ensure, before convicting an
undefended accused who could not test the reliability of any
witness, that the evidenc~ is sUfficiently credible to
found a conviction. This obligation is a further
expression of the court's overriding duty to see that
justice is done,2 complementing its inquisitorial power
and duty to call witnesses if the interests of justice so
demand.
3
Justice clearly requires that an accused should
only be convicted on evidence the reliability of which has
been tested. Participation in the testing of the state
evidence would not compromise the court's impartiality. To
1. Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) 568; RaIl 1982 (1) SA 828 (A)
831G. See also Sebatana 1983 (1) SA 809 (0) 813A.
2. Hepworth 1928 AD 265. See also NC Steytler "Die
Onverdedigde Beskuldigde: Die Inkwisatoriese Rol van die
Voorsittende Beampte" (1982) 6 SACC 278 282.
3. S 167 and 186. See further c~below.
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the contrary, by remaining aloof where the accused is unable
to test the state evidence, the jUdicial officer would
actually be siding with the prosecution by letting the
latter draw an unfair advantage from the accused's inept
, t' 1
cross-exam~na ~on.
The court may find it difficult to execute this duty if
confronted only with the bald statement of the witness. Its
task may be facilitated by the accused's s 115 statement,
which would indicate the area of dispute. Since consistency
(
is one of the key factors in the determination of a witness'
credibility,2 it is essential that the witness' prior
police statement be disclosed to the court. without this
statement the court will not be in a position to establish
the witness' consistency and hence credibility. The duty of
the prosecutor to disclose discrepancies would thus be
performed by the court. Although the court's questioning
will be no real sUbstitute for the services of a defence
lawyer, it would at the very least place the conviction on a
sounder factual base.
1. Steytler 1983 SACC 283. See also Sebatana 1983 (1) SA
809 (0) 813A.
2. R Eggleston Evidence, Proof and Probability (1983) 192.
See further ch 8 below.
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3. THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED AT THE END OF THE STATE
CASE
section 174 gives a court the power to acquit an accused at
the close of the State case "if there is no evidence that
the accused committed the offence." "No evidence" has been
interpreted to mean "no evidence on which a reasonable man
m~ght convict".l The important question which arises is
whether the court is obliged to discharge an accused if
there is no prima facie case against him. The main argument
against such a duty is that it is always open to an accused
to close his case without leading any evidence. In Mkize
1960 (1) SA 276 (N) Burne AJ expressed this sentiment as
follows:"If he chooses to effect self-immolation, or to
commit forensic hara-kiri giving evidence incriminating
himself, that is his own fault". [281G-H]
A lawyer would be able to determine, after a mature
reflection on the evidence before court, whether there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. The undefended
accused, on the other hand, is not in a position to judge
the strength of the evidence against him, and, because of
his ignorance, may proceed to provide the incriminating
evidence necessary to secure his conviction. It is thus
important to establish first, whether there is a duty upon
the court to discharge an accused in this situation, and
1. Shein 1925 AD 7 9; Khanyapa 1979 (1) SA 824 (A) 838F.
See also the decisions noted by A st Q Skeen liThe Decision to
Discharge an Accused at the Conclusion of the State Case: A
critical Analysis" (1985) 102 SALJ 286 287 n8.
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secondly, whether the undefended accused is treated any
differently from those assisted by legal practitioners at
this stage of the trial.
3.1. A DUTY TO DISCHARGE?
There is a degree of uncertainty in the case law as to
whether a duty to discharge ever arises. There have been a
number of decisions which grant the jUdicial officer the
right to refuse a discharge even though there is no evidence
against the accused. In Kritzinger 1952 (2) SA 401 (W) it
was said that the court has an absolute discretion whether
or not to discharge and any attempt to fetter it should be
deprecated. 1 It has been recognized, however, that the
exercise of the discretion should be judicial. 2 In Ostilly
1977 (2) SA 104 (D) Kumleben J declared that if there is no
evidence which might reasonably lead to a conviction, sound
reasons must exist for refusing an application. These
reasons, however, the jUdge felt, could not and should not
be circumscribed. [106F] The possibility that evidence may
emerge from the defence case has been regarded as justifying
a refusal.
3
If, however, the possibility that evidence of
accused or co-accused may supplement the State case, is so
remote as to be fanciful or unreal, then it would not be a
jUdicial exercise of discretion to refuse a discharge on
1. 404B-C. See also Mkize 1960 (1) SA 276 (N) 276D-E.
2. Herholdt ill 1956 (2) SA 722 (W) 723; Mpetha 1983 (4)
SA 262 (C) 266 in fin.
3. Kritzinger supra-406A; Bouwer 1964 (3) SA 800 (0) 806;




On the other hand, it was held in Mall 1!l 1960 (1) SA 340
(N) that it would not be a judicial exercise of discretion
to refuse a discharge in the expectation that the accused
may be convicted "out of his own mouth or the mouth of a co-
accused".[343A] Trollip J in HelIer ~ 1964 (1) SA 520 (W)
also doubted the correctness of the statement in Kritzinger
that a court is entitled to refuse a discharge on the basis
of a possibility that the State case may be strengthened by
evidence produced by the defence. The Court held that the
discretion, when a choice arose, should be exercised in
favour of the accused and that his discharge should only be
refused in exceptional circumstances. 2 Finally, in Peta
1982 (4) SA 863 (E) the Court for the first time imposed a
duty on a jUdicial officer to discharge an accused,
especially if he is undefended, if there is no evidence at
all against him. [865B]
While it is still by no means certain whether a duty to
discharge will be generally recognized in law, it is
submitted that the approach in Peta is preferable in
the trial of an undefended accused. 3 Section 174 is an
expression of the principle that a person is presumed to be
innocent until proved guilty. Should the State fail to
1. Mpetha 1983 (4) SA 262 (C) 268G. Cf Bouwer 1964 (3) SA
800 (0) 806.
2. 542H. See also Herholdt ill 1956 (2) SA 722 (W) 723.
3. See also Skeen (1985) 102 SALJ 286 287.
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advance a prima facie case, the presumption should prevail;
there is no reason to continue with the proceedings and the
accused should accordingly be discharged. The argument that
the accused himself may close his case after a discharge has
been refused, cannot apply to an undefended accused.
Furthermore, to expect the court to refuse a discharge
because an accused may incriminate himself, in effect
compromises the jUdicial officer by requiring him to decide
what is best for the prosecution.
The imposition of a duty on the court to protect the accused
against self-incrimination by unnecessarily testifying, is
not incompatible with the jUdicial officer's numerous duties
to protect the accused from unwittingly incriminating
himself. Setting a trap for the accused runs counter to all
the rules aimed at protecting the accused from his own
ignorance. The position should be exactly the same where
there are co-accused. If there is no evidence against the
accused and the nexus between the accused and the offence is
dependent on the evidence of a co-accused, the accused
should be discharged. It is of course a different matter if
the evidence of co-accused could provide the proof necessary
for a conviction where a prima facie case already exists.
3.2. INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO APPLY FOR A
DISCHARGE
The application for a discharge may be made by the
prosecutor or the accused, or the court may raise the issue
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mero motu. 1 For the reasons outlined above, it should be
incumbent on the jUdicial officer to consider mero motu, at
the end of the state case, whether the undefended accused is
entitled to a discharge. If there is no evidence against
such an accused, he should be discharged. 2 If no such duty
is accepted, it is important that the accused should be
informed of his right to apply for a discharge. The Court
has been reluctant, however, to demand this of the judicial
officer. In Ngcube 1976 (1) SA 341 (N) it was held that it
is not incumbent on the jUdicial officer to inform the
accused at the close of the state case of this right even if
there is no evidence upon which a reasonable man may
convict. 3 Howard J pointed out that if the court has already
decided that there is sufficient evidence, then it would be
a futile exercise to inform the accused. 4 This of course
assumes that the court is obliged to apply its mind to the
question, and there is little authority as yet to suggest
that it is compelled to do so. It is submitted that the
undefended accused should be informed of his right to apply
for a discharge should the jUdicial officer not be bound to
examine the issue mero motu in every case.
1. Mkize 1960 (1) SA 276 (N) 280Fi Godenschwieg 1985 (1)
PH H54 (SWA).
2. Peta 1982 (4) SA 863 (E) 865B.
3. 344D. For contrary view see Mdodana 1978 (4) SA 46 (E)
47G-H.
4. 344. But see Hiemstra 319 for contrary view.
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4. THE STATE CASE - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. THE PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR.
In the presentation of evidence the inequality between the
accused and the State was clearly visible. The state, with
vast resources at its disposal to collect evidence and to
subpoena witnesses, was routinely able to present a
comprehensive case to the court. 1 In the sample a second
witness was led in two thirds of the cases and a third
witness in a third of the cases. Moreover, the prosecutors
led the witnesses carefully in the presentation of a
coherent account of the incident.
The prosecutor's impartial role to present all available
evidence, even if it favours the accused, and to inform the
court where a State witness deviates from his police
statement, has been described as "existing largely in
. 2 .
ldeology". Although the prosecutor, as an officer of the
court, is exhorted to see that "justice is done", his duty
is nevertheless defined by his role as an adversary.3 His
task is to argue the State's side of the case4 and not to
interfere on behalf of his less able opponent. 5 Even if he
is intent on performing his impartial role by presenting any
1. For a similar position in Australia, see R Douglas "Case
Structures, Participation and Verdict in the Melbourne
Magistrates' Courts" (1982) 15 Australian & New Zealand
Journal of Criminology 195 200.
2. McBarnet 19.
3. LL Weinreb Denial of Justice (1977) 46.
4. McBarnet 20.
5. Weinreb ~ cit 46.
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evidence favourable to the accused, his duty is likely to be
undercut by the police docket. It has been shown that police
investigations are usually aimed at proving a case, not at
presenting an even-handed account of an incident.
1
The
information in the police docket presented to the prosecutor
is therefore unlikely to contain evidence favourable to the
accused.
Hahlo has expressed confidence that South African
prosecutors, unlike their American counterparts, "have
always been deeply conscious of their duties as officers of
the court, and where there has been a slip up, it has
generally been due to neglect or carelessness rather than
deliberate suppressio veri".2 Van der Berg, a former
state advocate, disagrees with this assessment and advances
two main reasons why prosecutors routinely fail to carry out
this duty.3 Firstly, the dictates of efficiency lead to
the following situations:
"To many the presumption of innocence is no more than
an irritating obstacle in the daily quest to dispose of
the many cases on a congested court roll. It is, for
instance, not uncommon for lower court prosecutors to
have the accused's intended plea canvassed in the court
cells, with broad hints that pleas of not guilty will
result in a fortnight's remand in custody. This
practice is not confined to the ruthless. If a
prosecutor's need to complete his roll leads to such
drastic covert measures, he is hardly likely to harbour
a sense of fairness sufficient to compel him to
disclose inconsistencies in his case that are known
only to himself". [204]
1. McBarnet 86.
2. HR Hahlo "The Role of the Prosecutor" (1963) 86 SAIJ 334.
3. J van den Berg (1984) 8 SACC 204.
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Secondly, the demands of crime control are emphasized by
magistrates and judges alike when they criticize prosecutors
for acting in the interests of an accused. [204] The
influence of the magistrate in this regard will invariably
prevail, as he is the prosecutor's administrative superior
and negative comments on the latter's efficiency may affect
the prosecutor's career. Efficiency, furthermore, is
measured in the number of convictions a prosecutor
achieves. [205] Acting within these constraints, full
compliance with the duty - over which there are no external
controls - seems unlikely.
out of a total of 119 completed state cases, prosecutors in
nine cases, all of them in the regional court, disclosed
witnesses' conflicting police statements. They handed the
statements to the court, whereupon the judicial officers
questioned the witnesses extensively. None of the accused
utilized the statements and in one case, after the regional
magistrate had destroyed the credibility of the witness, the
accused was discharged without even being afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. No case was
recorded where the prosecutor disclosed to the court the
availability of a witness not called by the State, who could
give evidence favourable to the accused.
Prosecutors in Durban clearly perceived the proceedings as
party-centred and viewed the accused as an opponent or
adversary, even if he was undefended and clearly not in a
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position of equal strength. One prosecutor complained to the
writer that he preferred defended cases since prosecuting
undefended cases was "like stepping on bugs." His perception
of his role was thus firmly based on the "battle" model of
the trial,l rather than seeing his function as an impartial
searcher for the truth.
4.2. THE COURT'S CONTROL OVER THE STATE EVIDENCE
The prosecutors in general adhered to the rules pertaining
to the admissibility of evidence. Inadmissible confessions
or hearsay evidence were seldom sought to be introduced,
although leading questions were freely asked. On the whole,
the court was infrequently required to control the evidence
presented by the State. The accused never objected to any
evidence and of the 119 first State witnesses observed, the
court excluded evidence in only eight cases, the majority
being for hearsay evidence. The court did little to curb
leading questions. Interpreters, familiar with the basic
rules of evidence pertaining to confessions and hearsay,
played in some cases the role of the jUdicial officer by
mero motu excluding inadmissible evidence. In Case A14 RC
the interpreter interrupted a Black policeman's testimony
with the advice, "Don't tell us what he reported to you, but
what you did."
The treatment of rules of evidence in court illustrates how
1. See J Griffiths "Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a
Third "Model" of the Criminal Process" (1970) 79 Yale Law
Review 359.
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the structure of rules may facilitate either their
enforcement or their breach. Since the basic rules relating
to hearsay evidence are clear and since this evidence is in
most instances inadmissible, prosecutors, judicial officers
and even interpreters had little difficulty in identifying
and excluding such evidence. On the other hand, there is no
categorical prohibition against the use of leading
questions, and their permissible use falls within the
discretion of the court. This resulted in widely divergent
practices with a disregard for the rule in many cases.
In respect of the translation of the state witnesses'
evidence, the courts did not always exercise strict control
to ensure the proper execution of the interpreters'
function. One of the most serious defects in the
interpreters' practice was their failure, almost without
exception, to translate the questions put by prosecutors and
the magistrates to English or Afrikaans-speaking witnesses.
When such a witness was asked a question, he would answer
back immediately. The interpreter, without being granted or
himself demanding the opportunity to translate the question,
would interpret only the answer of the witness. When a
magistrate intervened during the examination-in-chief, this
resulted in two conversations being conducted with the
witness at the same time. The interpreter, not able to cope
with the rapid verbal exchanges, would in the end give up
translating the dialogue altogether.
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In case A20 RC the regional magistrate, interjecting during
the prosecutor's examination-in-chief, conducted a long
dialogue with the district surgeon about a post mortem
report, at such a speed that the interpreter could not
translate a word of it. There followed a rapid exchange of
questions and answers between the prosecutor and the same
witness, also not interpreted. In the end the interpreter
was totally confused, and consequently translated
incorrectly the following exchange: The prosecutor asked the
district surgeon whether the cause of death was the neck
injury to the deceased. The latter replied: "This is
probable when the neck has been twisted in an unnatural
way". The interpreter's transl.ation into Zulu was: "The
neck, it is said, you twisted in an unnatural fashion", at
which the accused immediately, and not without good cause,
exclaimed: "I never did it! I deny that!"
The information which the accused eventually received in
these cases was thus often a grossly distorted version of
the English-speaking witness' testimony. The importance of
this partial translation cannot be ignored because, as
Rumpole of the Old Bailey wryly commented: "You know what we
always say in Court? Listen to the questions. The questions
are so much more important than the answers".l An answer
unaccompanied by the question may be unintelligible and even
misleading. The interpreters never stopped the witness,
usually a White person in a position of some authority, from
1. John Mortimer Rumpole for the Defence (1981) 120.
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answering the question before it was translated. The
magistrate never came to his assistance either, although it
was blatantly obvious even to any non-Zulu speaker that the
accused was hearing only half of what was said. with 57,1%
of the first state witnesses being English or Afrikaans-
speaking, the overall effect of this parti~l translation
could have been grave indeed.
4.3.THE ACCUSED'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF STATE WITNESSES
The criminal liability of most accused was dependent on the
resolution of the disputed facts as the applicable
principles of the sUbstantive law were usually clear. It has
been said that there exists a factual presumption of guilt
against the accused despite the legal presumption of
innocence. 1 Judicial officers know that statistically most
accused will be found guilty2 and are convinced that the
police and the prosecutor would not waste their time if
there was no case against an accused. 3 In the reality of
the courtroom there is thus a burden on the accused to
transform the legal presumption of innocence into a factual
reality by proving that the decision of the police and
prosecutor to prosecute, was wrong. In short, the accused
must positively prove that the evidence of the witnesses is
wrong or unreliable or insufficient. An accused escapes
conviction if the evidence of the State witnesses, firstly,
1. B Wootton Crime and Penal Policy (1978) 31.
2. QE cit 33.
3. Cf Goldstein (1959-60) 69 Yale LJ 1149 1163.
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does not show the commission of an offence, secondly, is so
poor, confused or contradictory during evidence-in-chief
that it is per se unreliable, or thirdly, is shown during
cross-examination to be false or unreliable.
In the sample the state case collapsed on a number of
occasions due to its inherent weakness and not because of
any prodding by the accused. In those instances the
prosecutors did not hesitate to abandon the case. In the
majority of cases, however, the state presented a prima
facie case and cross-examination remained the only method,
apart from the accused's own testimony, by which his guilt
could be disproved.
The importance of cross-examination is extolled by Colman in
the opening line of his handbook on cross-examination as
follows: "Cross-examination, skillfully employed, is perhaps
the most useful of all the instruments used in the
administration of justice".l To use this instrument
effectively is also one of the most exacting skills lawyers
acquire through years of experience. The aims of cross-
examination are twofold: in the words of Morris, "get what
you can; destroy everything else".2 The task of the cross-
examiner is thus, firstly, to get favourable information
from the witness, and secondly, to discredit the other
evidence by showing it to be either false or unreliable. The
1. George Colman Cross-examination (1970) 1.
2. Eric Morris Technique in Litigation (1985) 178.
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court's duty to inform the undefended accused of his right
to cross-examine, and of the purpose of cross-examination,
and to assist him where he falters in the task, is therefore
of extreme importance.
4.3.1 INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
The Supreme Court has not spelt out in a definitive manner
what the explanation of the accused's right to cross-examine
State witnesses should contain, nor is it clear what
sanction will follow on a less than complete apprisal. In
the absence of a clear directive, the court's explanations
were not uniform. Most of the accused (82,9%) were told that
they could question the witness if they disagreed with the
latter's evidence; two thirds (69,4%) that they could elicit
favourable information from the witness; 62,2% that if they
did not contest the evidence it would be accepted as
correct, and 65,8% were told to put their version to the
witness, while only 31,5% were informed that they could also
attack the witness' credibility. More than half of the
accused (53,5%) were told of four or more of these five
aspects of cross-examination, while only 15,2% received none
of this information. The magistrates were less meticulous
than their brethren in the regional court and a third of the
accused in the magistrates' courts were not informed of any
of these aspects. The magistrates often sufficed with the
question: "Any questions?" 1
1. Bekker et al report that in only 24% of their cases did
the court explain to the accused the purpose of cross-
examination (24).
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Some magistrates made a genuine attempt to make cross-
examination more accessible to the undefended accused. One
explained the purpose of cross-examination to the accused as
soon as the first witness was called, "so that the accused
can keep in mind points which he may wish to dispute". [Case
8 RC] Another magistrate explained the technique of cross-
examination in layman's language: "You can ask the
complainant questions to trip her up". [Case 162 DC]
other magistrates' explanations of cross-examination could
have had the effect of inhibiting questioning. One
magistrate consistently explained "that the accused's
questions would be recorded and used as evidence against
him". [Case 228 DC] Although the information is strictly
speaking correct, it is highly misleading in that it
highlights only one of the consequences of cross-
examination, indeed, only the negative side. It is not
surprising that after such a caveat, the accused restricted
himself to only three questions.
The formalistic and sometimes rushed explanation of rights
given by the court, often rendered it incomprehensible to
the accused. The same tendency was also observed in respect
of the interpreters. In a number of cases their explanations
were given so quickly that even the Zulu-speaking court
observers could not follow them. Interpreters occasionally
made a contribution to the accused's understanding of the
nature of cross-examination. In one case the interpreter
supplemented the terse information of the magistrate that
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"you may cross-examine the witness", with the following
advice: "You may leave it [questioning] now, but you will
never get another time. They will think you agree with
them". [Case A3 RC]
4.3.2. THE ACCUSED AS A CROSS-EXAMINER
The undefended accused's inability to participate in the
adversary process was most dramatically illustrated by his
failure to utilize adequately the opportunity to cross-
examine state witnesses. He was structurally not in a
position to perform the function of cross-examination.
Firstly, he was not routinely told, before a witness
commenced his evidence, that he should note every factual
dispute. Secondly, as Didcott J commented in Mgomezulu 1983
(1) SA 1152 (N), few had the tools of the trade to cope with
the demands of cross-examination. Few had the memory to
remember all the details of the evidence, and less had the
literacy to note such with pen and paper. Thirdly, as the
"one shot" player, the accused was placed in an unfamiliar
or even hostile environment and was under considerable
stress because it was his case. The undefended accused's
experience of the court proceedings was expressed in the
response of a 20 year old Black accused, facing a charge of
rape, when asked by the prosecutor "Why did you not ask the
complainant whether she was your girlfriend?" He simply
replied: "1 forgot because I was frightened of the court."
A large portion of the accused did not utilize the
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opportunity to cross-examine at all. A quarter (24,3%) of
the accused declined to question the first witness and more
than a third of the second and third state witnesses (36,7%)
went by unchallenged. Of the accused who gave a detailed
explanation for their plea of not guilty, 30% asked no
questions, while of those who did not, only 14,3% let the
first witness go by unquestioned. This may suggest that the
s 115 procedure could have lulled the accused into a false
sense of security; a confidence that he had in fact
presented his side of the story to the court and therefore
need not put it again to the witness.
When the undefended accused did 'cross-examine', this did
not resemble the activity conducted by lawyers. 43,6% of the
accused who attempted cross-examination put five or less
questions to the first state witnesses while only 18,8% had
more than 15 questions to ask. The average number of
questions asked was 9,3 questions per witness. 1 Even fewer
questions were put to second and third state witnesses.
Accused were particularly reluctant to confront witnesses
who were in a position of authority. It has been observed
that to inform an accused that he can cross-examine a
policeman will not give him the confidence to do so
effectively.2 Black accused seemed to have more confidence
to confront a person speaking their own language. They
1. Bekker et al (13) report an average of no more than seven
questions per witness.
2. Sulman & willis QE cit 140.
Chapter 6 Page 337
engaged more often and at greater length in verbal combat
with the latter than with English or Afrikaans-speaking
witnesses.
The fact that the accused was fully informed about the
purposes of cross-examination did not influence the
accused's decision to cross-examine or the extent of the
examination. It therefore did not matter whether the accused
appeared in the regional or magistrates' court; he remained
inarticulate and ineffective and often busied himself with
irrelevancies. Few of the accused actually formulated.
questions; most of them (80%) merely started to relate their
version of events, and magistrates and interpreters
" f f t' 1transformed thls lnto a ew per unctory ques lons. To
convince the court of the unreliability of state witnesses'
evidence, it is clearly insufficient for the accused merely
to state his version to the witness. As McBarnet observes:
"Approaching an opposition witness with direct denial
and a clear statement of one's own case is not cross-
examination in that it does not achieve the job cross-
examination is fashioned for in the adversary trial. It
does not search out weaknesses in an opponent's
evidence or undermine credibility. On the contrary, it
underlines the opposing case by giving the witness an
easy opportunity to simply deny the defence.
Professional cross-examination proceeds by different
means - indirect questions and subtle questions on
peripheral matters with crucial issues casually dropped
in en route, by a series of questions leading the
witness to a position which he cannot logically deny
without discrediting his previous answers". [132-3]
The failure of undefended accused to conduct cross-
~. Bek~er et al (13) reported that 92% of the 'questions'
ln thelr sample consisted of a repetition of the accused's
account rather than an attack on the credibility of the
witness.
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examination effectively was most evident when their efforts
were contrasted with the combative tactics of the defence
lawyers. In the defended cases not a single witness went by
unexamined and considerable time was spent on each witness;
only 20% of the first witnesses faced less than 15
questions and 46,6% had more than 50 questions put to
them.
The jUdicial officer faced with inept cross-examination by
undefended accused, can follow different, but often
conflicting lines of action. He is allowed to assist the
accused actively by formulating the accused's statements
into questions. On the other hand, he may also remain
passive and allow the accused to pursue his own questioning,
however irrelevant it may be. He may assert his power to
control cross-examination by keeping the accused to the
formal rules by disallowing improper questions. As there is
no clear principle or duty to assist the accused, (none, in
any event, which would make a failure to assist an
irregularity), the jUdicial officers approached the matter in
different ways.
The various judicial responses to inept cross-examination
are well illustrated by Case 23 RC.
Case 23 RC
On a charge of rape three males, aged 18, 19 and 22,
denied all knowledge of the incident. During evidence-in-
chief the regional magistrate cleared up with the complainant the
question of, identification of the accused. Accused no 1 put
three questlons to the complainant, disputing the
identification and then said he had no further questions.
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M: You have not disputed that you had sexual intercourse
with her.
A: I have not.
M: You must put it to her.
A: I did not have sexual intercourse with you.
Complainant (C): You did.
(Pause)
A: No further questions.
Accused no 2 did not fare any better with his cross-
examination which consisted of the following questions:
A2: Do you know me?
C: No.
A2: How can you say it was me?
C: You were there.
A: (pause) No further questions.
Accused no 3 was more vociferous. His eighth question was as
follows:
A3: Do you have any documentary evidence who raped you?
M: Ridiculous question.
A3: Is this the first time you give evidence against a ...
M: Improper question.
A3: I have no further questions.
Most magistrates allowed the accused his first few
questions, however irrelevant they were, as with accused no
2. within a few minutes the accused would invariably have
tired in the effort. Where the accused engaged in extensive
questioning, however, the magistrate could, while preserving
the appearance that the accused was allowed a free hand in
his questioning, quickly terminate it by various techniques.
One technique was to enforce the normal rules of cross-
examination. By emphasizing procedural correctness, as with
accused no 3, the court could effectively terminate a
prolonged cross-examination. A third of the accused were
stopped during their cross-examination, the reason in half
of the cases being that the question was irrelevant. The
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accused were often reminded not to give evidence during
questioning, but the neat distinction between putting one's
version to a witness and giving evidence, was frequently not
understood, and more often than not this intervention led to
the accused's silence. One accused, charged with theft and
the possession of dagga, was stopped by the magistrate after
his fourth question, with the admonishment that he should
not narrate his story, since he would later be given the
opportunity to put forward his case. After this information,
the accused discontinued his questioning. [Case 250 DC]
Where accused attempted to cross-examine more assertively,
the court often curtailed their activities, usually on the
vague ground of "improper" questioning, as happened to
accused no 3 in Case 23 RC quoted above. The more questions
the accused put, the greater was the likelihood that the
court would interfere. [P<.05 r =.41] The accused was
frequently caught in a double bind; if he was an ineffectual
cross-examiner he achieved nothing, but he could not "play
the role of the confident, punch pUlling advocate"
either.
1
In Case 11 RC, for example, a 19 year old male
charged with rape, put the following question to the mother
of the complainant: "Did you believe what the complainant
told you?" The magistrate disallowed the question because it
was "irrelevant". After this the accused had no further
questions to ask. The question, both legitimate and
pertinent if asked by a lawyer, was not permitted from a
1. McBarnet 135.
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combative undefended accused. Confronted with confusing and
contradictory jUdicial instructions, admonishments and
directions, the accused frequently opted for non-
participation.
A second technique to curtail an accused's questioning was
to exert some pressure on him to conduct his questioning in
an expeditious manner. One magistrate was quick to ask the
accused, as soon as there was a pause after an answer, "Any
further questions?" The accused was then compelled to
respond immediately to the question, which, at the same
time, might have interrupted his train of thought in respect
of a possible question. If he did not have a question ready
- which was bound to happen as a result of the interruption
- he would be forced to say no. By ostensibly allowing the
accused a free hand in questioning, and even affirming his
right, the magistrate effectively terminated the
t . . 1ques l.onl.ng.
The same technique was frequently employed by interpreters
acting independently of the court. One interpreter
continually asked the accused after every question, "Have
you finished?" By raising his voice and asking, "Do you
still have other questions?", the interpreter often
terminated the accused's attempts at cross-examination. The
interpreter would also at times act as an informal screen
1. This would be an example of the situational use of rUles,
as described by Carlen £2 cit.
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for the accused's questions. In Case AI? RC the interpreter
refused to translate a question: "You have asked that
already, ask another question." In case A50 DC the accused
said in Zulu during cross-examination: "The witness does
not tell the truth." The interpreter omitted to translate
that and merely asked the accused whether he had further
questions. The response was in the negative and the court
heard, "No further questions."
Some judicial officers extended a helping hand to the
struggling accused by assisting him in the formulation of
questions and ensuring that he put his defence to the
witness. Such assistance, as accorded to accused no 1 in
case 23 RC, above, was also in evidence in Case 81 RC.
Case 81 RC
An accused charged with rape was fully apprised of the
purpose of cross-examination. His first question to the
complainant was:
A: Is this the first time you tell a lie?
M: Improper question.
The magistrate then explained to the accused how to go about
revealing a lie. Later on the prosecutor objected to a
question on the ground that the witness could not answer as
it was not in her knowledge.
M: The prosecutor's objection is valid but I am not going to
stop your cross-examination as you are unrepresented.
The magistrate continued to assist the accused by dissecting
his questions and putting them to the witness.
The ability of the magistrate to assist the accused in his
cross-examination is limited by his structural position. He
cannot go much further than dissecting and rephrasing the
questions. But as McBarnet remarks, such assistance is not
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an adequate sUbstitute for professional cross-examination:
"The questions take the form of a bland statement with
no follow-up possible after a denial. A lawyer would
never follow this course. The magistrate does not help
the unrepresented defendant but only ensures that the
defendant's amateur cross-examination both terminates
and fails. The magistrate's help is no sUbstitute for
defence advocacy. Nor can it be: that is not his role
as an independant arbiter. He does not know the
defendant's version either and his questions would be
coloured by the only version he has heard, the
prosecution's". [133]
4.4. THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE STATE WITNESSES
In observing its overriding duty to see that justice is
done, the court may question state witnesses even if such
questioning may favour the prosecution, provided that it
does not take over the function of the prosecutor. There is
thus no categorical prohibition against putting
supplementary questions to the witness in respect of an
element of the offence which the prosecutor has omitted.
There is, however, no corresponding duty as yet to test the
veracity or reliability of the witness' evidence.
In the sample most jUdicial officers participated in the
proceedings by questioning the state witnesses. Seventy per
cent questioned the first witness during evidence-in-chief,
and on average asked ten questions per witness. The aim of
the questioning was primarily to elucidate the evidence
rather than to test it. Frequently jUdicial officers,
through skilful questions, filled in fatal gaps in the
evidence with facts which the prosecutor had failed to
elicit. The impression one gained was that the court was not
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amenable to the prospect of acquitting an accused person as
a result of the prosecutor's inability to elicit the
necessary information from a witness.
Many factors may influence the court's decision to
elucidate, and thereby strengthen, the state case. One
factor which was significantly related to the number of
questions asked by the court, was the race of the accused.
witnesses testifying against a Black accused received more
questions than others, [P<.Ol r = ,38] particularly where the
accused was in custody. [P<.05 r =,56] The court was also
more likely to enter the arena in respect of the more
serious offences. [P<.05 r =,52] Apart from the possibility
of racial prejudice, the court's concern was that an accused
charged with a serious offence (of which the bail decision
was another indicator), should not be acquitted through
inept prosecution. There was thus a limit to which the court
allowed the adversary process to operate; it should not
facilitate the acquittal of a "guilty" accused. The court
did, however, intervene readily to test a witness' evidence
where the prosecutor indicated that the witness might be
unreliable by disClosing his conflicting police statement;
the court tested the witness' evidence fully and asked on
average 20 questions of such witnesses.
Half of the witnesses were also questioned during the
accused's cross-examination, but on a more limited scale,
and half of them did not receive more than two questions.
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After the accused's cross-examination, 43,8% of them were
asked additional questions with an average of 6,6 questions
per witness. These questions too were on the whole directed
towards elucidating and amplifying the evidence, rather than
testing it.
In trying to determine the extent of the court's assistance
to the accused, notes were made of occasions when jUdicial
officers either helped with the formulation of questions,
pointed out discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses, or
in any other way rendered assistance. In 19,1% of the cases
such assistance was recorded. Where the evidence of a state
witness was palpably false, the court did not hesitate to
question a witness thoroughly. In Case 13 RC, after the
prosecutor disclosed the complainant's contradictory police
statement, the regional magistrate questioned her
extensively and the accused, without being given an
opportunity to cross-examine her, was discharged. The court
did not, however, routinely supplement the accused's lack of
cross-examination with its own questioning. The converse was
rather true; the less questions the accused asked, the less
the court questioned the witness.[P <.19 r =,34] In the
assistance rendered the racial factor was again evident.
Only 15,8% of the Black accused were assisted whilst 40% of
the rest received some form of help from the
magistrate. [N=110 P<.05] The Black accused were assisted
least where white witnesses or complainants testified, the
most when there were Black witnesses. [P<.05 r =.37]
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In dealing with the production of state evidence the court's
obligation to see that justice should be done was performed
primarily in favour of the state. To assist the state, which
in this sample was competently represented, was a fairly
easy task for the magistrates who, with years of experience
on the bench and as prosecutors, were able to ask a few
important questions to establish a prima facie case for the
prosecution. The court's action on behalf of the accused was
limited to assisting the accused to put his questions to the
witnesses. It did not include testing the reliability of a
witness' evidence mero motu, even if the accused failed to
do this himself. Where the prosecutor, however, intimated to
the court that the witness was unreliable by disclosing a
previous inconsistent statement, the court did take the
lead, questioning the witness extensively and with great
success. The jUdicial officer therefore did not perform a
fully inquisitorial role to establish independently the
reliability of the state evidence.
4.5. DISCHARGING THE ACCUSED AT THE END OF THE STATE CASE
Undefended accused need not be informed of the right to
apply for a discharge, and the accused in the sample were
. routinely left uninformed in this regard, consequently
making no such applications. The discharge of an accused was
thus entirely dependent on the discretionary intervention of
the jUdicial officer or the prosecutor. In the sample the
court took the initiative on a number of occasions and
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independently raised the matter of discharge with the
prosecutor. In the 119 cases where the state closed its case
and a discharge was theoretically possible, magistrates
raised the issue 17 times and prosecutors twice. In all, 18
accused were discharged. In half of these cases the state
witnesses had been found to be unreliable. In three cases
the magistrates refused the state's request for a remand in
order to call further witnesses and the accused were
accordingly discharged because of a lack of evidence. The
remaining accused were discharged because the state evidence
failed to establish all the elements of the offence. Where
the state evidence could not justify a conviction at all, it
was clearly in the interest of the court and the prosecutor
to dispose of the matter as quickly as possible through a
discharge, thus obviating any further waste of court time.
The accused played no significant role in laying the ground
for their discharge. In the 15 cases where evidence was led,
seven of the accused did not even cross-examine the
witnesses, while the rest asked on average no more than nine
questions. Their discharge was thus not occasioned by their
efforts, but was due to the inability of the state to muster
sufficient and reliable evidence.
Only one regional magistrate, working within the adversary
mould, attempted to achieve the participation of the accused
in the disc~arge decision. In Case 13 RC the prosecutor
closed his case after the complainant had been totally
discredited by him and the regional magistrate regarding her
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conflicting statements. The two accused were not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and were
advised by the court as follows: "Accused, since you are
unrepresented, the court feels that there is a duty to
inform you that you may apply for a discharge at this stage
if there is insufficient evidence against you." After a
short conversation with the accused the interpreter said:
"Both accused apply". The court thereupon acquitted them.
The court's conduct, which seems excessively formalistic and
artificial, is, nevertheless, a true reflection of the legal
confusion pertaining to this aspect of the trial. The court,
on the strength of some decisions, did not regard itself as
duty-bound to discharge the accused although there was no
prima facie case against him. It still viewed its position
as that of an aloof arbiter who makes decisions only when
called upon and so, correctly, informed the accused of his
right to apply for a discharge. The court's behaviour here
is also further evidence of the conflicting roles the
jUdicial officer performs. After extensive questioning of
the complainant, where he assumed a truly inquisitorial
role, the magistrate reverted back to his traditional role
in the adversary process when dealing with the discharge
issue.
Faithful to the case law, the courts did not always
discharge accused persons against whom there was no
evidence. In a few cases involving more than one accused,
where there was no prima facie case, the court did not
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discharge the accused. The court thus accepted that the
accused, placed on their defence and unable to assess the
strength of the state case, would most likely decide to give
evidence and might under cross-examination incriminate
themselves and one another.
5. CONCLUSION
The state case - prepared and presented by a competent
prosecutor - lays the ground for a possible conviction. Yet
while in principle an accused should not be convicted on
evidence the reliability of which has not been established,
the mechanism designed for this purpose - cross-examination
- is beyond the capacity of most undefended accused. In
recognition of this accused's weak adversarial position,
some legal provision has been made for assistance by the
court and the prosecutor. The provision made, however, is
quite ineffective to achieve its purpose. Where clear rules
do exist, they usually set down incomplete or inadequate
assistance; more often, though, rules have no absolute
application either because of prevarication among the Courts
or because they are not accompanied by effective sanctions
for non-adherence.
The prosecutor's unenforceable duty to disclose evidence
favourable to the accused is therefore superceded by the
clearer duty to represent the state's interests in a
combative manner. The court's control over the admissibility
of the state evidence is confined to situations
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unequivocally governed by the law. The absence of direct,
clear and enforceable rules results in the jUdicial officer
(and in consequence, the interpreter) rendering divergent
types and degrees of assistance to the undefended accused in
his cross-examination of the state witnesses. It also
accounts for inconsistent discharge practices.
The measures available to protect the undefended accused at
this stage of the trial encompass those designed to
strengthen the accused as an adversary and those involving
inquisitorial-type intervention by the judicial officer on
the accused's behalf. In relation to cross-examination, it
is submitted on the strength of the empirical evidence above
that no degree of formal assistance will make the accused an
effective cross-examiner. The degree of skill and
articulateness required, means that advice alone cannot equip
the accused to test the state case satisfactorily. The
testing of the state evidence being pivotal to the outcome
of the trial, this is an area where independent
inquisitorial intervention by the court is the only means of
achieving justice for the undefended accused.
CHAPTER SEVEN THE DEFENCE CASE
After the closure of the State case and if the accused is
not discharged, there are a number of ways in which an
accused may conduct his defence. He may close his case
forthwith, or proceed to testify and/or call witnesses. The
choice of the accused in this regard will normally depend on
an assessment of ,the strength of the State case. The
undefended accused will usually be unaware of the different
avenues open to him and the considerations which should be
taken into account in making such a decision. The court is
entrusted with the responsibility to ensure that the
undefended accused is not prejudiced in his defence by his
ignorance. The court's primary task in this regard is thus
to facilitate the accused's participation in the adversary
proceedings by informing him of his rights and duties in
respect of the production of evidence. It will be argued
that the court also has a sUbsidiary duty to assist the
undefended accused in the presentation of his defence.
1. ADVISING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN
CONDUCTING HIS DEFENCE
It is incumbent on the jUdicial officer to apprise an
undefended accused of the courses open to him for the
conduct of his defence. 1 As the majority of accused may
not be fluent in, or familiar with either of the official
languages, the explanation of the accused's rights must be
1. Vezi 1963 (1) SA 9 (N) 11C; Cele 1973 (1) PH H31 (N).
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translated for the accused. The duty to give the
explanation, however, remains that of the judicial officer;
he may not delegate it to the interpreter.
1
1.1 THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY OR TO REMAIN SILENT
section 151(1) (a) provides that where the accused is not
discharged in terms of s 174, the court "shall ask him
whether he intends adducing any evidence on behalf of the
defence ... ", and further "whether he himself intends to give
evidence .•. "[S 151(1) (b)] The Court has made it clear that
this enquiry is imperative2 and that the accused's
attention should specifically be drawn to the fact that he
may testify.3 The undefended accused should also be
informed that he has the right to remain silent. 4 Merely
to ask the accused whether he wishes to say anything is
insufficient5 and the explanation should expressly inform
the accused that he is under no obligation to place his side
of the case before the court. 6 Once the accused has
decided not to testify, his decision should be respected and
the jUdicial officer should not attempt to convince him to
1. Mzo 1980 (1) SA 538 (C) 539E; sithole 1967 (2) PH H293
(N); Beter TPD 11/1/63 reported in (1963) 26 THRHR 122.
2. Demaar 1922 CPD 96; Read 1924 TPD 718 719; Graan 1925
EDL 49; Swart 1926 NLR 486; Ndalaza 1930 EDL 417; Sibia
1947 (2) SA 50 (A) 54; Vezi 1963 (1) SA 9 (N) lID; Moloyi
1978 (1) SA 516 (0) 522H; Motaung 1980 (4) SA 131 (T) 133.
3. Sib~a supra 54; Vezi supra lID ..
4. Vez~ supra 11D; Cele 1973 (1) PH H31 (N);
Mdodana 1978 (4) SA 46 (E) 48C.
5. Mdodana supra 48C-D.
6. Mdodana supra 47G. Cf the explanations at s 115
proceedings, Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C) .
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Mere knowledge of the choice does not, however, guarantee
the considered and wise exercise thereof, since the
undefended accused will invariably have no idea of the
important considerations which should be taken into account
in arriving at a decision. The court is therefore obliged to
divulge some pertinent considerations in this regard to the
accused.
Once the accused had been afforded the opportunity to make a
statement in terms of s 115 indicating the basis of his
defence, the Court soon realized the danger that an
undefended accused may decline to testify on the mistaken
belief that his statement was evidence and that there is no
reason why it should be .repeated. 2 This danger is further
compounded where the accused is allowed to make an extensive
explanation of plea. 3 In order to avert this danger, the
accused must be informed that his s 115 statement was not
evidence under oath and that if he wishes to put his side of
the case to the court, he should give evidence under
oath. 4 This duty has been extended to the situation where
1. Klumalo 1972 (4) SA 500 (0) 501. See below for
circumstances in which some attempt at persuasion should be
made.
2. Moloyi 1978 (1) SA 516 (0) 523B; Dreyer 1978 (2) SA 182
(NC) 184A.
3. Moloyi supra 523B.
4. Dreyer supra 184B; Thomas 1978 (2) SA 408
(BSC) 409; Kekwana 1978 (2) SA 172 (NC) 176; Thela 1979 (3)
SA 1018 (T) 1024B; Campher 1981 (2) PH H187 (C); Moloyi
supra 523B (Which regarded such a warning merely as
"wenslik"); Benjamin 1983 (2) PH H198 (C); Brovln 1984 (3)
SA 399 (C) 401-H.
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the accused, after a plea of guilty, makes an exculpatory
statement during the magistrate's questioning and his plea
is later changed to not guilty.1 This accused may labour
under the impression that he has already given his side of
the story at the outset of the case and that it would
t t 't 2 0 t h b Itherefore be unnecessary 0 repea 1. n e same aS1s
Grosskopf J in Mzo 1980 (1) SA 538 (C) was of the opinion
that the accused should also be informed at this stage that
any statements he made during his cross-examination of State
witnesses were not evidence either. [539B]
The accused should be warned that should he choose to
testify, he may be sUbjected to cross-examination by the
prosecutor. 3 It is submitted that the accused should
similarly be apprised of the possibility of questioning by
the court. The new provision that he must testify first,[S
151(1) (b) (i)] should also be explained.
An important consideration to be taken into account by the
accused in deciding whether or not to testify, is the
strength of the State case. If there is no case to meet,
then it would be foolish to testify, but where there is a
prima facie case against the accused, there are compelling
reasons why the accused should give evidence. The undefended
accused is in no position to make an assessment of the
evidence for the prosecution, and there is a real
1. Afr i k a 1982 (3) SA 1066 (C) 1067H.
2. See Steytler (198 2) 6 SACC 278 279.
3. Ve zi 1 963 (1) SA 9 (N) 11D; Ferreira 409.
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possibility that he could err in either remaining silent
when he should speak out, or testifying when there is no
need. There have been a few cautious suggestions that the
court should advise the accused in this regard.
In Mdodana 1978 (4) SA 46 (E), where there was no prima
facie case for the accused to meet, Stewart J faulted the
trial court for not indicating to the accused that
"he was not under any obligation to place his side of
the case before the court. Nor was it indicated to him
that he was entitled to apply for his discharge and, if
that was refused, to close his case without leading any
evidence". [47G-H]
He added that "when explaining his position to him, a
magistrate should be careful to ensure that an undefended
accused, in an appropriate case, understands that he may
close his case without leading evidence".l It is submitted
that even if the accused in that case had been given this
explanation, it would not have assisted him at all in making
an informed decision. The question whether there is a case
to meet can usually be answered only by means of a skilled
legal practitioner's assessment of the State case; the
undefended accused is usually not capable of this. with such
scant advice as given above, he may well commit "forensic
hara-kiri" during his testimony. The judicial officer, on
the other hand, is fully capable of assessing the strength
of the State case and ascertaining whether the closure of
the accused's case would be followed by an acquittal. It is
1. 48C. See also Beter TPD 11/1/9963 reported in (1963) 26
THRHR "122.
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submitted that the only way to prevent the undefended
accused from testifying unnecessarily is for the judicial
officer to close the case on his behalf when it is clear
° d °t 1that the state case w1ll not succee on 1 sown.
When the magistrate in Govender 1974 (2) PH H63 (N),
however, closed the defence case for an undefended co-
accused, it did not receive the approval of the Natal
Provincial Division. In casu, after the first accused had
testified, the second accused was acquitted without being
asked whether he wished to give evidence. The first accused
appealed against his conviction on the basis that the second
accused was acquitted before he was afforded an opportunity
to testify, thus denying the appellant the opportunity to
cross-examine him. Van Heerden J regarded it as irregular
for the magistrate to have closed the case of a co-accused
as the latter was never afforded an opportunity to decide
for himself whether he wanted to give evidence. As this
irregularity was held to have been potentially prejudicial
to the first accused, the latter's conviction was set aside.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision is open to
criticism. In principle there can be no objection to the
court acting in favour of an undefended accused who is
incapable of appreciating the various considerations
involved in making a jUdicious decision. The appellant
cannot be entitled as of right to an advantage - in this
1. This assumes, of course, that the more preferable path -
discharge mero motu - has not been followed.
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instance the cross-examination of the co-accused - which in
effect involves unfairly exploiting a co-accused's
ignorance. If the co-accused had been represented and had
closed his case, the appellant could not have claimed that
he was irregularly deprived of an advantage to which he was
entitled.
When there is a prima facie case to meet, the important
considerations involved in an accused's decision whether to
testify, were succinctly set out by Holmes JA in Letsoko
1964 (4) SA 768 (A):
"Generally, in regard to an accused's failure to
testify, a useful, practical distinction can be drawn
between situations in which the State's case is (i) the
direct testimony of a witness or witnesses, and (ii)
circumstantial evidence. In (i), if the testimony is
wholly credible or non-credible, no problem arises, for
in the former case the accused's failure to contradict
the credible evidence must inevitably result in the
prima facie proof becoming conclusive proof, and, in
the latter case, it would be irrelevant: there could
then be no prima facie proof and the accused's silence
could not make or restore the State's case. It is only
when the State's evidence, although amounting to prima
facie proof, creates some doubt about its credibility
that the accused's silence becomes important, and may
be decisive, for his failure to contradict the State's
evidence may then resolve the doubt about its
credibility in the state's favour". [776C-D]
An undefended accused may have difficulty in weighing up
these complex considerations and where he has chosen not to
testify, the Courts have been reluctant to attach too much
weight to the omission,l emphasizing the need for the
"greatest caution in drawing inferences adverse to an
1. Volschenk 1948 (2) PH H15S (T); Mhlati 1976 (2) SA
426 (Tk) 427E-G.
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untutored person for his failure to give eVidence".l
Despite this benevolent but passive approach, it would none
the less be in the interests of the accused for him to be
informed of 't h e particular considerations which are relevant
in deciding whether to give evidence. If there is a strong
prima facie case against him, or if his silence would
resolve any doubt that may exist as to his gUilt,2 the
court should inform him that should he remain silent, he
will be convicted on the evidence before court. More than
this the court cannot, and should not do, as the accused's
right to remain silent should still be respected. By
outlining the relevant factors, the court will enable the
accused to make a more informed choice. An ill-informed
choice is no choice at alIi mere lip service would be paid
to the procedural rights of the undefended accused. 3
Where an accused wishes to testify, he must do so before any
other defence witnesses are called, although the court has
the discretion, on good cause shown, to allow otherwise at
the outset of the defence case. 4 The purpose of this
provision is to prevent the accused from tailoring his
evidence to that of his witnesses. 5 If an accused, who at
first declined to give evidence, changes his mind, the court
"may draw such inference from the accused's conduct as may
1. Vogwane 1965 (2) PH H175 (SR) per Young J.
2. Cf Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 (A).
3. Cf Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA 321 (N) 323D.
4. S 151(1) (b) (i). See Nene 1979 (2) SA 521 (D); Swanepoel
1980 (2) SA 81 (NC).
5. Hiemstra 314.
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be reasonable in the circumstances".[S 151(1) (b) (ii)] It is
submitted that it is incumbent on the court to inform the
undefended accused of these provisions. Should this accused
change his mind and elect to testify after his witnesses,
the court should be cautious in drawing inferences from this
fact. Lawyer-like assessment of the defence case cannot
readily be ascribed to an undefended accused.
1.2. THE RIGHT TO CALL WITNESSES
Informing an accused of his right to call witnesses has been
described as one of the most important aspects of the
court's duty to explain to an accused his procedural
rights.
1
Although s 151(1) (a) requires only that the
accused should be asked whether he intends to adduce
evidence, the Court has interpreted this provision in favour
of the accused by insisting that the accused must be asked
whether he wishes to give evidence himself and, separately,
whether he wishes to call any other witnesses. 2 This has
been done, according to Schreiner JA in Sibia 1947 (2) SA
50 (A), in consideration of the fact that the accused may
be an "ignorant person unacquainted with court
procedure". [54]
The adequacy of explaining the right by merely asking the
1. Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA 321 (N) 323C.
2. Sibia 1947 (2) SA 50 (A) 54; District Commandant SAP
~ Murray 1924 AD 13; Read 1924 TPD 718 719; Fish 1934 (1)
PH H54 (C); Nyambirikira 1943 SR 183; Simon 1948 (2) SA
925 (SR).
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accused "Do you have any witnesses you wish to call?", is
open to doubt. Didcott J noted in Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA
321 (N) that "to let him know of that right, yet not how to
exercise it when he has no idea and starts running into
trouble, is not much use".[323D] It has been argued
elsewhere that the information which the undefended accused
routinely receives in respect of both the right to call
witnesses and how to call them, is inade~ate.1 An
undefended accused, ignorant of his right to compel the
attendance of witnesses, may well assume that the ~estion,
"00 you have any witnesses to call?", refers only to persons
who would voluntarily attend court to testify on his behalf.
Prospective witnesses may thus be drawn primarily from his
own circle of friends or family. Ironically, the personal
bond which causes these type of witnesses to attend court
and testify for the defence, may undermine their
credibility. The accused's misconception may thus prevent
him from calling other innocent bystanders whose independent
evidence might be of greater value.
It is submitted that in a proper explanation of this right
the court should widen the parameters of the accused's
vision of possible witnesses for the defence. The following
explanation is suggested: "Are there any persons who have
seen the incident who may assist your case? If such
witnesses are unwilling to come to court, you may ask the
1. NC Steytler "The Calling o f witnesses by Undefended
Accused and the Right to SUbpoena" (1983) 7 SACC 74.
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court to compel them to attend. They need not be friends or
relatives. If they are independent witnesses their evidence
will carry great weight".
It is equally important that an accused should be informed
as to how he can enforce his right of calling a witness. An
accused may secure the attendance of a witness in a lower
court by means of a subpoena prepared by him and issued by
the clerk of the court. 1 The subpoena must be delivered to
the messenger of the court or any other person authorized to
serve a subpoena in the area where the witness resides. [Rule
64(2)] The accused must deposit with a prescribed officer of
the court a sum of money sufficient to cover the cost of
serving the subpoena.[S 179(3)] If the witness resides
outside the magisterial district the accused must pay a
further amount to cover the witness' transport costs.[S 181]
If the accused can convince the "prescribed officer" that he
is unable to pay the necessary "costs and fees" and that the
witness is necessary and material for his defence, then that
officer must subpoena the witness free of charge. 2 If the
clerk of the court, as the "prescribed officer", refuses to
subpoena such a witness, the accused may appeal to a
magistrate for a decision on the matter.[S 179(3) (b)]
The practical implementation of this formal procedure is
1. S 179(1); Magistrates' Court Rules rule 64 (1).
2. S 179(3) (a). For similar provision for calling a prisoner
as a witness, see Prisons Act 8 of 1958 s 87(4).
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fraught with obstacles for an undefended accused. 1 He may
encounter difficulties, firstly, in obtaining a sUbpoena
form from the appropriate official, secondly, in locating
the messenger of the court for the service of the subpoena,
(the latter's office is usually not situated at the
magistrates' courts) and thirdly, in being able to afford
the money to cover the cost of service and possible
transport fees. If unable to raise the money for the latter,
the accused must return to the clerk of the court or the
magistrate to apply for the free service of the subpoena.[S
179(3)]
The position of accused in custody is even more precarious;
these accused would find it more difficult to get even
friends or family to court and no specific legal provisions
are made to assist them in locating, contacting or
b I 't 2su poena1ng W1 nesses.
Provision has been made for the situation where the court is
aware that the accused has encountered difficulties in
getting his witness to court; here it is obliged to inform
the accused of his right to subpoena witnesses in terms of s
179 and to explain how this can be done. 3 Yet even if the
accused is so informed, he will encounter the difficulties
inherent in the complex procedure outlined above. These
practical problems have led prosecutors and jUdicial
1. Steytler 1983 SACC 74 77.
2. Cf Mr Justice AJ Milne's description of the prison barrier
to justice (1984 SALJ 681).
3. Hlongwane 1982~ SA 321 (N) 323B.
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officers to develop informal methods of assisting the
undefended accused - usually by sUbpoenaing a witness on his
behalf. If the accused is in custody, it is common practice
for the investigating officer to subpoena the defence
witnesses at the instance of the court. If this officer
cannot trace a witness, he should testify in court to that
effect and the prosecutor and the accused should be given an
opportunity to question him in this regard.
1
To leave the matter to the informal discretion of court
personnel is not, however, satisfactory, as there are no
safeguards that they will routinely exercise this discretion
properly. A less cumbersome and more streamlined legal
procedure should be created to ensure that all accused
benefit from easy access to the legal process.
within the confines of the present provisions, the following
procedure is suggested: The court should inform the accused
that he may secure the attendance of any witness by
depositing a sum of money with the clerk of the court to
cover the cost of the service of the subpoena and possible
transport expenses. The subpoena will be served free of
charge on proof of his indigence and the necessity and
materiality of the witness. The court should then, without
delay, decide on the accused's indigence and on the
necessity for the witness. It should be the duty of the
clerk of the court to provide the subpoena form, issue the
1. Ajam 1983 (1) PH H84 (C).
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subpoena and ensure that the messenger receives it together
with the required sum of money (where the accused has not
been found to be indigent).
1.3. RECORDING THE EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS
It is essential that it should appear on the record that the
accused was apprised of his rights at the close of the State
case. 1 If the record does not reflect that all the
procedural steps have been followed, it will be impossible
for the Court on review to assess whether the proceedings
were in accordance with justice. 2 The effect of a failure
to record the explanation of rights has not been
unequivocally determined. In Motaung 1980 (4) SA 131 (T)
it was held that such an omission from the record does not
constitute an irregularity resulting in a failure of justice
(and the setting aside of the proceedings), provided that
the rights were in fact explained. Where, however, it cannot
be affirmed that the rights were disclosed, or that the
omission has not prejudiced the accused, an appeal against
the conviction will be allowed. 3
Where the record does not disclose the details of the
explanation of rights, the practice adopted by reviewing
jUdges of calling on the trial magistrate to declare whether
the accused was fully apprised of his righ~s, is clearly
1. Puwana 1913 EDL 81; Graan 1925 EDL 49; Read 1924 TPD 718
719; Dreyer 1978 (2) SA 182 (NC) 184.
2. Mdodana 1978 (4) SA 46 (E) 48A-B.
3. Sibia 1947 (2) SA 50 (A) 54.
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unsatisfactory. It places the magistrate in a difficult
position, as it is not easy to recall exactly what was said
in a case completed a month ago, and there is an unhealthy
invitation to state that everything was done according to
the book. In recent cases, however, no or inadequate
recording has been regarded as an irregularity per se and
convictions have not been confirmed on the basis of an
incomplete record. 1 The latter practice is preferable as
it provides a measure for ensuring that procedural rights
are correctly explained in all cases.
1.4 THE OPERATION OF PRESUMPTIONS
The use of rebuttable presumptions to facilitate the proof
of essential elements of an offence, can be justified only
if the accused is aware of their operation and how they can
be rebutted. No such knowledge can, however, be ascribed to
the undefended accused. To protect this accused, the Supreme
Court has burdened the jUdicial officer with the duty to
apprise him of the operation of any presumptions where the
prosecution intends to rely on such. 2 The jUdicial officer
1. Vlotman 1981 (2) PH H175 (C); Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275
(A) 300D per Nicholas AJA.
2. See eg, Stock Theft Act ch 48 s 5(1) - Lebang 1965 (3) SA
774 (SR) 775C. Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 s 2(1) -
Mthalane 1968 (4) SA 257 (N) 258Ai Nabo 1968 (4) SA 699 (E)
701Gi Mzopo 1975 (2) PH H164 (N) i Magwaza 1976 (4) SA 281
(N) 282E-F. Act 23 of 1963 s 11(3) - Siebert 1972 (1) SA 351
(NC) 353Ai Cross 1971 (2) SA 356 (RA) i Setenane 1985 (1)
PH H46 (0). Act 51 of 1977 s 245 - Andrews 1982 (2) SA 269
(NC) 272B. Act 51 of 1977 s 55 (1), 72 (2) (b), 170 (1), 188 (1) -
Du Plessis 1970 (2) SA 562 (E) i Bkenlele 1983 (1) SA 515 (0).
Act 44 of 1958 s 7(3) (e) - Shonyeke 1981 (2) PH H119 (SWA).
Act 41 Of 1971 s 10 - Lango 1962 (1) SA 107 (N) 107Gi continued
on the next page -
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should ensure the accused's comprehension of the presumption
by explaining it in clear and simple language. 1 The
accused must be alerted to the dangers contained in
presumptions and to the manner in which he can seek to avert
them. 2 He should further be informed that the presumption
can be rebutted by evidence either from himself or other
witnesses. 3 He should be advised that a bald statement
refuting the conclusion which the presumption produces,
would be insufficient,4 as would be his explanation of
plea or the version he put to the witness in cross-
examinationi evidence under oath will have to be
5produced.
Should the court mention to the accused possible defences by
means of which a presumption could be rebutted? In Magwaza
1976 (4) SA 281 (N) Fannin J did not approve of the
argument that such additional information should be
divUlged. In casu the accused was charged with the
possession of a dangerous weapon and could escape liability
if he could prove that such possession was not for an
Shangase 1972 (2) SA 410 (N) 432Ei Green 1972 (3) SA 533
(0) 533H. Ord 11 of 1955 s 17bis - Mtembu 1968 (2) PH H298
(N). Act 39 of 1930 s 11(1) - Mkize 1966 (4) SA 280 (N) 282D;
Chetty 1975 (3) SA 980 (N) 982E; Khumalo 1979 (4) SA 480
(T) 483H.
1. Brown 1984 (3) SA 399 (C) 401H-I. See also Van der
Westhuizen 1975 (2) PH H254 (E).
2. Shangase 1972 (2) SA 410 (N) 432E.
3. Nabo 1968 (4) SA 699 (E) 701Gi Maleka 1970 (2) SA 63 (0)
65Gj Maloyi 1984 (1) PH H101 (N) j Bkenlele 1983 (1) SA 515
(0) 518Dj Mokheseng 1 981 (1) PH H40 (0).
4. Cross 1971 (2) SA 356 (RA).
5. Kekwana 1978 (2) SA 172 (NC) 175.
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unlawful purpose. 1 Although the judge conceded that
unlawfulness is not an easy concept to explain to an
ignorant person,[282D] he discouraged jUdicial officers from
mentioning specific examples of lawful possession:
"In the present type of case, where there is or may be
a statutory onus upon the accused, a very heavy
responsibility is cast upon a judicial 'o f f i c e r
presiding at the trial, for it is his responsibility to
ensure that the accused is fully aware of the
provisions of the Act, and is fully aware of the nature
of the defence which, if he wishes to escape
conviction, he should put before the court •••• I do not
think that it is necessary that the presiding officer
should tell the accused that he can escape guilt by
satisfying the court that he intended to use the weapon
in self-defence, or indeed that he should suggest to
the accused any other means Whereby he can sh2w that he
did not intend to use the weapon unlawfully".
If the trusted teaching technique of giving examples to
explain abstract concepts is assiduously avoided, however,
the judicial officer's task of explaining the concept of
unlawfulness is made extremely difficult. The fear that an
accused would "adopt" a defence if given examples of lawful
purposes, should not override the principle that the accused
should be given a comprehensible explanation. Admittedly,
the possibility exists that the accused could adopt a
defence so mentioned, but a bold statement asserting a
defence is not sufficient to rebut a presumption,3 and the
accused would still be open to cross-examination by the
prosecutor and questioning by the court. The suggestion that
an accused will escape conviction if he happens to stumble
on an acceptable "lawful purpose", cannot, it is SUbmitted,
1. Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 s 2(1).
2. 282E-G. See also Mtembu 1968 (2) PH H298 (N).
3. Kekwana 1978 (2) SA 172 (NC) 175.
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be regarded as valid. Judicial officers should therefore not
be discouraged from providing a thorough, understandable
explanation which includes examples of how a presumption may
be rebutted.
The explanation of a presumption does not always ensure that
the accused understands what is expected of him, or that he
is able to communicate a rebuttal effectively. The following
advice of Van den Heever J in Siebert 1972 (1) SA 351 (NC)
is instructive in this regard:
"[W]aar 'n arbeider sonder die voordeel van regshulp
wel onder eed getuig, maar nie sy storie ver genoeg
neem nie, sou dit billiker wees dat die hof deur middel
van gepaste vrae pols of hy dit inderdaad verder kan
voer".[353B]
The court's duty is thus not limited to an advisory
capacity; the accused should be actively assisted when it is
apparent that he experiences some difficulty in
presenting his rebuttal of a presumption lucidly.
The effect of an omission to inform the accused of the
operation of a presumption, will depend on whether he has
been prejudiced by it. 1 Where the state relies on a
presumption for the proof of an essential element of an
offence, then an omission to inform the accused thereof
would be fatal for the conviction. 2 Conversely, where the
prosecution does not rely on the presumption, the conviction
1. Andrews 1982 (2) SA 269 (NC) 272Bi Setenane 1985 (1) PH
H461 (0) i Ntuli 1967 (3) SA 721 (N) 722G.
2. Andrews supra 272G; Williams 1975 (2) PH H142 (C);
Khumalo 1979 (4) SA 480 (T) 483H. But see contra Lango
1962 (1) SA 107 (N).
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will not be affected. 1 It should also be noted in this
regard that even where an explanation is given, but it is
more confusing than illuminating, little value will be
attached to the accused's answers that he understood the
explanation and the case will be regarded as if he was not
2duly warned.
The explanation should be recorded verbatim.
3
Where it
does not appear on the record that the explanation was given
and there is some doubt whether it was, the conviction
should be set aside and the matter referred back to the
trial court for a proper warning to be administered.
4
2. ASSISTING THE ACCUSED IN THE PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENCE
When undefended accused are called upon to present their
defence, most are faced with an unfamiliar and daunting
task. They seldom understand the legal procedure and their
role in it sUfficiently to be able to present the lucid and
comprehensive cases submitted by skilled lawyers. In view
of the difficulties experienced by undefended accused in
this regard, the court should routinely assist them in the
presentation of their defence and strict adherence to formal
rules of procedure should not be demanded in their case.
1. Moeketsi ~ Die Staat 1965 (2) PH H157 (0).
2. Brown 1984 (3) SA 399 (C) 401D.
3. Na b o 1968 (4) SA 699 (E) 701H.
4. Lebang 1965 (3) SA 774 (SR).
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2.1. THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED
2.1.1. TESTIFYING FROM THE WITNESS BOX
On occasions, unsophisticated accused have shown a
reluctance to enter the witness box, although intent on
testifying. The phenomenon has been ascribed by a Rhodesian
court1 to the perception that the witness box is the camp
of the opposing faction since the latter testified from
there. The accused supposes that his entering it would
signify either a capitulation to the enemy or a weakening of
his opposition. According to Munnik CJ in Mhlati 1976 (2)
SA 426 (Tk) there exists also among many unsophisticated
Xhosa witnesses a genuine fear of going into the witness box
as they believe it to be bewitched. [427C]
It has been accepted by the Rhodesian court that there is no
requirement that the accused should testify from the witness
box and accordingly he may be allowed to give his evidence
from the dock. 2 Although it is the practice in South
Africa for the accused to give evidence from the witness
box, he ought to be allowed to do so from the dock if he so
requests. 3 In dealing with such accused persons, it is
submitted that there is no room for rules that reflect form
rather than the essence of proceedings. Local perceptions
and beliefs should be allowed to dictate to some extent the
1. Francis 1956 (2) PH H166 (SR).
2. Francis supra; Finiasi 1963 (2) PH H152
(SR); Herbert 1965 (2) SA 385 (SR); Jonathan 1971 (1) SA
402 (RA) .
3. Mhlati 1976 (2) SA 426 (Tk) 427C; Tsane 1978 (4) SA 161
(0) •
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outer trappings of the trial, and the jUdicial officer
should be sensitive to such considerations and accommodate
them where necessary.
2.1.2. PRESENTING HIS EVIDENCE-IN-CHIEF
The undefended accused, perhaps uneducated and/or
inarticulate, confronted by the unfamiliar and formal
atmosphere of the court, may find it difficult to relate his
version of the event in a coherent and logical manner. He
may not confine himself to the incident in question, but may
include antecedent events which appear to the court to be
irrelevant. The court is obliged, however, to allow the
accused his day in court and give him the necessary leeway
to tell his story in his own way. Yet where the accused
omits cardinal aspects of the defence - perhaps facts
already intimated in his explanation of plea or cross-
examination of State witnesses - it should be the court's
duty to draw his attention to these and, through questions,
to pro~pt him to relate his version more comprehensively. 1
The emphasis of the court should be upon eliciting from the
accused as much evidence in favour of the defence case as
possible.
2.1.3. CONTROLLING THE PROSECUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION
When c~oss-examined by the prosecutor, undefended accused
are particularly vulnerable as they may be unaware of their
1. See Tengeni 1967 (1) PH H193 (0) i RaI l 1982 (1) SA 828
(A) 831G.
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right to refuse to answer questions which would introduce
inadmissible evidence, or to object to the manner in which
questions are put. Even if aware of these rights, they would
invariably lack the knowledge and skills necessary to
exercise them. It should therefore be incumbent on the court
to protect the accused's rights by exercising the necessary
control over the prosecutor's questioning. The court must
disallow questions which tend to elicit the accused's
previous convictions or evidence of bad character. 1 In
Dozereli 1983 (3) SA 259 (C) Lategan J held that the
magistrate's failure to restrain the prosecutor from
questioning the accused regarding his previous convictions,
resulted in an infringement of a basic right of the accused
which per se constituted a gross irregularity, warranting
the setting aside of the conviction. [261A]
The court should also ensure that the prosecutor's cross-
examination of the accused is fair. In Petersen 1982 (1) PH
H93 (A) it was remarked that the presiding judicial officer
in casu could and should have stopped the prosecutor when
"his zeal outran his discretion". Even if the accused is
represented, the court should prevent rude and unreasonable
cross-examination. 2 In Gidi 1984 (4) SA 537 (C) Rose-
Innes J said that if an accused is undefended, the court's
duty to ensure that the cross-examination is fair, should be
1. Rlela 1981 (2) PH R193 (0) i Dozereli 1983 (3) SA 259
(C) 260.
2. Omar 1982 (2) SA 357 (N) 359Ai Vaduvela 1974 (1) PR
R(s)63(N) •
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all the more assiduously observed. [540I] In casu the Court
held that the first accused did not have a fair trial as he
was not allowed a full opportunity to state his case because
of the haranguing, badgering and hectoring of the
prosecutor. The second accused, who declined to give
evidence, did not have a fair trial either. The Court found
that it was likely that he had refrained from giving
evidence after he saw how "an accused would be intimidated,
insulted, harassed and overborne in the court should he
venture into the witness box". [543G] Both convictions were
thus set aside. The principle is clear; by failing to
curtail such questioning by the prosecutor, the court failed
in its duty to assist the two accused in the presentation of
their defence. Instead of facilitating the production of
evidence, the court committed an irregularity by allowing
conduct on the part of the prosecutor which inhibited it.
2.1.4. THE RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED
Because an undefended accused is not able to re-examine
himself, Ferreira has suggested that the court should put
questions to clear up aspects which have been muddled during
the cross-examination. [415] It is submitted that this should
be recognized as part and parcel of the jUdicial officer's
overriding duty to see that the accused puts his case as
clearly as possible before the court. 1
1. See Williams 1968 (1) PH L5 (C).
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2.2. WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE
It is a fundamental principle of justice that an accused
should be given ample opportunity to place his case before
court and to call witnesses who may give relevant
evidence. 1 A court should be particularly careful when
refusing to allow an undefended accused to call a witness
and should first be assured that the witness cannot possibly
give relevant evidence. 2 The accused should be given the
fullest opportunity to trace material witnesses. The mere
fact that court officials could not trace a material witness
during a short adjournment, did not allow the magistrate in
Pillay 1967 (1) PH H189 (N) to deny the accused any
further opportunity to attempt the same. Where an undefended
accused encounters difficulties in bringing a witness to
court, it is the duty of the court to assist the accused by
sUbpoenaing the witness in terms of its own powers to call
't 3Wl nesses.
While a state witness is entitled to witness fees unless the
court directs otherwise,4 a witness for the defence will
receive fees covering travelling and transport expenses5
only if the court makes such an order.[S 191(2)] Ferreira
suggests that the court may order the payment of expenses if
the accused is indigent or has been acquitted. [164] It is
1. Tembani 1970 (4) SA 395 (E) 396E.
2. Tembani supra 396Fi Selemana 1975 (4) SA 908 (T) 909A.
3. S 186. Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA 321 (N) 323.
4. S 191(1). See Hiemstra 393.
5. Government Notice No R653 in Regulation Gazette No 2972
of 28 March 1980 reg 3.
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submitted that the court should bring these provisions to
the notice of the undefended accused at the conclusion of
the proceedings and not wait for the unlikely event of the
latter making such an application.
2.3 THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED AND DEFENCE
WITNESSES
The court's duty to remain impartial has been viewed as the
major obstacle to its active participation in the
proceedings. 1 Impartiality entails the jUdicial officer
remaining detached and objective in his assessment and
adjudication of the issues contested before him by the
parties concerned. 2 Active participation in the trial, it is
said, may lead to a dimunition in objectivity,3 and the
following dictum in Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183 has often been
quoted to highlight this danger: "If the jUdicial officer
descends into the arena he is liable to have his vision
clouded by the dust of the conflict".4 Furthermore, in line
with the principle that justice must not only be done but
also be seen to be done, the Courts have stressed that the
jUdicial officer should appear impartial, particularly in
the eyes of the accused;5 the court should not be seen to be
1. De Villiers 1984 (1) SA 519 (0) 574G. See also Jacobs
1970 (2) PH H152 (C).
2. RaIl 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) 832; Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566
(A) 568H; Roopsingh 1956 (4) SA 510 (A) 514.
3. Van Niekerk 1981 (3) SA 787 (T) 794.
4. 189. See also Roopsingh supra 514; Walsh 1961 (2) PH
F72 (N).
5. Sigwahla supra 568Hi RaIl supra
832Ai Skhwebelo 1982 (1) PH H60 (0); De Villiers
supra 546; Calata 1984 (1) PH H20 (E)-.-
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t ' 1siding with the prosecu 1on.
What then is the correct role for the court in questioning
the accused and his witnesses? The answer lies in the
distinction between formal and material truth. The adversary
system is predicated upon adjudication on the formal truth,
that is, on evidence that the parties choose to produce in
court. A system predicated on material truth places an onus
upon the jUdicial officer, before coming to a decision, to
establish the truth by his own endeavours; he is thus not
reliant on the evidence presented by the litigants. 2 In
the adversary system, however, there is no overriding duty
on a judicial officer to establish the material truth and it
is sufficient for him to rely on the formal truth. His
participation in the production of evidence is therefore
limited to the clarification of the formal truth. 3
The jUdicial officer's power to question the accused and his
witnesses is accordingly restricted to elucidating or clarifying t h l
evidence presented. In RaIl 1982 (1) SA 828 (A), in the
court ~ ~' Didcott J defined his role as trial jUdge
inquisitorially, declaring himself "not a referee in a game
who is here merely to blow the whistle." He elaborated: "I
am here to discover the truth of the matter". [830G-H] The
Appellate Division, however, rejected the view that the
1. Wood 1964 (3) SA 103 (0) 105G.
2. Hermann (1978) 2 SACC 3.
3. See Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183 185; Saib v R 1946 (2)
PH H191 (A); Wood supra 105; ~ 1962 (1-)---
SA 197 (A) 205.
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court's power to question is so extensive.
1
Acknowledging
the well known dictum in Hepworth 1928 AD 265 that the
jUdge is an administrator of justice, not merely an umpire
to see that the rules are obeyed, Trollip AJA in RaIl
formulated the court's power to question witnesses as follows:
"Inter alia a Judge is therefore entitled and often
obliged-rn-the interests of justice to put such
additional questions to witnesses, including the
accused, as seems to him desirable in order to elicit
or elucidate the truth more fully in respect of
relevant aspects of the case". [831C-D]
The court's power to "elicit and elucidate the truth more
fully" is thus seen to be SUbsidiary, complementing the
parties' efforts in searching for the truth.
A number of guidelines have been formulated to limit the
court's questioning of the accused and his witnesses to its
circumscribed purpose. 2 The proper time to question
witnesses is after the litigants have completed their
questioning. 3 Although leading questions are not
per se proscribed,4 they are not acceptable when asked in
a persistent and pressing manner. 5 Nor is a jUdicial
officer entitled to put such questions to a witness if the
I I t d t b t h ' 'd' 6answers are ca cu a e 0 e 0 lS preJu lce. Cross-
1. 832H. See A st Q Skeen "Descending into the Arena" (1982)
6 SACC 180.
2. See RaIl supra 831H-832H.
3. Meyer 1972 (3) SA 480 (A) 483.
4. RaIl supra 831C-Ej ~ 1952 (3) SA 212 (A) 222.
5. Baartman 1960 (3) SA 535 (A) 541F.
6. Laubscher 1926 AD 276; Masinyana 1958 (1) SA 616 (A)
621D. See also Beattie 1967 (2) PH H318 (0).
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examination is not permissible. 1 The manner in which
questions are asked is often more important than the number
and nature of the questions;2 the questioning should not
intimidate or disconcert the witness to the extent that it
unduly influences the quality or nature of his replies,
affects his demeanour or credibility,3 or prevents him
, h' 'd 4from conveY1ng 1S eV1 ence.
The undefended accused in the witness box, it was said in
Tengeni 1967 (1) PH H193 (0), deserves more accommodating
treatment than the ordinary witness. It has been stressed
that the court must be particularly careful in these cases
to preserve an attitude of impartiality5 and should not
assume the role of the prosecutor. 6 The court faces a
dilemma where, through the inept cross-examination of the
prosecutor, the defence of an accused may not be properly
tested. The problem has been raised,7 but no decision has
ever suggested that the court should examine the accused or
his witnesses in order to fulfil the prosecutor's function
in this regard.
The principles guiding the court's questioning entail in
general a prohibition against an inquisitorial search for
1. Walsh 1961 (2) PH F72 (N); Taylor 1968 (2) PH H388 (N);
Titus 1974 (2) PH H(S)95 (C); Van Niekerk 1981 (3) SA 787
(T) 794.
2. De Villiers 1984 (1) SA 519 (0) 545; Skhwebelo 1982 (1)
PH H60 (0).
3. RaIl 1982 (1) 828 (A) 832G.
4. De Villiers supra 548.
5. Eshumael 1973 (2) PH H83 (RA).
6. g 1962 (1) SA 197 (A) 195 .
7. Titus supra.
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the truth, particularly where the accused is undefended. Any
questioning of this accused should be directed at eliciting
or elucidating his defence, not testing its veracity. The
primary aim of the questioning is to assist the undefended
accused. In RaIl it was said that the judge "should and
ordinarily would assist him to put his defence adequately,
if necessary by the Judge himself questioning prosecution
witnesses as weil as the accused and his witnesses".1
It has been argued above that it should be the proper duty
of the court to test the reliability of the evidence of the
state witnesses where the accused is unable to do so
himself. If the court's role is defined as an inquisitorial
one in respect of state witnesses, does consistency and
fairness require that this applies equally to the undefended
accused and his witnesses? It is submitted that the answer
to this question should be in the negative. The recommended
adaptations to the court's role in respect of state
witnesses are necessitated by the undefended accused's
inability to play his role in the adversary system in the
testing of the state evidence. The undefended accused is
consistently at a disadvantage in this regard in relation to
the state, which is represented by a legal practitioner,
well-qualified to test the defence evidence. This inequality
is such that the court's duty to see that justice is done,
demands that it assists the undefended accused where he will
1. 831G. See also Sigwahla 1982 (1) SA 566 (A) 568F-H; Du
Preez 1972 (2) SA 519 (A); Williams 1968 (1) PH L5 (C).--
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be prejudiced by the lack of legal representation. Moreover,
should the court remain passive in such an unequal contest
it would compromise its impartiality because, by allowing
the prosecutor to take unfair advantage of the undefended
accused's ignorance and incompetence, it sides indirectly
with the prosecution. These considerations do not apply to
the examination of the accused or his witnesses. since the
state is represented by a competent adversary, there is no
need for the court to deviate from its established role.
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3. THE CALLING OF WITNESSES BY THE COURT
section 167 empowers the court to examine any person, other
than the accused, who has been subpoenaed to attend or who
happens to be attending the proceedings, and to recall any
witness, including the accused, who has testified. The court
is obliged to follow such a course of action if it "appears
essential to the just decision of the case". section 186
empowers the court to subpoena, at its discretion, any other
person, excluding the accused,l as a witness and once
again, it is duty-bound to do so if this is "essential for
the just decision of the case".
The court has a wide dis~retion to call witnesses,2 but
this power should be exercised jUdicially.3 Only if it is
used for a legally acceptable purpose can there be said to
be a jUdicial exercise of the discretion. In Hepworth 1928
AD 265 Curlewis JA said that the power was to be used "so
that an innocent person be not convicted or a guilty person
get free by reason, inter alia, of some omission, mistake or
technicality".4 The court may thus assist the prosecution
by calling a witness who has been omitted by mistake or is
necessary in order to rectify some technical deficiency.5
1. Moepane 1958 (3) SA 649 (E).
2. Siko 1959 (2) PH H174 (A); Olyn 1984 (2) SA 75 (NC) 78H;
Impey 1960 (4) SA 556 (E) 561 ("the widest possible
discretion"); ~ 1980 (2) SA 946 (A) 953.
3. Gani 1958 (1) SA 102 (A) 108; siko supra.
4. 277. See also Evans 1924 CPD 232 233; Omar 1935 AD 230;
Impey supra 561. ----
5. See Hepworth supra 277; Van Schoor 1941 CPD 392; Jonas
1920 EDL 26; Mgotywa 1958 (~SA 99 (E); Beck 1949 (2) SA
626 (N); Singh 1948 (3) SA 554 (N) 557; Kemp 1973 (1) PH
H(S) 29 (C).
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The power may not, however, be used to perform the function
of the prosecution,l particularly when there is no




exercise its power to elucidate issues, but not to rebut
a defence such as an alibi. 4 The power may also be used to
assist the accused. 5 In respect of undefended accused, it
has been held that if the court notices that he experiences
difficulty in getting a witness to court, it should subpoena
the witness on his behalf.
6
The jUdicial officer must examine the witness himself,7
and should allow questioning by the parties; he should
specifically invite the undefended accused's participation.
After calling a witness, the court should afford both
parties an opportunity to lead further evidence8 and
where the accused is undefended, he should be invited to do
so.9 It is extremely difficult, it was held in Soni 1973 (1)
PH H(S)20 (N), to ascertain in cases where no such
invitation was extended, whether there has been prejudice to
the accused, and in such circumstances he should receive the
benefit of the doubt and
1. Hepworth 1928 AD 265 270; Impey 1960 (4) SA 556 (E) 562.
2. Naidoo 1934 NPD 393; Hlalele 1978 (1) PH H20 (0); Jada
1985 (2) SA 182 (E) 184G; Contra see Singh 1943 NPD 2~
3. Hepworth supra 270; Hlalele 1978 (1) PH H20 (0).
4. Impey supra 562.
5. Lucas 1968 (2) SA 592 (E); Hlalele supra.
6. Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA 321 (N) 323E.
7. Du Preez 1972 (2) SA 519 (SWA) 522.
8. Du Preez supra 522; Benjamin 1983 (2) PH H198 (C);
Johnson 1939 AD 241; Lubbe 1966 (2) SA 70 (0) 72; Nea Hellas
(pty) Ltd and Theo 1935 TPD 262 265; Molifante 196~1) PH
Hl16 (0).
9. Soni 1973 (1) PH H(S)20 (N).
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the conviction should be set aside.
1
The principles formulated in respect of the court's power to
question witnesses, are a useful guide for the exercise of
the court's discretion in this regard. The power is to be
exercised within the confines of the adversary process; the
court is not to use its power to perform the function of
the prosecution. However, in respect of the undefended
accused, who cannot fulfil the role of a true adversary, the
court should use its power actively to assist the latter in
the presentation of his defence. It should therefore be
incumbent on the court to call such witnesses who, in its
opinion, may favour the accused. If the court has no access
to information regarding such potential witnesses, its use
of the power to call witnesses would be severely restricted.
It has been argued above2 that it should be the duty of the
prosecutor to hand over to the court statements of witnesses
favourable to the accused who have not been called by the
state. The court would then be in a position to assess their
value and, where necessary, call these witnesses.
1. See also Johnson 1939 AD 241; Nea Hellas (pty) Ltd and
Theo 1935 TPD 262 265.
2. See ch 6 par 1.
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4. THE DEFENCE CASE - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
At the end of the State case, the undefended accused is
thrust onto the centre stage of the courtroom drama. The
opportunity to present his defence offers him the most
important occasion for proving his innocence, as he has
invariably been unable to discredit the State case due to
his inadequate cross-examination. To compensate for his lack
of knowledge and skills, the court is obliged to advise him
about his rights and duties in presenting his defence. To
assist him actively in the presentation of his defence,
however, remains in the domain of the court's discretion.
4.1. ADVISING THE ACCUSED REGARDING HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES
The Code and the case law have spelt out clearly the various
rights and duties which the court has to disclose to the
accused. In the survey it was found that the court
SUbstantially complied with these rules. Every accused was
informed of his right to testify, 91,9% of the right to call
witnesses, and 78,8% of the right to remain silent. Most of
the accused (85%) were informed that their s 115 statement
was not regarded as evidence. Where a presumption was
operative, the court usually explained it, and the same
applied to competent verdicts. The court explained the
rights personally and did not delegate this duty to the
interpreter. The translation of these rights to the Zulu
speaking accused was also fairly accurate. 1
1. strict compliance with these legal provisions is also
reported by Bekker et al (14).
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Only the rights and duties that the court was legally bound
to explain, were disclosed. There was no explanation of the
court process by which witnesses could be subpoenaed, or of
the possibility of having material and essential witnesses
sUbpoenaed free of charge for indigent accused. Where a duty
was not firmly established in the case law, for example the
duty to inform the accused that he will be cross-examined by
the prosecutor should he testify (as suggested in Vezi 1963
(1) SA 9 (N», there was no compliance.
Apart from reminding the accused that his s 115 statement
was not evidence, other considerations essential to making
an informed decision were not routinely divulged. In a few
isolated instances, however, the court went beyond the call
of duty to assist the accused to make an informed decision.
In case 15 RC, for example, the regional magistrate stressed
the importance of giving evidence in that particular case.
The state established a prima facie case against two accused
for the theft of a film projector. At the end of the state
case the regional magistrate gave a full explanation of
their rights, and continued as follows:
M: You may state your case now.
A1: No.
M: (repeated the explanation and added) The court cannot
attach much credibility to that [s 115] statement.
A: I have a witness.
M: IIIl ask accused number two. Think the matter over.
A2: No evidence.
M: Do you realize what the implications are. (He thereupon
repeated the evidence of the key state witness) Your denial
is not good enough.
No case was encountered, however, where the court strongly
advised the accused that he should close his case because
there was no case to meet. In the end the majority of the
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accused - 72 of 92 who presented their defence - decided to
testify.
4.2. THE ACCUSED'S PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENCE
Bennett and Feldman contend that one of the central
determinants of the outcome of contested trials is the
participants' storytelling ability.1 The credibility of
evidence - and consequently the verdict - hinges on the way
it is presented to court. This involves the party's capacity
to produce a coherent and reasonable account of the events
in question. The coherence and reasonableness of evidence
are not, however, absolu~e qualities, but are defined
according to the social and cultural context. Thus a person
from an educationally deprived background or from a
different class, cultural or race group to that of the
jUdicial officer, may not be able to present an account that
is coherent and reasonable in the latter's eyes. These
differences may, however, be mitigated by a defence lawyer,
who usually has much in common with the jUdicial officer in
terms of the abovementioned demographic factors. He may
bridge the differences by restructuring the accused's
version into a story which is intelligible to the court.
Both prosecution and defence lawyers play an important role
as communication facilitators to ensure that the
complainant's and accused's stories are lucidly presented to
the court. In the preparation for trial the accused's
1. WL Bennett & MS Feldman Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom (1981).
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version is moulded into a logical form and during the trial
the lawyer seeks to lead the accused to relate his story in
a precise, orderly fashion to the court. The undefended
accused, on the other hand, has great difficulty in
presenting his defence in the same manner without assistance
or guidance. 1 His inability to communicate his evidence in
an effective manner may be further compounded by fear,
confusion or inarticulateness.
2
In South Africa Hansson has explored the relationship
between the difficulties experienced in the comprehension of
evidence and the evaluation of such as credible.
3
She
examined the extent to which class differences led to
comprehension problems which, in turn, would affect the
credibility of a witness and in the end the chances of
conviction. A number of undefended cases were selected in
which the witnesses shared Afrikaans as a first language but
came from different social c~asses according to their race -
White or Coloured. The comprehensibility and credibility
assessments of 'common users' of language were compared with
the credibility assessments of the magistrates who presided
over those cases. The 'common users' were students with the
same white middle class background as the magistrates.
1. Cf McBarnet 127.
2. S Dell Silence in Court (1969); Sulman & willis 2E cit
139; McBarnet 127.
3. D Hansson structural Ambiguity of Evidence as a
Determinant of Evidence Credibility: ~ ComparatIve study
of the Evaluation of Different Groups in the Administration
of Justice (1984) Report to the HSRC's-rnquiry into
Intergroup Relations.
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The results showed that the evidence given by Coloured
witnesses was more difficult to understand than that given
by White witnesses. [27] The comprehensibility of the
evidence was dependent on the structure in which the
evidence was presented. The structure or framework of a
testimony (or story) was formed during the witness'
evidence-in-chief and it remained crucial to the coherence
of the rest of his evidence. [30] It was found that Coloured
witnesses were less able than White witnesses to structure
their evidence in a manner that "conforms to the ideal
schema of a coherent narrative". [30] The rules determining
the ideal narrative schema in a south African court are
particular to people of a western, White, middle class
background.
There was a high probability that magistrates' jUdgments of
the credibility of testimony would be lower when the
evidence was found to be not readily comprehensible. Where
the evidence-in-chief was difficult to understand due to its
poor structure, it was more likely to be evaluated as
lacking in credibility than evidence which was well-
structured and therefore comprehensible. [33] Hansson thus
concluded that
"the findings point to the structure and
comprehensibility of testimony as a likely source of
systematic bias that may operate to the disadvantage of
Coloured court participants by increasing the
probability of a jUdgment of incredible and therefore
guilty". [34]
The effect of such class differences was mitigated by the
assistance of a legal practitioner. This meant that the
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undefended accused was doubly discriminated against, not
/ / / /
only vis a vis the prosecution, but also vis ~ vis defended
accused. The complainant and other state witnesses had the
advantage of being led by the prosecutor, who would attempt
to present their evidence in a coherent way. The accused, on
the other hand, was left unguided in the presentation of his
evidence. To ameliorate the communication in court, Hansson
suggested, inter alia, the greater use of legal
representation and the appointment of assessors belonging to
the same class or racial group as the accused.
If, as in the Hansson study, class divisions within the same
language group can have a marked effect on the communication
process, then differences in language as well as in class
and cUlture, would have an even more profound influence. In
our sample the accused, mostly Black and ZUlu-speaking, had
to tell their story, unassisted, to White jUdicial officers.
The jUdicial officers allowed the accused to tell their
story in their own way, but few attempted to elucidate it
afterwards. Only a third of the accused were asked questions
(on average not more than three) for the sake of greater
clarity. The accused's "inarticulateness", then, may well
have stood in the way of laying a sound foundation for what
was perhaps a truthful account.
The ZUlu-speaking accused had additional problems in
communicating his story through the medium of an
interpreter. Apart from the inherent difficulties
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associated with communicating effectively across social
barriers, there are numerous obstacles in the way of a
correct translation of the accused's evidence. The
interpreter hears the story piecemeal and is thus not in a
position to appreciate the significance of small details and
nuances in the light of the full story; he may consequently
omit these in the translation. It was found that complex
.
statements containing numerous small details and subtleties
of meaning were often simplified. A statement expressing an
uncertainty, for example, might be transformed into a bald
and positive assertion. Because of the social, cultural and
linguistic barriers between the majority of the accused and
the bench, then, many accused may have failed to establish
the all important framework for a coherent and credible
story during evidence-in-chief.
4.3. TESTING THE ACCUSED'S EVIDENCE
The prosecutors utilized their opportunity to cross-
examine the accused in true adversary style and combatively
sUbjected them to extensive questioning. On average they
asked 33,9 questions of each accused,l and more than 50
questions were put to 22,2% of the accused. The prosecutors
were in a very powerful position to cross-examine the
accused effectively as they had a host of information
available through which the accused's consistency, and hence
1. The study of Bekker et al (14) shows a remarkable
similarity to this sample,-reporting an average of 34
questions per accused.
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credibility, could be tested. A prosecutor may have at his
disposal the accused's statement to the police, his s 115
statement, his cross-examination of state witnesses, and
finally, his evidence under oath. The accused's various
statements were usually given at different times, resulting
often in discrepancies which were not necessarily the result
of the fabrication of evidence. Furthermore, the prosecutor
also used as material for cross-examination the accused's
conduct of his case, inter alia, why he failed to make a
statement to the police or to the court, why he failed to
cross-examine, to put certain facts in dispute or to put his
defence to a witness.
In 6,9% of the cases the accused's police statement was used
against him; his explanation of plea in 11,1% and his
failure to cross-examine in 25,0%. The consistency of the
accused's evidence was thoroughly scrutinized. In Case 23 RC
the accused, charged with rape, was cross-examined at length
on his failure to cross-examine and for not disclosing more
information in his s 115 statement. Although the court was
precluded from holding the accused's failure to cross-
examine against him, the prosecutor was free to make full
use of it in cross-examination and thereby tarnish the
accused's credibility. The court exercised little
restraining power over the conduct of the prosecutors'
cross-examination and on only five occasions were their
questions disallowed.
During the cross-examination of 41,7% of the accused, the
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court joined in, asking on average 6,6 questions. After
cross-examination 59,7% of the accused were subjected to a
further 9,8 questions (average) from the bench.
1
There was
little evidence that the questioning by the court was aimed
at assisting the accused to put their defence before the
court and it usually amounted to a testing of the accused's
version. The judicial officer was undoubtedly in a most
favourable position to cross-examine the accused. He had, in
addition to the prosecutor's armament of the accused's
different statements and conduct, the latter's cross-
examination of the accused. with years of experience the
judicial officer could with ease pick out discrepancies in
the evidence of the accused. The view expressed by
magistrates in their evidence to the Hoexter Commission -
that the low level of experience of prosecutors virtually
forced them to undertake the cross-examination of
witnesses2 - was evident in the behaviour of some
magistrates. In the few cases where the prosecutors did not
show the necessary skill, the court entered the arena
readily. Even where the level of experience and competence
of the prosecutors was high, as in the regional court,
jUdicial officers still participated in the questioning,
usually going beyond the elucidation and clarification of
the accused's evidence. The court's examination, then, was
an integral part of the process of testing the defence
evidence.
1. Bekker et al (14) report 13 questions per accused.
2. Hoexter Report Part 11 par 4.3.4.
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In translating the cross-examination of the accused,
furthermore, some interpreters exhibited a pro-prosecution
bias. Throughout their translation of the accused's
testimony, they commented negatively on his credibility,
sometimes sUbtly, often blatantly. The conduct of an
interpreter in Case A23 .RC represented an extreme version of
this practice. A Black accused, aged 25, faced a charge of
rape. When he was cross-examined by the prosecutor, the
interpreter commented directly on the proceedings through
the manner of his translation of the questions and answers.
When the prosecutor asked a good question (according to the
interpreter), the latter would smile, turn to the accused,
intensify the atmosphere by moving closer and then pounce
the question on the accused. When the accused attempted to
answer, he would, with great mimicry, hold his hand to his
ear, then smile broadly, bemused by the stupidity of the
answer, and translate it in a belittling fashion. At times
he would even burst out laughing at the accused's answers.
Both the prosecutor and the regional magistrate enjoyed the
interpreter's antics and seemed to accept his assessment of
the credibility of the witness. Not only was the interpreter
translating; he was giving his interpretation of the value
of the evidence as well.
It is not improbable that jUdicial officers, aware of the
communication difficulties which linguistic and cultural
differences produce, may rely on the interpreter for an
"authoritative" jUdgment upon which to base their assessment
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of the credibility of Zulu-speaking witnesses. The
interpreter, bridging the language barrier, and perhaps also
mediating the cultural divide, would become the 'common
user' guide for the White magistrate. The interpreters were
not, however, always detached and impartial observers. They
were part of the state machinery and some exhibited a
definite pro-prosecution bias which made the objectivity of
such assessments dubious.
Re-examination offers a defended accused the opportunity to
undo some- of the damage done during cross-examination by
rectifying wrong impressions created thereby. The undefended
accused could also utilize this opportunity to effect the
purpose of re-examination. They were not told, however, what
the purpose of re-examination was, and were merely asked
whether they wanted "to add anything". Such an explanation
of this right was not of much assistance to an accused who
had just given evidence; only one accused utilized the
opportunity, but in a manner which did not correspond with
the intended purpose of re-examination. The undefended
accused were thus effectively deprived of this opportunity
to mitigate the harshness of the adversary mode of testing
evidence.
4.4. CALLING DEFENCE WITNESSES
Of the 92 accused who presented their defences, only 14
called a witness and a further three presented a third
witness. None of the awaiting-trial prisoners called a
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witness for their defence. The small number of defence
witnesses called could well be the result of the legal and
practical difficulties involved in bringing them to court.
Firstly, the accused were not informed about the right to
subpoena a witness, nor about the provisions regarding the
free issue of a subpoena for material and essential
witnesses should they be indigent. Secondly, even if the
undefended accused was aware that he could subpoena a
witness, the procedure by which it was to be executed was a
daunting, if not impossible, task. 1
The first step was to obtain a subpoena form. Since it was
not generally known where such a form could be purchased, it
was decided to investigate whether assistance could be
obtained at the magistrates' court. The clerk of the court
seemed an appropriate official to approach. There were,
however, no signs to direct one towards the correct office.
When it was eventually located on the first floor, a
subpoena form was requested, but the clerk's initial
response was that the office did not provide such a service
to an accused and she did not know where the form could be
purchased. Eventually she relented and referred the writer
to the process clerk of the prosecutor's office. From that
official on the seventh floor, the quest was directed to the
typing pool on the second floor. A form could not, however,
be obtained without the authority of the process clerk. This
meant another journey to the process clerk, back to the
1. See Steytler (1983) 7 SACC 74.
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typist to collect the form, to return yet again to the
process clerk to have the form rUbber-stamped for issue.
The difficulty experienced in obtaining a sUbpoena was no
doubt due to the fact that none of these officials had
previously encountered an accused in search of a subpoena.
The second step was to serve the subpoena. In Durban there
are two separate offices for messengers of the court serving
different sections of the magisterial district. Both these
offices are more than a kilometre away from the magistrates'
court and a kilometre apart from one another. The correct
messenger's office had to be traced. If the witness resided
outside the magisterial district of the city (as does a
large section of the city's work force), a further problem
would be encountered in locating the correct messenger for
the particular area. The last step was to pay the required
amount for the sUbpoena and the service.
In a few cases the court sUbpoenaed witnesses on behalf of
the accused where it was apparent that he encountered
problems in securing their presence at court. The rule in
Hlongwane 1982 (4) SA 321 (N) did not, however, imply that
the accused should be routinely informed of the methods by
which he could bring a witness to court and it remained
incumbent on him to draw the court's attention to his plight
before assistance could be expected.
4.5 LEADING DEFENCE WITNESSES
The accused often experienced great difficulty in presenting
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his witnesses' evidence in the correct adversarial manner.
When a witness was called, the court routinely asked, "What
do you want your witness to say?" Although this may sound to
an undefended accused like an invitation to ask leading
questions, the court did not relax the strictures of that
rule of evidence. In Case 23 RC the accused, charged with
rape, attempted to lead his witness after a similar
invitation. He was stopped and told by the magistrate "You
are not allowed to put leading questions. Phrase your
questions in such a way that his answers are his and not
yours." The accused's confused reply was: "Who should first
put questions to the witness?" The court's answer was
simply: "You". The accused was cons~stently left alone to
attempt to extract the required information from his witness
in the accepted adversary manner. As with his own evidence,
the presentation of the witness' testimony was not
structured or coherent. The jUdicial officers did not
perceive it as their task to lead the defence witness. The
insistence on the correct legal procedure in the
presentation of the defence evidence frequently restricted,
rather than facilitated, the production of evidence.
4.6. WITNESSES CALLED BY THE COURT
The court used its power to recall or call witnesses
sparingly. Courts more readily recalled witnesses still
present at court and did so on five occasions. only once did
a magistrate call his own witness to elucidate a factual
dispute and that was in a defended case. The availability
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of "material and essential" witnesses not called by either
party was seldom apparent from the evidence presented in
court. Moreover, the prosecutor did not disclose to the
court or the accused the police statements of witnesses who
were not called but who might give evidence favourable to
the accused. The court, unaware of the existence of such
possible witnesses, was mostly precluded from adopting a
more inquisitorial approach to the production of evidence.
5. CONCLUSION
The handicaps suffered by the undefended accused in an
adversary framework are most vividly illustrated at this
stage of the trial where he is called upon to become the
central actor in the proceedings. Required to produce and
lead evidence in support of his plea of not guilty, this
accused faces numerous obstacles, the most serious being his
lack of legal knowledge and his inability to communicate his
defence effectively due to the differences of language,
culture and class between him and the jUdicial officer. Yet
the legal provisions aimed at facilitating his fullest
participation in the production of evidence are insufficient
to realize this objective. While clear rules require the
jUdicial officer to advise the accused of his basic rights
and duties in relation to the production of evidence -
resulting in substantial compliance with this duty - the
disclosure of considerations pertinent to the exercise of
such rights and duties is invariably left to the court's
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discretion. The court's duty to assist the accused in the
presentation of his defence is ill-defined and on the whole
discretionary and court practice in this respect is
accordingly erratic. The court's active participation in the
production of evidence at this stage is limited to the
elucidation of witnesses' answers but the absence of any
definite limit for questioning directed towards probing the
defence evidence means that the latter is not only
thoroughly tested by the prosecutor but also regularly
scrutinized by the jUdicial officer. The inadequacy of the
legal protection of the undefended accused in his
presentation of the defence case means that he will
routinely fail to meet the challenge of his adversary.
CHAPTER EIGHT THE ADDRESS ON THE MERITS AND JUDGMENT
1. THE ADDRESS ON THE MERITS
The final act of participation in determining the accused's
criminal liability is the address by each party on the
merits of the case.[S 175(1)] This part of the proceedings
is the supreme instance where the lawyer is called upon to
exhibit his skills in the analysis of facts and the
marshalling of legal argument. This opportunity to influence
the court's decision is not, however, designed to
accommodate laymen uninstructed in the law and lacking the
skills of advocacy. To redress the disadvantages that the
undefended accused may suffer due to his incapacity at this
stage of the trial, both the prosecutor and the court should
offer him some assistance.
1.1 THE PROSECUTOR'S ADDRESS TO THE COURT
The prosecutor, in accordance with his duty as "minister of
the truth", need not argue for a conviction where he is
convinced that a case has not been made out against the
accused. 1 Even if the case against the accused is
convincing, Ferreira suggests that the prosecutor may still
comment on any factors favouring the accused. [416] Although
the court is not bound to follow a prosecutor's attitude
towards conviction,2 it will take serious cognizance
thereof. The prosecutor can thus play an important role in
1. Ferreira 417.
2. See eg sitlu 1971 (2) SA 238 (N).
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assisting the undefended accused, who is seldom able to
utilize this opportunity to advance any argument on the
facts or law.
1.2 ADVISING THE ACCUSED REGARDING HIS RIGHT TO ADDRESS
THE COURT
It is trite law that the accused or his legal advisor should
be given the opportunity to address the court on the
merits. 1 In earlier decisions convictions were maintained
despite the court's failure to afford the accused the
opportunity to address, as long as he was not prejudiced
thereby.2 In Mutambanengwe 1976 (2) SA 434 (RA) it was
held that if the evidence of the state is overwhelming and
the accused's evidence is so bad that no argument could
persuade the court to acquit the accused, the failure to
give the accused the opportunity to address the court on the
merits does not warrant the setting aside of the conviction.
In Mabote 1983 (1) SA 745 (0), however, the Court regarded
the right to participate in the proceedings at this stage as
a fundamental principle, the denial of which per se is a
gross irregularity, irrespective of the prospects of
success. 3 The latter approach is preferable as the
recognition of the right to participate in the
1. O'Connel ~ Attorney-General and Magistrate, Pretoria 1930
TPD 9; Malherbe 1931 OPO 99; Gwmanda 1960 (2) PH H242 (N);
Msibe 1945 (2) PH H194 (0); Bresler 1967 (2) SA 451 (A).
2 .. Pillay 1947 (3) SA 254 (T) ; Kaleni ~ 1959 (4) SA 543 (E);
Phlke 1953 (1) SA 59 1 (0 ).
3. 746G. See also Louw 1965 (1) PH H77 (0); Malherbe supra
100; Breakfast 1970 (2) SA 611 (E).
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decisionmaking process should not be dependent on the
jUdicial officer's assessment of the strength of the state
case. Apart from the fact that participation in the
proceedings should be regarded as one of the basic
principles of a fair trial, the discretionary enforcement of
the rule cannot exclude the possibility of prejudice because
"when the magistrate weighed up the case against him [the
accused] something which might have told in his favour was
not in the scale".l
Although the Code does not require that the court must
enquire whether the parties wish to address the court, it
was held in Parmanand 1954 (3) SA 833 (A) that the
jUdicial officer should make such an enquiry and record the
response. The failure of the court to conduct such an
enquiry has not always been regarded as an irregularity.2
In Cooper 1926 AD 54 the Court distinguished between
denying the accused the opportunity and failing to ask him
whether he wished to utilize the opportunity. In the latter
case, the Court held, there was no irregUlarity where an
undefended accused, who had a string of previous convictions
and must have known his rights, did not ask the court for an
opportunity to address it on the merits. 3 Although it may
be argued that there is an onus on lawyers to assert their
1. Yeni 1955 (2) PH H221 (N). See also Malherbe 1931 OPD
99 100.
2. See Mutambanengwe 19 76 (2) SA 434 (RA).
3. See also Kamffer 1965 (3) SA 96 (T) 99C.
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right to address if the court fails to invite them, this
is not a tenable position in respect of the undefended
accused. Failure to disclose the right to him amounts, in
effect, to a denial of the opportunity.
It may be contended that because undefended accused
routinely fail to advance any argument at this stage of the
trial, there is no justification for vigorously asserting
their right. In Yeni 1955 (2) PH H221 (N) Broome JP
described the undefended accused's efforts in this regard as
follows:
"Few undefended accused appreciate the difference
between evidence and argument and in my own experience,
when they return to the dock after giving evidence,
they nearly always feel that they have said all that
they want to say; indeed it is usually quite difficult
to get them to understand that they are entitlid to
address the court and they hardly ever do so".
There are, nevertheless, cogent reasons for protecting the
accused's right. Firstly, during his address, the accused
could mention further information that might be relevant for
a just decision by the court and in the case of an accused
who chose not to testify, this would be a valuable
opportunity to state his case. 3 Although the information
so conveyed may not carry much weight, it still has
evidential value. 4 Secondly, if the prosecutor addresses
the court, the audi alteram partem rule demands that the
accused should be granted the same opportunity.
1. See sitlu 1971 (2) SA 238 (N).
2. See also Mutambanengwe 1976 (2) SA 434 (RA) 438.
3. See Yeni 1955 (2) PH H221 (N).
4. See Van der Merwe et al 138.
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If it is recognized as important to extend the invitation to
the undefended accused, the question arises as to what the
content of such an invitation should be? simply to ask: "Do
you have anything to say before jUdgment?" does not assist
the accused much as it does not explain the purpose of the
address and will invariably result in a repetition of his
evidence or his silence. It may be to little avail, on the
other hand, to attempt to transform the accused into a
lawyer by giving him an extensive explanation of the
intricacies of advocacy. Yet, if the accused is apprised of
the basic purposes of the address, his participation may be
more constructive. It is submitted that the following
explanation may be useful to an undefended accused:
"You have heard the state witnesses and you have
presented your side. You have now the opportunity to
say why the state witnesses should not be believed, for
example, if they have contradicted themselves, or each other,
or if they have reason to lie to the court.
You have been charged with the crime X. The essential
elements are the following .••• Do you wish to argue that
any of them have not been proved?
The purpose of the address is not to repeat your
version but for you to comment on the whole case".
If the court is duty-bound to facilitate the undefended
accused's participation in the process, it should not pay
lip-service to a right by merely mentioning its existence;
it should endeavour to render the right accessible by making




In arriving at its judgment the court is bound by the rule
that the state bears the onus of proving the accused's guilt
1beyond reasonable doubt. Although the state evidence may
be reliable and credible, the court is bound to acquit the
accused if there exists a reasonable possibility that his
2 .
evidence may be true. The rationale underlying the
imposition of a more onerous duty on the state is that "in
the search for the truth, it is better that guilty men
should go free than that an innocent man should be
punished".3 The court should thus convict an accused only
when there are valid reasons why the evidence for the state
is true above reasonable doubt and the evidence for the
accused is beyond reasonable doubt false. 4
Where there is a conflict between the evidence of the state
witnesses and that of the defence, the court is to assess
the credibility of the witnesses' evidence in terms of its
reliability, consistency and probability.5 Having reached
its decision as to why the evidence of a witness should be
rejected or accepted, the court must state its reasons: "If
the reasons are, because of inherent probabilities, or
because of contradictions in the evidence of the witness, or
1. Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) 569.
2. Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 (W) 537Gi Mgoma 1962 (2) SA 209
(N) 211.
3. Kubeka supra 538F.
4. Mabaso 1978 (3) SA 5 (0) 8F.
5. See Singh 1975 (1) SA 227 (N) 228F-Gi Guess 1976 (4) SA
715 (A) 718.
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because of his being contradicted by more trustworthy
witnesses, the Court expects the Magistrate to say so".l In
delivering its jUdgment the court is obliged to communicate
its findings and the reasons for them to the accused. 2 Where
the accused is undefended, it is important that the court
should take particular care to explain the reasons for its
jUdgment comprehen~ively and comprehensibly since the latter
does not have the services of a lawyer to make the jUdgment
intelligible to him. This would increase the accused's
understanding of the trial's outcome and facilitate possible
appeal and review proceedings.
1. Schoonwinkel v Swart's Trustee 1911 TPD 387 401. Quoted
with approval in-Guess 1976 (4) SA 715 (A) 718.
2. Irnrnelrnan 1978 (3) SA 726 (A) 729A.
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3. THE ADDRESS ON THE MERITS AND JUDGMENT - AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS
3.1. THE ADDRESS ON THE MERITS
The address on the merits signified the formalization of the
adversary process of evidence production. The evidence, the
presentation of which had already been selective, was then
summed up. This allowed "further editing, abstraction, 'a n d
imputation of meaning to be imposed" on what individual
witnesses had said. 1 This was the final act of
constructing a coherent and understandable story out of all
the bits and pieces of evidence. At the same time
incoherence, contradictions and unreliability of the
opposing side's evidence would be highlighted. In the hands
of a skilled legal practitioner, the address played an
important role in securing either a conviction or an
acquittal. The undefended accused's inability to master this
art placed him at a disadvantage vis ~ v{s both a skilled
prosecutor and other defended accused.
3.1.1. THE PROSECUTOR'S ADDRESS
The prosecutors were not obliged to ask for a conviction and
could abandon the State case simply by "leaving the decision
in the hands of the court". In 21,7% of the 92 contested
cases the prosecutors did not ask or argue for a conviction,
being convinced that there was no case against the accused.
In 43% of the cases where a conviction was sought, the
1. McBarnet 24.
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prosecutors advanced full arguments in support of a
conviction. In the magistrates' court the majority of the
prosecutors were content with merely asking for a
conviction, while in the regional court the prosecutors
participated more actively. Their addresses consisted
primarily of an analysis of the evidence, as argument on
legal principles was usually unnecessary. They analysed the
evidence in detail, emphasizing the weaknesses of the
defence witnesses and the coherence and credibility of the
state case.
3.1.2. THE ACCUSED'S ADDRESS
The accused were in most ins~ances (91,3%) invited to
address the court on the merits. The judicial officers'
explanation of the right did not, however, facilitate the
accused's comprehension of the purpose of the address. The
apprisal, when correctly put, was simply, "Are there any
reasons why the court should find you not guilty?", while
the usual invitation was worded: "Do you have anything to
say before jUdgment?" The prosecutor's address, which
preceded that of the accused, often did not contribute much
to the latter's understanding of the purpose of the
activity. In a number of cases the interpreter omitted to
translate the argument of the prosecutor. In Case A76 DC the
prosecutor gave a detailed argument in support of a
conviction but all that the accused heard was that "the
prosecutor wants the court to find you guilty." This
practice was widespread, forcing the court in some instances
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to instruct the interpreter to translate the address.
Forty per cent of the accused had nothing to say on the
merits. The rest made some attempt, usually consisting of a
repetition of the evidence which they had given earlier. On
a number of occasions, the accused started to bring
mitigating factors to the court's attention. This reaction
was quite understandable if one considers the confusing
information the accused received from the court and the
interpreter in this regard. Case Al8 RC will serve as an
illustration.
Case Al8 RC
M: Anything to say before the court pronounces jUdgment?
I: (Zulu) Anything to say before the end of the matter?
A: (Zulu) I ask the court to impose a light sentence and I
will never be found in error again.
Because of the inadequate explanation by the court of the
purpose of an address on the merits and, consequently, a
misleading translation, the accused quite understandably
assumed that the end of the matter meant the imposition of a
sentence. This confusion resulted in his "admission" of
guilt, whether real or merely for a show of contrition. The
effect of such an "admission" could have been disastrous. If
the court harboured any doubts about the accused's guilt,
then such an admission would have provided the necessary
confirmation and conviction would inevitably follow. The
court's explanation, instead of assisting the accused, had
the potential to prejudice him.
1. Bekker et al (15) note that only 42% of the addresses




In the theory of criminal procedure, the odds are stacked
against the prosecution obtaining a conviction; it must
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
while the accused will escape liability if there is merely a
reasonable possibility that the defence evidence is true. In
practice, however, the court is convinced beyond reasonable
doubt of the accused's guilt in the majority of cases.
1
Why, then, in contested cases where the court is confronted
with conflicting versions of a single event, does it usually
accept the state evidence as credible and reject that of the
accused as false? The obvious answer - that most accused are
in fact guilty - is not entirely convincing in view of the
adversary manner in which evidence is presented to court.
The evidence on which the court bases its decision is on the
whole both presented and evaluated by the prosecutor and the
accused. The evidence which the court finds credible, it
will be argued, depends more on the-way the evidence is
presented and probed than on any inherent quality attached
to it. As the undefended accused is disadvantaged in his
ability to probe the state evidence adequat~ly and to
present his own case lucidly, the defence case is less
likely to be regarded as credible than the state case which
1. McBarnet 2. For conviction rate in contested cases in
magistrates' courts in England see eg AE Bottoms & JD
McClean The Defendents in the Criminal Process (1976) 106
(72,5% convicted); Julie Vennard Contested Trials in
Magistrates' Courts (1981) (75% convicted); Vennara-"The
Ou~c~IDe of Co~tested Cases" in D Moxon (ed) Managing
CrlIDlnal Justlce (1985) 126 131 (70% convicted). In
Australia see Douglas ~ cit 202.
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is well presented and generally remains untested.
3.2.1. THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE
The credibility of a witness - and thus the value to be
attached to his evidence - is assessed by the court in terms
of its consistency, reliability and probability.1 The
consistency of a witness includes the inherent consistency
of his evidence, consistency with other witnesses, and
consistency with undisputed facts. The ability of a witness
to give reliable evidence includes the consideration of
physical or mental defects which would render the evidence
unreliable or biased against the other party, and other
factors which would affect the witness' powers of
observation. The inherent probability of the witness' story
is determined by its own internal logic and correspondence
with common sense perceptions. 2
It is submitted that in terms of all three criteria the
undefended accused's evidence is more likely to be found
wanting than that of the State witnesses. Firstly, in the
study the undefended accused's evidence was tested more
thoroughly for consistency. His consistency was checked by
the prosecutor and the court with reference to up to four
different statements he might have made - his statement to the
police, his s 115 statement, his cross-examination of State
1. R Eggleston Evidence, Proof and Probability (1983)
192-93.
2. Eggleston ~ cit 192-93 . See also Vennard ~ cit (1981) &
(1985) .
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witnesses, and his evidence-in-chief - all of which were
likely to have been recorded at different times.
Furthermore, his conduct in respect of those statements or
opportunities to make them - his decision not to give a s
115 statement, or omitting information from it; his decision
not to cross-examine or the paucity of his testing - became
part of the evidential material against which his
consistency was measured. On the other hand, the consistency
of the state witness' evidence was to be tested without any
of the above aids. The principal potential sources for
evaluating his consistency would be his prior police
statement or the charge sheet containing detailed factual
allegations based on his police statement. Due to the
privileged nature of the police statement it was
protected from the routine scrutiny of the accused and the
court. The charge sheet was equally unhelpful as it usually
contained too little information with which the
complainant's evidence in court could be compared.
Because of the extensive scrutiny to which the consistency
of an accused's evidence was exposed if numerous statements
were made, it was the practice of defence lawyers to limit
the sources of possible comparison. Accused represented from
the commencement of the proceedings were not encumbered with
previous statements since they were usually advised to
remain silent and leave the talking to their lawyers. The
undefended accused, on the other hand, unaware of the
dangers involved, often made numerous statements, thus
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ensuring that their consistency would be thoroughly checked.
The consistency, reliability and probability of evidence are
tested primarily by means of the cross-examination of
witnesses. In defended cases the state evidence was
thoroughly tested. In undefended cases, in contrast, the
state witnesses were not, and could not be, examined
adequately. Nor did the court attempt to compensate for the
accused's lack of ability in cross-examination. The
accused's testimony, on the other hand, was sUbjected to the
cross-examination of the prosecutor and the court, who
accomplished this with professional skill. ~ rough
indication of the extent to which (a) the prosecution and
(b) the defence evidence was tested, can be obtained by
comparing the number of questions which were put to the
various witnesses by the court, the prosecutor and the
accused in their respective questioning and cross-
examination. Table 8.1 sets out the number of questions
asked of the first state witness (usually the complainant or
principal witness) and the accused respectively.
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Table 8.1: Mean number of questions put to the first state
witness and the accused


























7,0 (a) evidence- 26
in-chief
1,2 (b) cross- 30
examination
2,3 (c) after cross- 43
examination










Questions put by ACCUSED to
first State witness:




examination 72 33,9 33,9
30,0
Total mean of questions
17,5 put to FSW and ACC 54,2 43,9
From this table it is clear that the State witnesses'
evidence was not tested as thoroughly as that of the
accused. A quarter of the first State witnesses were not
questioned at all by the accused. When the accused
did question the witnesses, it did not achieve the aims of
cross-examination; the nine questions asked per witness
did not adequately test the consistency, reliability or
probability of the witnesses' evidence. The accused's
evidence, however, was thoroughly probed by two
professionals, the prosecutor and the court. Every accused
had to face the prosecutor's searching questions and the
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majority's evidence was further tested by the court.
Although the court asked the state witnesses and the accused
an equal number of questions, the purposes of the questions
differed. with regard to the first state witness the aim was
primarily to elicit information; with regard to the accused
it was to test his evidence. Apart from those cases where
the prosecutor indicated to the court that the evidence of ·
the complainant was contradictory, and the court assisted in
discrediting the witness, the questions asked by the court
of state witnesses were generally designed to supplement the
case for the prosecution.
The third criterion, probability, is also closely linked to
the way evidence is presented. As pointed out above, the
undefended accused, usually from a different linguistic,
cultural and class background to that of the jUdicial
officer, could not easily give an account which was coherent
and understandable to the court. Unable to overcome these
cultural differences and his own inarticulateness, the
comprehensibility, and hence the probability of his
evidence, could not match that of the prosecution. More than
half of the state witnesses, on the other hand, were
English-speaking and the prosecutor could, through the
leading of witnesses, present a coherent, understandable,
and thus probable version to the court.
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The evidence on which the court based its verdict did not,
in the words of McBarnet, consist of "self-evident
absolutes. [It was] the end product of a process which
organizes and selects available facts and constructs cases
for and against in the courtroom". [83] More particularly, it
was a product of the adversary system; the prosecutor's
skilful handling of his combative adversary role resulted
in a sound state case, logically and coherently presented,
and the thorough probing of the opposing evidence.
Conversely, the incomplete and sometimes unintelligible
evidence presented for the defence, and the absence of
effective challenge to the state case, was directly
attributable to the inability of an unrepresented layman to
perform a role designed for a professional.
with such an imbalance between the parties and between their
respective evidence, the SUbstantially untested evidence of
the state was invariably sufficient to prove the accused's
guilt "beyond reasonable doubt" and thus found a conviction.
The state's heavy onus of proof did not pose a serious
obstacle in the way of convicting undefended accused.
3.2.2. THE VERDICT
Apart from the 18 accused who were discharged at the end of
the state case, a further 25 of the 92 who contested charges
were acquitted. Of the 25 acquitted the prosecutor had asked
for the conviction of only seven (he thus succeeded in 90,5%
of the cases where he asked for a conviction - 74 requests
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resulting in 67 convictions). In the other 17 cases, the
prosecutors were convinced that there was no case against
the accused even to warrant an argument and left the matter
in the hands of the court. The prosecutors abandoned these
cases primarily because of inherent weaknesses in the state
evidence combined, in some instances, with a credible
defence case. Because there is no rule compelling a
discharge at the end of the state case even where there is
no case at all against an accused, there was no scope to
eliminate cases that were weak at that stage. In these cases
the accused played no part in exposing the inadequacies in
the state case and thus in securing their own acquittal. In
the magistrates' court they put on average no more than 6
questions to the first state witness, while in the regional
court the average was 13,5 questions. Where a strong case
was made out during the state case, the accused seldom
convinced the court of his innocence through the
presentation of his defence.
As most acquittals of undefended accused occurred despite
their inability to participate effectively, either in
testing the state witnesses or presenting their defence
lucidly, it was hypothesized that the acquittal rate in
defended cases, where skilful lawyers participated, would be
much greater.
3.2.3. THE EFFECT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION ON THE JUDGMENT
Caution should be exercised in attachi.g too much
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significance to court statistics as an illustration of the
value of legal representation because the benefits of legal
assistance are not always apparent from the case records or
court observation. Some of the important aspects of the
defence lawyers' task are conducted before the case comes to
trial; their efforts to have charges withdrawn, to arrange
bail, or to engage in plea bargaining, are not recorded or
visible in court. A case is submitted to trial when the
State is most confident of a conviction and these cases test
the skills of a lawyer to the utmost. 1 This may explain
why no or slight associations have been found by some
researchers,2 while others have demonstrated a strong
correlation. 3
In the present study it was clear that when a defended
accused was put on trial, the State witnesses' evidence-in-
chief at least disclosed a prima facie case against the
1. Cf Mileski 2E cit 492.
2. Feeley 132, 143; GR Wheeler "The Benefits of Legal
Representation in Misdemeanor Courts" (1983) 19 Criminal Law
Bulletin 221 226; Zander 2E cit table 9; J Ryan
"Adjudication and Sentencing in a Misdemeanor court: The
outcome is the Punishment" in J Alfini (ed) Misdemeanor
Courts: Policy Concerns and Research Perspectives 93 111 (as
quoted by Wheeler ~ cit); RG Hann Decisionmaking in the
Canadian Criminal Court System: ~ Systems Analysis (1973)
409.
3. J Katz "Municipal Courts - Another Urban Ill" (1968) 20
Case Western Reserve LR 105; T Vinson & R Homel "Legal
Representation and outcome: A Progress Report on the
Relation between Legal Representation and the Findings of
Courts of Petty Sessions throughout New South Wales" (1973)
47 Australian LJ 132 133; Cashman QE cit 204; M Slabbert
"Social-political Factors influencing Access to and Effect
of Legal Representation" in Olmesdahl & Steytler 89 92; D
Hutchinson "Juvenile Justice" in Olmesdahl & Steytler 236
252.
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accused. A discharge or an acquittal could then be obtained
only if it was shown that the state witnesses were not
credible or the defence case was reasonably possibly true.
Making a comparison between the outcomes of defended and
undefended cases in the present sample could, however, be
misleading, as the sample does not represent a finite group.
Because of these shortcomings the investigation was repeated
with a finite sample. In the original sample legal
representation had no significant effect on the outcome of
cases. This is reflected in table 8.2.
TABLE 8.2: outcome of contested cases by legal representation
Defended cases Undefended cases
Contested cases 14* 110**
Discharge 0 18 (16,5%)
Acquittal 7 (50,0%) 25 (22,0%)
Conviction 7 (50,0%) 67 (61,5%)
* Including one change of plea
** Including 13 changes of plea
(r=.07 p=,409)
To select a finite sample, all the records of the cases
completed in the month of March 1984 in four magistrates'
courts were analysed and the effect that representation had
on (a) the pleas of the accused, and (b) conviction rate in
respect of the pleas, was examined. A total of 212 cases were
recorded. Table 8.3 sets out the pleas of the accused and
table 8.4 the conviction rate.
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Table 8.3: Pleas by legal representation (second sample)
Plea Defended Undefended
Guilty 5 (23,8%) 96 (50,2%)
Not guilty 16 (76,2%) 95 (49,8%)
Total 21 191
(r=.15 p=.02)
Table 8.4: Outcome of contested cases by legal
representation (second sample)
Defended Undefended
Contested cases 16 111*
Discharge 7 (43,7%) 25 (22,5%)
Acquittal 8 (50,0%) 19 (17,1%)
Conviction 1 (6,3%) 67 (60,4%)
* Including 16 changes of guilty pleas to not guilty
(r=.36 p<.001)
From the above statistics it is clear that legal
representation bore a marked relationship to the acquittal
rate. Although 40% of the undefended accused who pleaded not
guilty were discharged or acquitted, these acquittals
resulted predominantly from the inherent weakness of the
state case rather than from the accused's efforts at testing
the state evidence or presenting his defence. The 25 accused
discharged at the end of the state case did little to
demonstrate the unreliability of the state witnesses'
evidence and the discharges were initiated by the court or
the prosecutor. The same can be said of the acquittal of the
19 undefended accused. In 12 of these cases the prosecutors
did not ask for a conviction. Where they did request a
conviction, they were successful in 90,5% of the cases (74
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requests resulting in 67 convictions). In contrast, most of
the defended accused were discharged or acquitted against
the opposition of the prosecutor. The failure of the state
case and the discharge of the accused was as a result of the
active participation of the defence lawyers, who tested the
state evidence thoroughly. In the undefended cases the
state case collapsed because of the blatant weaknesses which
were apparent without the probing of the accused. This is an
indication that in the latter cases there was no early
screening out of cases where a conviction was improbable.
Undefended accused thus did not enjoy the early withdrawal
of charges which legal practitioners often secure. In
defended cases acquittals were also obtained
despite the prosecutor's opposition and in only three of the
eight cases did the latter not argue for a conviction.
Legal representation thus had a significant effect on the
acquittal rate. The active role played by defence lawyers in
testing state witnesses and presenting a lucid defence case,
was instrumental in the court's rejection of the state
evidence and acceptance of the accused's version as
reasonably possibly true. The undefended accused failed in
both respects; he was incapable of exposing weaknesses in
the state case and of presenting his defence coherently .
•
3.2.4. EXPLAINING THE JUDGMENT
The jUdicial officers gave reasons for their decisions in
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1all but three of the cases. Whether the reasons were fully
and comprehensibly communicated to the accused, however, was
sometimes open to doubt. In some cases the impression was
gained that , it was not so much the court's intention to
communicate the reasons to the accused, as to complete the
record correctly. This attitude was particularly pronounced
when the judgment had to be translated to the accused. The
interpreters were not always given the opportunity to
translate properly, and were often compelled to interpret
simultaneously with the court's delivery of its jUdgment.
They were not given a chance to catch up with what was being
said and did not seek to remedy this by interrupting the
court's speech.
4. CONCLUSION
In the jUdgment the merits of the state and defence case are
assessed. The parties may, in the exercise of their right to
address the court on the merits, assist the court in its
deliberations. For an undefended accused, however, the right
has little value. Firstly, he seldom receives an adequate
explanation as to the purpose of the address. Secondly, even
if he understands what the address entails, his incompetence
in testing the State case and his inarticulateness in
presenting his own, means that he will have little
favourable material on which to build a convincing argument.
1. This was much higher than the 46% reported by Bekker et
al 16.
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The evidence upon which the court bases its jUdgment -
usually untested state evidence and a thoroughly tested
defence case - is determined by the relative capacities of
the adversaries. The final verdict not only reflects the
undefended accused's failure to acquit himself as a
competent adversary, but, more importantly, is a function
of the court process; despite the breakdown of
the adversary system, the only alternative solution -
a more activist approach by the jUdicial officer - is not
pursued.
CHAPTER NINE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
1. THE SENTENCING PROCESS
The imposition of a sentence differs fundamentally from the
settlement of factual or legal disputes, the usual business
of a court of law. Schmidt views the sentencing act as more
of an administrative than a judicial act.[65] There is no
disputed fact or legal principle which the court is called
upon to settle and neither the State nor the accused can
"prove" a "correct" sentence. Instead, the court is required
to determine the sentence which will most effectively meet
the various purposes of sentencing. The determination of an
appropriate sentence is thus the responsibility of the
1court and not that of the accused or the prosecutor. The
adversary mode of dispute resolution is therefore not the
most suitable method of arriving at a suitable sentence and,
consequently, no onus rests on either the accused to prove
mitigating factors, or the prosecutor to prove aggravating
factors. 2
In arriving at an appropriate sentence it is trite law that
the court must take into consideration a triad of factors
including the offence, the offender and the interests of the
't 3communl y. The court can pass a considered sentence only if
1. Taylor 1972 (2) SA 307 (C) 311F. See also Seleke 1976 (1)
SA 678 (T) 690F.
2. Du Toit 50, 86, 147. See also Von Zell ~ 1953 (4) SA 552
(A) 561.
3. Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). See generally JR Lund
"Discretion, Principles and Precedent in Sentencing" (1979)
3 SACC 203.
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it has at its disposal sufficient information regarding
these factors. 1 The absence of such information will not
only restrict the exercise of the court's discretion,2 but
3
the sentence will be no more than a "hazardous guess".
The court must therefore participate actively in the
process by conducting an enquiry in order to obtain all
relevant information. 4 In defended cases, the active
participation is usually curtailed because the legally
qualified representatives of each party invariably submit
full information in support of their respective views as to
an appropriate sentence. Where the accused is undefended,
however, he may fail to inform the court of favourable
factors of his own accord and the court must endeavour to
obtain his fullest participation by informing him of his
right to advance mitigating factors. Should the accused fail
to provide sufficient information, it remains the duty of
the court to establish such factors inquisitorially before
determining a sentence.
1.1. INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO ADVANCE
MITIGATING FACTORS
After initial doubt as to whether the accused had a right to
lead evidence or address the court,5 the Appellate
1. Tsiyane 1981 (2) PH H1D8 (0); Lekometsa 1981
(2) PH Hl14 (0).
2. Sithole 1969 (4) SA 286 (N) 287.
3. Maxaku, Williams 1973 (4) SA 248 (C) 256A.
4. See s 274 (1) and s 112(3).
5. See Wright 1955 (1) PH H98 (0); Chinayi 1956 (1) PH
H65 (SR); Bresler 1967 (2) SA 451 (A) 456; Booysen
1974 (1) SA 333 (C) 334.
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Division held unequivocally in 1975 that the accused had
such a right, derived not from statute, but from usage in
practice. 1 In order to afford the undefended accused the
opportunity of participating in the sentencing process, the
court is under a duty to invite him to advance mitigating
factors. 2 It is further incumbent on the court to explain
fully how such factors can be adduced. In Malaza 1980 (2)
PH H186 (A) the Appellate Division set aside a death
sentence where the trial judge, although giving the accused
an opportunity to address the court in mitigation, had not
informed him that he could adduce evidence. While Trengrove
JA said that where an accused faces a serious charge, he
should be properly informed of his rights in respect of
mitigation, it is submitted that the principle is applicable
to all cases. It should be fully explained to the accused
how he can advance mitigating factors - either by giving
evidence or making a statement from the dock,3 or by
calling witnesses. It is equally important - although not
obligatory - that the accused be informed of the purpose of
the enquirYi 4 he should be told what is meant by mitigation.
Only if the accused understands what the enquiry is about,
will he be able to participate meaningfully in the process.
1. Leso 1975 (3) SA 694 (A) 695H. See s 274(2). See also
sithOIe 1967 (2) PH H292 (N). But see Louw 1978 (1) SA 459
(C) 460A where s 274(2) was regarded as the basis for such a
duty.
2. sithole 1969 (4) SA 286 (N) 289i Nakasal 1984 (1) SA
392 (SWA) 395Gi Du Toit 163.
3. But see Du Toit's argument (138ff) that the accused cannot
make an unsworn statement at all.
4. Nakasal supra 395Gi Awaseb 1984 (1) PH H49 (SWA).
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Where the death penalty is a competent sentence it has been
held that, in the interests of justice, the accused should
be apprised of that fact. 1 The ratio for the rule, it is
submitted, is to impress upon the accused the seriousness of
the matter and the need for him to participate in the
process by advancing mitigating factors. This salutary
principle has the same relevance for accused convicted of
non-capital offences, wherever their liberty is likely to be
infringed upon and it is submitted that it should be
incumbent on the court to inform an accused where a sentence
of imprisonment is likely.
1.2. ESTABLISHING THE ACCUSED'S PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Where the accused, despite the advice offered, fails to
inform the court sUfficiently or at all about his personal
circumstances, it nevertheless remains the court's duty to
establish these before imposing a sentence. 2 The need for an
enquiry for this purpose is particularly acute where the
accused is convicted following a plea of guilty,[S
112(1) (b)] as the court will be less informed about both the
accused and the surrounding circumstances of the offence
than after a full trial. 3 In
1. Leso 1975 (3) SA 694 (A) 695.
2. Maxaku, Williams 1973 (4) SA 248 (C) 255G; Mantusse 1973
(3) SA 223 (T) 224; Phakati 1978 (4) SA 477 (T) 479; Ncube
1979 (2) PH H169 (T); Tsiyane 1981 (2) PH H108 (0);
Lekometsa 1981 (2) PH H114 (0) i Mokoena 1982 (3) SA 967 (T)
968Hi Nakasal 1984 (1) SA 392 (SWA) 395G; Kahmene 1983 (1)
PH HI (SWA).
3. Sikhindi 1978 (1) SA 1072 (N) 1072; Balepile 1979 (1)
SA 702 (NC) i Serumula 1978 (4) SA 811 (NC).
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Tsiyane 1981 (2) PH H108 (0) Malberbe AJ remarked that the
time saved by the s 112(1) (b) procedure could be utilized
fruitfully to consider the question of a suitable sentence.
Although s 112(3) merely states that a court is permitted to
hear evidence for the purpose of determining an appropriate
sentence, this has not denigrated the already established
. 1
duty of the court to enqu1re.
1.2.1. QUESTIONING THE ACCUSED
The principal sources of information regarding the accused's
personal circumstances would be the accused himself and
witnesses called either by him or by the court. Where the
accused decides to participate, the court may question him.
The accused cannot be compelled to testify or to make a
statement where he has clearly expressed his intention to
remain silent. 2 However, the court is not prohibited from
questioning the accused in the dock where the latter fails
to say anything. 3 Although the questioning of the accused
where he does not venture a statement may appear to conflict
with his right to remain silent, this is in fact not so.
Firstly, the accused's non-participation may be more
indicative of his inability to grasp the purpose of
mitigation or his own inarticulateness than an expression
of his right to remain silent. Secondly, since the basis of
this right is the protection of the accused against self-
1. Phakati 1978 (4) SA 477 (T) 479. See also Sikhindi 1978
(1) SA 1072 (N).
2. sithole 1969 (4) SA 286 (N) 287.
3. Mokoena 1982 (3) SA 967 (T); Komsana 1978 (2) PH H233
(E). Contra sithole supra 287.
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incrimination, the prohibition need not apply where the
purpose of the questioning is to elicit information
favourable to the accused. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the accused retains his right to silence also in
respect of sentencing, and should be informed of it. If he
indicates expressly that he wishes to remain silent, the
court should desist from questioning. A thorough explanation
of the purpose of the court's enquiry will, no doubt, obtain
the accused's co-operation in most cases.
The procedure which the court should adopt in order to
inform itself concerning a proper sentence, Botha JA said in
Jabavu 1969 (2) SA 466 (A), must be determined largely by
considerations of fairness to the accused. 1 To the extent
that the procedure is unfair, the proceedings will be held
to be irregular. 2 What is fair to the undefended accused?
An answer, sound in principle and simple in practice, would
be that the accused should be given the same opportunities
as a defended accused. As a defence lawyer's objective in
the mitigation process is to submit those personal
circumstances which could be to his client's advantage, the
purpose of the court's questioning should be no different.
The questioning of the accused should thus be aimed at the
establishment of mitigating factors and the opportunity
should not be used to elicit aggravating factors. 3 The
1. 472. See also Kiewiets 1977 (3) SA 882 (E) 883B; Nakasal
1984 (1) SA 392 (SWA) 395G.
2. Jabavu supra 472.
3. Kiewiets supra 883B. See also Steytler
(1982) 6 SACC 278 280.
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object of the enquiry is thus to discover the personal
circumstances of an accused. 1 It has been suggested that the
court should enquire, inter alia, whether the accused is a
worthy citizen, whether he is in fixed employment, what he
earns, his standard of education, whether married or not,
his family circumstances, the number of dependents, and his
age. 2 Where details of the offence are relevant, the court
may also establish these from the accused.
3
1.2.2. THE COURT CALLING WITNESSES
The court may call its own witnesses for the purposes of
sentencing. 4 In terms of sections 186 and 167 the court's
discretionary power in this regard may become a duty where
it is essential for the just decision of the case. It is in
the court's discretion to call on probation officers to
submit pre-sentence reports on accused persons. There is no
duty on the court to obtain the invaluable assistance of
such a report although with regard to juveniles, it has been
stated that it is the practice of the courts to do so.5
with due regard for the limited resources of the probation
services, such a practice should be extended as far as
possible to undefended offenders who face possible prison
1. See Maxaku, Williams 1973 (4) SA 248 (C) 255G; Ncube 1979
(2) PH H169 (T); Hlohlogane 1981 (2) PH H47 CO); Mokoena
1982 (3) SA 967 (T) 969.
2. Mantusse 1973 (3) SA 223 (T) 224; Maxaku, Williams supra
254. See also Nkabinde 1981 (1) PH H71 CO).
3. Mokoena supra 969; Mantusse supra 224.
4. Olyn 1984 (2) SA 75 (NC) 78H. See also Du Toit 161.
5. Adams 1971 (4) SA 125 (C) 127Fi yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E);
g 1978 (4) SA 345 (E) i Khulu 1975 {~A 518 (N).
Chapter 9 Page 431
sentences, particularly when they are young adults. Such an
offender, where there is still the potential for reform, will
benefit from a probation officer's report containing a
comprehensive personal assessment coupled with a motivated
recommendation for the imposition of a constructive non-
custodial sentence.
1.3. THE PROSECUTOR ADVANCING MITIGATING FACTORS KNOWN TO
HIM
The prosecutor can play an important role in assisting an
undefended accused in the mitigation process. As part of his
right and duty to participate in the sentencing process by
producing relevant information and argument,l he must, as
"minister of the truth", bring to the court's notice any
information which may favour the accused. 2 As the police
docket is a privileged document, the duty is an ethical one
and compliance with it will again depend on the prosecutor's
f · t· 3sense 0 JUs 1ce.
1.4 IMPOSING SPECIFIC TYPES OF SENTENCES
1.4.1. A FINE
Since the aim of the imposition of a fine is to punish an
accused without resorting to imprisonment,4 the court
should not defeat that objective by imposing a fine which
1. S 274(2). See also Motehen 1949 (2) SA 547 (A) 550;
Viljoen Report par 5.2.14.
2. See Du Toit 144.
3. See ch 6 above for the prosecutor's "duty" to disclose
during the trial information favourable to the accused.
4. Ockhuis 1972 (2) PH H156 (C).
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1the accused cannot pay. While it is not an absolute rule
that the amount of the fine should be within the accused's
means,2 an attempt should be made to keep it within
reasonable bounds in relation to the accused's financial
position. 3 A fine should therefore not be imposed where
the court is aware that it is utterly beyond the means of
the accused to pay it. 4 Where the accused, particularly
when he is undefended, fails to advance sufficient
information regarding his financial position, it is the
court's duty to ascertain this where it intends to impose a
fine. 5 A "purposeful enquiry" should be conducted into the
6accused's means; the court ought not to speculate on the
accused's ability to pay a fine when the matter can easily
be investigated. 7 The view in Rice 1959 (1) SA 138 (SR)
that it is sufficient to take jUdicial notice of the rough
average earnings of a class of people,[139C] cannot be
supported. The court should enquire about the type of work
the accused does, his income,8 the possibility of his
1. Nhlapo 1954 (4) SA 56 (T) 58; Radebe 1981 (2) PH Hl15
(0); Sithole 1979 (2) SA 67 (A) 69G.
2. Jansen 1972 (3) SA 86 (C) 87.
3. Jansen supra 86; Ockhuis 1972 (2) PH H156 (C);
Letoba 1909 EDL 138; Frans 1924 TPD 419; Nyati 1973
(1) SA 553 (R) 554A; sithole supra 69G.
4. sithole supra 69G. See also Chabaka 1981 (2) PH H159 (0).
5. Nhlapo 1954 (2) SA 56 (T); Taurayi 1963 (3) SA 109 (SR)
114; Apollos 1971 (3) SA 265 (C); Jansen supra
87; Ndamase .1973 (3) SA 614 (E) 614G; Komsana 1978 (2) PH
H233 (E); Radebe supra; Sithole supra
69H; Joggams 1984 (2) PH H149 (C). See also Du Toit
304ff.
6. Sithole supra 69H.
7. Ndamase supra 614H.
8. Jansen supra 87.
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1
rai~ing money from other sources, and of his paying the
fine in instalments. 2 with regard to the latter prospect,
the court should take the initiative and explain to the
undefended accused that, in appropriate circumstances, the
court would allow him to pay a fine by way of
instalments. 3
1.4.2. COMPULSORY SENTENCES IN THE ABSENCE OF MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
A number of statutory offences are SUbject to compulsory
penalties if no mitigating circumstances are present.
4
The
undefended accused, unaware of the possibility of escaping a
compulsory sentence, will be severely prejudiced if he is
not informed thereof. The court, in conducting an enquiry
before imposing such a sentence, should assist this accused
firstly, by inviting his participation to advance such
circumstances, and secondly, where the information produced
by the accused is insufficient, by itself investigating
possible mitigating circumstances. The court's duties in
this regard are accurately and comprehensively set out by
Baker AJ in Taylor 1972 (2) SA 307 (C) and have been
endorsed in a number of decisions.
"[W]hen sentencing an undefended convicted person who
qualifies for a compulsory sentence, the trial court
must -
1. Mdluli 1984 (2) PH H138 (0).
2. Manwere 1972 (4) SA 425 (RA) 432.
3. Ockhuis 1972 (2) PH H156 (C). See s 297(5).
4 . See eg Act 41 of 1971 5 7; Act 56 of 1955 s 334ter, 335A
(repealed by Act 51 of 1977); Act 71 of 1968 s 4(1).
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(a) inform the convicted person that he is entitled to
lay before the court evidence of circumstances which, if
accepted, may persuade the court to im~ose a lighter
sentence than the compulsory sentence;
(b) ask the convicted person whether he wishes to lead
such evidence, or make submissions to ~ersuade the
court to impose such lighter sentence;
(c) whether the convicted person leads evidence and/or
makes submissions or not, mero motu consider whether
mitigating circumstances exist in the particular case;
and where the convicted person does not lead any
evidence or make submissions, question h~m in order to
elicit whether such circumstances exist;
(d) in all cases, record in the record of proceedings
whether or not in its opinion such circumstances exist,
and if it finds that they do exist, state what they
are. It is not sufficient, in my view, only to enter
the circumstances upon the record if and when such
circumstances have been found to exist. The court
4should record that it has considered the matter".
In informing the accused of the provisions for compulsory
penalties, the crucial question remains whether this is of
any use if the accused is not given any idea of what is
meant by "mitigating circumstances". It is suggested that
the court should explain to the accused what it regards as
circumstances which have a mitigating effect. 5
It has been emphatically stated that there is no formal onus
on the accused to prove mitigating circumstances. 6 It is
1. See also Ngwane 1969 (3) SA 44 (N) 44H; Van Straaten 1971
(4) SA 487 (N); Kanyile 1972 (1) SA 204 (N)~5H; Nkosi 1972
(2) SA 753 (T) 764; Green 1972 (3) SA 533 (0) 533H; Xulu
1972 (4) SA 675 (N); Mzolo, Manqele 1976 (1) SA 49 (N) SOH.
2. See also Mzolo, Manqele supra 50H.
3. See also Nkosi supra 764; Shangase 1972 (2)
SA 410 (N) 430B; Maxaku, Williams 1973 (4) SA 248 (C) 257H;
Seleke 1976 (1) SA 678 (T) 690F.
4. 312C-F. See also Ngwane 1969 (3) SA 44 (N) 44H; Maxaku,
Williams supra 257.
5. Cf Shangase supra 431A.
6. Shangase supra 431A; Ma x a ku , Williams supra 257Gi
Seleke supra 690F.
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thus wrong to look solely to the accused to supply special
1
circumstances which would warrant a lesser sentence,
although he could be expected to bring forward circumstances
2
which are peculiarly within his knowledge. In the final
instance, it is the task of the court, assisted by the
accused and the prosecutor, to investigate all reasonable
possibilities as to the existence of mitigating
circumstances. 3 Such a full investigation should include the
past history and the present circumstances of the accused.
4
The court must thus ensure, through its own investigation,
that an appropriate sentence is imposed.
2. COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS
Where an accused is convicted of an offence which caused
damage to or loss of property belonging to someone else, the
court has the discretion to award compensation on the
application of the person so injured. 5 In considering the
application, the court must determine three distinct issues;
firstly, whether the accused is liable, secondly, if liable,
the extent of his liability, and thirdly, whether the order
should be made in view of the accused's financial status. In
respect of the first two issues, the adversary mode of
procedure is followed, while in the third the court must
1. Joseph 1969 (4) SA 27 (N) 28.
2. Shangase 1972 (2) SA 410 (N) 431A.
3. Seleke 1976 (1) SA 678 (T) 690F.
4. Nkosi 1972 (2) SA 753 (T) 764.
5. S 300(1). See Lepale 1979 (1) SA 117 (B); Msiza 1979 (4)
SA 473 (T); Vorster 1983 (1) PH H48 (0).
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Before beginning the proceedings the court should inform the
accused that it intends to consider the question of
compensation. 2 The court should thereafter, in accordance
with the audi alteram partem principle,3 afford each party
the opportunity to lead evidence and address the court,4
irrespective of how convincing the case against the accused
may be. 5 Where the accused is undefended, the court should
explicitly enquire whether he wishes to participate in the
proceedings. 6 In Bidi 1969 (2) SA 55 (R) it was
suggested that where the accused is undefended the court
should ask whether he disputes either his liability or the
quantum of damages. [56A]
It is in the court's discretion to refuse an award of
compensation where, despite the accused's liability, he is
indigent and has no assets that can be sold in execution; an
order in this situation would be inappropriate since it
would be unenforceable. 7 The court should thus conduct an
1. Van Rensburg 1974 (2) SA 243 (T) 244H; Tlame 1982 (4)
SA 319 (BSC) 320D.
2. Nguli 1973 (4) SA 556 (C) 557; Van Rensburg supra
244H; Baadjies 1977 (3) SA 61 (E) 62G.
3. Bidi 1969 (2) SA 55 (R) 55A; Maelane 1978 (3) SA 528
(T) 529; Lepale 1979 (1) SA 117 (B)" 119B; Tlame supra
320D.
4. Msiza 1979 (4) SA 473 (T) 475Ei Van Rensburg supra
244H; Tlame supra 320D; Gamiet 1929 CPD 540 541.
5. Ndhlovu, Dorizhi 1970 (1) SA 381 (R) 382A.
6. Nquli supra 557.
7. Bepela 1978 (2) SA 22 (B) 24G; Tlame 1982 supra
320H. See also Baloyi 1981 (2) SA 227 (T) 229H.
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enquiry in respect of the accused's financial position.
Instructive in this regard was the approach adopted in
Zumbika 1978 (3) SA 155 (R). The magistrate in the court a
~ merely enquired from the accused whether he was able to
make restitution to the sum of $1 200, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. The Court criticized the
magistrate for taking the accused's consent at face value,
and held that he should still have investigated the latter's
ability to pay compensation by ascertaining his savings and
realizable assets. 1
By conducting an enquiry the court will ensure that, in the
exercise of its discretion, all the relevant information
required to be taken into consideration, is at its
disposal. The undefended accused will thus not be
prejudiced should he fail to advance favourable
factors.
3. PUTTING SUSPENDED SENTENCES INTO OPERATION
section 297(7) grants the court a discretion not to impose a
suspended sentence despite the fact that a condition of the
suspension has been breached. 2 The court has the power to
resuspend the sentence for a further period, . amend any
positive conditions of the suspended sentence,[S 297(8)] or
refrain from putting the sentence into operation.[S 297(9)]
The court may exercise this power "if satisfied that the
1. 155H. See also Bepela 1978 (2) SA 22 (B) 24G.
2. Olyn 1982 (3) SA 31 (BSC) 32E.
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person concerned has through circumstances beyond his
control been unable to comply with any relevant condition,
or for any other good and sufficient reason".[S 279(7)]
The procedure to determine whether a suspended sentence
should be put into operation has been described as an
enquiry,l or an administrative act. 2 The basic principles of
an enquiry should thus be followed to ensure that, before
arriving at a decision, the court has at its disposal the
relevant information pertaining to that decision.
In conducting the enquiry the court should first secure the
accused's participation by inviting him to lead
r • 3eVldence and to make representatl0ns. Where the accused
is undefended, he should specifically be informed about his
right to participate in the enquirYi 4 to make
representations5 and to give evidence under oath if he so
wishes. 6 There is as yet no decision which requires that
the apprisal of his rights should include an explanation of
what relevant considerations may be. It is submitted that
without such a comprehensive explanation, the apprisal as to
1. Van Nieuwenhuizen 1972 (3) SA 575 (T) 576A. See also
Burgher 1931 TPD 391 393.
2. Labuschagne 1964 (3) SA 454 (T) 457F. The order of the
court is thus not appealable or reviewable in terms of the
Code, but only reviewable in terms of s 24 of the Supreme
Court Act 59 of 1959, Labuschagne supra 455Ei Payachee 1973
(4) SA 534 (NC) 536F; Gasa v Regional Magistrate for the
Regiona~ Division of Natal 1979 (4) SA 729 (N). ---
3. Zondl 1974 (3) SA 391 (N) 391Hi Van Straaten 1971
(4) SA 487 (N) 488i Sambe 1981 (3) SA 757 (T) 758H.
4. Payachee supra 536A.
5. Motlhapi 1979 (4) SA 1052 (BSC) 1053.
6. Moletsane 1979 (4) SA 613 (BSC) 614F.
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how he can advance considerations, will be a
meaningless exercise.
Even if a comprehensive explanation is given regarding his
rights and what they entail, the undefended accused may lack
the insight and ability necessary to provide the court with
sufficient and relevant information. 1 Although the court's
function has been described as an enguiry,2 the principles
of an enquiry have not been fully incorporated in the law.
It has been argued that there should be no onus on the
accused to satisfy the court of the existence of "good and
sufficient reasons" and that the court should mero motu
conduct an enquiry into whether it is appropriate to put a
suspended sentence into operation. 3 The argument may be
summarized as follows: Firstly, neither the Supreme Court
nor the Code [S 297(7)] has placed any onus on the accused
to satisfy the court of the existence of "good and
sufficient reasons".4 When the discretion not to enforce
suspended sentences was first introduced in 1926, the onus
was explicitly placed on the accused to prove that he had
been unable, through circumstances beyond his control, to
comply with any condition of such suspension. The 1955 and
1977 Codes, however, omitted any reference to such an onus.
Secondly, the Court has laid down various guidelines
1. See Colleen Hall "Suspended Sentences - An Exercise of
Judicial Discretion in Theory and in Practice" (1985) 9 SACC
3 11ff.
2. Van Nieuwenhuizen 1972 (3) SA 575 (T).
3. Hall QE cit 9-11.
4. But see Payachee 1973 (4) SA 534 (NC) 536E; Du Toit
399-400.
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according to which the discretion should be exercised,l
and all the guidelines assume an active participation by the
court in investigating all the circumstances of the case.
2
Finally, as the invocation of a suspended sentence is in
essence the imposition of a punishment,3 the same duty to
enquire incumbent on a court in respect of sentencing,
should also app~y in this instance. 4 In principle, then,
the court can only exercise its discretion jUdicially if it
has all the relevant information at its disposal. Where the
undefended accused, on invitation of the court, fails to
inform the court adequately, it remains the duty of the
court to establish inquisitorially an adequate basis for its
decision. This means that the undefended accused will not be
prejudiced by his incompetence as an adversary.
1. See Smith v Friend NO 1973 (3) SA 168 (N) 170H; Callaghan
y Klackers NO-1975 (2)-SA 258 (E) 259G. See further Hall 2E
cit 10. --
2. Cf Callaghan v Klackers NO supra 259G-H.
3. Du Toit 399-400.
4. See Zondi 1974 ( 3) SA 391 (N) 391Hi Mngoni 1985 (2) SA
448 (N) 451H.
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4. SENTENCING - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. THE MITIGATING PROCESS
The undefended accused faces considerable difficulties in
participating in the mitigation process and usually fails to
advance relevant mitigating factors. The failure of this
accused to utilize the opportunity to his advantage is not
only a function of his own inarticulateness, but stems
principally from the professionalized nature and structure
of the mitigation process. In a survey of English court
practice Shapland found that mitigating factors mentioned
by lawyers covered the following:
(a) the reasons for the commission of the offence;
(b) the gravity of the offence;
(c) the offender's attitude to the offence;
(d) his personal circumstances at the time of the court
appearance;
(e) his personal circumstances before the offence was
committed;
(f) his future circumstances; and
(g) his past criminal record. 1
The first three categories of factors are also used by
laymen in mitigating everyday inter-personal accidents;
people ask apologies, give excuses or justifications for
harm which they have caused to others. The rest of the
factors listed above are not part of the layman's common
1. J Shapland Between Conviction and Sentence: The Process
of Mitigation (1981) 59-74.
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response to wrongs committed. Furthermore, the process of
mitigating everyday accidents occurs within the context of a
conversation with the victim and long monologues by
transgressors are not expected.
Shapland found that undefended accused, contrary to
individuals' responses to everyday accidents, seldom
attempted to explain their criminal conduct in court. They
mentioned on the whole very few mitigating factors (1,71),
usually limiting their participation to expressions of
regret.[75J The accused's incompetence was attributed to his
situational position in court and the type of invitation he
had received from the magistrate. [59J The latter merely
asked the accused whether he had anything to say. The
accused was not likely to make a long speech on his own,
particularly where his audience, the magistrate, did not
engage in a conversation with him and gave little feed-back
on what was said. Moreover, the offender, already degraded
by the conviction, perceived that his word could not carry
much weight, particularly since his evidence in defence had
previously been rejected. Even where he wished to
participate, though, he was hampered by his ignorance of
what factors the court regarded as mitigating. Shapland thus
concludes that
"By far the greatest difficulty of the unrepresented
defendant is his lack of knowledge on which to base
decisions as to what to say and perhaps more important,
what not to say - to select and sift from his whole
life history and all the circumstances of the offences
those points that will produce cogent arguments to
persuade a particular sentence". [120J
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In Shapland's study lawyers were, in contrast, most active
in the mitigation process and mentioned on average 8,23
factors, frequently referring to the accused's background
and future prospects, factors which undefended accused were
reluctant to mention. [75] Lawyers were also structurally in
a better position to participate in the mitigating process.
since the purpose of the process was to determine an
appropriate sentence for an offender, the lawyer
participated as a professional with specialized knowledge,
and not merely as a spokesman for the accused. [95] Specific
sentences could thus be argued for, and the lawyer was
consulted about what should be done to the offender. The
undefended accused, because of his marginalized status, was
not invited to do the same, [96] and the mitigating factors
which he did mention did not enjoy the respectability and
credibility attached to those submitted by lawyers by virtue
of their status as officers of the court. [80-81]
In this writer's study undefended accused were similarly
incompetent in assisting the court with the provision of
mitigating factors. Obliged to conduct an enquiry, the court
attempted to achieve accused persons' participation in the
process by advising them of their rights to advance
mitigating factors, and where they failed to do this
adequately, it enquired after their personal circumstances.
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4.1.1 INFORMING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF
MITIGATION
The court is obliged to invite the accused to advance
mitigating factors, and to inform him how this can be done,
although the meaning of "mitigation" may be left
unexplained. In a sample of 115 cases all the undefended
accused were informed of the opportunity to participate in
the mitigation process, but not all were given explanations
of how this could be done. The regional court magistrates
carefully explained to the accused the means by which he
could adduce mitigating factors; that he could give evidence
under oath himself, make an unsworn statement or call
witnesses. In the magistrates' court, however, only half of
the accused were apprised of their right to give evidence
under oath. The other half were merely asked: "Anything to
say in mitigation?" Even less were told of the right to call
witnesses.! In neither the regional nor the magistrates'
court was the purpose of the mitigation process routinely
explained to the accused. Even where information was given
as to how the accused could advance mitigating factors, this
did not assist the accused to understand what a mitigating
factor was. Some magistrates did, however, make a tentative
effort to convey the essence of mitigation to the accused.
In Case A4 RC, for example, the regional magistrate informed
the accused: "You may state Whatever may reduce your sentence."
1. Bekker et al (16) found a similar failure to inform the
accused fully-of his rights. Only 21% of accused were told
of the right to testify under oath and only 16% were
enlightened about calling witnesses.
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In translating the information as to rights, the
interpreters often played an instructive role by
enlightening the accused as to the purpose of mitigation.
One interpreter independently advised the accused to state
his circumstances "so that the court does not impose a harsh
sentence on you". [Case A18 RC] In Case A80 DC the
interpreter added to the magistrate's terse question,
"Anything to say in mitigation", the following advice: "[For
example] things like you are working, you are the sole
supporter of your kids, family etc." On numerous occasions
the interpreter also prompted the accused to mention further
mitigating factors. The interpreter's intervention was a
sUbstitute for the court's duty to inquire into the
accused's personal circumstances should the latter fail to
reveal such. By prompting the accused to relate his personal
circumstances the interpreters asked those questions which
the court invariably would have put to determine factors
which the accused failed to mention.
4.1.2. THE ACCUSED'S PARTICIPATION
Although most of the undefended accused wanted to
participate (only 11% indicated that they had nothing to
say), they experienced difficulties in expressing themselves
adequately and advancing relevant mitigating circumstances.
Only 3% gave evidence under oath and a further 1,5% called a
witness to give evidence, while the rest made a statement
from the dock. Forty per cent mentioned only one item, while
27% advanced a second. The factors which were most
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frequently mentioned were: dependents (54%), repentence
(35%), marital status (23%) and income (13%). Pleas of mercy
were often made, irrelevant information was frequently
tendered, and there were some requests for a "suspended
sentence". The undefended accused were unable to offer
anything more than their basic personal circumstances -
whether married, their dependents, and employment. They
seldom tried to explain why the offence was committed or to
mitigate the gravity thereof.
The majority of defence attorneys, on the other hand, were
most active in mitigation and 82,4% of them presented five
or more factors to the court, usually arguing for specific
sentences.
4.1.3. ESTABLISHING THE ACCUSED'S PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Since the undefended accused failed to participate
adequately in the mitigating process, the court pursued its
inquisitorial role and in most instances questioned the
accused about his personal circumstances. The enquiry -
conducted in 82,9% of the cases - tended, however, to be
superficial and on average an accused was questioned
regarding not more than three factors. The questioning
focused primarily on the personal circumstances of the
accused: his occupation (65,3%); dependents (53,6%);
marital status (48,4%); income (33,3%); and his ability to
pay a fine (28,9%).
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Where a "sentencing tariff" existed for particular offences,
the court still conducted the enquiry but did so in a very
mechanical fashion, as if only to comply with its legal
duty. Although the standard sentence for a first offender
for the possession of a small quantity of dagga was
invariably four months' imprisonment suspended for three
years, the court would go through the motions of enquiring
after the various personal factors, while seldom deviating
from the established sentencing tariff for the offence.
The principle that a fine imposed should be individualized
with due regard to the accused's means was observed in the
main. The court enquired into the financial position of the
undefended accused or was informed thereof in 81,2% of the
32 cases where a fine was imposed. One magistrate
consistently asked the accused explicitly whether he would
be able to pay a certain amount. Other magistrates were
content with a determination of the accused's earning
capacity or income.
In a few exceptional cases the court went to great lengths
to arrive at an appropriate sentence and utilized its
inquisitorial powers to call witnesses. In Case 63 RC a 19
year old Black male was convicted in the regional court of
theft of a motor vehicle. When it appeared during mitigation
that the accused's father worked at a certain store in the
city, the regional magistrate decided to call the latter as
a witness and instructed the prosecutor to get him to
court. When the prosecutor reported that the father was not
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employed at that particular store, the court instructed the
investigating officer to take the accused to point out his
father. The latter was eventually traced and subsequently
gave evidence in support of his son.
Probation officers were not frequently called by the court.
As there was no discernible rule as to when a probation
officer's report was required, they were not consistently
used even in the regional court, despite the severity of the
prison sentences which were imposed on a number of young
adult offenders.
Although the majority of the jUdicial officers conducted
enquiries to establish a factual basis for determining an
appropriate sentence, the depth and comprehensiveness of the
enquiries were disparate and were strongly influenced by the
type of offence, the offender and the jUdicial officer.
4.1.4. THE PROSECUTOR'S PARTICIPATION
The prosecutor's participation consisted mainly of handing
in the SAP 69 form which reflected the accused's previous
convictions. Prosecutors in the regional court were more
active in addressing on sentence than their colleagues in
the magistrates' court, who hardly participated at all. No
instances were recorded, however, where the prosecutor




Some researchers have found that legal representation had
1
a significant influence on the severity of sentence,
while others have reported no consistent relationship.2 A
comparison between the sentences imposed on defended and
undefended accused in the present sample cannot necessarily
be relied upon to reflect accurately the effect of legal
representation upon sentencing since the accused who faced
the more serious charges were the least represented. Table
9.1 gives some indication that there was a marked difference
in the sentences received by the two classes of accused.























It is important to note that most of the accused who
received a prison sentence did not have the benefit of legal
representation, illustrating yet again the fact that the
accused most in need of legal assistance were the least
protected.
The translation of legally complex sentences did not always
receive the same meticulous care as was exercised in the
1. Warren ~ cit 333; Wheeler ~ cit 228-9; Vincom & Homel
~ cit 133. ---
2. Cashman ~ cit 208; Feeley (1979) 144; Ryan 2E cit 122.
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magistrates' explanations. While the regional court
interpreters explained provisions of a suspended sentence
carefully, their colleagues in the magistrates' court gave
the information in a haphazard way. At times the length of
the suspension of the sentence was omitted, sometimes even
the entire suspended sentence. The interpreter in Case A77
DC took the liberty to sUbstitute the interpretation of the
sentence with a moral lecture. After the magistrate
sentenced an accused, convicted of the possession of dagga,
to six months' imprisonment suspended for five years on the
usual conditions, the interpreter castigated the accused as
follows: "You rascal, free yourself away from the satan, but
if you pay no attention to what I tell you, we'll call you
and we'll say come and serve your sentence because you are
stubborn, you rascal."
4.3. PUTTING SUSPENDED SENTENCES INTO OPERATION
In Hall's study of the invocation of suspended sentences,
she found that the accused was given the opportunity to
state why the suspended sentence should not be put into
operation and the ways in which he could bring information
to the court's attention were explained. 1 The accused
routinely failed, however, to advance reasons and the
magistrates uniformly failed to conduct an enquiry into the
circumstances of the second offence before invoking the
suspended sentence.
1. (1985) 9 SACC 3.
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The court in this study displayed a similarly passive
attitude in respect of this 'enquiry'. Case 391 DC is an
example of a common approach.
Case 391 DC
After the magistrate had determined that the accused had
breached one of the conditions of his suspended sentence
imposed for the possession of dagga, he addressed the
accused as follows:
M: The prosecutor asked me that the six months suspended
sentence be imposed. Anything to say why the sentence
should not be imposed?
A: I plead leniency for the six months already served are
heavy for the possession of merely one gram of dagga.
M: The court is not satisfied that there is any reason why
the suspended sentence should not be imposed.
He thereupon invoked the suspended part of the sentence.
In none of the cases did the court investigate the existence
of any circumstances which might have obviated the need to
impose the suspended sentence; it was left to the accused to
advance such reasons. without any information as to what
acceptable reasons were, the accused either attempted
unsuccessfully to advance some or simply remained silent.
Hall criticizes the courts' failure to conduct such an
enquiry, which in effect places an "onus" on the accused to
prove why the suspended sentence should not be invoked. She
argues that such an approach is contrary to the case and
statute law, which imposes a duty on the court to conduct
this enquiry. Hall is mistaken, however, as to the structure
and content of the law in this regard and contrary to what
she maintains, the magistrates' practice was a faithful
rendition of the case and statute law. The central tenet of
her argument is that the court is obliged to conduct an
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enquiry and that no onus rests on the accused to advance
reasons why the suspended sentence should not be invoked.
This is a convincing argument which accords with the
rhetoric of the law, but this is not the letter of the law.
The Supreme Court has not created a duty with any certainty
or clarity, nor set aside a decision where a magistrate
fai~ed to conduct an enquiry.1 The fact that the Court
has said that there is no onus on the accused in this
respect, does not imply that the jUdicial officer is legally
bound to enquire mero motu into the circumstances of the
commission of the second offence, however desirable this may
be. What the Court has clearly said is that the accused
should be given an opportunity to bring information to the
court's attention. This was dutifully fulfilled by the
magistrates in Hall's sample and the present one.
Hall's observation that the offenders were not informed
about the grounds on which a further suspension could be
granted, does not reveal a deviation from the case law
either. The Supreme Court has given more attention to
identifying the considerations that should be taken into
account in exercising the discretion,2 than enforcing the
disclosure of such to the accused.
The court conduct when invoking a suspended sentence, is yet
a further example of the dominant role that law plays in
1. Cf Hiemstra 658-661. Ferreira 670 also suggests that no
onus rests on the accused.
2. See Hall QE cit 10.
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moulding judicial behaviour. Where clear and unambiguous
duties are laid down, coupled with definite sanctions for
their non-observance, the jUdicial officers conducted the
proceedings with due regard thereto. Where the rules have
not been formulated lucidly and authoritively, courts, not
bound to obey, did not do so voluntarily.
5. CONCLUSION
At the sentencing stage of the trial, inquisitorial
intervention by the jUdicial officer has been provided for
in the shape of a compulsory enquiry to be conducted in
order to elicit the information essential for a just
sentencing determination. The court must first invite the
accused to advance mitigating factors, and where the latter
fails to provide sufficient information, it should establish
such inquisitorially. This is appropriate since the
imposition of a sentence is primarily an exercise in
discretion guided by policy considerations. This enquiry
operates in theory for all accused but is of particular
significance in the case of an undefended accused, who is
usually incapable of protecting his own interests adequately
in adversary proceedings. This accused's incompetence was
evident in the empirical study in his inability to
contribute meaningfully to the mitigation process when
invited to do so at the outset of the enquiry. The
inquisitorial process means that the accused will not be
prejudiced by his incompetence as a skilled participant. The
enquiry as a form of decisionmaking has a firm legal basis
Chapter 9 Page 454
in all but one aspect of sentencing-related proceedings (the
exception being the implementation of suspended sentences),
and is thus uniformly conducted. The depth or thoroughness
of the enquiry, however, remains discretionary, and this
results in disparate court practices. Thorough protection of
the undefended accused at this stage would require guiding
rules regarding the conduct of the enquiries and the
extension of the process to the implementation of suspended
sentences.
CHAPTER TEN APPEAL AND REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court's supervisory function over lower court
proceedings has a special importance where the accused are
undefended, because, in the absence of a defence lawyer,
the rights of this accused to a fair trial may remain
unprotected. In the adversary system the onus is on the
litigants to invoke the superior court's supervisory powers
through appeal and review proceedings. Moreover, these
proceedings, due to their technical and formal nature,
are highly professionalized and costly, and, as Hiemstra CJ
remarked in Motlapi 1979 (4) SA 1052 (B), "[n]ormally
accused persons have neither the funds nor the knowledge to
launch such proceedings".[1054A] The normal adversary
procedure is thus ill-suited to ensure the uniform
enforcement of the principles of a fair trial. Consequently,
in a number of instances, lower court proceedings are
reviewed independently of the accused's initiative. Since
only a limited category of cases are reviewed in this way,
the general rights of appeal and review exercisable only at
the accused's instance, remain important for the
enforcement of the principles of a fair trial in the vast
majority of undefended cases.
1. APPEAL AND REVIEW AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ACCUSED
An accused person is entitled as of right to appeal against
any conviction, sentence (inclUding a caution), or order
passed by a lower court.[S 309(1) (a)] A prisoner who wishes
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to prosecute an appeal without the assistance of a lawyer,
however, must first obtain a jUdge's certificate stating
that there are reasonable grounds for an appeal.[S 309(4) &
305] An accused person may also submit proceedings of lower
courts for review by the Supreme Court in terms of s 24 of
the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, s 304(4) of the Code, or
the Court's inherent right of review. Should a prisoner wish
to institute review proceedings in person, he must obtain a
jUdge's certificate as above.[S 305]
No duty has been placed on the trial court to apprise an
undefended accused of these remedies at the completion of
the proceedings. 1 Furthermore, seeking the protection of
the Supreme Court in terms of the Code and Supreme Court Act
and Rules, requires skilled participation because of the
highly adversary nature of the procedure and the numerous
technical rules which must be followed. 2
The undefended accused prosecuting his own appeal is
entitled to limited assistance from court officials. The
Magistrates' Court Rules provide that if an appellant, due
to his illiteracy or a physical defect, is unable to draw up
a notice of appeal, the clerk of the court is obliged to do
this at his request. [Rule 67(2)] It is suggested by Du Toit
that there is no reason why the prosecutor, at the request
of the clerk, could not assist in the drafting of the
notice, since the latter may not have the requisite legal
1. See Arries 1959 (3) SA 913 (C) 916C.
2. See eg Supreme Court rule 53.
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knowledge for the task. [475 n 267] He further contends that
the state, in dealing with such appeals, should be more
lenient by not insisting on strict compliance with the rules
of court. The Attorney-General usually informs an
unrepresented appellant where his notice of appeal does not
meet the legal requirements, in order that the necessary
amendments may be made before the hearing of the appeal.
l
Should the accused manage to lodge a notice of appeal, the
Court of appeal may also come to the appellant's assistance
2
by appointing counsel to argue the appeal on his behalf.
These provisions, it is submitted, do not render the
undefended accused's rights to appeal and review fully
accessible to him. The accused is not informed that he has
such rights or how they should be exercised. Should he
attempt to prosecute an appeal in person, he is entitled to
very little assistance, considering that he is engaging in
highly professionalized proceedings. The assistance which
the clerk of the court must render is limited to writing the
notice of appeal, as rule 67(2) refers only to illiteracy or
some physical defect which may prevent the accused from
reducing his appeal to paper. To rely on the prosecutor to
give the necessary legal advice and assistance is not
desirable or practicable. He may experience a conflict of
interests, particularly where he was involved in the
prosecution of the case and he is in any event not legally
1. Du Toit 475 n 267. See also Sewraj 1978 (1) 434 (N)
436D.
2 . See eg Loggerenberg 1984 (4) SA 41 (E).
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compellable to render advice or assistance. The appointment
by the Court of counsel to argue the appeal is not only
sUbject to the Court's discretion, but may also come too late.
Counsel will be appointed only after the notice of appeal
has reached the Court, once the accused has had to identify
the grounds of appeal and formulate the appeal himself.
In order to afford the undefended accused the
protection of the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court,
his rights to appeal and review should be made accessible.
Firstly, the judicial officer should inform the accused of
the existence of the right of appeal and review. Secondly,
he should be apprised of his right to apply for legal aid to
prosecute an appeal or review. It is submitted that in view
of the professionalized nature of the appeal and review
proceedings, it is futile for the court officials - such as
the clerk of the court - to attempt to assist the accused
in the exercise of his rights. Should an accused feel
aggrieved by the result of his trial or the way in which it
was conducted, private practitioners, instructed by the
Legal Aid Board, are the only persons suitable to advise him
on possible grounds of appeal and the prospects for success
and, where necessary, to prosecute the appeal or review.
2. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS INDEPENDENT OF THE UNDEFENDED
ACCUSED
In view of the difficulties which an undefended accused may
experience in enforcing his procedural rights, the review
proceedings independent of his initiative are extremely
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important. In terms of the Code review proceedings are
initiated automatically in respect of certain specified
sentences.[S 302] Review proceedings may also be instituted
by persons other than the accused in terms of s 304(4), s
116, and the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction.
2.1. AUTOMATIC REVIEW
The aim of automatic review is to protect undefended accused
in a specified category of cases from miscarriages of
justice and, in general, to provide guidance to the lower
courts. 1 The significance of the system of automatic
review has been described as follows:
"When it is borne in mind that at least 90% of the
accused persons are either wholly or partially
illiterate and that the great majority of them are
undefended, the vital importance of the system in the
administra~ion of justice in this country becomes
apparent 11 •
The court's supervisory function is limited, however, to
those cases where an undefended accused is sentenced in the
magistrates' court to a substantial period of imprisonment,
whether or not suspended, or a whipping.[S 302]
2.1.1. THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED
Automatic review is restricted to cases where the accused
has been undefended.[S 302(3) (a)] In Mboyany 1978 (2) SA
1. Songongo 1984 (2) SA 146 (E) 150; Mboyany 1978 (2)
SA 927 (T) 930A-B; Mokubung, Lesibo 1983 (2) SA 710 (0)
714H; Nyelele 1984 (1) PH H72 (0).
2. Mokubung, Lesibo supra 715C. See also
Songongo supra 149H.
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927 (T) an accused was regarded as legally represented as
long as he enjoyed the services of a practitioner at the
sentencing stage. Indeed, the lawyer need not even have been
physically in court at that stage, as long as his mandate
had not been terminated. The Court was of the opinion that
automatic review was superfluous in those circumstances
since the defence lawyer could advise and assist the accused
in respect of possible remedies. 1 It is submitted that the
accused will indeed be sufficiently protected if he has
access to a lawyer only at the sentencing stage but that the
converse also holds true; if the accused is represented only
at the trial stage, but was unassisted during sentencing,
the proceedings should be automatically reviewable.
2.1.2. IMPRISONMENT AS A RESULT OF A SENTENCE
The thrust of the changes brought about in 1977 was to limit
reviewable cases to those where the accused has been
sentenced by a magistrates' court to a substantial period of
imprisonment - more than six months if the sentencer has
held the rank of a magistrate for seven years or more, and
three months for others. Automatic review was thus described
in Dalton 1978 (3) SA 437 (0), as "the jUdicial control
over the infringement of an individual's liberty". [440D]
Review follows only if the imprisonment is a sentence of the
1. 930. For criticism, see DJL Kotze (1978) 41 THRHR 72 74
who doubts whether the mere presence of the attorney at the
sentencing stage can be a sufficient safeguard.
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court and not an administrative order.
1
The referral of a
person to a rehabilitation centre [S 296] may thus be
reviewable as the order is a sentence of the court [S
276(1) (e)] and the period of detention is not limited to
less than three months. 2 On the other hand, the order that
an accused who has been found unfit to stand trial, be
detained awaiting the state President's decision, is not a
sentence and thus not automatically reviewable.
3
It is
submitted, however, that because of the grave inroads that
the latter order makes on a person's liberty, and in view of
the indeterminate length of the detention, this order should
receive legislative attention and be made sUbject to
automatic review.
2.1.3. SUSPENDED SENTENCE
Before 1983 the suspended part of a prison sentence was not
to be included in calculating whether the sentence was
reviewable.[S 302 (2) (b)] This provision was repealed in
1983. 4 The present position is thus that a prison
1. Automatic review may, however, be specifically provided
for in other statutes which authorize detention as a result
of administrative orders. See Prisons Act 8 of 1959 s 56;
Act 41 of 1971 s 30-33, In re: Doubell 1984 (1) PH H11 (T);
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 s 29(11);
Coloured Persons Rehabilitation Centres Law 1 of 1971 s
15-17, Arendse 1978 (2) SA 494 (C).
2. Tolmay 1980 (1) SA 182 (NC) 184A; Dalton 1978 (3) SA
437 (0) 439F.
3. Blaauw 1980 (1) SA 536 (C).
4. Act 59 of 1983 s 22. For the unsatisfactory operation
of the repealed provision see Boyi 1978 2 PH H232 (E);
Paulsen, Ntenase, Bila 1982 (4) SA 91 (T) 93F; Mokoena 1983
(2) SA 312 (0); Mokubung, Lesibo 1983 (2) SA 710 (0);
Chabagae 1978 (4) SA 807 (0) 810H; Moletsane 1979 (4) SA 613
(BSC). See also NC Steytler "Die Outomatiese Hersiening van
Opgeskorte Vonnisse" (1983) 7 SACC 178.
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sentence, irrespective of whether it is wholly or partially
suspended, will be reviewed as long as the period of
imprisonment exceeds the set limits. 1
Putting into operation a suspended sentence of a fine
coupled with an alternative of imprisonment, which would
become reviewable on default of payment in terms of s
302(3) (b), could result in the same injustices which led to
the repeal of the provision in respect of suspended prison
sentences. 2 If a conviction or sentence is set aside on
review long after the completion of the trial, the first
conviction and suspended sentence may have been taken into
account in the imposition of subsequent sentences. If the
first sentence is later set aside, then all subsequent
sentences that took that conviction and sentence into
consideration, should also be reviewed. Furthermore, the
extra-curial prejudice that a person with a criminal record
suffers cannot be recompensed by the subsequent reversal of
his conviction.
3
In Songongo 1984 (2) SA 146 (E) Kroon
AJ accordingly called for the repeal of s 302(3) (b) or its
suitable amendment to eliminate the possibility of such
unjust results.
2.1.4. IMPRISONMENT AS A RESULT OF A DEFAULT IN THE PAYMENT
OF A FINE
In an obiter dictum Law J stated in Lyons 1984 (3) SA 63
1. Mathebola 1984 (4) SA 113 (T) 116.
2. Songongo 1984 (2) SA 146 (E) 149.
3. Songongo supra 1 49. See also Chabagae 1978 (4) SA 807 (0);
Paulsen et al 1982 (4) SA 91 (T) 94E-F.
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(N) that imprisonment following on a person's failure to pay
any fine, made that case reviewable in terms of s
302(3) (b) .[64H] Furthermore, a fine exceeding the monetary
limits set out in s 302(1) (a) (ii) should also be sUbject to
review, even if that fine had been paid. This extension of
the scope of automatic review was soon set aside by a Natal
full bench decision in Naidoo 1985 (1) SA 36 (N) where it
was held that only if a person is in default of the payment
of a fine exceeding the set monetary limits and must serve
the alternative sentence of imprisonment, will the case be
reviewable. 1 This would apply to all such cases irrespective
of the length of imprisonment that must be served. 2 Where
the imprisonment which is to be served in default of the
payment of a fine, exceeds the reviewable limit for
imprisonment, but the fine does not exceed the monetary
limit, the case also qualifies for automatic review. 3 There
is no unanimity, however, on the question of whether, for
the purposes of review, the length of the sentence of
imprisonment to be served in default of payment of a fine,
should be added to any other sentence of imprisonment,
whether or not suspended. The Transvaal Provincial Division
has decided that when an alternative prison sentence must be
served, the length of that sentence must be added to any
other prison sentence whether or not it
1. 42H. See also Songongo 1984 (2) SA 146 (E) 148; Ismail
1983 (4) SA 240 (T) 242A.
2. Mathiot 1984 (3) SA 140 (0) 144; Mathebola 1984 (4)
SA 113 (T) 116.
3. Mathebola supra 117; Mathiot supra 144E.
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is suspended,l while the Northern Cape Division is of the
opposite view. 2 The decision of the Transvaal court is, it
is submitted, correct. If the aim of automatic review is to
afford an undefended accused a measure of protection in
respect of a sentence of imprisonment, whether actual or
potential, then surely according to the pro libertate
principle of construction, the interpretation most
favourable to the accused should be adopted.
2.2. WHEN A MATTER IS BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN TERMS OF S 304(4)
In terms of s 304(4) the Supreme Court may review the
proceedings of any lower court in which a sentence was
imposed, if it is brought to its notice that the proceedings
were not "in accordance with justice". This provision
affords a variety of persons the opportunity to initiate
review proceedings independently of the accused in cases
which fall outside the ambit of automatic review. Since the
1977 Code reduced the scope of automatic review so
drastically, Eksteen J stated in Eli 1978 (1) SA 451 (E)
that the Court would be more inclined to exercise its powers
under s 304(4) than in the past. [452]
There is no limit to the ways in which a jUdge's attention
can be drawn to a miscarriage of justice. This rule thus
provides magistrates with a useful means of rectifying their
1. Mathebola 1984 (4) SA 113 (T) 117.
2. Louw 1984 (1) SA 549 (NC) 553.
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1
own or others' incorrect .convictions or sentences. In
Jacobs 1955 (2) SA 526 (T), for example, a magistrate who
felt that the sentence he had imposed was too harsh,
submitted the case for review. A magistrate unconnected with
the trial could also forward the record of proceedings heard
2by a colleague. Prosecutors have, on occasion, assisted
undefended accused by sUbmitting for review the record and
supporting affidavits indicating the innocence of the
accused. 3
Judges have on numerous occasions initiated review
proceedings when irregularities came to their attention in a
variety of ways. In Mbatha 1969 (2) PH H128 (0), the Court
hearing an appeal by an undefended accused on sentence only,
set the case down for review as it was not satisfied that
th ' t' 4e conV1C lon was correct. In Monkoe 1966 (1) PH H15
(T), when the innocence of an accused became apparent only
during the appeal of one of his co-accused, the Court came
to his assistance by ordering that the record of his trial
should be submitted for review. Even where an undefended
accused noted an appeal, but did not appear on the day of
the hearing, the Court acted mero motu and reviewed the
5 t'case. Ac lng on a newspaper report which highlighted a
miscarriage of justice involving a juvenile, Didcott J in M
1. See eg Themba 1966 (1) SA 644 (0); Ruiter 1962 (1) SA
J 161 (0).
2. Anderson 1962 (2) SA 286 (0).
3. Mtembu 1961 (3) SA 60 (0).
4. See also Prinsloo 1970 (3) SA 550 (0); Phukungwana 1981
( 4) SA 209 (B).
5. Beck 1958 (4) SA 150 (C); Hlope 1962 (2) SA 607 (T).
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1982 (1) SA 240 (N) called for the record of the
proceedings and eventually set the conviction and sentence
aside on review.
Where it becomes apparent after conviction but before
sentence that the conviction cannot stand, the Courts have
had to confront the provisions of s 304(4), which accords
the power of review only after the imposition of sentence.
In certain divisions the Court has insisted that sentence
must first be imposed before the case can be submitted for
review. 1 In Sekakala 1962 (2) SA 105 (NC), however, the
Court intimated that it was not precluded from interfering
before sentence was passed. 2 There seems to be no need,
however, to give the provision such an extensive
interpretation in view of the court's acknowledged inherent
right of review before sentence is passed.
2.3. THE SUPREME COURT'S INHERENT RIGHT OF REVIEW
Since there is no statutory provision which allows review
proceedings before a sentence has been imposed, the Court
has exercised its inherent right of review to remedy this
lacuna in the law. 3 The Court may exercise its inherent
right of review "where a grave injustice might otherwise
result or where justice might not by other means be
1. Seloke 1983 (2) SA 455 (0); Ruiters 1983 (4) SA 260
(C); Olyn 1984 (2) SA 75 (NC).
2. Magistrates' Court Act of 1944 s 97 and 98(4). S 304(4)
re-enacted these sections.
3. Taylor 1976 (4) SA 185 (T); Shezi 1984 (2) SA 577 (N);
April 1985 (1) SA 639 (NC); smit 1948 (4) SA 266 (C) 267;
Ngwenya 1959 (2) SA 397 (N). See generally J Taitz The
Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1985).
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attained".l The possibility of a grave injustice need not
necessarily flow from an irregularity in the trial itself
but could result from any circumstance which casts a
different light on the conviction. 2 If it is clear that
the conviction cannot stand, then the Court should without
hesitation intervene. 3 To assist the Court in its decision
whether to invoke its inherent right of review, the
jUdicial officer who submits a case for review before
sentence, must clearly indicate the basis of his belief that
the conviction is wrong. 4
Although there has been fairly widespread acceptance of this
utilization of the Court's review power, there are some
dissenting decisions which stand in the way of total
uniformity on the issue. 5 The Orange Free state Provincial
Division, for instance, has consistently refused to review a
case before sentence has been passed. 6 As a result there
have been calls to grant the magistrates' court the same power
as the regional courts have in terms of s 116, to submit a
1. Mametja 1979 (1) SA 767 (T) 768F.
2. Shezi 1984 (2) SA 577 (N) 580C; April 1985 (1) SA 639
(NC) 646.
3. Molefi 1985 (2) SA 474 (B).
4. Molefi supra 475D.
5. See CF Klopper "Hersiening van Landdroshofverrigtinge voor
· Vonnis" (1976) 39 THRHR 143; DJL Kotze "Hersiening voor
Vonnis - Die Kar voor die Perde?" (1979) 96 SALJ 444.
6. Mpatsi 1957 (2) SA 517 (0); Thabanchu 196~) SA 323 (0);
Seloke 1983 (2) SA 455 (0); contra Gordon 1950 (2) PH H197
(0); Malakwana 1975 (3) SA 94 (0). See JL Snyman (1983) 46
THRHR 349. This rule has also been adopted infrequently in
other divisions, eg Stokel 1966 (1) SA 143 (T).
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case for review before sentence is passed. 1 In the light
of the overwhelming acceptance of the court's inherent
jurisdiction to prevent a miscarriage of justice, however,
there can be no justification for following the line of
decisions requiring a prior imposition of sentence.
2.4. NOTIFICATION BY THE REGIONAL COURT WHEN CALLED UPON TO
IMPOSE SENTENCE AFTER A TRIAL IN THE MAGISTRATES' COURT
Regional magistrates perform an intermediary reviewing
function in respect of cases tried in the magistrates' court
and referred to them for sentencing.[S 116(1)] Where a case
is submitted for sentence to the regional court, the
judicial officer must, after considering the record of the
trial, pass sentence, unless he is "of the opinion that the
proceedings are not in accordance with justice or that
doubt" to that effect exists.[S 116] The criterion
prescribed is the same as that laid down in section 304(1)
and (2) for review by a jUdge. The regional magistrate,
however, has no power to call for further information from
the trial magistrate and if he notices an irregularity he
"must proceed on the assumption that the irregularity
operated in the most prejudicial manner of which it was
2
capable". In such a case he must, without sentencing the
accused, submit the reasons for his opinion to the registrar
of the Supreme Court, together with the record of the case
for purposes of review.[S 116(3) (a)] Where such a case is
1. Seloke 1983 (2) SA 455 (0).
2. Mafuya 1985 (1) PH H56 (N).
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submitted for review, it is necessary to call for the trial
magistrate's reasons for conviction, despite the fact that
the regional magistrate has presented an argument against
. t. 1conV1C 10n.
3. THE PROCESS OF AUTOMATIC REVIEW
Review proceedings may comprise of two stages: First, the
trial record is examined by a judge in chambers (hereinafter
referred to as the reviewing jUdge). If he is satified that
the proceedings were in accordance with justice, he
certifies the record to that effect. If he is not so
satisfied, he must submit the record to a Court for review.[S
303] Provision is made for the participation of the accused
and the trial magistrate in the review proceedings; each may
submit further arguments before the record is placed before
a jUdge in chambers. 2 Additional information or argument
may also be called for by the reviewing jUdge or the Court
on review.
3.1. PARTICIPATION BY THE MAGISTRATE
The magistrate is entitled to add remarks to the record
before it is transmitted to the registrar.[S 303] In Norman
smith 1966 (1) PH H151 (C) it was suggested that a
1. Sethunsa 1982 (3) SA 256 (O).
2. The clerk of the court must within one week after the
completion of the case forward the record to the registrar
of the Supreme Court (S 303). The expeditious forwarding of
the record is essential to prevent serious prejudice
(arising from delay) to the accused, who is likely to be in
custody (Mofokeng 1974 (1) SA 271 (0); Nyelele 1984 (1) PH
H72 (D)).
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magistrate who has any doubt as to whether the sentence he
has imposed is too severe, should utilize this opportunity
to air his view and not wait for a query from the judge. If
the accused has submitted any statement or argument,[S 303]
he may comment on it. 1
3.2. PARTICIPATION BY THE ACCUSED
The accused may append to the record any written statement
or argument within three days of the imposition of
sentence.[S 303] As Hiemstra correctly points out, this
period of three days is not peremptory but directory and the
late filing of a written statement should be
permissible.[682] Information that could mitigate the
sentence, for instance, may be brought to the court's
attention in this statement. 2 The accused may also set the
case down for argument before the Supreme Court.[S 306] The
magistrate must in terms of the Code inform the accused of
these rights: that the record of the proceedings will be
transmitted within one week to the registrar of the Supreme
Court; that he may make a copy of such record before
transmission; that he may set the case down for argument
before the Supreme Court [S 306]; and that he may append to
the record any written statement or argument within three
days of the imposition of the sentence. 3
1. Hiemstra 682.
2. See Brunette 1979 (2) SA 430 (T).
3. S 303. See also Ferreira 721.
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3.3. PARTICIPATION BY THE MAGISTRATE, THE ACCUSED AND THE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL AT THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT ON REVIEW
Where the reviewing judge considers that any proceedings
were not in accordance with justice, or has doubts in that
regard, he is obliged to obtain reasons from the magistrate
for the conviction or sentence.[S 304(2) (a)] If the jUdge is
convinced that the proceedings were clearly not in
accordance with justice and that the person convicted may be
prejudiced if the record is not forthwith placed before a
Court of review, he may dispense with this requirement.[S
304 (2) (a)]
The reviewing jUdge may direct that further information or
evidence be supplied to him - taken either by himself or by
the magistrate.[S 304(1)] The Court of review may also hear
any evidence and summons any person to appear and give
evidence or produce any document or article.[S 304(2) (b)] If
the Court desires that any question of law or fact be argued
before it, it may direct that the Attorney-General and
counsel appointed for the accused present such argument. 1
More often only a written memorandum of the Attorney-General
is obtained. 2 The Court has on occasion adopted the
memorandum in toto as its judgment,3 while in other
instances it has rejected the opinion offered. 4 Although
1. S 304(3). See Grey 1983 (2) SA 536 (C).
2. See for example Sibuya 1979 (3) SA 192 (T); Mdodana 1978
(4) SA 46 (E); Sehane 1979 (1) SA 318 (T); Sambe 1981 (3) SA
757 (T); Andrews 1982 (2) SA 269 (NC); Mitchell 1982 (3) SA
72 (T); Moluazi 1984 (4) SA 738 (T).
3. Sibuya 1979 (3) SA 192 (T).
4. See eg Mitchell 1982 (3) SA 72 (T) 74A.
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the Attorney-General's opinion in many instances favours the
accused and has led to the setting aside of the conviction,
it is submitted that this practice is objectionable in
principle. Firstly, despite the Attorney-General's ethical
duty of impartiality, his very position as representative of
the state makes him structurally biased in favour of the
prosecution. Secondly, the practice of hearing only the one
side is in conflict with a fundamental principle of a fair
trial, the audi alteram partem rule. As the Court is
empowered to appoint counsel for the accused to argue any
point of law or fact,[S 304(3)] it should obtain the views
of a member of the bar acting for the accused whenever the
opinion of the Attorney-General is sought.
3.4. THE COURT'S APPROACH TO AUTOMATIC REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
Automatic review was not initially conceived of as being
solely for the benefit of the accused, or the undefended
accused in particular, but rather as a mechanism to control
the proceedings in general. 1 The review Court's statutory
duty was thus to determine whether the proceedings were in
accordance with "real and substantive justice",2 and the
Court perceived its duty from an early stage as being to
"see that justice is done both to the convicted person and
the State".3 A decision of a magistrate may thus be
1. See ch 3 below.
2. Ord 20 of 1856 s 45; Wetboek of 1891 (OFS) ch 4 schedule
rule 166; Harmer 1906 TS 50 52.
3. Sukana 1916 TPD 576 578. See also Zulu 1967 (4) SA
499 (T) 500; Mokoena 1975 (4) SA 295 (Of:
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altered even though this would prejudice the accused, for
instance where a conviction for a more serious offence is
substituted,l or an incompetent or illegal sentence is
. d . 2corrected and the new sentence 1mpose 1S more severe.
The Court thus follows a strict bureaucratic approach; rules
are to be applied uniformly irrespective of which party they
benefit.
since protecting the undefended accused has always been
among the main objectives of automatic review, particularly
since 1977 when defended cases were excluded from this
review,3 the Court has been reluctant to use it to the
accused's prejudice and has exercised its discretion to
refuse to enforce a rule which would be to the accused's
disadvantage. In Makata 1975 (2) SA 315 (T) the accused
was sentenced without his list of previous convictions being
produced in court, as was then obligatory. The Attorney-
General requested that the sentence be set aside and the
case remitted to the trial court for the correct procedure
to be followed. De Villiers J, in considering the request,
outlined the two competing considerations that the court
should take into account. On the one hand, it was unfair to
the accused to reopen the case and cause him renewed
discomfort when the mistake was not his. On the other,
1. Mokoena 1984 (1) SA 278 (0); Ngobo 1980 (1) SA
579 (B); Mbayi 1976 (4) SA 638 (Tk).
2. Anderson 1962 (2) SA 286 (0); Zulu 1969 (4) SA 499 (T);
Msindo 1980 (4) SA 263 (B). ----
3. Mboyany 1978 (2) SA 927 (T) 930A-B; Mokubung, Lesibo
1983 (2) SA 710 (0); Ny e l el e 1984 (1) PH H72 (0); Songongo
1984 (2) SA 146 (E) 150.
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the court has a duty to see that justice is done and this
includes the enforcement of the provisions of the Code. The
Court had a discretion, however, to decline to interfere on
grounds of fairness and in casu it refused to set the
sentence aside because of the hardship it would cause the
accused. 1 In Beharie 1966 (1) PH H122 (N) the Court
followed a similar approach. The accused was acquitted on
the main charge but convicted on the alternative charge.
Although the evidence supported a conviction on the main
charge and not on the alternative, the Court declined to
exercise its power to alter the conviction as this would
have prejudiced the accused. In these cases the principle
seems to have been accepted that the primary aim of
automatic review is to ensure that the undefended accused
was fairly tried and that this institution should not
readily be used to his prejudice.
4. EXTENDING AUTOMATIC REVIEW
since undefended accused lack the knowledge, skill and
the finances to invoke post-conviction remedies,
the institution of automatic review is indispensable for the
fair administration of justice. It is SUbmitted, however,
that the benefit of automatic review is too limited; it does
not apply to regional courts and in the magistrates' courts
its field of influence is restricted to certain categories
of cases.
1. See also Van Lingen 1960 (2) SA 29 (T).
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The exclusion of regional court proceedings from the
operation of automatic review has been defended on the basis
that the competency of the regional magistrates is
sufficient to protect undefended accused from miscarriages
of justice. 1 It is submitted, however, that the competency
of a judicial officer is not in itself infallible to
safeguard this accused from injustices. A fundamental
principle of a fair trial - that all proceedings should be
open to review by a superior court - highlights the fact
that even competent jUdicial officers, such as jUdges, may
at times be open to correction. Moreover, when the Supreme
Court itself had exclusive jurisdiction over offences which
have since 1977 mainly been tried by the regional courts,
the former insisted that pro Deo counsel be appointed for
the accused not defended on brief. Finally, the independence
and hence impartiality, of regional magistrates is open to
criticism because of their status as civil servants and
their initial appointment solely from the ranks of the
prosecutors. 2 In view of the extens ive substantive and
sentencing jurisdiction entrusted to these magistrates, it
is imperative that the cases over which they preside be
subjected to independent review.
In the magistrates' court, while automatic review is
available for specified cases, it is submitted that the
manner in which review is implemented, restricts its
potential beneficial influence. A serious obstacle to the
1. See Botha Report par 4.09.
2. See Hoexter Report part 11 par 1.4.2.
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achievement of the controlling purpose of automatic review
is that the type of sentence likely to be reviewed is too
predictable. If magistrates are able to predict with some
accuracy whether a case will go on review, then full
compliance with all the rules may be reserved for these
cases only. By referring to the charge a magistrate could,
at the outset of the trial, predict which cases are likely
to be reviewed. Dealing in drugs, because of the prescribed
penalties,l invariably leads to a reviewable sentence. The
seriousness of the case could also be determined from the
evidence of the first state witness. with the knowledge that
a case is likely to be reviewed, the magistrate could then
conduct the proceedings accordingly. The court could also
avoid the possibility of automatic review; it could simply
impose a sentence slightly lower than the minimum reviewable
sentence or, when a reviewable sentence cannot be avoided,
transfer the case to the regional court for purposes of
sentencing.[S 116] Although the regional court must be
convinced of the accused's guilt before sentencing him, the
same detachment and critical approach of the Supreme Court
may not be forthcoming.
In order to avoid the possible negative consequences
attached to the predictability of cases that might be
reviewed, it is submitted that the present system of
automatic review should be complemented by a scheme whereby
1. Act 41 of 1971 s 7.
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cases are randomly selected for review. The knowledge that
any case - even where a non-custodial sentence is imposed -
may be submitted for review, may discipline jUdicial officers to
ensure that the principles of a fair trial are applied in
every case. A similar system should also be instituted for
regional court proceedings. The selection of cases,
conducted at the instance of the Supreme Court, need not be
numerous, but it will give the Court significant control
over the conduct of proceedings in serious cases in the
regional court and the less serious ones in the magistrates'
court.
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5. APPEAL AND REVIEW PROCEEDINGS - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The accused arraigned in the regional court, who were seldom
represented and usually sentenced to lengthy terms of
imprisonment, could challenge the court's decisions only by
means of the highly professionalized and costly appeal or
review proceedings. Most, however, remained ignorant of
their rights relating to appeal and review; the court was
under no obligation to inform the accused in this regard
and, consequently, no regional magistrate in this study did
so.
In the magistrates' court the accused were likewise not
informed of their rights to appeal and review. These rights
would remain inaccessible to the vast majority of the
accused due to either their ignorance or indigence. The
institution of automatic review was thus the most important
method by which the proceedings of the magistrates' court
were supervised. This controlling device was not,
however, frequently applicable and i n only two cases
were reviewable sentences imposed. I n these cases
the accused were informed of their right to make
representations to the reviewing jUdge. As the present
sample was too small and not all the stages of the cases
were observed, it was not possible to determine whether in
these two cases or in others where a reviewable sentence
was likely, jUdicial officers were more careful to
comply with their legal duties.
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In order to achieve a better understanding of the
functioning of automatic review, it was decided to examine
its operation in respect of the cases heard by the Durban
magistrates' court during 1983. From the 15 courts
which fall in the Durban magisterial district,l and
administered from the Durban magistrates' court building,
601 cases were forwarded for automatic review. The following
types of sentences rendered the cases reviewable:
imprisonment (64,9%); reformatory (3,6%); rehabilitation
centre (9,0%); suspended imprisonment (21,8%),2 and fine
(0,7%). The cases involved the following offences: theft
(31,6%), dealing in drugs (20,7%), possession of drugs
(15,2%), housebreaking (10,4%), assault with the intention
to do grievous bodily harm (7,3%), robbery (5,9%), and other
offences (6,0%).
The records of cases submitted for review restricted the .
reviewing judge's scrutiny to proceedings relating to pleas
and the production of evidence. Aspects not directly related
to these - the remand and bail decisions - were not recorded
verbatim. The records merely contained the remand dates and
whether or not bail had been granted. The reviewing jUdges
did not demand that these proceedings should be fully
recorded and, consequently, was in no position to examine
the way in which these decisions were made. The jUdges'
1. Including at least six courts sitting at Amamzintoti,
Wentworth and Cato Manor.
2. During that year the repeal of s 302(2) (b) caused
the review of certain suspended prison sentences.
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concern was clearly centred on the question of whether the
accused's guilt was established and whether the sentence was
appropriate.
The Supreme Court performed its reviewing duty
conscientiously and 77,8% of the cases were reviewed within
a month after sentence was passed (including the time spent
on the transcription of the court record). Most of the
accused sentenced to a term of imprisonment spent that time
in custody. Most cases (91,6%) were confirmed without
further ado; a further 5,2% were confirmed after the
magistrate responded to a query of the revie~ing judge. One
conviction was altered by a Court on review whilst seven
were set aside, six of these being remitted to the
magistrates' court. A further eight sentences were altered
and three were set aside. Thus in only 3,2% of the cases did
the Supreme Court interfere with the decisions of the
magistrates. 1 This was ab~ut half of the national average of
6,1% as reported by the Hoexter commission. [Part IV par
2.2.1.2.3] The Supreme Court was thus largely satisfied that
the conduct of · the proceedings, was "in accordance with
justice".
The finding that 96,8% of the reviewed cases were confirmed,
corresponds with the general import of the study's empirical
data; on the whole magistrates complied with clear and
1. An examination of the cases where queries were raised,
and/or convictions and sentences altered or set aside,
proved to be impossible as many of the records could not be
traced.
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sanctionable legal rules and execut~d their duties according
to the letter of the law. It must be pointed out, however,
that more procedural irregularities were encountered during
the observation period than what were noted in the 601 cases
reviewed in 1983. The blatant non-observance of some legal
rules as recorded in the study, was limited to cases where
there was no likelihood of review. This lends support to the
contention that in cases which are not likely to be
reviewed, the court's conduct may conform less to the letter
of the law. This does not distract from the general
conclusion that there was no significant disparity between
magistrates' court practice and the Supreme Court's view of
justice. The way in which undefended accused are tried in
practice is thus a faithful reflection of the Supreme Court's
view on how and to what extent the principles of a fair
trial should be enforced in respect of these accused.
6. CONCLUSION
Despite the extreme importance of the supervision of the
administration of justice in the lower courts, where the
vast majority of accused are tried without the assistance of
legal representation, the protective powers of the Supreme
Court remain inaccessible to most of them. Their ignorance,
indigence and the professionalized nature of the legal
remedies, make most lower court decisions impervious to
challenge.
Undefended accused benefit from the Supreme Court's
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supervisory function only where the proceedings are reviewed
independently of their initiative. Through the institution
of automatic review, the Supreme Court inquisitorially
examines a select number of proceedings. Although the scope
of automatic review is limited, the importance of this
institution lies in the formulation of rules which set the
standard of justice applicable to all undefended cases.
Since the Supreme Court regards most cases automatically
reviewed as "in accordance with justice", the injustices
routinely perpetrated in the lower courts are not to be
attibuted solely to the behaviour of court officials, acting
individually or collectively, but to the legal rules which
structure and guide court behaviour and define the
requirements of a fair trial.
SECTION D: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER ELEVEN THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED: A GENERAL REVIEW
Throughout the development of South African criminal
procedure, little attention has been paid by the legislature
to the position of the undefended accused and few steps have
been taken to incorporate the principle of equal and
impartial justice into legislation. The plight of the
indigent accused has been recognized to the extent that he
is entitled to the free sUbpoenaing of material witnesses
and may qualify for legal aid. Yet although in theory the
Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969 should provide free legal
assistance to most indigent accused, the limited funding set
aside for this purpose and the failure to make this right
accessible, has meant that only a minute fraction of those
eligible for legal aid, have benefitted from it. The
institution of automatic review - restricted to undefended
cases - has provided some protection for a section of this
class of accused. Few attempts have been made, however, to
provide assistance for the undefended accused. The absence of
a thorough legislative commitment to the principle of equal
and impartial justice and the failure of the legislature to
provide adequately for the protection of the undefended
accused in a demanding adversary system, has meant that
attention must be directed - for assistance in this regard -
to the Supreme Court which, through its automatic review of
some lower court proceedings, is in a position to develop
and enforce protective rules.
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulties
encountered by undefended accused and has made provision for
judicial assistance to them. The active judicial
participation prescribed is a deviation from the fundamental
nature of the adversary process which involves a passive
role for the judicial officer, but it becomes necessary
where the parties themselves cannot by their own efforts
ensure that justice is done. The Supreme Court has
encumbered the judicial officer with various duties under
the broad scope of a general duty to see that the undefended
accused is fairly tried.
1. THE DUTIES OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICER
There are basically three types of duties, which are as
follows: (a) a duty to facilitate the accused's
participation in the proceedings as an adversary by advising
him of his rights and duties and assisting him in their
exercise; (b) a duty to control the prosecutor in the
exercise of his powers; and (c) a duty to conduct an enquiry
before arriving at administrative-type decisions.
1.1. THE COURT'S DUTY TO FACILITATE THE ACCUSED'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS
The court is obliged to inform the accused of some of his
procedural rights and duties and to assist him in exercising
some of those rights where he clearly experiences difficulty
in doing so. The accused must be apprised of his right to
remain silent after pleading not guilty; the right to cross-
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examine state witnesses; the right to present his defence
and the ways in which this can be done; the existence of
presumptions; the right to participate in the mitigation
process and the right to participate in the automatic review
proceedings. Complementing the disclosure of rights and
duties, is the duty to assist the accused in the exercise of
these where he experiences difficulty in putting his
questions in cross-examination to the state witness,
presenting his defence, rebutting a presumption, or getting
his witnesses to court.
The court is obliged to disclose only certain rights,
however, and the accused need not be apprised of the
following: the right to consider his position before
pleading; the right to apply for a remand; the right to
bail; the right to appeal against an adverse bail decision;
the right to be represented by a legal practitioner; the
right to apply for legal aid; the right to prepare for
trial; the right to request further particulars; the right
to object to the charge sheet; the different pleas open to
an accused; the right to recall witnesses; the right to
apply for a discharge at the end of the state case; the
right to subpoena witnesses; the right of indigent accused
to subpoena material witnesses free of charge; and the
rights relating to appeal and review. Where there is no duty
to inform an accused of a right, there is correspondingly no
duty to assist him in the exercise of it.
It is therefore clear that only rights which deal directly
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with the central issue of the trial - the determination of
criminal liability and imposition of sentence - need to be
disclosed. Of particular importance are the rights relating
to the production of evidence. Such rights will need to be
disclosed, however, only if they arise in all cases (eg, the
right to cross-examination) or need to be applied in a
particular case (eg, the right to subpoena a witness only if
the accused experiences difficulties in getting a witness to
court). Rights which ostensibly touch only tangentially, or
not at all, on the production of evidence, are simply
ignored. It is ironic that the only two types of assistance
provided by the legislature for indigent accused - the free
sUbpoenaing of material witnesses and the provision of
legal aid - need not be made accessible to possible
beneficiaries by disclosure. Where rights are to be
disclosed, little guidance has been given as to the manner
of apprisal. There is no requirement that the meaning of the
right should be explained, or that the legal considerations
which structure and guide the exercise of the right should
be disclosed. Without this information the apprisal as to a
right may have little meaning for an undefended accused.
1.2. THE COURT'S DUTY TO CONTROL THE PROSECUTOR IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS
Where an undefended accused fails to object to the
prosecutor's improper exercise of his powers, the court
should intervene mero motu to restrain such conduct. What is
required from the jUdicial officer is an awareness that he
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should exercise his function of control over the proceedings
without being requested to do so by the accused. The court
must ensure that the formulation of the charge meets the
required standards, refuse the improper splitting of
charges, ensure that the state evidence is admissible, and
keep the prosecutor's cross-examination of the accused and
his witnesses within acceptable limits. The enforcement of
legal rules independently of the accused's initiative would
benefit all accused, but its impact would be felt most by
the undefended accused.
The court's duties in this regard are also selective. There
is no clearly defined duty to guard against the unwarranted
adjournment of proceedings or to challenge an objection to
the granting of bail. The court's duty to control the
prosecution has been spelled out primarily in terms of the
guilt determination process while control over other aspects
of the prosecutorial powers has been left to the court's
discretion.
1.3. THE COURT'S DUTY TO CONDUCT AN ENQUIRY
It is the court's duty to establish independently a
sufficient factual basis for certain administrative-type
decisions where the parties have failed to adduce adequate
information. The duty to conduct an enquiry flows from
the nature of these decisions. No onus can be placed on
either party to convince the court of a "correct" decision ,
because the court's task is to make a decision which, in the
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light of policy considerations, will best serve the ends of
justice. To make an appropriate decision the court should
have all relevant information at its disposal. It should
first afford both parties the fullest opportunity to adduce
information and argument favourable to their positions. If
the accused fails to provide such, the court should
establish inquisitorially whether considerations , favourable
to him do exist. It is well-established that the court is
obliged to conduct an enquiry before imposing a sentence and
awarding compensation. Such an enquiry is not, however,
obligatory in respect of decisions not related directly to
the central issue of sentencing. No clear or binding
inquisitorial duty has been imposed with regard to bail, the
amount of bail, the forfeiture of bail money, the remand of
the proceedings, or the implementation of suspended
sentences - all of which involve administrative-type
decisions.
There has been no clear extension of inquisitorial fact-
finding to jUdicial-type decisions. To arrive at the correct
jUdicial decision in determining criminal liability, the
court in the adversary system is traditionally bound to rely
on the evidence as adduced and tested by the parties. The
adversary mode of procedure, however, is placed under
considerable strain where the undefended accused is unable
to participate skilfully in this process. There have been
some tentative indications that it may be the duty of the
court to establish mero motu a sufficient factual basis for
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decisions in this situation. It may be the court's duty to
ascertain the reliability of the evidence produced by the
state where the accused fails to test it adequately. As the
imposition of such a duty runs .c ou nt e r to the adversary
procedure, the development of this duty has been cautious.
The first two duties outlined above are directed towards the
maintenance of the adversary mode of procedure. By
facilitating the accused's participation with information
and assistance, it is envisaged that he will perform his
role as an adversary and, through the maintenance of the
party-orientation of the proceedings, a fair trial will
result. By restraining the prosecutor from acting
improperly, the court exercises its normal duty to control
the proceedings, but in the trial of an undefended accused
it performs that function on its own initiative, without
waiting for the accused to raise an objection. The trial
thus remains adversary and the production of evidence and
the presentation of legal argument remain the responsibility
of the parties. The third type of duty introduces a definite
inquisitorial flavour to the prevailing adversary process in
that the court is obliged to conduct an enquiry in
establishing mero motu the factual basis for certain
administrative-type decisions.
In imposing these duties, the Supreme Court has not often
articulated a theoretical basis for assistance.
Justifications, when given, for the imposition of duties on
jUdicial officers, have usually been expressed in the
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vaguest of terms. The Court has on occasion said that
"justice and common sense" require that an accused's rights
should be explained to him. 1 In other cases references
have been made to "billikheid en redelikheid",2 "reg en
geregtigheid",3 and "elementary but fundamental principles
4of fairness to an accused person". What is clear is that
the court's active participation in the proceedings is
derived from its general duty to see that justice is
done. 5
It is apparent from the duties imposed on jUdicial officers
that the Supreme Court perceives justice for the undefended
accused as lying primarily in an adequate determination of
his criminal liability, and not in the conduct of
proceedings in accordance with all the principles of a fair
trial. Although the activist role which these duties oblige
a jUdicial officer to play, may render considerable
assistance to an undefended accused, it will fail to ensure
that this accused is fairly tried for two main reasons:
firstly, the common law principle of equal justice is not
pursued as this accused is not tried in accordance with all
the principles of a fair trial, and secondl~ the rules
applicable are inadequate even to achieve the more limited
goal of ensuring that the accused's guilt is reliably established.
1. Du Plessis 1970 (2) SA 562 (E) 564H. See also Bkenlele
1983 (1) SA 515 (0) 518D.
2. sithole 1969 (4) SA 286 (N) 287H.
3. Shonyeke 1981 (2) PH H119 (SWA).
4. Kanyile 1972 (1) SA 204 (N) 205H.
5. Hepworth 1928 AD 265 277; Seheri 1964 (1) SA 29 (A)
34H-35A; Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (T) SA 293G.
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2. THE FAILURE TO PURSUE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL JUSTICE
The Supreme Court has not encumbered judicial officers with
duties which would ensure that in the prosecution of an
undefended accused all the principles of a fair trial
accessible to defended accused, would be pursued. The only
duties laid down relate primarily to the production of
evidence. The effect of these decisions is that one set of
rules applies to the defended accused and a different - less
protective - set of rules applies to undefended accused.
Since the services of a legal practitioner are a commodity
obtainable only at a price, such a dispensation is
inherently discriminatory as it is based on the economic
status of an accused. This offends clearly against the
principle of equal justice which holds that accused persons
should receive equal treatment before a court of law. 1 Was
it, however, possible for the Court to have imposed duties
which would have given effect to the equal justice
principle? It is submitted that it was open to the Court -
in view of the nature of its supervisory powers - to adopt
such an approach but that due to other policy
considerations, it neglected to do so.
2.1. THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO CREATE DUTIES
The Supreme Court has imposed clear duties on jUdicial
1. See Zgili ~ McCleod (1904) 21 se 150 152; In re Marechane
1882) 1 SAR 27 31; See also Griffen ~ IllinoiS-351 US 12 19
(195~); Douglas ~ California 372 US 383 387 (1963); Ross v
Mofflt 417 US 600 609 (1974). See further ch 2 par 1; ch I
par 5.
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officers by sanctioning their non-observance with the
reversal of the conviction or sentence. The Court is,
however, bound by the provision in s 309(3) of the Act which
holds that a conviction or sentence may be set aside,
reversed or altered on the basis of an irregularity only if
a "failure of justice has in fact resulted from such
irregularity or defect". The definition of a "failure of
justice" is therefore of crucial importance. The Supreme
Court has distinguished two types of irregularities which
will lead to a failure of justice. The first one affects the
production of comprehensive and reliable evidence, while the
second involves a deviation from the fundamental principles
of a fair trial without affecting the merits of the case.
Where an irregularity has affected the production of
evidence, the question whether it has resulted in a failure
of justice will depend, according to Holmes JA in Tuge 1966
(4) SA 565 (A), upon
"whether the court hearing the appeal considers on the
evidence (and credibility findings if any) unaffected
by the irregularity or defect, that there is proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If it does fO consider,
there is no resultant failure of justice".
If it is possible to separate the evidence affected by the
irregularity from that unaffected, the court must base its
decision on the latter evidence. 2 If such a separation is
not possible, for example, where the accused's cross-
examination has been irregularly disallowed, the Court
1. 568F-G. See also Yusuf 1968 (2) SA 52 (A) 57.
2. See eg Naidoo 1962 (2) SA 625 (A) .
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cannot be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's
guilt as possible evidence has been excluded.
1
The principle
is that any irregularity which prevents the evidence from
being comprehensively and reliably placed before the court,
thereby raising doubt as to the correctness of the
conviction, leads to a failure of justice.
The Supreme Court could thus, on the basis of this test, set
aside convictions and sentences and in the process develop
duties relating to the production of evidence, on the basis
that some doubt inevitably existed as to the accused's
guilt. The test is not, however, applicable in respect of
rights not directly related to the production of evidence.
The second type of irregularity is predicated on the notion
that there are certain fundamental principles which must be
observed in all circumstances for the trial to be fair. If
one of these principles is not met, then, whatever the
evidence may prove, there has been a failure of justice per
se. In Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A) Holmes JA said that
"in exceptional cases, where the irregularity consists
of such a gross departure from established rules of
procedure that the accused has not been properly tried,
this is per se a failure of justice, and it is
unnecessary to apply the test of enquiring whether a
reasonable trial court would inevitably have convicted
if there had been no irregularity". [758F]
Holmes JA's reference to "execptional cases" makes it clear
that the Court will exercise caution and selectivity before
setting aside a conviction on this basis. Where a conviction
1. Gani 1958 (1) SA 102 (A) 109.
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is set aside, the trial is a nUllity and the Court is
1
precluded from considering the merits of the case. It
should, however, be noted that the setting aside of a
conviction on this ground does not debar the state from
prosecuting the accused again as the acquittal was not based
on the merits of the case.
The Court, where it enforces the fundamental principles of a
fair trial in this way, is giving precedence to pUblic
policy considerations. 2 The values defining procedural
justice are regarded as being of greater importance than the
punishment of a particular accused; these values are of
general application and are intended to ensure a fair trial
in all cases. In the words of Rumpff CJ in Mushimba:
"Die 'geregtigheid' waarna verwys word, is nie 'n
begrip wat veronderstel dat die beskuldigde noodwendig
onskuldig is nie. Geregtigheid wat geskied het in
hierdie sin is die resultaat wat 'n bepaalde eienskap
van die verrigtinge aandui. Die eienskap toon aan dat
die vereistes wat grondbeginsels van reg en
regverdigheid aan die verrigtinge stel voldoen is. Die
vraag of onreelmatige of met die reg strydige
verrigtinge in verband met 'n verhoor van In beskuldig-
de van so 'n aard is dat dit gese kan word dat van
daardie grondbeginsels nie nagekom is nie, en
geregtigheid dan nie geskied is nie, sal afhang van die
omstandighede van elke geval en sal altyd In oorweging
van pUblieke beleid vereis".[844C-D]
2.2. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
When the non-observance of a legal principle does not affect
1. Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A) 353; Nzuza 1963 (3) SA 631
(A) •
2. Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 (A); Mushimba 1977 (2) SA 829 (A)
844~. See RaIl 1982 ( 1) SA 828 (A) 833A where reference is
agaln made to the "interests of pUblic policy".
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the evidence, then, the Court is faced with two conflicting
policy considerations; the need to punish the guilty and the
importance of maintaining the principles of a fair trial.
This dilemma McBarnet describes as follows:
"The problem is that jUdges are exercising a dual
function in reaching their decision. They must not just
ensure that justice is done in the sense of the accused
getting his deserts; they must also ensure that the
technical checks on how criminal justice is executed
are upheld. They must not just uphold the substantive
criminal law but the procedures of legality. They must
think not only of the apparently guilty man before them
but of the protection of the innocent in the future.
But this duality of function sets up an impossible
contradiction. The decision is a finding for either one
party or the other. It has either to declare the
methodS-illegitimate, the evidence inadmissible and
quash the defendant's conviction, or uphold the
conviction, but in doing so, inevitably they legitimise
the questionable methods - inevitably because of a
second duality in the functions of decisions. The
jUdicial decision does not just resolve a particular
case but sets a precedent for future cases". [158]
Whether irregularities are regarded by the Court as fatal
despite the accused's apparent guilt, will thus indicate
which procedural values the Court recognizes to be
fundamental to a fair trial. A court sUbscribing to the
tenets of the crime control model, as described by Packer,
would interfere only where there is doubt about the factual
guilt of the accused or in the case of a gross procedural
irregularity which calls into doubt the reliability of the
guilt determination process. [228] The function of review in
the due process model, on the other hand, is broader, for
here it would also address infringements of the accused's
rights which have occurred at the pre-trial stages of the
process, and aim to deter their repetition in subsequent
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cases. [229] The crime control model thus holds that a
conviction stands if there is proof of factual guilt despite
the irregularity, while the due process model posits that
any denial of a basic right is a ground for reversal
regardless of the strength of the case. [231] The aim of the
due process model is thus of a social utilitarian nature:
"If the criminal goes free in order to serve a larger and
more important end, then social justice is done, even if
individual justice is not".l
Between these two sets of values the Supreme Court has
vacillated. It has set aside convictions, despite the
apparent guilt of the accused, on the basis that certain
principles are fundamental to a fair trial, and their denial
renders the proceedings a nUllity. Examples are the right to
an impartial hearing, the right to legal representation, the
right to be prepared for pleading and trial, the right to
participate in every decisionmaking process, and the right
against self-incrimination. The Court recognized these
rights where they were positively asserted by the accused,
usually through his legal representative, and denied by the
court, or where the judicial officer infringed upon those
rights by a positive act. In the trial of undefended accused
the Court has acknowledged that this accused - usually
ignorant and uneducated - cannot be assumed to be aware of
his rights. It can therefore not be expected from him to assert
those rights in an adversary manner. Where an undefended
1. AS Goldstein "The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in criminal Procedure" (1059-60) 69 Yale LJ 1149.
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accused is not apprised, then, for example, o~ the right to
legal representation, the availability of legal aid, or the
right to consider his plea, the Court is confronted with the
following question: Is it a fundamental principle that all
accused should be treated equally before the law in that all
rights should be accessible to all accused irrespective of
whether or not they are defended? By holding that a judicial
officer commits no irregularity by failing to make the
abovementioned rights accessible to an undefended accused,
the Supreme Court implicitly failed to regard equal justice
as a fundamental principle of a fair trial. It thus accepted
that an undefended accused may be hampered in his contest
with the prosecution by his own ignorance and incompetence
and, at the same time, receive less favourable treatment
than defended accused. In assessing the fairness of the
trial of an undefended accused only in terms of the
satisfactory establishment of his guilt, the Supreme Court's
decisions are thus more in accord with the values of crime
control - interfere only where there is doubt about the
factual guilt of the accused - than with due process of which
the principle of equal justice constitutes a central tenet.
3. THE UNSATISFACTORY DETERMINATION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The Supreme Court's practice of enforcing only those
procedural rights of the undefended accused which relate to
the production of evidence, points to the .n a t u r e of the
Supreme Court's understanding of a fair trial for this
accused; he should be given every opportunity to challenge
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the state case and adduce evidence to prove that his guilt
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Justice
has thus been equated with a sound guilt determination
process. It is submitted, however, that the procedural rules
which have been developed for this purpose are inadequate to
achieve even this limited goal in the case of an undefended
accused.
Where an undefended accused pleads guilty, it is the duty of
the court to establish inquisitorially from the accused
whether there is a reliable factual basis for his plea.
There is, however, no duty to guard specifically against
involuntary pleas and hence the possibility of coerced false
admissions cannot be excluded.
Where the undefended accused contests the state case, his
criminal liability may not be reliably determined because
the court is not bound, (a) to facilitate his participation
as an effective adversary, or (b) to step in and compensate
for the breakdown of the adversary system caused by his
failure to be an effective participant.
(a) The accused's participation
There are various factors which present obstacles to the
undefended accused's participation as a competent adversary.
Firstly, because the rights not directly linked with the
production of evidence are inaccessible to an undefended
accused, he is hampered in his participation in settling
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factual disputes. The assumption which seems to underlie the
Supreme Court decisions - that there is a watertight
distinction between rights affecting the production of
evidence and other rights and that the denial of the latter
does not affect the former - cannot be sustained. It is
submitted that the accused's other due process right are
inextricably linked to the central issue of a trial, the
proof of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the
imposition of an appropriate sentence. The rights to legal
representation, to bail, to be prepared for trial, are all
integral to the accused's ability to participate in the
search for the truth. Secondly, even the rights relating to
the production of evidence are not adequately explained.
When and how the right to cross-examine should be explained
is unclear. The accused is not apprised of the material
considerations pertaining to his choices in presenting the
. defence case. Even the right to subpoena defence witnesses
(and in the case of indigence, the free subpoena of material
witnesses) is not disclosed. Thirdly, the jUdicial officer's
duty to assist the accused in exercising rights where the
latter experiences difficulty, is poorly defined and
discretionary.
(b) The court's intervention
The rules do not compel a jUdicial officer to compensate for
the undefended accused's inability to participate as an
effective adversary (although the latter is inevitable in
view of the apprisal of rights and assistance he receives).
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There is as yet no clear duty on the court to ensure that
the conviction is based on reliable evidence. Even where the
undefended accused fails to determine the reliability of the
state evidence, the court is not compelled to establish this
independently of the accused. The court may assist the
accused in his cross-examination, but should he decline to
cross-examine or do it inadequately, the court is not
required to step into the breach. While the adversary mode
is strictly maintained for the production of evidence, the
inequality of the contestants will mean that the truth will
not be established. The Court's limited view of justice -
the conviction of those whom the state has proved guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of reliable evidence -
can therefore not be realized even by the faithful
application of the legal rules.
The failure of the legislature and the Supreme Court to
incorporate the principle of equal justice into the legal
process has a profound effect on the administration of
justice in the lower courts. A system that is flawed in its
own structure cannot be expected to provide a fair trial for
all accused. Where the undefended accused routinely fails to
be a competent adversary and all the principles of a fair
trial are not pursued or enforced, the court proceedings
will inevitably be characterized by unjust practices and
outcomes.
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4. LEGAL RULES AND COURT PRACTICE
Sociological examinations of the courtroom behaviour of
jUdges and prosecutors have generally been based upon the
assumption that the law to be applied is clear and
unambiguous and, more importantly, contains a comprehensive
and authoritative expression of accused persons' due process
rights. Where these rights are not implemented by the court
officials, their conduct is examined in terms of non-legal
factors, since the normative structure in which they operate
is regarded as unproblematic. 1 The law in action has thus
been explained not in terms of the legal structure but in
terms of occupational factors such as heavy case loads,2
3information games played by court personnel, or the
pursuit of efficiency.4
Valuable insights are provided by these studies but the
understanding of the court practice is inevitably inadequate
due to the basic assumption that the court operates within a
well-established liberal legal framework. Doreen McBarnet
has challenged this notion, arguing that court practice
denying an accused his due process rights is not necessarily
1.See MM Feeley "The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A
Critique and Notes on an Expanded View" (1976) 10 Law and
Society Review 497. --- ---
2. AS Blumberg "The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game:
Organizational Co-optation of a Profession" (1967) 1 Law and
Society Review 15.
3. Pat Carlen Magistrates' Justice (1976).
4. AE Bottoms & JD McLean Defendents in the Criminal-- ---Process (1976).
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at odds with legal rules. 1 She distinguishes between the
ideology or rhetoric of justice and the actual content of
legal rules. The ideology of justice, as embodied in "law in
the books", proclaims all the accused's rights while a
closer analysis of the fine print of legal rules reveals the
incomplete and ineffectual incorporation of those rights.
2
The reason for non-adherence in court practice to the
ideology or principles of a fair trial is thus to be sought
in the legal structure itself. Contrary to the perception
that "law in the books is quite different from the law in
practice",3 the latter is but a product of the formal
legal rules. According to McConville and Baldwin
"It is misleading to suggest that the sort of
injustices that arise within the English system can be
attributed to say, a handful of corrupt police
officers, or to incompetent lawyers, or even lazy or
foolish judges. No doubt such individuals exist and may
in isolation cause appalling injustice. But most
miscarriages of justice which occur within our system
cannot be explained in these terms. What we see as of
greater importance is the formal structure of legal
rules and procedures which allow and even facilitate
the erosion or violation of the rights of
defendants". [17]
They thus draw a distinction between 'aberrational' and
1. Doreen J McBarnet "Pre-trial Procedures and the
Construction of Conviction" in Pat Carlen (ed) The Sociology
of Law (1976) 172; "Magistrates' Courts and the Ideology of
Just~ce~ (1981) 8 British ~ of Law and Society 181;
Convlctlon: Law, the State and the Construction of
Justice (1981). --- --- --- --
2.Conviction 5. See also RV Ericson & PM Baranek The
Ordering of Justice: ~ Study of Accused Persons as--
Dependants in the Criminal Process (1982) 219. --
3. See eg M Zander "Promoting Change in the Legal System"
(1979) 42 Modern LR 489 497.
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'systemic' injustice. 1 The former represents incorrect
outcomes in a sound system - a system designed to avoid such
mistakes. The latter "results not from human error but from
fundamental structural weaknesses within the system
itself".2
It is important, therefore, not to overemphasize the conduct
of the administrators of justice. If, as McConville and
Baldwin argue, "the rights of individuals are at many points
uncertain and ambiguous, responsibilities of those in the
prosecution process are ill-defined, and the adversary model
produces numerous conflicts and contradictions", then court
practice cannot be consistent with or resemble the ideology
f ' t' 3o JUs l.ce.
From the empirical study outlined in this work, it is evident
that the lower criminal courts routinely produced unjust
practices and outcomes. It was also clear that this was a
result of the legal structure's failure to guard adequately
against the undesirable consequences flowing from an undefended
accused's inability to be a competent adversary in highly
professionalized adversarial proceedings.
1. A distinction made by K Kipnis "Criminal Justice and
the Negotiated Plea" in K Kipnis (ed) Philosophical Issues
in Law (1978) 304, McConville & Baldwin 17.
2. McConville & Baldwin 17. \
3. 18. See also AB smith & AS Blumberg "The Problem of
Objectivity in Judicial Decisionmaking" in JA Robertson
Rough Ju~tice: Perspectives on Lower Criminal Courts (1974)
108 117 l.n respect of sentencing.
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4.1. THE FAILURE OF THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED AS A COMPETENT
ADVERSARY
The undefended accused failed to fulfil his role as an
effective adversary to the prosecutor. He lacked the legal
knowledge, skill, and experience necessary to make
considered legal decisions, to test the State evidence, to
challenge the prosecutor's actions and to present an
adequate defence case. These incapacities were not easily
remedied by the court's attempts to "educate" the accused in
the ways of the law. simply informing an accused of his
rights did not render him capable of asserting or exercising
them; the fundamental difficulties inherent in attempting to
equip a layman to participate in a professionalized process
remained. For one, the legal concepts to be conveyed to the
accused had been designed for use by lawyers and not by "the
legally naive".l It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
express in simple terms the import of such a concept without
losing its essence. The most valuable method of explanation
- by example - was assiduously avoided.
Where an explanation was given, it might be difficult to
ascertain whether the accused was able to comprehend it. 2
The danger of "court deafness" was ever present; an
accused, fearful of the unfamiliar and formalistic
proceedings, might be too scared or nervous to concentrate,
and when asked by the magistrate whether he understood an
1. V Aubert "Researches in the Sociology of Law" 7 American
Behavioral Scientist 16 as quoted by Mi l e s k i ~ cit 484.
2. See Mileski ~ cit 483-4.
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explanation, would respond in the affirmative.
1
The accused
might also be reluctant to admit his incomprehension lest he
should appear stupid, or even worse, difficult.
2 Unless the
court was prepared to investigate thoroughly the accused's
capacity to understand explanations given and to use this
knowledge in conducting an adequate defence, the trial would
press on without the accused's full participation. Whatever
might be done then, by the court, to make of the undefended
accused a capable adversary, there was little chance that
this "one shot player,,3 could be satisfactorily equipped to
ensure that he could invoke and benefit from the principles
of a fair trial.
Achievement of a fair trial thus depended upon the conduct
of the other "seasoned players" in the proceedings, the
jUdicial officer and the prosecutor.
4.2. ASSISTANCE BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER AND THE PROSECUTOR
The jUdicial officer dutifully attempted to facilitate the
undefended accused's participation by informing him of the
right to silence after a plea of guilty, the right to cross-
examine State witnesses, the various avenues open to present
the defence case, the right to address the court on the
merits and the right to advance mitigating circumstances. He
also, on occasion, assisted the accused in his cross-
1. Carlen 2E cit 84.
2. Carlen Q2 cit 108. See also Ericson & Baranek Q2 cit
186.
3. Cf Ericson & Baranek 2E cit 221 .
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examination and in getting defence witnesses to court. No
attempt was made to compel the prosecutor to give a full
disclosure of the factual allegation in the charge.
Inadmissible hearsay evidence was excluded but the court did
not stringently enforce the rule against leading questions.
The most effective assistance was rendered when the court
participated inquisitorially in the proceedings. On the
whole the court attempted to establish the correctness of a
plea of guilty and if there was any doubt as to an accused's
guilt, the plea was scrupulously changed to one of not
guilty. It routinely fulfilled its inquisitorial function of
establishing the accused's personal circumstances before
imposing a sentence. On occasions, it rendered valuable
assistance by conducting enquiries as to the granting of
remands or bail. Where the prosecutor disclosed an
inconsistent statement of a state witness, the court
examined the witness incisively. In a few cases the court
also raised the issue of the accused's discharge at the end
of the state case.
The extent of the prosecutors' compliance with their
impartial duty as "ministers of the truth" was by the very
nature of the duty indeterminable. In a few instances where
the state witnesses' evidence was palpably unreliable, they
would reveal this. Likewise, where there was no case against
the accused, the prosecutors did not hesitate to abandon the
state case. The general impression, however, was that the
prosecutors performed their task in t h e combative spirit of
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the adversary system; they presented the case for the state
and attacked the defence as true adversaries of the
undefended accused.
A fair trial was not routinely accomplished by the
assistance these "seasoned players" provided. Firstly, legal
rules did not oblige them to pursue actively all the
principles of a fair trial and secondly, even where clear
rules did exist, duties were invariably discretionary and
were consequently not carried out in accordance with the
principles of a fair trial.
4.2.1. THE FAILURE TO PURSUE ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF A FAIR
TRIAL
The conduct of the jUdicial officers consistently reflected
the procedural rules as enacted by statute and developed and
interpreted by the Supreme Court. They were conscientious in
applying clearly defined rules of general application to
which definite sanctions were attached for non-adherence.
The converse was equally true; judicial officers did not
voluntarily render assistance where the Supreme Court ruled
specifically that they were not obliged either to disclose
certain rights, control the prosecutor's discretion, or
conduct enquiries. The same occurred where case law was
silent on a matter. Furthermore, where a legal duty was
unclear, ambiguous or the sanction for non-adherence
uncertain, compliance did not follow either. For a decided
case to be followed in practice, it had to possess those
qualities which characterize law; it had to be of gene al
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application, certain and precise, with an identifiable and
definite sanction which followed on its breach. Case law,
however, often fails to satisfy these criteria since it does
1
not always operate on a level of general rules.
By its very nature case law comprises of conflicting
decisions, obiter dicta, rules couched in vague terms, and
rules dependent on the circumstances of the case. since the
majority of the rule-making decisions relevant to the trial
of undefended accused are made in automatic review
proceedings at provincial division level, there arise
conflicting decisions in the various divisions, which cannot
give authoritative guidance for all the lower courts. The
result is that where jUdicial conflict or confusion exists,
a magistrate is free either to adopt the decision to his
liking, or to decide not to follow any. Furthermore, rules
are often couched in situational terms with their
application depending on the circumstances of a particular
case. The question whether the circumstances are met lies
within the discretion of the jUdicial officer and anything
less than a clear and unequivocal existence of the
circumstances may result in non-application of a rule.
The inadequate incorporation of the principles of a fair
trial into clear legal duties was seen to have a pervasive
effect on court practice. Uninformed of the right to legal
representation and the possibility of legal aid, the vast
1. See McBarnet 163.
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majority of accused remained undefended and ill-equipped for
the adversary proceedings. The presumption of innocence was
frequently ignored: the bail decisionmaking was unstructured
and erratic and unwarranted incarceration of the undefended
accused was common; the accused, uninformed that his
explanation of his plea of not guilty could only be used as
evidence against him, made extensive prejudicial statements;
and the court, not obliged to discharge the accused at the
end of the state case when there was no evidence against
him, or to close the defence case when there was no prima
facie case to meet, put some accused unnecessarily on their
defence. The truth was not always satisfactorily established
for the settlement of factual disputes: the accused's
incompetence as a cross-examiner was not routinely
compensated for by the court's examination of state
witnesses; the accused's difficulties in presenting a
coherent defence were exacerbated by his ignorance regarding
the sUbpoenaing of witnesses. Excessive punishment might
have been imposed with the invocation of suspended sentences
because the court did not conduct an enquiry prior to their
implementation. The accused was not routinely granted a full
opportunity to participate in every decision: he was not
given notification when bailor remand decisions were being
made; he did not receive specification of the charges he had
to meet; he was not given the opportunity to prepare for
pleading or trial; and he was not informed about the purpose
of an address on the merits or mitigation of sentence. The
court's impartiality was not always manifest: not obliged to
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assume an active role where the accused was unable to cope
with the adversary process, the court in effect showed
partiality towards the prosecution by allowing the latter to
take unfair advantage of the accused's incompetence. Save
for the few cases automatically reviewed, proceedings were
well-insulated against superior court scrutiny as the
accused was not informed of the post-conviction remedies,
which in any case remained inaccessible because of the
expense and professionalism required to utilize them.
4.2.2. DISCRETION AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF A
FAIR TRIAL
To a large extent the court's treatment of the undefended
accused lies within its own discretion. Where no clear legal
rules demand protective steps in a particUlar situation, the
court alone may decide whether any assistance at all will be
rendered to the accused. Where the Court has imposed duties
of assistance upon the jUdicial officer, that assistance is
invariably not clearly defined and the quality and extent of
the assistance will be determined according to the court's
discretion. Explanations of rights, for instance, are
usually conducted without reference to any standards of
comprehensiveness. Also undefined are the strictness of the
court's control over the prosecutor's conduct, the exercise
of its power to question and call witnesses, and the
thoroughness with which obligatory enquiries are conducted.
In exercising their discretion, jUdicial officers may act in
the accused's favour by pursuing all the principles of a
Chapter 11 Page 511
fair trial. On the other hand, it is totally permissible to
ignore all the principles not legally enforceable or to
fulfil those duties laid down with the minimum of
thoroughness.
The exercise of any discretion inevitably leads to variances
among jUdicial officers. The most notable differences
between the regional courts, presided over by more senior
and experienced jUdicial officers, and the magistrates'
courts, were the former's meticulousness in conducting the
mandatory explanation of rights and their more incisive
questioning after a plea of guilty. Yet despite these
disparities, the conduct in these different courts was on
the whole similar. Although they faced more severe charges
and penalties, the accused in the regional court did not
receive more types of assistance than those in the
magistrates' court. The regional magistrates did not more
frequently disclose rights where it was not compulsory to do
so and did not act inquisitorially more often to establish a
better factual base for their jUdgments. Although they had
more time at hand, they were not markedly more active in
pursuing the principles of a fair trial. Operating within
the same legal framework the magistrates' and regional court
practice remained the same, the latter exhibiting only
greater diligence in the formal application of enforceable
. legal rules.
A few magistrates went beyond the call of duty in attempting
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to ensure that all the principles of a fair trial were
observed. One magistrate routinely informed the accused of
his right to legal representation and the right to be
prepared for pleadings and trial, and conducted enquiries
during the bail and remand proceedings. This was, however,
the exception rather than the rule. Discretion was more
frequently exercised in favour of the prosecution: the
court's conduct after a plea of guilty, in disclosing the
right to remain silent and in questioning the accused,
operated predominantly in favour of the state; when the
court put questions to state witnesses, these were more
often designed to assist the prosecution in establishing a
prima facie case than to test the reliability of the
evidence. In the same way the co~rt was more likely to
examine the accused incisively than to assist him in the
presentation of the defence case. At times racial prejudice
also appeared to be influential: in the granting of bail
some jUdicial officers were motivated by racial
considerations and this prejudice was again encountered in
the lack of assistance rendered to Black accused.
The failure of jUdicial officers to pursue the principles of
a fair trial in the exercise of their discretion, cannot be
attributed principally to the particular individuals
occupying those positions. Neither the legal rules which
guide their actions nor the wider legal structure in which
the court system functions, encourage the pursuit of equal
and impartial justice. The Supreme Court, because of its
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ambivalent attitude towards the principles of a fair trial
and its failure to pursue the goal of equal justice, did not
provide authoritive guidance for the lower courts. The
prosecutorial background of most judicial officers and their
position as civil servants are circumstances likely to
result in a pro-prosecution bias. Moreover, a legal system
which sanctions and enforces racial discrimination, is very
likely to influence the attitude and conduct of judicial
officers who are often called upon to apply the very laws
sustaining apartheid.
In this atmosphere where the judicial officer was often
neither compelled nor encouraged to pursue all the
principles of a fair trial, the interpreter adopted the
court's approach and was less than professional in the
performance of his task.
4.3. THE INTERPRETER: TRANSLATING COURT PRACTICE
The formal role of the interpreter is unambiguous - to
facilitate communication where one party is not conversant
in the court language. He delivers an expert service and
assumes a neutral position in the contest between the
parties. In the words of Channon,
"A good court interpreter must have the ability to
translate faithfully without adding to the questions
asked or the answers given. He must be completely
impartial and take no personal interest in the outcome
of the casr and remain unaffected by anything he sees
or hears".
The interpreters' court conduct, however, did not uniformly
I.ON Channon The Role of the Court Interpreter (1982) 23.
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correspond to this role description. Some interpreters
exhibited partiality in favour of the prosecution and in
many instances their interpretation was incomplete or
inadequate.
The very nature of the interpreter's function as sole
communication link between the accused and the court, allows
him a measure of independence from the control of the court
personnel, who are usually not conversant in the African
language used in court. Yet, despite the fact that the
accuracy of the translation may be beyond the court's
control, the judicial officer can ensure that the
interpreter translates all communications. Little attempt
was made, however, to enforce even this basic prerequisite
of the interpreters' task. The jUdicial officers' failure to
ensure adequate translation was primarily a function of
their own attitude towards the relevant proceedings, which
in turn was a product of the relevant legal rules or absence
thereof. Where the court, for example, was not obliged to
bring the accused into the bailor remand decisionmaking
processes, it did not insist upon translation of the
prosecutor's request for remands or objections to bailor
even the accused's own comments or requests in this regard.
There was also little control over the quality of what was
in fact translated. The administrative control by the
Department of Justice over the quality of interpretation is
extremely limited. After an interpreter has successfully
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completed a course in interpretation, he is examined only
once every 12 to 15 months by a chief court interpreter who
spends one day 'h' t 1 No steps have been taken to1n 1S cour .
establish in the courtroom a system by which the accuracy of
the translation may be controlled. For the purposes of the
court record, only the words spoken in English or Afrikaans
are tape-recorded, while the Zulu spoken by the accused and
the interpreter is omitted. Any form of ex post facto
control as to the correctness of translation is thus
impossible. Such a total lack of control unnecessarily
creates the opportunity for possible abuse of interpreters'
sphere of autonomy. The immunity against direct and routine
monitoring opens the way for the inadequate or even corrupt
execution of the interpreting function. The latter risk is
particularly great where there is a possibility of bias in
the interpreter.
Although the interpreter is required to perform his role
impartially, his position in the court structure does not
promote this. His role as an independent and impartial
expert is compromised by his position as a member of the
team of court officials, including the prosecutor and the
court orderly, whose daily task is the processing and
I disposal of the cases on the court roll. Before the court
proceedings in this study commenced, the interpreter entered
in the court book the cases for the day, interviewed state
witnesses for the prosecutor and in some instances
1. Report of Department of Justice! July 1983-30 June 1984
18.
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ascertained the pl~as of the accused. When the court was in
session, he called the accused and the witnesses, and
managed the movement of the accused in and out of the dock.
Where he was allocated to a specific court for a lengthy
period of time, he soon developed a good working
relationship with the prosecutor. Thus the interpreter did
not, as his function demands, stand apart from the
prosecution; instead, as part of the state machinery, he
became susceptible to its ideology.
As a member of the state bureaucracy, furthermore, he
assumed a specific position in the court hierarchy and, in
accordance with his qualifications and task, was ranked
below the jUdicial officer and the prosecutor. His
subservient position as a 'ranked' court official was
obvious in the way he related to the other court
participants. with the exception of one old and respected
interpreter, none dared to interrupt the court's speech with
a request for a pause to enable interpretation of all that
was said. Similar behaviour was apparent in relation to the
prosecutor. Interpreters did not stop Afrikaans or English-
speaking witnesses from responding immediately to
prosecutors' questions or those put by the court and
confined their translation to the answers given. On the
other hand, the interpreters asserted their position of
power and authority over Black witnesses and accused, not
hesitating to stop them in mid-sentence. At times they
expressed their authority even in physical terms by forcibly
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pushing obstinate accused out of the dock and down the
stairs leading to the cells below.
The interpreter's position as a cog in the court machinery,
and his subservient role in it, facilitated his
internalization of the values and attitudes of his court
superiors. This inevitably compromised his impartiality and
the resultant bias was evident in what he chose to translate
and the manner in which he did it. The undefended accused,
confronted with a foreign language, was not given the
benefit of unambiguous facilitation of communication, but
instead had to confront one more obstacle in a system
weighted against the achievement of a fair trial. In
performing their task the interpreters not only interpreted
the language of the court but also translated into practice
the court's ambivalent attitude towards the undefended
accused and the principles of a fair trial.
5. CONCLUSION
The quality of justice attained in a trial is a function of
the rights, duties, efforts and abilities of the accused,
the prosecutor, the interpreter and the jUdicial officer to
pursue the principles of a fair trial. In the adversary
trial, the prosecutor's role, although ambiguously defined,
is unambiguous in its execution; fighting for the conviction
of the accused and abandoning a case only where the
innocence is patent. An equitable result is unlikely to be
attained where his adversary, the accused, is crippled by
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indigence, ignorance and incompetence. In the absence of a
definite and comprehensive inquisitorial role for the
jUdicial officer to rectify the imbalance by pursuing all
the principles of a fair trial, there are few obstacles in
the way of the prosecution's dominance of the process and
equal justice for all accused remains unrealizable. The
injustices that occur in court practice are clearly not due
primarily to the failings of a few magistrates, prosecutors
or interpreters. The injustice is 'systemic'; it is the
product of the many facets of the South African legal system
which bear on the trial of the undefended accused.
CHAPTER TWELVE THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE
The principle of equal justice has been referred to in two
very different political documents in recent South African
history. In the South African constitution of 1983 the
principle of equality before the law was included in the
preamble as one of the "national aims". On the other side of
the pol~tical spectrum, the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955
by the Congress of the People, and forming the basis of the
African National Congress' political manifesto, proclaims
that "all shall be equal before the law" and "all shall
enjoy equal human rights". Equal justice is and will remain
a central issue in the political debate and constitutional
development of South Africa, and the pursuit of this ideal
in criminal justice will be of considerable importance.
Yet equal procedural justice can at best be attained only in
limited degree if the wider legal order is unjust and
discriminatory.1 As Bottomley remarks,
"To the extent that equal justice is correlated with
equality of status, influence and economic power, the
construction of a just system of criminal justice in an
unjust society is a contradiction in terms. criminal
justice is inextricably interwoven with 2nd largely
derivative from broader social justice".
This should not, however, mean suspending the pursuit of
procedural equality until the time when a more egalitarian
society is achieved in South Africa. While a just system of
procedure cannot change the unjust rules of substantive
1. LW Potts "Criminal Liability, Public Policy, and the
Principle of Legality in the Republic of South Africa" (1982)
73 Jo~r~al of C~iminal La w and Criminology 1061 1107.
2. Crlmlnology In Focus (1979) 112.
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criminal law, let alone the conditions of an unjust society,
social justice in a wider context cannot be pursued without
a simultaneous pursuit of procedural justice. At a
time when social and economic inequality cannot be excluded
from the courtroom, their intrusion should at least be
contained and minimized by a fair system of procedure.
1. THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE:
THE POSSIBILITIES
In jurisdictions where legal representation is regarded as a
fundamental right, the yardstick of procedural justice will
be the quality of justice secured by legal practitioners
whose business it is to protect and advance their clients'
interests as fully as possible. In such a professional-
orientated system, as in South Africa, the enforcement of
the principles of a fair trial is predicated upon
professional assistance. In such circumstances, procedural
justice for all accused can be realized fully only by making
competent legal representation accessible to all indigent
accused, and this should be the primary objective of the
South African criminal justice system. Legal aid for
indigent accused should thus be extended as expeditiously as
finances and manpower resources allow. such a programme
should begin with the phasing in of the right to counsel for
those most in need thereof, namely the accused in the
regional courts. Serious consideration should in the
meanwhile be given to the more efficient utilization of the
presently available financial and manpower resources
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through, for example, the introduction of a system of public
defenders and representation by senior law students. Since,
however, there is no possibility that legal aid will be
provided to the majority of the indigent accused faced with
serious charges in the foreseeable future, the principle of
equal justice should also be pursued through alternative
strategies.
Where the adversary system fails by its very nature to
secure the equal application of the principles of a fair
trial for undefended accused, indeed, when it facilitates
the perpetration of injustices, deviation from this mode of
procedure becomes essential. 1 Where an undefended accused
cannot enforce the principles of a fair trial by his own
efforts, they can be achieved only by the intervention of an
activist jUdicial officer. 2 This would mean that the
jUdicial officer's role could no longer be a passive one,
requiring him to make decisions only when called upon.
Instead, he should pursue assertively all the principles of
a fair trial. In order that such an active jUdicial role
could be achieved and maintained and that it could
consistently achieve justice for undefended accused, it is
important that it should be located firmly within the
context of a bureaucratic system of justice.
1. See Weinreb Denial of Justice (1977) 143.
2. R Seidman "The Legal Process in Africa" in WB Harvey
(ed) An Introduction to the Legal System in East Africa
(1975) 158; WL Church liThe Power to Call witness" (1971 &




At the core of a bureaucratic system of justice is the ideal
of equal application of the principles of a fair trial to
all cases according to firmly established rules. Reiss sums
up the purpose of bureaucratic justice as follows:
"Bureaucratization of the administration of justice
should guarantee the distributive property of justice
since the property of bureaucracy is the univirsal
application of standards according to rules".
Essential to the achievement of the purpose is control over
the officials of the system; some means of ensuring that the
rules of conduct are adhered to. The system is thus to be
tightly constructed with "rational organization,
hierarchical control, common purpose and central
administration".2 This means that the decisions and
impartiality of officials will be overseen by a higher
authority.
What should be pursued in the South African system of
criminal justice, it is sUbmitted, is an activist jUdicial
officer, responsible for implementing the principles of a
fair trial (which would be concretized in clear legal rules)
in an impartial manner, with his decisionmaking supervised
by a superior court.
2.1. AN ACTIVIST JUDICIAL OFFICER
The South African Supreme Court has over the years developed
1. AJ Reiss "citizen Access to Criminal Justice" (1974) 1
British Journal of Law and Society 50 70.
2. Feeley Court Reform on Trial 17-18.
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a more activist role for the judicial officer when dealing
with undefended accused, demanding the execution of numerous
duties. It is submitted that these duties should be expanded
to include the enforcement of all the principles of a fair
trial.
To ensure that the accused's participation is informed,
prepared and jUdicious, the court should be obliged to
apprise him of the various rights available to him,
including those not directly related to the production of
evidence. Merely mentioning the existence of rights,
however, does not ensure the accused's jUdicious
participation. It is essential to explain the meaning of
such rights and to disclose the important considerations
relevant to their exercise. Supplementary to the court's
advisory duty should be an obligation to assist the accused
in the exercise of those rights. As the accused does not
have the necessary experience or insight to exercise his
rights to his best advantage, the court should be obliged to
assist in their effective and prudent use. There are, of
course, instances where even assistance will not suffice to
protect the accused. This is where the accused is totally
lacking in the ability to make use of information and
assistance to conduct his own defence. In such cases, it is
sUbmitted, the court should be obliged to intervene actively
and participate on the accused's behalf. An example would be
closing the accused's case for him where there is no
State case to be met. The court's duty to counter the
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improper exercise of the prosecutorial powers should be
extended to the scrutiny of the prosecutor's decision
regarding bail and remands. Finally, where the court is not
. provided with a sufficient factual basis for a decision,
whether administrative or jUdicial, it should establish this
inquisitorially. This duty should extend to the
determination of bail, the forfeiture of bail money and the
invocation of suspended sentences. In the settlement of
factual disputes where the accused cannot test the
reliability of the state witnesses' evidence, it should be
incumbent on the court to examine such evidence.
The standard mode of thinking has been that in adversary
proceedings jUdicial impartiality is ensured by ascribing a
passive role to the jUdicial officer. with two equally
matched opponents the need for his participation does not
arise and any intervention by the court would be bound to be
viewed as a display of partiality. However, in a contest
where the undefended accused is patently unequal to the
prosecution in ability and resources, a jUdicial officer, by
remaining passive and allowing the prosecution to take
unfair advantage of the accused's inability, sides most
decidedly with the prosecution. The principle of
impartiality demands that the court's conduct should not
favour either of the contestants. Where one of the parties
is manifestly not capable of matching his opponent's ability
the court's duty of impartiality calls for its active
participation in the proceedings.
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2.2. CLEAR AND BINDING RULES
The empirical study confirmed that while clear and
unambiguous rules were routinely observed by the courts,
ill-defined rules were ignored, particularly where the
possible sanction for their non-observance was less than
certain. A prerequisite for the universal application of the
principles of a fair trial, therefore, is that the legal rules
must not only embody those principles, but that they must be
formulated with precision and clarity, with well-defined and
efficacious sanctions for their non-observance.
2.3. AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIAL OFFICER
Even where the pursuit of the principles of a fair trial is
made obligatory, the full realization of those principles in
practice will to a large extent remain dependent on the
proper exercise of the court's discretion. The discretionary
component in the administration of justice allows numerous
factors to be influential, irrespective of whether they are
relevant or acceptable. The quality of justice would still
be a function of the tenor of the court's conduct. In
mediating between the demands of the various interest
groups, be it as between the State and the accused or as
between various classes of accused persons, the ideal of an
impartial jUdicial officer acquires added importance where
he assumes an activist role in a bureaucratic system of
justice. The advantages of an activist jUdicial officer will
remain unrealized if he does not hav e a commitment to t he
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principles of a fair trial. since the quality of the
assistance rendered to the accused, the extent of the
control exercised over the prosecution, and the
comprehensiveness of the factual base established for
decisions, are in the final analysis discretionary, a
prosecution-minded judicial officer may defeat the
objectives of these duties. Similarly, discriminatory
practices against accused on racial grounds may also
subvert the principle of equal justice. All possible methods
of promoting impartiality among jUdicial officers should
therefore be employed. Attention should be paid to the
mode of appointment of jUdicial officers, the granting of
jUdicial independence, appropriate training, and the
strict supervision of proceedings.
The danger that jUdicial officers, appointed solely from the
ranks of the prosecutors, may be prone to be biased in
favour of the prosecution, has often been articulated. 1
Moreover, the status of magistrates as civil servants
compromises their jUdicial independence as they are
susceptible to undue influence from the state. 2 The
appointment of jUdicial officers predominantly from the
white community also stands in the way of an image of
the court's impartiality. It is therefore important for the
creation of an impartial lower court bench that magistrates
be appointed from the ranks of legal practitioners
1. See above the Lansdown Report par 352; Hoexter Report
part IV 5.1.3.
2. Hoexter Report part IV par 1.4.24.
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other than prosecutors. The establishment of jUdicial
independence through the granting of tenure,l akin to the
position of judges, is another important method by which
jUdicial independence is fostered and the possibility of
undue influence minimized. The incorporation of the pUblic
in the court's decisionmaking processes through the
appointment of assessors, will further enhance the court's
independence, and hence impartiality.
since a new activist approach to the conduct of proceedings
is called for, the training of jUdicial officers in this
regard is peremptory. Although the suggested approach is not
novel but merely an extension of the jUdicial officers'
present duties in respect of the undefended accused, the
correct attitude towards the accused and the proceedings
needs to be inculcated. What is required is the training of
jUdicial officers as liberal bureaucrats;2 liberal in
pursuing the principles of a fair trial, and bureaucratic in
applying those principles uniformly to all accused.
2.4. SUPERVISING LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS
Central to bureaucratic justice is a hierarchical system of
supervision to ensure the universal application of standards
according to rules. The supervision of the lower court
proceedings occurs routinely and at the instance of the
supervising body. In South Africa the institution of
automatic review by the Supreme Court of certain proceedings
1. See Hoexter Report part 11 par 3.2.
2. Cf Bottoms & McClean ~ cit 220.
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in the magistrates' court embraces this principle. The
Court's proper review function should then be to ensure that
the undefended accused is tried according to all the
principles of a fair trial. The need for such supervision is
particularly acute where the judicial officer plays an
activist role in the proceedings, because in the execution
of inquisitorial powers, any pro-prosecution bias that a
judicial officer may harbour, will be exacerbated. Through
the review of randomly selected cases, the Supreme Court
will provide guidance for the correct approach to the new
inquisitorial duties, and the beneficial effect of this
supervision will permeate to the proceedings of all the
lower courts.
3. REFORMING COURT PROCEDURE
The injustice suffered by the undefended accused in the
lower courts is largely attributable to the failure of the
legislature to acknowledge the need for special protection
of those who cannot enforce the principles of a fair trial
for themselves and the Supreme Court's "r e l u c t a n c e to seek
the enforcement of all the principles of a fair trial. Any
change for the more equitable prosecution of undefended
accused will have to be brought about by these two law-
creating bodies.
In the development of the law in this regard, the
legislature has on the whole played a minor role.
There has been little specific recognition of the plight of
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the undefended accused and the equal application of the
principles of a fair trial has not often featured in the
parliamentary agenda. In the administration of civil
justice, the Small Claims Court Act of 1984 was the first
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the existing machinery
of justice, and provided the "small man" with access to
justice without requiring the services of a legal
practitioner. Concern for the undefended accused could also
lead to innovative measures along similar lines in the
administration of criminal justice.
The Supreme Court has developed a considerable body of law
relating to the undefended accused and will no doubt, within
the present statutory framework, further develop the duties
for an activist judicial officer. The creation of duties has
been hampered, however, by the Court's reluctance to enforce
the principle of equal justice. The enforcement of all the
principles of a fair trial can only be realized if the Court
would adopt a more social utilitarian approach to its
supervising function. By accepting the principle of equal
justice as fundamental to a fair trial, the Court should not
hesitate to set convictions aside, despite the apparent
guilt of the accused, where an undefended accused has not
been tried according to all the principles of a fair trial.
On examination of the criminal procedure and court practice
at the beginning of the previous century the Colebrook and
Brigge Commission argued forcefully that justice would only
be done through the pursuit of the principle of equal and
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impartial justice. Subsequent legislative and jUdicial
developments failed, however, to realize this ideal with
respect to the undefended accused. The principle of equal
and impartial justice remains valid today and only through
the full incorporation of this principle in legislation and
case law, will the administration of criminal justice in the
lower courts cease to be routinely characterized by
"systemic" injustice.
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